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Rousseau’s Discours sur les sciences et les arts predicts the rise of the public intellectual, and 
along with him, intellectual trends and scientism. It is therefore a treasure to anyone who has 
wondered about the cults of “authenticity” and “openness,” or slogans like “believe science.” To 
be more precise, his goal in the Discours is to expose the philosophes of the Enlightenment as 
hypocrites who laud the advancement of the sciences only to “distinguish” themselves and win 
power. In this way, the Discours parallels the City of God, where St. Augustine argues that self-
love [amor sui] leads to the will to power [libido dominandi]. Rousseau’s Discours is unique 
however, since he considers the philosophes to be unconscious hypocrites. That is, he does not 
believe that they treat philosophy and science as “fashions” in order to directly acquire power, 
but rather because they are over-socialized. In this thesis, I will argue that Rousseau develops a 
unique method in the Discours for exposing the over-socialized hypocrite: unmasking. Although 
previous authors such as Molière, La Bruyère and Montaigne often invoked the rhetoric of the 
mask, I will show that Rousseau is the first to transform this rhetorical device into a method of 
social theory proper. Ultimately, when Claude Lévi-Strauss argues that Rousseau is the “founder 
of the sciences of man,” it is this method that he is describing. Of course, Rousseau could not 
have intended for this method, which sought to expose how institutions socialize people, to itself 
be institutionalized within the academies. 




Résumé :  
Le Discours sur les sciences et les arts de Rousseau prévoit l’émergence de personnalités 
intellectuelles publiques et, par conséquent, des modes intellectuelles et du scientisme. Cet 
ouvrage est donc un plaisir pour ceux qui ont déjà cogité sur les cultes de l’authenticité et de 
l’« openness », et sur des slogans tels que « croyez la science ! ». Plus précisément, Rousseau 
s’engage dans le Discours à dénoncer les philosophes des Lumières comme des hypocrites qui ne 
louent le progrès des sciences que pour « se distinguer » et gagner du pouvoir. Le Discours 
ressemble ainsi à La Cité de Dieu, où saint Augustin soutient que l’amour de soi-même [amor sui] 
donne lieu à la volonté de puissance [libido dominandi]. Le Discours est cependant original, 
puisqu’il considère les philosophes comme des hypocrites involontaires. Autrement dit, il ne 
pense pas qu’ils traitent de la philosophie et de la science comme des « modes » pour 
volontairement obtenir du pouvoir, mais plutôt car ils sont hyper-socialisés. Dans cette thèse, on 
se propose de démontrer comment Rousseau élabore une méthode unique dans le Discours afin 
de dévoiler l’hypocrite hyper-socialisé : le démasquage. Bien que d’autres penseurs tels que 
Molière, La Bruyère et Montaigne emploient souvent la rhétorique du masque, on soutient que 
Rousseau est le premier à transformer cette figure de style en une méthode de la théorie sociale 
à proprement dit. Lorsque Claude Lévi-Strauss fait valoir que Rousseau est le « fondateur des 
sciences de l’homme », il semblerait en fin de compte qu’il décrive cette méthode. Pourtant, 
Rousseau n’aurait pas pu prévoir que le démasquage, qui cherche à exposer comment les 
institutions socialisent des hommes, soit institutionalisé lui-même dans les universités.  




The Discours can be viewed as a belated contribution to the Querelle des Anciens et des 
Modernes, insofar as it equates the notion of Enlightenment progress with the moral decline of 
Europe. Whether one has regard to the ancient Greek conception of the golden age, typified by 
Plato’s Atlantis, or the Christian account of man’s fall from grace, the ancients tended to regard 
history as a process of decline. This became a question of debate when Renaissance humanists 
like Bacon, inspired by recent achievements in natural philosophy, began to reinterpret biblical 
passages such as Daniel’s “multiplex erit scientia” (12:4).1 Instead of affirming the multiplication 
of “opinions” in the end times, Bacon interpreted “scientia” as “knowledge.” And while Bacon 
largely views progress in technological terms, this did not stop him from conceiving of an ideal 
monarchy organized around the pursuit of science in his New Atlantis. By the time the Querelle 
was resolved, prominent thinkers like Fontenelle, the perpetual secretary of the Académie des 
Sciences, were advancing a dual vision of moral and technological progress. Rousseau, it is well 
known, rejects this vision in the second Discours sur l’inégalité. But it is in the first Discours, the 
famous Fabrician prosopopoeia as it were, that he reveals his sources. Although commentators 
such as François Bouchardy and Ernst Cassirer have dismissed this Discours as a mere rhetorical 
display,2 I believe that the ancient authors that Rousseau mobilizes here provide the basis of his 
view of history. Rousseau is not a metaphysical thinker. Hence, we will not attempt to disprove 
the essential claim of the moderns: that nature does not degenerate, but is instead stable, and 
 
1 Francis Bacon, Confession of Faith in The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. 7, ed. James Spedding, Robert L. Ellis, Douglas 
D. Heath (Longman, Green and Co., 1859), p. 211. 
2 See, for instance, Ernst Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, trans. Peter Gay (New Have: Yale 
University Press, 1954), p. 48, where he refers to the Discours as a “mere rhetorical display piece.” 
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can therefore be built upon. Rather, he rejects this account of history for moral reasons, such as 
those that one finds in Polybius, Seneca and Tacitus to name a few of his sources.   
 In his Letters, Seneca states that our ills multiply in proportion to the “doctrines” [docti] 
that we invent.3 In Germania, Tacitus praises the superior virtue of the German barbarians, who 
unlike the Romans, never dismiss vice as merely being “fashionable” or the “spirit of the age” 
[indoles et mores saeculi] (i.e., fashionable).4 And in his Histories, Polybius recounts the “cycle of 
political revolution” [ἀνακύκλωσις], arguing that necessity and “sociability” compel men to form 
states, while “the thirst for reputation” and luxury cause their decline.5 These thinkers have a 
different notion of the golden age than their classical predecessors, one characterized by 
simplicity rather than wisdom. It is this notion of history that one encounters not only in Vico, 
Montesquieu and Fénelon, but also Rousseau’s Premier discours: "On ne peut réfléchir sur les 
mœurs, qu'on ne se plaise à se rappeler l'image de la simplicité [the image of simplicity] des 
premiers temps. C'est un beau rivage, paré des seules mains de la nature, vers lequel on tourne 
incessamment les yeux, et dont on se sent éloigner à regret."6 Rousseau’s interest in this reading 
of history is somewhat paradoxical, given that his conception of virtue in terms of hypocrisy and 
sincerity is markedly Christian. That is, he seems to think that the pagan golden age is the one in 
which Christian virtues reign. 
 
3 See Seneca, Epistolae Morales, in Omnia Opera: L. A. Senecae, Philosophica, Declamatoria et Tragica (Paris: M. 
Ehrmann, 1829), p. 146. 
4 Tacitus, Germania, in Germania and Agricola, trans. by William D. Tyler, (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 
1876), p. 109. 
5 See Polybius, The Histories, vol. 3, trans. W. R. Paton (London: Heinemann, 1923), p. 289. 
6 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur les sciences et les arts. In Œuvres complètes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, vol 3., 
ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1964) p. 20. Hereafter cited as Premier discours. 
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 Rousseau inherits this paradox from Fénelon, who seems to both praise St. Augustine’s 
City of God and Virgil’s early Rome. More precisely, he admires the selfless and “pur amour” of 
the saints in his Explication des maximes des Saints sur la vie intérieure, while explaining in the 
Lettre sur les occupations de l’Académie française that the self-interested love for one’s nation 
of which Homer and Virgil speak inspired some of the greatest acts of virtue.7 This paradox will 
manifest itself as a double standard that is necessary for comprehending Rousseau’s critique of 
the public intellectual, and his explication of the origin of scientism. On the one hand, he thinks 
that the philosopher and scientist must be selfless, which is reflected throughout his oeuvre in 
his remarks about his own person. In the Lettre à d’Alembert, he writes that he “almost always 
wrote contrary to [his] own interest” [j’ai presque toûjours écrit contre mon propre intérêt].8 In 
the Confessions, he states that he refused a pension from Louis XV on the grounds that the paid 
philosopher must be prepared to say “Adieu to truth, freedom [and] courage” [Adieu la vérité, la 
liberté, le courage].9 And in Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire, he asserts that there are two 
types of men, “the man of truth” [l’homme vrai], who is prepared “to immolate himself” for the 
truth that he loves, and “the worldly man” [l’homme du monde], who only preaches the truth 
that “costs him nothing,” or others something.10 On the other hand, Rousseau denies that the 
average person is capable of such selflessness, and for this reason makes “self-love” [amour de 
soi-même] the foundation of the state and the general will. 
 
7 Cf. Fénelon, Lettre sur les occupations de l’Académie française (Paris: Librairie Charles Delagrave, 1875), p. 100. 
8 Cf. Rousseau, Lettre à d’Alembert, in Œuvres complètes de J.-J. Rousseau, vol. 5, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel 
Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), p. 120. All translations from French in this work are mine. 
9 Rousseau, Les Confessions de J.-J. Rousseau, in Œuvres complètes, v. 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1959), p. 380. 
10 Rousseau, Rêveries d’un promeneur solitaire, in Œuvres complètes de J.-J. Rousseau, vol. 1, ed. Bernard Gagnebin 
et Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), p. 1031. 
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 Insofar as Rousseau does not expect the average person to act selflessly, he thinks that 
the best society is the one in which there is the least possibility of the interests of its members 
coming into conflict. Such is the society characterized by simplicity. Further developing on this 
position in the Préface à Narcisse, Rousseau argues that while the savage might commit an evil 
act, he cannot make a habit of it: "Il est très-possible qu’un Sauvage fasse une mauvaise action, 
mais il n’est pas possible qu’il prenne l’habitude [habit] de mal faire, car cela ne lui serait bon à 
rien."11 That is, if the savage betrays his comrades too often, then he will destroy the society 
along with himself, as it lacks the wealth, technology, etc., to rebound from each betrayal. The 
problem, as Rousseau points out in the Discours, is that philosophy and science require wealth 
(as Aristotle also argues in the Metaphysics). What is more, Rousseau recognizes the ambition of 
the French philosophes to build academies around these, which, like all institutions, trade in 
“distinctions.” Such distinctions not only pose a threat to society, permitting people to be judged 
by their titles rather than their actions, but are also incompatible with the selflessness required 
to pursue the truth. It will not be long, Rousseau believes, until titles, bursaries, etc., are no longer 
a means of pursuing the truth in the academies, but the ends themselves. And what is worse, the 
public, enamored with all the “fashionable” philosophies of the salon, Fontenelle’s famous 
eulogies of dead scientists, and so on, will regard these people as “experts” and leaders. 
 Rousseau’s goal in the Discours is to expose the philosophes as hypocrites, who preach 
the truth only to win “distinctions,” that is, to flatter their vanity and gain power in society. To 
this end, he employs the rhetoric of the veil, accusing them of concealing their vices behind a veil 
 
11 Rousseau, Préface à Narcisse ou l’Amant de lui-même, in Œuvres complètes de J.-J. Rousseau, vol. 2, ed. Bernard 
Gagnebin et Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1965), p. 970, footnote. 
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of politeness and urbanity: "Les soupçons, les ombrages, les craintes, la froideur, la réserve, la 
haine, la trahison se cacheront sans cesse sous ce voile [veil] uniforme et perfide de politesse, 
sous cette urbanité si vantée que nous devons aux lumières de notre siècle."12 Indeed, one 
discovers the very same rhetoric in Molière’s Tartuffe, where Elmire speaks of “placing the mask 
on [his] hypocritical soul” [faire poser la masque à cette âme hypocrite].13 One also finds it in La 
Bruyère’s Caractères, which, being a critique of honnêtes hommes and salon culture, might be 
considered a forerunner of the Discours. But Rousseau’s Discours distinguishes itself from these 
by focusing on the unintentional hypocrite, who does not consciously seek power and reputation, 
but only because he is over-socialized. More precisely, Rousseau understands corruption as the 
process whereby natural, human tendencies and relations are replaced by institutions. This 
conception is particularly apparent in the Émile, where Émile must learn sciences like celestial 
navigation by applying them, rather than memorizing them only to repeat them in polite society. 
However, it is already present in the first Discours, where he praises Cato the Elder for removing 
the Greek philosophers from Rome; Cato appreciates that virtue is not a doctrine that can be 
taught, but must rather be learned in the course of life by fulfilling one’s duties to family and 
country. 
 My goal in this thesis is twofold. Firstly, I trace the emergence of the philosophe as that 
of the public intellectual. Secondly, I examine Rousseau’s critique of this novel architype in the 
Premier discours, which not only means unearthing his sources of inspiration, but also defining 
the unmasking method that he mobilizes to level this critique. To contextualize the emergence 
 
12 See Rousseau, Premier discours, p. 8. While the word ‘mask’ appears in subsequent works, such as the Préface à 
Narcisse, it does not appear here.  
13 Jean-Baptiste Poquelin Molière, Tartuffe, ou l’imposteur (Paris: E. Flammarion, 1894), p. 97. 
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of the philosophe, I first turn to Louis XIV’s absolute monarchy, and explain how the reforms of 
figures like Colbert undermine aristocratic distinctions and create meritocratic institutions that 
accord the talented, bourgeois man a far greater role in society. As Voltaire holds in his Lettres 
philosophiques, the Enlightenment is borne on the shoulders of these men: “While the barons, 
bishops [and] popes had torn England apart,” he maintains, “the most respectable sect of men, 
composed of those who study the laws and sciences, negotiators, artisans,” began to enlighten 
humanity.14 The ascendancy of the bourgeois man is equally reflected in doctrines such as that 
of doux commerce, whereby Mandeville, Saint-Lambert, and other philosophes argue that self-
interest is the cornerstone of society, and that vices like greed are necessary for advancing the 
sciences and its overall interests—naturally, Rousseau has this doctrine in mind in the Discours. 
In this part, I also trace the evolution of the philosophes, examining Renaissance humanists like 
Bacon, Erasmus and More, the Republic of Letters, the origins of the honnête homme and salon 
culture, and ultimately the philosophes’ emergence from this milieu. Indeed, Bacon imagines a 
society organized around the sciences, but his scientists live underground, studying the earth’s 
minerals in obscurity, their sole reward being the improvement of man’s material conditions. In 
short, they are what humanists like Erasmus call “herculean laborers,” self-sacrificing men. This 
is a Ciceronian ideal, and thoroughly anti-Epicurean. By contrast, the honnêtes gens who appear 
in the 17th century pride themselves on being “do-nothings” [faineans] in de Méré’s words,15 and 
believe that one must primarily study philosophy with a view to making good conversation. At 
the same time, honnêtes gens like Fontenelle will blend Cartesian science with Epicurean ideals, 
 
14 Voltaire, Lettres Philosophiques in Voltaire, ed. Roger-Pol Droit (Paris: Flammarion, 2008), p. 43. 
15 See Le Chevalier de Méré, “De la vraïe honnêteté,” in Œuvres complètes du Chevalier de Méré (Saints-Geosmes: 
Klincksieck, 2008), pp. 69 – 70. 
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using the former as a vector to introduce the latter into the salons, as he does in the Entretiens 
sur la pluralité des mondes. Therefore, one remarks the practice of advancing moral doctrines 
under the guise of “science” early on. In the end, the philosophes’ conception of the intellectual 
is diametrically opposed to the silent, herculean laborer of the humanists. He is self-interested, 
sympathetic to epicureanism, socially active in the private salon, and a public figure. 
 In the second part, I develop Rousseau’s critique of the philosophes in the first Discours. 
Rousseau’s romanism is perhaps nowhere more apparent in this work, to which he refers as his 
“Fabrician prosopopoeia” [prosopopée de Fabricius] in a letter to Malesherbes.16 Hence, I begin 
by painting a picture of Rousseau’s romanism, and contrasting this with the philosophes’ nearly 
universal scorn for Rome. While Rousseau exclaims in the Confessions “Would that I was born a 
Roman!” [Que ne suis-je né Romain!],17 Hume, Diderot, Voltaire and company all refer to Rome 
as a pack of “brigands.” What Rousseau admires most about Rome, it’s simplicity, rusticity, and 
patriotism, is despised by these well-spoken, urbanite cosmopolitans. What is more, it helps to 
better understand Rousseau’s insistence on the importance of action over words, as well as his 
frequent criticisms of the philosophes’ virtue-signaling, as it were. In addition to Seneca, Tacitus 
and Polybius, one recognizes the influence of various ancient authors in the Discours, including 
Plutarch, Sallust, Virgil and Xenophon. Through them, Jean-Jacques conceives of the ideal state 
characterized by simplicity, what Victor Goldschmidt refers to as Rousseau’s “cité cynique” [city 
 
16 See Rousseau’s second Lettre à Malesherbes, in Œuvres complètes de J.-J. Rousseau, vol. 1, ed. Bernard Gagnebin 
et Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1965), p. 1135. 
17 Je sentais […] je ne sais quoi qui m’élevait l’âme ; et je me disais en soupirant : Que ne suis-je né Romain !” 
(Rousseau, Confessions, p. 255 – 256) 
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of cynics].18 At the same time, it is evident that Rousseau is reading these thinkers through the 
lens of modern philosophers such as Montaigne, Montesquieu, and Fénelon, who situate them 
within contexts that will reappear in Rousseau’s Discours. Therefore, Leo Strauss explains how 
Montesquieu contrasts Roman republicanism with modern, absolutist monarchism, and shows 
that this is mirrored in Rousseau’s attempt to associate the popularization of the sciences with 
the absolutist tendencies of the state—from this perspective, Rousseau’s critique appears quite 
similar to Habermas’ own in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.19 What I find 
more interesting however is the neo-Augustinian or Jansenist lens through which everything in 
the Discours seems to pass. While Michael McLendon has recently demonstrated the extent to 
which the Augustinian critique of libido dominandi is present in Rousseau,20 it was Bertrand de 
Jouvenel who first characterized Rousseau’s Discours in Augustinian terms: de Jouvenel argues 
that Rousseau’s claim that the Enlightenment leads to moral decline mirrors Augustine’s claim 
that libido sciendi [desire for knowledge] leads to libido sentiendi [desires of the flesh].21 But as I 
have mentioned above, this critique is complicated by the fact that the society in which these 
libidos are most under control is, according to Rousseau, a pagan and self-interested one. This 
paradox might be explained by remarking that while hypocrisy is considered one of the gravest 
sins in Christianity, the pagan moral framework thoroughly precludes it, insofar as one’s actions 
rather than one’s intentions are the basis of moral judgements. Quite simply, hypocrisy cannot 
 
18 Victor Goldschmidt, Anthropologie et politique: les principes du système de Rousseau (Paris: Librarie Philosophique 
J. Vrin, 1982), p. 67. 
19 See Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into the Category of 
Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p. 27. 
20 See Michael Locke McLendon, The Psychology of Inequality: Rousseau’s Amour-Propre (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2019). 
21 See Bertrand de Jouvenel, “Essai sur la politique de Rousseau”, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau : Du Contrat social (Paris: 
Librarie Générale Française, 1978), p. 30. 
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exist where morality does not oblige us to read other’s intentions. However, and this paradox 
remains unresolved, the pagan moral framework also precludes the Christian one for precisely 
this reason.  
 In the remaining chapters of this part, Rousseau’s unmasking method will be expounded 
upon. This not only entails studying past thinkers who employ the rhetoric of the mask, but also 
performing a genealogy of the concept of hypocrisy, and demonstrating how Rousseau’s unique 
understanding of virtues such as autonomy leads him to unmask the unintentional hypocrite. In 
After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that unmasking is part of a “distinctively modern moral 
scheme.”22 To better understand how unmasking is unique to modernity, I first explain why the 
style neither emerges in heroic nor Hellenic society where (1) the lack of a concept like the soul 
or individual means that people consider their social roles (i.e., masks) as a fundamental part of 
their being, and (2) the emphasis of virtue is on ‘successful action’ rather than ‘good intentions’, 
which can more easily be masked than the former. This analysis is reflected in Aristotle’s notion 
of virtue, which deems failures as vicious no matter how good their intentions might be: “To be 
vicious is, on Aristotle’s view, to fail to be virtuous”.23 In consequence, nowhere does Aristotle 
describe hypocrisy [ὑπόκρισις] as a vice. Rather, he merely considers hypocrisy as a form of 
exaggerated speech suited to politics, theater and poetry. This view is characteristic of Hellenic 
thinkers, and explains why someone like Demosthenes might say that hypocrisy is the “first, 
 
22 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), p. 68. 
23 “To be vicious is, on Aristotle's view, to fail to be virtuous. […] It is therefore very difficult in Aristotelian terms to 




second and third rule” of oratory.24 By contrast, as William Barclay demonstrates, hypocrisy is 
the greatest sin in the New Testament, where its contemporary meaning appears for the first 
time.25 This owes to the fact that Christians make the soul the locus of one’s rational being, and 
thus a place greater emphasis on the intentions of the soul, ignoring the success of one’s actions. 
This is reflected in passages like Mathew’s “Blessed are meek, for they will inherit the earth.” 
(Matt. 5.5) However, despite this shift to ‘good intentions’, Church Fathers like St. Augustine 
emphasize the complex and flawed nature of the soul in such a way as to preclude its being 
unmasked. The unmasking method requires that the soul or individual be sufficiently simple and 
unchanging to be pinned down, but also pure enough to be perfected or restored—depending 
on the unmasker’s vision. The former requirement means that someone like Montaigne would 
not adopt such a method, given his belief that men naturally change the “faces” of their soul as 
they mature.26 The latter requirement is typically accompanied by the belief that human flaws 
and prejudices are simply parts of an artificial exterior that might be shed. It is easy to see how 
Jean-Jacques meets these criteria, insisting in the Premier discours that the virtues are 
“engraved” upon the human heart, and that the “good man is an athlete who takes pleasure in 
fighting naked” [L’homme de bien est un Athlète qui se plaît à combattre nu].27 
I shall not only explain how this contention, along with Rousseau’s quest for autonomy, 
inspire him to adopt the unmasking method, but also how this method embodies what Claude 
 
24 Plutarch, Lives of the Ten Orators, in Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 10, trans. Harold N. Fowler (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1960), p. 418, 845b. 
25 William Barclay, New Testament Words (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 1974), p. 140.  
26 See Baehr’s discussion of Montaigne in The Unmasking Style in Social Theory (New York: Routledge, 2019), p. 139 
– 140. 
27 See Rousseau, Premier discours, p. 8: “L’homme de bien est un Athlète qui se plaît à combattre nu: il méprise tous 




Lévi-Strauss identifies as Rousseau’s basic methodology in “Jean-Jacques Rousseau: fondateur 
des sciences de l’homme,” where he argues that Rousseau founded the human sciences. While 
this implies that unmasking is foundational to the human sciences in some way, I do not intend 
to defend Lévi-Strauss’ stronger claim that Rousseau founded these sciences, whose origins are 
as diverse as many. I therefore leave this implication untouched. I shall conclude by comparing 
Rousseau’s unmasking method to that of philosophes like Holbach and Condorcet, who instead 
are interested in unmasking the public, and seek to institutionalize the method. 
The dangers of institutionalized unmasking become apparent when we examine these 
philosophers. In Le Christianisme dévoilé, Holbach does not hesitate to grant the sovereign the 
power to unmask the unenlightened masses, whom he accuses of being motivated by “hatred,” 
“fear,” “intolerance,” “prejudice,” and every other based desire under the sun.28 Although the 
unmasking method seeks to discover people’s hidden motives, it can easily become a means of 
imputing them, especially when the mask is a caricature. When the unmasker is a dissident like 
Rousseau, these motives can be disputed, but when it is an authority, one might be coerced or 
even forced to bear them in silence. The danger, furthermore, is amplified when that authority 
professes to have science on his side, as in the case of Condorcet. The “social mathematics” of 
which he conceives in the Tableau général des sciences similarly functions to unmask prejudice 
and “superstition.”29 But Condorcet imagines a vast technocratic, media-academic complex to 
carry out this science. In the Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain, he 
 
28 Paul-Henri Thiry Holbach, Le Christianisme dévoilé ou Examen des principes et des effets de la religion chrétienne, 
in Premières œuvres (Paris: Les Classiques du people, 1972). See pp. 106 – 124. 
29 See Condorcet, Tableau général de la science, qui a pour objet l’application du calcul aux science politiques et 
morales, in Œuvres de Condorcet, vol. 1 (Paris : Firmin Didot Frères, 1847 – 1849), p. 540. 
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praises “the press” for unmasking the oppressors of humanity. Yes, Bacon imagines a scientific 
class as the rulers of society in his New Atlantis, but in Condorcet’s own version,30 science is the 
object of society, just as much as society is the object of science. And as Condorcet expresses in 
his speech to the Académie française, the unscientific classes will be “forced” to accept the light 
of reason should they reject it.31 
While I hesitate to argue that the unmasking method is foundational to all social theory, 
one undoubtedly observes its presence in many 19th and 20th century theorists. Sigmund Freud 
unmasks the Victorian defender of chastity as an incestuous murderer. Karl Marx dismisses the 
Christian’s devotion to the meek and impoverished as a mere “veil of tears” [Jammertales] and 
accuses him of unwittingly contributing to humanity’s exploitation.32 And in the Authoritarian 
Personality, Theodore Adorno sets out to expose the White Christian liberal as a crypto fascist. 
While thinkers like Marx and Adorno present themselves as being critical of the Enlightenment, 
and concerned about the hidden forms of domination that it engenders, the institutionalization 
of their sciences and unmasking critiques in academia and media represent precisely the sort of 
abuses of which Rousseau accuses the philosophes; one equally notes the paradoxical nature of 
institutions themselves informing people how to overcome their socialization. In antiquity, one 
 
30 See Condorcet, Fragment sur l’Atlantide, ou efforts combines de l’espèce humaine pour le progrès des sciences, in 
Œuvres de Condorcet, vol. 11 (Paris: Firmin Didot Frères, 1847). 
31 See Condorcet, “Discours de réception de M. de Condorcet”, Académie française, accessed August 10, 2020, 
http://www.academie-francaise.fr/discours-de-reception-du-marquis-de-condorcet: "La marche des sciences 
morales sera donc plus lente que celle des sciences physiques, et nous ne devons pas être étonnés si les principes 
sur lesquels elles sont établies ont besoin de forcer, pour ainsi dire, les esprits à les recevoir." 
32 Marx speaks of a religion as an “illusion” [Illusionen] hiding behind a “veil of tears” [Jammertales] in Zur Kritik der 
Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, in Marx-Engels Werke, vol. I (Berlin: Verlag, 1972), p. 378: “Die Aufhebung der 
Religion als des illusorischen Glücks des Volkes ist die Forderung seines wirklichen Glücks. Die Forderung, die 
Illusionen über seinen Zustand aufzugeben, ist die Forderung, einen Zustand aufzugeben, der der Illusionen bedarf. 
Die Kritik der Religion ist also im Keim die Kritik des Jammertales, dessen Heiligenschein die Religion ist.” 
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is judged by his actions, and in the Christian world, by his intentions, but in modernity, one has 
the impression of being judged only by the intentions that the state and the media give to him.  
In the past, Ernst Jünger writes, a man had to commit homicide to be driven into the forest and 










33 See Ernst Jünger, The Forest Passage, trans. Thomas Friese (Candor, NY: Telos Press Publishing, 2013), p. 17: 
"Although we will further refine the expression here, it is helpful that it already has a history in old Icelandic 
vocabulary. A forest passage [Waldgang] followed a banishment; through this action a man declared his will to self-
affirmation from his own resources. This was considered honorable, and it still is today, despite all the platitudes. In 
those times, the banishment was usually the consequence of a homicide, whereas today it happens to a man 
automatically, like the turning of a roulette wheel. […] In our ancestors’ times, anyone banished was already 
accustomed to thinking for themselves, accustomed to a hard life, and to acting autonomously. […] Things are 
different today. People are incorporated into the collective structures in a manner that makes them very defenseless 
indeed. They hardly realize how irresistibly powerful the prejudices have become in our enlightened epoch. […] 
Suddenly, in the midst of such conditions, comes banishment, often like a bolt from the blue: You are red, white, 




Part I: The Origins of the Philosophes 
Introduction to Part I 
Rousseau presented his Discours sur les sciences et les arts to the Académie de Dijon in 
1750, a year regarded by many as the beginning of the French Enlightenment.34 His Discours was 
a response to a seemingly uncontroversial question that the Académie had posed to the public 
in its annual essay competition: “Si le rétablissement des Sciences et des Arts a contribué à épurer 
les mœurs” [If the reestablishment of the Sciences and the Arts contributed to purifying mores].35 
The answer, which lay in centuries of administrative, philosophical and cultural developments in 
France and abroad, was for the vast majority of contestants “yes”. Rousseau however responded 
in the negative. His answer incorporated many of these developments, but the polemical style of 
his Discours—which itself is essential to understanding precisely what he was rejecting—often 
prevents the 21st century reader from discerning the true objects of Rousseau’ critique. For this 
reason, the question must be framed within in its own socio-historical context. Such is the goal 
of this first part, which will focus in particular on the emergence of the public intellectual, that is, 
the philosophe. That being said, my intention is not to reduce the question to its historical 
situation. For what Rousseau had to say about the modern sciences and arts was deeply inspired 
by the ancients, and is perhaps relevant even to post-modernity. 
 
34 See, for instance, J.B. Shank, The Newton Wars and the Beginning of the French Enlightenment (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2008), p. 9. 
35 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur les sciences et les arts, in Œuvres complètes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, vol. 
3, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 1. Unless otherwise stated, all translations 
are my own. 
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In order to contextualize the question posed by the Académie de Dijon and Rousseau’s 
response, we shall first examine the administrative reforms implemented by figures like Colbert 
and Pontchartrain during the reign (1643 – 1715) of King Louis XIV. For it was under the absolute 
monarchy of the exalted Sun King that France erected its first scientific academies, and extended 
the governmental and hence public sphere beyond the aristocracy to those capable bourgeois 
men whom Voltaire will later celebrate in his Lettres Philosophiques (1733) as the champions of 
the Enlightenment. The enlargement of the public sphere as a coincidental phenomenon of the 
absolutist state is a theme to which Jürgen Habermas drew serious attention in Strukterwandel 
de Öffentlichkeit (1962). The first chapter of this part is not, however, limited to his analysis. 
More broadly, we shall attempt to understand how the “reestablishment of the Sciences” came 
packaged with a bureaucratic state that replaced aristocratic institutions with meritocratic ones 
open to the lowborn, and which favored commerce over tradition—to the great dissatisfaction 
of aristocratic-minded men like François Fénelon. Developing this theme is important, not only 
because this newly formed public sphere pours into the Parisian salons where philosophes like 
Voltaire first convene and compose their esoteric critiques of the Church and other institutions, 
but also because science and commerce give rise to new “mœurs”, such as those of leisure and 
luxury that Anne Robert Jacques Turgot and other philosophes will later advocate for in their 
doctrine of doux commerce. To be sure, the influence of the philosophes is so substantial in the 
mid-18th century, that the question posed by the Académie de Dijon might be rephrased as 
follows: “have the philosophes, as popularizers of the sciences and the arts, contributed to the 
purification of mores?” 
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Although the formation of scientific academies and the enlargement of the public sphere 
are necessary for understanding the rise of the philosophes and the “enlightened” mores of the 
18th century, neither this cultural archetype nor the values that he espouses can be sufficiently 
understood without first studying their origin in humanism. When Colbert founded the Académie 
des Sciences in 1666, for instance, it embodied the scientific model that Bacon outlined in works 
like the Novum Organum and The Great Instauration, where he not only emphasized the 
mechanical arts and experimentation over “vain speculation”, but also framed scientific pursuit 
within a greater, Christian humanist project. Having cast aside scholastic thought, the moderns, 
Bacon argued, “find themselves in a third period of time [that] will far surpass that of the Grecian 
and Roman learning”,36 that will deliver them from the pagan cycles of time, and place them on 
a linear path of scientific progress to redemption and “eternal sabbath”.37 To achieve this end, 
he imagines a New Atlantis where the aristocracy is composed of experimental philosophers—as 
opposed to warriors—that labor “for the benefit and use of life” of humanity.38 Although the 
Académie was not founded for the sake of this project, but rather to serve the military, naval and 
commercial interests of the Sun King’s absolute state, those who helped to establish it 
undoubtedly had Bacon’s humanist vision of progress in mind. Before the end of the seventeenth 
century, the Académie would elect as its secretary the honnête homme, Bernard le Bovier de 
Fontenelle, who had spent his days in the salons of Paris popularizing science and progress, and 
 
36 Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, ed. G.W. Kitchin (Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books, 2001), II, xiv, p. 192. 
37 Francis Bacon, Confession of Faith in The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. 7, ed. James Spedding, Robert L. Ellis, Douglas 
D. Heath (Longman, Green and Co., 1859), p. 221. 
38 Francis Bacon, The Great Instauration, in Francis Bacon: Selected Philosophical Works, ed. Rose-Mary Sargent 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1999), p. 75. 
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would use his position in the Académie to broadcast them to the French public. In any case, 
Bacon’s scientific-humanist vision will be explored in the second chapter of this part.  
The humanist tradition not only had a profound impact on the conceptualization of the 
cosmological and moral framework within which experimental philosophy was cast, but also on 
the social philosophy of the honnêtes gens of the 17th century who would become advocates of 
the new science, and in so doing transform into the philosophes of the 18th. This tradition can be 
traced back to Renaissance Humanists like Erasmus of Rotterdam and Thomas More of the 15th 
century Republic of Letters, men who uncovered in Cicero the rhetorical tools that might be used 
to arbitrate the religious conflicts of their day, notably between Martin Luther and the Church. 
Indeed, even before Hugo Grotius defended religious tolerance in the name of natural law in the 
16th century, More had already developed upon the concept in his Utopia—the book that inspired 
Bacon’s New Atlantis. The rhetorical tools used by the Humanists were founded on virtues such 
as honor [honestum] and propriety [decorum], which they considered conducive to an ideal sort 
of conversation [sermo] leading to friendship and truth, rather than to holy war. If the humanist 
tradition of the bonae literae of the early Republic of Letters merits attention in the third chapter, 
then it is because the social norms of the honnêtes hommes and subsequently the philosophes 
can be traced back to them. However, as we shall later see, thinkers such as Montesquieu and 
Rousseau believed that the honnêtes hommes and philosophes had failed to live up to the noble 
virtues of their Ciceronian predecessors.  
 While Humanists like More put their rhetorical tools into the service of king and country, 
honnêtes gens believed that the ambitions of the court were not conducive to the cultivation of 
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good société and bons airs, and instead looked to the grand monde [high society] of the salons 
for its development. Cicero enjoys conversation and friendship for their own sake, but he likely 
would have considered the discourse of honnêtes hommes like the Chevalier de Méré a form of 
selfish epicureanism. For honnêtes hommes eschewed business and politics, and even abstained 
from specializing in any one field of study, in order to become what Montaigne calls “universal 
men” capable of discussing any topic and breathing bons airs into any conversation. In the fourth 
chapter, my goal is to understand the priority that honnêtes gens like the Chevalier de Méré, 
Nicholas Faret, Montaigne, Pascal and Fontenelle give to sociabilité. In particular, I examine the 
shift from the Ciceronian sense of duty defended by Renaissance Humanists, to what Thomas 
Carlyle calls the “enlightened self-interest” of honnêtes gens. By this, Carlyle means the tendency 
of thinkers of the era to equate virtue with sweetness and delight, and to rarely consider the 
conflict between virtue and one’s happiness. I explain this by first examining Pierre Gassendi’s 
successful attempt to revive certain Epicurean doctrines, and then by showing how Fontenelle 
introduces what I call neo-Epicureanism or salon-Epicureanism to the grand monde of the salon. 
In distinction with Epicurus, who explicitly mentions virtues that are incompatible with our 
happiness, salon-Epicureanism is defined, I argue, by the assumption that all virtues are 
delightful. By means of this discussion, I hope to prepare the way for the following chapter, where 
I will show how Fontenelle succeeds in advancing the heterodox doctrines of Epicurus that 
Gassendi was obliged to refute, by pairing them with Descartes’ recent discoveries in physics. 
 In contrast to other, more universal honnêtes gens, Fontenelle took a special interest in 
mathematics and physics, of which he possessed more than a superficial knowledge, and sought 
to introduce these topics to the world of the salon. Therefore, in his Entretiens sur la pluralité des 
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mondes, he imagines a playful dialogue between himself and a young Marquise, in which he 
explains to her Descartes’ theory of vortices, and shows how it implies a plurality of worlds—an 
idea that could be traced back to Lucretius’ De rerum natura. Even though Fontenelle does not 
mention him by name, my analysis reveals that he not only invokes Lucretian arguments there, 
but also comes to certain Lucretian conclusions that are neither found in Descartes’ mechanics, 
nor implied by it. Among them is the idea that, if other planets form under the same conditions 
as the earth, then they must also be capable of producing beings like ourselves. Such a conclusion 
would have been considered controversial, since it contradicts both Biblical history (i.e., the story 
of creation) and doctrine (i.e., the providential idea that man is unique and exists in order to fulfil 
his divine purpose). But by using Descartes’ mechanics as a vector, Fontenelle is able to introduce 
this idea, laden with Epicurean implications about man’s purpose and the role of happiness, into 
the world of the salon, where, according to the honnête femme Madeleine de Scudery, nothing 
“shocking” ought ever to be uttered. Fontenelle not only popularizes such ideas in the Entretiens, 
but also in his Digressions sur les Anciens et les Moderns, where he employs another Lucretian 
argument in order to advance a secular vision of scientific progress. 
In the fifth chapter, I maintain that Fontenelle becomes a forerunner of the philosophe 
architype by distancing himself from the “universal man or leisure” model of the honnêtes gens, 
and by popularizing Cartesian physics in order to sneak heterodox ideas into the public sphere. 
What distinguishes Voltaire, the first true philosophe I argue, are his explicit political ambitions. 
If Fontenelle promoted Neo-Epicurean mores and secular progressivism by making himself into 
an advocate of Cartesian mechanism, then Voltaire popularized Lockean doctrines and English 
tolerance in his Lettres philosophiques by pairing them with Newton’s discovery of the force of 
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attraction. Unlike Fontenelle however, Voltaire was intent upon altering society, as his battle cry 
“Écrasez l’infâme!” [Crush that infamy!] directed toward the Catholic Church would later reveal. 
The philosophes’ use of science as a vector for heterodox ideas, I further believe, is inspired by 
what Leo Strauss has called “the struggle of the Enlightenment against prejudice”, which draws 
a radical distinction between reason and (religious) authority, unlike classical philosophy, which 
principally opposes reason to appearance or opinion. Hans-Georg Gadamer has also referred to 
this as the “prejudice” motivating the Enlightenment’s “war on prejudice”. 
Having shown how the philosophes were inspired by the founding of the Académie des 
Sciences and King Louis XIV’s bureaucratic reforms, and having given a detailed account of their 
historical origins, their salon-Epicurean ethics, and their rhetorical tactics, it remains to explain 
in the sixth and final chapter their philosophies proper, which can be characterized, I argue, as 
“social sciences”. By this, I mean that they represent attempts to reduce all men to individuals, 
who, deprived of their natural and cultural differences, can more easily be fit into social models 
aimed at calculating supposedly objective features of society, especially economic ones. This is a 
critique that Pierre Manent leveled against early Modern thinkers like Machiavelli and Hobbes, 
and I not only think that it applies to the philosophes, but also believe that it is especially useful 
for understanding Rousseau’s critique of them in the Premier discours, where he reminds them 
how King Xerxes, counting his vast armies and treasuries, was rebuffed by a handful of virtuous 
Spartans—at least for a few days. Modernity, its attempt to combine science and man, always 
prioritizes quantity over quality, and becomes a never ending process of leveling-down. 
Nonetheless, I trace the origins of social science to what Manent describes as the shift from 
“idealistic” to “scientific” political philosophy. By depriving humans of “nature” or “naturalist 
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arguments”, Machiavelli and Hobbes likewise deprive them of that inner sphere of liberty, where 
the perfection of reason and virtue in pursuit of a natural “ideal” formerly translated into political 
action. In place of nature, these thinkers substitute base psychological desires (i.e., self-
preservation and narcissism), which they presume everyone equally possesses, and thereby 
create “individuals” who can more easily be manipulated externally (i.e., by reconstructing 
society) owing to their simplicity. This reduction of humanity is necessary for conceiving of what 
Manent calls “hypertrophic” political theories, which place all of the power in the hands of the 
organizers of society. And as I show, if thinkers like Mandeville, Hume and Voltaire praise base 
psychological desires like greed by propping up luxury, for instance, then it is part of the same 
tradition of “social science”. 
Moreover, I argue that if this approach gains traction in the 18th century, then it owes to 
the fact, as Hume and Voltaire pointed out, that Newton’s method seems to confirm it. Voltaire 
esoterically (to use Strauss’ language) draws the parallel between Newton’s rejection of “occult 
qualities” and Locke’s epistemological skepticism on the nature of the soul. Hume, who praises 
Newton for having restored her [nature’s] secrets to that obscurity, in which they ever did and 
ever will remain”, concludes on that no (moral) ought can be derived from what (naturally). 
Hume’s social science seems to go a step further than Voltaire’s however. For the former claims 
that we might even apply aspects of Newton’s method to psychological phenomena, such that 
he devises mental experiments, from which he believes we will be able to come to even more 
solid conclusions than in the physical domain. It must be reiterated that the shift from idealistic 
to scientific political theories is never justified by science itself. Rather, the philosophes merely 
observe how Newton’s science ignores the question of nature or metaphysics, but nonetheless 
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is able to predict the course of celestial phenomena with an accuracy hitherto unknown to man, 
and attempt to reproduce it in the social world. 
 This preliminary analysis will also permit us to frame the question posed by the Académie 
de Dijon, which might be rephrased as follows: how does the popularization of the sciences and 
the mechanical arts, both by public institutions like the Académie des Sciences and private ones 
like the Parisian salon, that is, both by statesmen and philosophes, alter the moral character of 
the society? Here, we focus on the popularization of Enlightenment science, rather than 
Enlightenment science per se, following Pierre Manent’s lead in his book Naissances de la 
politique moderne: Machiavel, Hobbes, Rousseau (1977): “ce qui est d’abord visé dans son 
premier Discours, c’est la vulgarisation des sciences, la démocratisation de la culture” [what is 
first and foremost the object of his first Discourse is the vulgarization of the sciences, the 







39 Pierre Manent, Naissances de la politique moderne: Machiavel, Hobbes, Rousseau (Paris: Payot, 1977), p. 140.  
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Chapter I: Louis XIV’s Absolutism and the Rise of the Bourgeois Man 
I. i. The Administrative Reforms of Colbert and Pontchartrain under Louis XIV’s Absolutism 
 It was under the absolutist reign of the Sun King, exulted by Voltaire in Le Siècle de Louis 
XIV (1751), that a vast administrative apparatus for advancing the sciences and mechanical arts 
took shape in France.40 With the traditional barriers to monarchal power removed, Jean-Baptiste 
Colbert (1619 – 1683), perhaps history’s greatest bureaucrat, set to establishing the institutions 
and academies that would give Louis XIV an advantage in commerce, maritime trade and war.  
Colbert is no doubt best known for having founded the Académie des Sciences in 1666.41 
Unlike England’s own Royal Society, a private association established in 1660, Colbert’s version 
would be a state entity. And in this way, it represented a greater fulfillment of the ambitions of 
English, natural philosophers like Thomas Hobbes and Francis Bacon, both of whom “believed 
that the monarch should rule over knowledge.”42 In his New Atlantis (1626) for instance, Bacon 
imagines a monarchy ruled by noblemen who, rather than waging war, labor in obscurity under 
the earth’s surface to discover nature’s truths.43 This ambition, it must be added, was inspired by 
what we might anachronistically call today Bacon’s preference for science to philosophy, as 
 
40 Voltaire, Le Siècle de Louis XIV (Paris: Librarie Armand Colin, 1913) 
41 See Denis Diderot (ed.), “Académie Royale des Sciences” in Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, 
des arts et des métiers, vol. 1 (Paris: Briasson, 1751), p. 54: “Cette Académie fut établie en 1666 par les soins de M. 
Colbert. Louis XIV, après la paix des Pyrénées désirant faire fleurir les Sciences, les Lettres & les Arts dans son 
Royaume, chargea M. Colbert de former une Société d’homme choisis & savans en différens genres de littérature & 
de science, qui s’assemblant sous la protection du Roi, se communiquassent réciproquement leurs lumieres & leurs 
progrès.” 
42 Jacob Soll, The Information Master: John Baptiste’s Secret State Intelligence System (Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press), p. 97. 
43 See Francis Bacon, New Atlantis in Essays and New Atlantis, ed. Francis S. Haight (New York: Walter J. Black Inc., 
1942), pp. 288 – 289. 
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evinced in the Novum Organum (1620), where he states that “speculation” must be eschewed 
for “experimentation,” which requires collaboration as well as greater resources.44 Although, as 
Colbert’s contemporary biographer Jacob Soll affirms, we cannot be certain that the Frenchman 
was directly inspired by Bacon, we can confirm that, like many educated men of his day, Colbert 
“knew who Bacon was,”45 as the latter’s ideas had made their impression on society by then—
we shall return to Bacon later. Nonetheless, by establishing the Académie des Sciences and 
others, including the Observatoire de Paris in 1667, Colbert attracted some of the greatest minds 
of Europe, including the Italian Giovanni Domenico Cassini, who discovered the moons and rings 
of Saturn, and the Hollander Christiaan Huygens, inventor of the pendulum clock. 
Colbert’s academic institutions were parts of a greater administrative project however, 
one that extended the public sphere beyond the cloistered courts and titles of the nobles, to the 
artisans, merchants and the bourgeois class in general. Hence, his administrative projects 
contributed to what Jürgen Habermas refers to as The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere.46 For instance, as Secretary of State of the Navy, Colbert assigned commissaires (or civil 
 
44 See Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, ed. Joseph Devey (New York: P.F. Collier, 1902), p. 12, for Bacon’s views on 
speculation: “The subtilty of nature is far beyond that of sense or of the understanding: so that the specious 
meditations, speculations, and theories of mankind are but a kind of insanity, only there is no one to stand by and 
observe it.” For the role of experiment in his philosophy, see p. 119: “The object of our philosophy being thus laid 
down, we proceed to precepts, in the most clear and regular order. The signs for the interpretation of nature 
comprehend two divisions; the first regards the eliciting or creating of axioms from experiment, the second the 
deducing or deriving of new experiments from axioms.” 
45 “While there is no concrete evidence that Colbert read the New Atlantis, he knew who Bacon was.” (Soll, The 
Information Master: John Baptiste’s Secret State Intelligence System, p. 215, f. 24) 
46 Habermas defines this sphere as essentially “bourgeois”, which as we shall see is in keeping with Voltaire’s overall 
assessment that the Enlightenment represented the rise, not of “the shoemaker” but rather that of businessmen, 
lawyers and scientists. See Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into the 
Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p. 27, for his definition of the 
bourgeois public sphere: “The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people 
come together as a public; they soon claimed the sphere regulated from above against the public authorities 
themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but 
publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor.” 
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servants) to various official posts, in contravention of the tradition whereby they were passed 
down by noble-born officiers from one generation to the next; he incentivized shipbuilders to 
improve upon their techniques by rewarding them with lucrative patents, and he made the 
secrets of shipbuilding public knowledge by means of funding their study—such secrets had 
hitherto been closely guarded in the corporate structure of the guilds.47 It is in light of such 
reforms that Voltaire would later write in Louis XIV that the “Français […] doivent [à Colbert] 
certainement leur industrie et leur commerce, et par conséquent cette opulence […].” (Voltaire, 
Le Siècle de Louis XIV, p. 520 – 521) The Colbert project therefore showed that the wealth and 
knowledge of France could be significantly enhanced by replacing traditional and aristocratic 
institutions (e.g., corporations and inherited offices) with merit-based ones open to the greater 
public. One must note, of course, that nobles were not stripped of such privileges in the name of 
the common good, but rather that of the king, who invoked his absolutist power to improve the 
commercial and military strength of his realm, and to fund his many wars in Europe. As we shall 
see in the second part of this thesis, Rousseau disputes in the Premier discours this very same 
presumption, i.e., that technological and commercial success leads to military victories, citing the 
many wealthy nations that were toppled by poorer ones whose morals had not been corrupted 
by these things. 
 
47 See J.B. Shank, “Before Voltaire: Newtonianism and the Origins of the Enlightenment in France. 1687 – 1734” (PhD 
diss., Stanford University, 2000), p. 78 – 81. As Shank writes: “Only by developing a systematic understanding of the 
principles involved in the master's discipline could the monarchy become the actual master of the knowledge itself. 
This ambition pushed the state toward publicity as a means of exposing all publicly relevant knowledge as a 
prerequisite for acquiring and controlling it. For this reason, it is not surprising to see a new' interest in publicity 
emerging in France in tandem with the rise of the administrative conception of monarchy.” (p. 81) 
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 The reestablishment of the sciences and mechanical arts, as it were, was motivated to a 
great extent by commercial and military ends, improvements in shipbuilding and optics being 
conducive to these. Their success depended on broadening the public sphere to include low-born 
but capable men, and consequently on growing the state. Their fate bound up with one another, 
French administrators such as Louis de Pontchartrain, Colbert’s spiritual successor, formed novel 
relationships with the public. In 1691 Pontchartrain directed the president of the Académie des 
Sciences, the Abbé Bignon, to furnish the public with a monthly mémoire of its activities, and in 
1699 stipulated that the academy present biannually its findings before the public, in addition to 
publishing an annual histoire raisonnée of its greatest inventions. (See J.B. Shank, “Before 
Voltaire: Newtonianism and the Origins of the Enlightenment in France. 1687 – 1734”, p. 57) It 
must not be forgotten however: the more public men, the bigger the state, and the more income 
required. Pontchartrain might be lauded for his administrative efforts, but he’ll also be 
remembered for introducing capitation in France, i.e., taxation based on the size of one’s estate 
and income. (See Voltaire, Le Siècle de Louis XIV, p. 532) So too did Pontchartrain “[sell] noble 
titles for two thousand crowns in 1696”. (Voltaire, Le Siècle de Louis XIV, p. 535) And although 
these brought “shame” (Ibid.) on their buyers, as Voltaire writes in Louis XIV, putting the 
aristocracy up for sale might easily be interpreted as another sign of the rise of the low-born but 
capable man. Bureaucracy, commercialism and meritocracy, these are the soil, sun and water 
from which the sciences and mechanical arts grow. 
Their success would later provide the French philosophes with the grounds not only for 
replacing traditional institutions with liberals ones, but also traditional, aristocratic notions of 
virtue with a new based on a bourgeoisie self-interest, i.e., the doctrine of le doux commerce. In 
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his famous Fable of the Bees or Private Vices, Publick Virtues (1714) for instance, Bernard de 
Mandeville claims that neither kindness nor virtue are the foundations of society, but rather vices 
such as envy and the desire for praise, which are most beneficial to trade:  
[…] neither the Friendly Qualities and kind Affections that are natural to Man, nor the real 
Virtues he is capable of acquiring by Reason and Self-Denial, are the Foundation of 
Society; but that what we call Evil in this World, Moral as well as Natural, is the grand 
Principle that makes us sociable Creatures, the solid Basis, the Life and Support of all 
Trades and Employments without Exception: That there we must look for the true Origin 
of all Arts and Sciences, and that the moment Evil ceases, the Society must be spoiled, if 
not totally dissolved.48  
This passage should help set the tone of the thesis: “what we call Evil in the World, Moral as well 
as natural, is […] the true Origin of all Arts and Sciences.”49 What is more, it is evident that “trade 
and industry,” in other words, the fruits of science, are consistently invoked to justify this 
doctrine. For as Mandeville also states in his Free Thoughts on Religion, The Church and National 
Happiness (1720): “We see daily men roused from sloth and idleness, and spurred on to 
emulation and useful labor, by no better principle than envy; and it is generally taken for granted, 
that covetousness and pride are the chief promoters of trade and industry […].”50 As we shall see, 
Mandeville’s recognition that traditional virtue must be abandoned to advance the sciences and 
 
48 Bernard de Mandeville, Fable of the Bees or Private Vices, Publick Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1732), p. 428. 
49 Rousseau will no doubt affirm this statement in the Premier discours, save for the claim that such evil is “natural.” 
50 Bernard de Mandeville, Free Thoughts on Religion, The Church and National Happiness (London, 1732), p. 12. 
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industry is hardly exceptional, and appears in different formulations in philosophes like Voltaire, 
Turgot and Saint-Lambert to name a few.  
I. ii. Voltaire, Diderot, Turgot and Saint-Lambert: Scientific Progress and Doux Commerce 
Before Voltaire praised the Sun King in Louis XIV, he sung an encomium to Isaac Newton 
(1643 – 1727) in his Lettres philosophiques (1731).51 Concealed however within his exoteric praise 
of the thinker who had discovered the force of attraction, was an esoteric critique of what would 
be referred to in post-revolutionary France as the Ancien Régime.52 Bishops and Barons had not 
produced this “powerful genius” [puissant genie] (Lettre Philosophiques, p. 61), but instead “the 
people” (Ibid., p. 43): scientists, lawyers, businessmen, traders—in short, low-born bourgeois 
men.53 And according to Voltaire, their success could be traced back to the liberalism and 
tolerance of the English, embodied best by the “sage and modest philosophy of Locke” [la sage 
et modeste philosophie de M. Locke] (Ibid., XIII, p. 74), and to their commercial spirit. Liberalism 
and commercialism, the two synergized and augmented one another: “Le commerce, qui a 
enrichi les citoyens en Angleterre, a contribué à les rendre libres, et cette liberté a étendu le 
commerce à son tour” [Commerce, which enriched the citizens of England, contributed to making 
 
51 Voltaire, Lettres Philosophiques in Voltaire, ed. Roger-Pol Droit (Paris: Flammarion, 2008). 
52 It should be noted that the phrase “ancien regime” was only coined after the French Revolution. 
53 The entire passage: “Tandis que les barons, les évêques, les papes déchiraient ainsi l'Angleterre, où tous voulaient 
commander le peuple, la plus nombreuse, la plus vertueuse même et par conséquent la plus respectable partie des 
hommes, composée de ceux qui étudient les lois et les sciences, des négociants, des artisans, en un mot de tout ce 
qui n'était point tyran, le peuple, dis−je, était regardé par eux comme des animaux au−dessous de l'homme. Il s'en 
fallait bien que les communes eussent alors part au gouvernement ; c'étaient des vilains : leur travail, leur sang 
appartenaient à leurs maîtres, qui s'appelaient nobles. Le plus grand des hommes étaient en Europe ce qu'ils sont 
encore en plusieurs endroits du Nord, serfs d'un seigneur, espèce de bétail qu'on vend et qu'on achète avec la terre. 
Il a fallu des siècles pour rendre justice à l'humanité, pour sentir qu'il était horrible que le grand nombre semât et 
que le petit nombre ; et n'est-ce pas un bonheur pour le genre humain que l'autorité de ces petits brigands ait été 
éteinte en France par la puissance légitime de nos rois, et en Angleterre par la puissance légitime des rois et du 
peuple ” (Lettres philosophiques, p. 43) 
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them free, and this freedom expanded commerce in turn] (Ibid., p. 87). The Lettres were burned 
by the executioner in France. For their esoteric content, which tacitly approved of the 
sensationalism that Voltaire discovers in John Locke (1632 – 1704), had not gone unnoticed by 
the authorities—of course, one hardly doubts that the wily Voltaire would have succeeded in 
passing the Lettres under the censor’s nose had his French publisher not acted without his 
consent.54 Nonetheless, a new and interesting argument had been made: that society should be 
organized with a view to improving experimental science—which, unlike the “science” of the 
scholastics, both provided useful tools and could predict the course of nature. 
Perhaps the most extreme form of this new and interesting argument appears in Anne 
Robert Jacques Turgot’s Discours sur les progrès successifs de l’esprit humain (1750), which was 
published only one year before Rousseau’s first Discours appeared. There, Turgot treats all the 
kingdoms, empires and nations of the past and present as mere discardable steps on the path to 
scientific progress, a path on which commerce is a companion no doubt:  
Les Empires s’élèvent et tombent : les lois, les formes du gouvernement se succèdent les 
unes aux autres ; les arts, les sciences se découvrent et se perfectionnent. Tour à tour 
retardés et accélérés dans leurs progrès, ils passent de climats en climats. L’intérêt, 
l’ambition, la vaine gloire changent perpétuellement la scène du monde, inondent la terre 
de sang ; et au milieu de leurs ravages, les mœurs s’adoucissent, l’esprit humain s’éclaire 
 
54 For more on this episode, see J.B. Shank, “Voltaire,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, last modified August 31, 
2009, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/voltaire. “Before it appeared, Voltaire attempted to get official permission 
for the book from the royal censors, a requirement in France at the time. His publisher, however, ultimately released 
the book without these approvals and without Voltaire's permission. This made the first edition of the Lettres 
philosophiques illicit, a fact that contributed to the scandal that it triggered, but one that in no way explains the furor 
the book caused. Historians in fact still scratch their heads when trying to understand why Voltaire's Lettres 
philosophiques proved to be so controversial.” 
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; les nations isolées se rapprochent les unes des autres ; le commerce et la politique 
réunissent enfin toutes les parties du globe ; et la masse totale du genre humain, par des 
alternatives de calme et d’agitations, de biens et de maux, marche toujours, quoiqu’à pas 
lents, à une perfection plus grande.55 
Turgot’s conception of scientific progress differs from Voltaire’s in an important way however. 
For Voltaire had thought that, insofar as the advancement of the sciences depends more on the 
bourgeois than the noble, organizing society around this goal would be conducive to achieving 
material and social equality between the two—after all, Voltaire was not a noble, as the Duke of 
Rohan had cruelly reminded him at the Comédie-Française.56 Turgot, by contrast, insisted that 
“barbarism equalizes all men” (Turgot, Discours sur les progrès successifs de l’esprit humain, p. 
598), whereas the pursuit of experimental science, which requires agriculture, the division of 
labor, and the accumulation of resources for a group of geniuses who might discover her truths 
at their leisure, tends toward inequality. Of course, and this must be emphasized, Voltaire was 
never interested in the equality of peasants, but rather between the privileged nobles and well-
to-do bourgeois like himself. As he once wrote to D’Alembert: “On n’a jamais prétendu éclairer 
les cordonniers et les servantes; c’est le partage des Apôtres” [We never claimed to enlighten 
 
55 Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, Discours sur les progrès successifs de l’esprit humain, in Œuvres de Turgot, vol. 2, ed. 
Eugène Daire and Hippolyte Dussard (Paris: Guillaumin, 1844), p. 598. 
56 See James Parton, Life of Voltaire (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1892), p. 184. Parton recounts this incident, 
which resulted in Voltaire spending one month in the Bastille, and then fleeing to England: “At the opera in Paris, 
one evening in December 1725, Voltaire was conversing with acquaintances in the lobby between the acts […] 
Among the by-standers was the Chevalier de Rohan [….]. This chevalier, forty-three years of age, a dissolute man-
about-town, broke into the conversation in an insolent tone, saying, “Monsieur de Voltaire, Monsieur Arouet, what 
is your name? […] The chevalier repeated the offensive question [several days later at the opera], when Voltaire 
replied […] “I begin my name; the Chevalier de Rohan finishes his.” 
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shoemakers and servants; that is the affair of Apostles].57 Enlightenment, while undermining the 
distinction between (legally) privileged noblemen and the wealthy, leaves the underclasses 
intact—which might help explain the indifference and even hostility of certain peasants to the 
Enlightenment and subsequent Revolution, as evinced by the Chouans. If the poor complain, then 
they must remember, as the Geometrician expresses in Voltaire’s L’Homme aux quarante écus 
(1762), that they owe their existence to their betters, and thus should be content if their masters 
increase the industry of the nation, since more goods shall be imported and they too will feel its 
effects—albeit in some meager way.58 We shall of course return to the question of equality later 
on, for Rousseau argued in his Premier discours that the meritocratic demands of science were 
at odds with the sort of equality on which stable nations are founded. 
 Contrary to the snooty Voltaire, the philosophe Denis Diderot (1713 – 1784) expressed a 
great admiration for artisans, cataloguing their methods—including those of the shoemaker—in 
his Encyclopédie, which was first published in 1751. And while he regarded natural equality as a 
“chimera,” he believed “equality” of fortunes to be important for preserving the “tranquility” of 
the nation.59 While the philosophes’ focus on doux commerce increased the general estimation 
of the arts (i.e., the trades), it was the mechanical arts (i.e. what we call engineering today) that 
they generally lauded. In his entry “Arts” to the first edition of the Encyclopédie, Diderot praises 
 
57 Voltaire, Voltaire to Jean le Ronde d’Alembert, Septembre 2, 1768, in Œuvres complètes de Voltaire, vol. 57 (Paris: 
Crapelet, 1821), p. 460.  
58 See Voltaire, L’Homme aux quarante écus (Paris: Éditions Slatkine, 1996), p, 52, where Le géomètre maintains: 
“par tout pays le riche fait vivre le pauvre. Voilà l’unique source de l’industrie du commerce. Plus la nation est 
industrieuse, plus elle gagne sur l’étranger. Si nous attrapions de l’étranger dix millions par an pour la balance du 
commerce, il y aurait dans vingt ans deux cent millions de plus dans l’État: ce serait dix francs de plus à répartir 
loyalement sur chaque tête, c’est-à-dire que les négociants feraient gagner à chaque pauvre dix francs de plus […]” 
59 See Denis Diderot, “Citoyen“, in Diderot : Œuvres complètes, vol. 14 (Paris : Garnier Frères, 1876), p. 193 :  “Plus 
les citoyens approcheront de l’égalité de prétentions et de fortune, plus l’État sera tranquille.” 
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Bacon for dispelling the prejudice held by speculative philosophers (i.e., scholastics) against the 
mechanical arts, and for regarding these as “the most important branch of true philosophy”.60 
This too represented a triumph of modern morality over ancient, aristocratic morality. For while 
the mechanical arts came under a favorable light in the Renaissance, they had been regarded as 
the “servile arts” in the Medieval Ages.61 And as Larry Shiner remarks in The Invention of Art: A 
Cultural History, the ancient aristocratic disdain for even the most technical arts was so great 
that, as Plutarch expresses, a young noble might admire Phidias’ statue of Zeus at Olympia, but 
would never “want to be Phidias.”62 
  Finally, it must be stated that the philosophe did not merely laud commerce and trade, 
but luxury itself. Jean-François Saint-Lambert, for instance, maintains that nations must acquire 
"luxury” so that they can achieve that “maturity” required to pursue the science: “pour tirer les 
nations de leur faiblesse et de leur obscurité, et pour leur donner une force, une consistance, une 
richesse qui les élèvent sur les autres nations, il faut qu’il y ait du luxe, il faut que ce luxe aille 
toujours en croissant pour avancer les arts, l’industrie, le commerce, et pour amener les nations 
à ce point de maturité” [in order to lift nations up from weakness and obscurity, and to give them 
a strength, consistency, and wealth that raises them above other nations, there must be luxury, 
and this luxury must always proliferate with a view to advancing the arts, industry, commerce, 
 
60 See Denis Diderot (ed.), Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, vol. 1 (Paris: 
Briasson el Le Breton, 1751-1772), p. 715: “Bacon regardoit l’histoire des Arts méchaniques comme la branche la 
plus importante de la vraie Philosophie.” 
61 See St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, trans. R. J. Blackwell (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox 
Books, 1995), no. 59, p. 29: “Hence, only those arts which are directed to knowing are called free [or liberal] arts, 
whereas those which are directed to some useful end attained by action are called mechanical or servile arts.” 
62 See Larry Shiner, The Invention of Art: A Cultural History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 23. 
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and to lead nations to this degree of maturity].63 Saint-Lambert’s reasoning has certainly endured 
the test of time. Voltaire too praised luxury as an instrumental good in his poem Le Mondain 
(1736), esteeming it the mother of the beaux arts: “J’aime le luxe, même la mollesse / […] Mère 
des arts” [I love luxury, even indolence / […] Mother of the arts].64 These, of course, were vices 
that the philosophes were praising—a tradition that could be traced back to Mandeville. Thus, 
the goal of building society around the arts and sciences resulted in the promotion of the 
following institutions: liberalism, tolerance, commerce, luxury, indolence, and a growing 
bourgeois class, composed entrepreneurs and mechanical artists, but having no need for 
aristocrats and their antiquated notions of excellence.  
I. iii. Opposition to the Administrative Reforms of Louis XIV: Fénelon’s Neoclassicism 
 The works of François Fénelon (1651-1715) seem to predict Mandeville’s unironic praise 
of luxury, as well as Voltaire’s admiration for Louis XIV’s administrative reforms, and ultimately 
the triumph of the bourgeois man under his reign. He is, for our purposes, noteworthy not only 
because he formulates one of the first critiques of Louis XIV’s luxuriousness in Les Aventures de 
Télémaque (1699), but also because his critique shares a great deal in common with Rousseau’s 
in the Premier discours. Like Augustin and Pascal, Fénelon rejects amour propre or what he calls 
“l’amour intéressé” [self-interested love] in the quest for a “pur amour” [pure love] inspired by 
God, one that is perfectly selfless and wholly dedicated to charity.65 But unlike these thinkers, he 
also expresses an admiration for the ancient Romans and Greeks who understood political 
 
63 Jean-François Saint-Lambert, “Lux,” in Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, 
vol. 20 (Paris: Briasson el Le Breton, 1778), p. 546. 
64 Voltaire, Le Mondain, in Œuvres complètes de Voltaire, vol. 3 (Paris: Crapelet, 1817), p. 11.  
65 François Fénelon, Explication des Maximes des Saints sur la Vie intérieure (Paris: Librarie Bloud, 1911), p. 130. 
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excellence in terms of a similar disinterested love, not for God but the polis. What is more, and 
this should make us think of Rousseau, it is their “simplicity” that he considers to be the source 
of their disinterested virtue. For as he maintains in his Lettre sur les occupations de l’Académie 
française (1714): “Diverse personnes sont dégoûtées de la frugalité des moeurs qu’Homère 
dépeint. Mais outre qu’il faut que le poëte s’attache à la ressemblance pour cette antique 
simplicité comme pour la grossièreté de la religion païenne, de plus rien n’est si aimable que 
cette vie des premiers hommes.”66 Fénelon’s admiration here for “this life of the first men” is 
clearly inspired by Roman historians like Sallust, who praises the early Romans for neglecting 
“letters” [les lettres] (p. 17) and instead concentrating on their duties, and Virgil, who prefers the 
“poverty of King Evander” to the luxury, decadence, and “magnificence of Rome” (p. 104). 
Likewise, Rousseau’s critique of the arts and science—which he no doubt associates with the 
luxuriousness of the Sun King—oscillates between these two polls: on the one hand, he affirms 
that vanity or amour propre corrupts society, but on the other, he believes that patriotic glory 
can, under the right circumstances, be harnessed to destroy more corrupting forms of vanity, 
e.g., pride in owning what others cannot afford. Lastly, while I believe that Rousseau’s love for 
antiquity can be traced to numerous modern thinkers—Montesquieu, Montaigne, etc.—it is no 
doubt true that Fénelon is one of his greatest influences in this regard.67 
 Les Aventures de Télémaque were published without the consent of Fénelon, and while 
he does not directly criticize Louis XIV there, he clearly has the reforms of the Sun Kind in mind. 
 
66 Fénelon, Lettre sur les occupations de l’Académie française (Paris: Librairie Charles Delagrave, 1875), p. 100. 
67 Cf. Patrick Riley, “Rousseau, Fénelon and the Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Rousseau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001): 78 - 93, p. 78: “Rousseau owed to Fénelon 
nothing less than the legitimation of his obsession with Greco-Roman antiquity.” 
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For instance, his character the Mentor advises Telemachus to avoid the absolutist tendencies of 
centralized government, which punishes the prudent and industrious by means of a graduated 
income tax, Pontchartrain’s no doubt:  
Les princes avides et sans prévoyance, ne songent qu’à charger d’impôts, ceux d’entre 
leurs sujets qui font les plus vigilans et le plus industrieux pour faire valoir leurs biens : 
c’est qu’ils espèrent en être payés plus facilement : en même temps ils chargent moins 
ceux que la paresse rend plus misérables. Renversez ce mauvais ordre qui accable les 
bons, [et] qui récompense le vice […].68 
The Mentor warns both against commercialism and bureaucracy, and argues that when nations 
place their material wealth first, virtue comes last. Thus, he recounts the story of Erichthon, who 
introduced the use of silver as money in Hellas, but cautioned the people not to conflate it with 
what it represented: things necessary and useful to our health and happiness.69 As the Mentor 
asks Telemachus, between the nation that considers gold and silver its riches, and another that 
measures its wealth in terms of the fertility of its land and people, which is the richer? Indeed, 
we know which version of wealth our modern nations value most. As Fénelon writes:   
Lequel vaut mieux, ajouta Mentor, ou une ville superbe en marbre, en or et en argent, 
avec une campagne négligée et stérile, ou une campagne cultivée et fertile, avec une ville 
 
68 François Fénelon, Les Aventures de Télémaque (Paris: Flammarion, 1912), p. 183.  
69 As the Mentor explains: “Erichthon […] inventa l’usage de l’argent pour la monnoie: il le fit en vue de faciliter le 
commerce entre les îles de la Grèce: mais il prévit l’inconvénient attaché à cette invention. […] Attachez-vous donc 
principalement aux véritables richesses qui satisfont aux vrais besoins de l’homme. Pour l’argent monnoyé, […] 
seroit-il à souhaiter qu’on laissât tomber le commerce à l’égard du toutes les choses qui ne servent qu’à entretenir 
le luxe, la vanité, et la mollesse.” (Ibid., p. 282)  
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médiocre et modeste dans ses mœurs ? Une grande ville fort peuplée d’artisans occupez 
à amollir les mœurs par les délices de la vie, quand elle est entournée d’un royaume 
pauvre et mal cultivé, ressemble à un monstre dont la tête est d’une grosseur énorme, et 
dont tout le corps exténué et privé de nourriture n’a aucune proposition avec cette tête : 
c’est le nombre du peuple et l’abondance des alimens, qui forment la vraye force et la 
vraye richesse d’un royaume. (Fénelon, Les Aventures de Télémaque, p. 321) 
What a resemblance this passage bears to those found in the Premier discours, where Rousseau 
compares Athens, remembered for its marble sculpture, and Sparta, of which no trace remains 
other than its heroes and their noble accomplishments! Rather than trade and commerce, the 
Mentor advices Telemachus to focus on agriculture, which produces people who are “simple in 
their morals […] but healthy, vigorous, robust, undisturbed by lusts, [and] exercised in virtue.”70 
Similarly, Rousseau will affirm that the “rusticity” of the early Romans is a source of their virtue 
in the Premier discours, as well as praise them in the Du Contrat social for privileging those who 
live in the countryside over urbanites.71 
 
70 “Il retranche le faste, la mollesse, et tous les arts qui ne servent qu’à flatter les vices; il fait fleurir les autres arts 
qui sont utiles aux véritables besoins de la vie: surtout il applique ses sujets à l’agriculture. Par-là, il les met dans 
l’abondance des choses nécessaires. Ce peuple laborieux, simple dans ses mœurs, accoutumé à vivre de peu, 
gagnant facilement sa vie par la culture de ses terres, se multiplie à l’infini. Voilà dans ce royaume un peuple 
innombrable, mais un peuple sain, vigoureux, robuste, qui n’est point amolli par les voluptés, qui est exercé à la 
vertu, qui n’est point attaché aux douceurs d’une vie lâche et délicieuse, qui sait mépriser la mort, qui aimerait mieux 
mourir que perdre cette liberté qu’il goûte sous un sage roi appliqué à ne régner que pour faire régner sa raison.” 
(Fénelon, Les Aventures de Télémaque, p. 76) 
71 Rousseau explains this phenomenon in Du contrat social. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du contrat social, in Œuvres 
complètes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, vol. 3, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), IV, 
p. 445 – 446: “De cette distinction des tribus de la ville et des tribus de la campagne résulta un effet digne d'être 
observé, parce qu’à n'y en a point d'autre exemple et que Rome lui dut à la fois la conservation de ses mœurs et 
l'accroissement de son empire. On croirait que les tribus urbaines s'arrogèrent bientôt la puissance et les honneurs, 
et ne tardèrent pas d'avilir les tribus rustiques: ce fut tout le contraire. On connaît le goût des premiers Romains 




 Fénelon’s critique of France’s absolute monarchy is interesting if only because Rousseau 
will mobilize many of the same arguments against the Enlightenment. This helps to confirm the 
thesis that Leo Strauss advances in his article “On the Intentions of Rousseau,” where he argues 
that Rousseau “attacks the Enlightenment as a pillar of despotism or of absolute monarchy.”72 
Unlike Rousseau however, Fénelon did not regard the arts and sciences as potential sources of 
vice and corruption. Hence, the Mentor lauds the Tyrians for having taught humanity how to 
navigate by the stars, and for the esteem in which they hold their geometers and astronomers, 
while criticizing Bocchoris, who lacked “curiosity for the sciences” [curiosité pour les sciences] 
(Fénelon, Les Aventures de Télémaque, p. 29) and ruled over Egypt like a tyrant.  
 Here, we have outlined the political and cultural context in which the Premier discours 
appears. But the Discours is not primarily aimed Louis XIV nor absolute monarchy, but rather at 
the philosophes, whom Rousseau accuses of making science and philosophy fashionable. Thus, 







72 Leo Strauss, “On the Intentions of Rousseau,” in Social Research, vol. 14, no. 4 (1947): 455-486, p. 456. 
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Chapter II: Bacon and the Origins of Scientific Progress  
II. i. Bacon’s New Atlantis: Organizing Monarchy around the Sciences  
 While Colbert might not have been directly inspired by the Baconian model of science, it 
surely inspired philosophes like Condorcet, who wrote his own version of Bacon’s New Atlantis 
many years later. Moreover, the Christian humanism that comes packaged with it represents an 
important stage in the evolution of Republic of Letters, to which we can trace the origins of the 
philosophes. When Bacon rejected scholasticism and adopted his new experimental method, he 
was filled with hope that man might finally be delivered from the pagan cycles of time that St. 
Augustine had once sought to straighten out, as it were, in the City of God.73 More precisely, he 
thought that humanity was now entering a “third period of time” (Bacon, The Advancement of 
Learning, p. 192) in which the world no longer appeared cyclical and therefore static, but rather 
like a growing plant bearing the fruits of knowledge across human history. As Bacon writes in 
Valerius Terminus (~1603): 
[…] knowledge appeareth to be a plant of God’s own planting, to it may seem the 
spreading and flourishing or at least the bearing and fructifying of this plant, by 
providence of God, nay, not only by a general providence but by a special prophecy, was 
 
73 See St. Augustine, The City of God, in The Works of Aurelius Augustine, vol. 1, ed. and trans. Marcus Duds 
(Edenborough: T. & T. Clarke, 1871), book XII, argument xiii, p. 498: “This controversy some philosophers have seen 
no other approved means of solving than by introducing cycles of time, in which there should be a constant renewal 
and repetition of the order of nature; and they have therefore asserted that these cycles will ceaselessly recur, one 
passing away and another coming, though they are not agreed as to whether one permanent world shall pass 
through all these cycles, or whether the world shall at fixed intervals die out, and be renewed so as to exhibit a 
recurrence of the same phenomena—the things which have been, and those which are to be, coinciding. And from 
this fantastic vicissitude they exempt not even the immortal soul that has attained wisdom […].” 
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appointed to this autumn of the world; […] in the prophecy of Daniel, where, speaking of 
the latter times, it is said, “Many shall pass to and fro, and science shall be increased”; as 
if the opening of the world by navigation and commerce, and the further discovery of 
knowledge, should meet in one time or age.74 
While Bacon’s conception of progress is essentially technological, and understood in terms of 
man’s mastery over nature, it is not secular. Rather, Bacon maintains that by mastering nature, 
humanity will be restored to a state not unlike the Garden of Eden, where it will live in perfect 
health and all of its physical needs will be met—in this way, Bacon distinguishes himself from 
Enlightenment philosophers like Fontenelle, who will advance a secular theory of unbounded 
progress. The passage “and science shall be increased” [multiplex erit scientia] derives from the 
prophecy of Daniel 12:4 for the end times. But whereas St. Jerome had interpreted this passage 
to mean that there shall be a “multitude of opinions” and thence chaos in the final days of the 
world, Bacon interprets it as foretelling the coming of “an eternal Sabbath” (Bacon, Confession 
of Faith, p. 211) of knowledge.75 Moreover, it would not seem that Bacon’s vision of progress is 
informed by classical authors like Cicero who otherwise exerted a great influence on Bacon. For 
J.R. Webb points out, Cicero, like his contemporaries, believed that the greatest intellects had 
come before him, and that the world was now in a state of decay (J.R. Webb, “Knowledge Will 
Be Manifold,” p. 323). 
 
74 Francis Bacon, Valerius Terminus, in The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon, ed. John M. Robertson (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), p. 118. 
75 For a discussion of the interpretation of this passage during the Medieval Ages and the Renaissance, see J.R. Webb, 
“Knowledge Will Be Manifold”: Daniel 12.4 and the Idea of Intellectual Progress in the Middle Ages,” in Speculum 
89, no. 2 (April 2014): 307 – 357. On the “multitude of opinions”, see p. 307. 
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 Bacon not only conceives of what might be called an early version of scientific progress, 
but also imagines a political regime resembling Plato’s Republic in which it might be achieved. In 
the Novum Organum for instance, he distinguishes three tiers of people. At the bottom, are those 
who fight amongst their compatriots for material wealth; in the middle, those who fight alongside 
their compatriots against other nations for honor; and at the top, those who seek to bring the 
light of the arts and sciences to all humanity: 
It will, perhaps, be as well to distinguish three species and degrees of ambition. First, that 
of men who are anxious to enlarge their own power in their country, which is a vulgar and 
degenerate kind; next, that of men who strive to enlarge the power and empire of their 
country over mankind, which is more dignified but not less covetous; but if one were to 
endeavor to renew and enlarge the power and empire of mankind in general over the 
universe, such ambition (if it may be so termed) is both more sound and more noble than 
the other two. Now the empire of man over things is founded on the arts and sciences 
alone, for nature is only to be commanded by obeying her. (Bacon, Novum Organum, p. 
105 – 106) 
If the Académie des Sciences was inspired and peopled by first order men, it was established for 
the sake of a second order ruler whose ceaseless wars with neighboring kingdoms would exhaust 
the resources of France—one speaks of King Louis XIV of course. Thus, one remarks the conflict 
between the ambitions of the absolute monarchy and the model that inspired some of its most 
productive institutions. The distance between the two will grow in the years to come, especially 
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with Fontenelle becoming the Académie’s perpetual secretary, and ultimately lead to the 
tensions that give rise to the French Revolution, as many commentators have argued.76 
 Like Plato, Bacon also dreamt of Atlantis. His New Atlantis (1626) differs however from 
the one found in the Critias and Timaeus.77 For Bacon’s exists in the future. In the New Atlantis 
of the future, there is a utopic city named Bensalem, meaning “Son of Wholeness in Hebrew”, 
ruled by the philosopher king Solomon. And while Bacon also imagines three tiers of men there, 
his philosophers do not study arcane moral and metaphysical truths, but instead remain in the 
cave to experiment on the earth’s minerals. Bacon’s philosophers live underground and in total 
obscurity, where they seek to determine the “cause” and “secret motions of things” in order to 
better understand how to improve human health, duration of life and the material conditions: 
“The end of our foundation is the knowledge of causes, and secret motions of things; and the 
enlarging of the bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible […] for curing of 
some diseases, and for prolongation of life […].” (Bacon, New Atlantis, p. 288) These objectives 
are characteristically humanist, and go to the heart of Bacon’s belief that that philosopher must 
be willing to sacrifice both his pride and well-being to succor humanity—here, even the pursuit 
of the truth per se is considered a form of vanity. As we have already seen, the philosophes did 
 
76 See, for instance, Roger Hahn, The Anatomy of a Scientific Institution: The Paris Academy of Sciences, 1666 – 1803 
(Berkeley: University of California, 1971), p. 117: “[…] the utilitarian object of the Academy was recognized from its 
very inception as an essential part of its function. It was a theme reiterated throughout the century by all spokesmen 
of science from Fontenelle to Condorcet. Everyone referred to the possibilities held out by science for the 
improvement of man’s well-being and in the service of the Crown. But the relative importance of these activities 
changed considerably in the decades preceding the French Revolution, and in direct response to the stepped-up 
pace of economic development.” 
77 Francis Bacon, New Atlantis in Essays and New Atlantis, ed. Francis S. Haight (New York: Walter J. Black Inc., 1942). 
In the kingdom of New Atlantis, named Bensalem, the philosophers remain in the cave to study the natural causes 
of things. As their leader, King Solomon explains: “We have large and deep caves of several depths: the deepest are 
sunk six hundred fathom […] some hermits […] choose to live there.” (p. 288 – 289) 
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not share Bacon’s attitude toward such vices, and according to the doctrine of doux commerce, 
were happy to make incentives like wealth and glory incentives for scientific progress. The turn 
from humanism therefore helps to explain how the scientist and philosopher are transformed 
into public figures in the Enlightenment. 
II. ii. “Herculean Labors”: The Renaissance Humanist as Scientist 
 Unlike the philosophes, who eulogized thinkers like Descartes and Newton, the natural 
philosophers of New Atlantis were prepared to live underground, where they would never reap 
the distinctions and honors that their discoveries merited. Instead, they contented themselves 
with undertaking what Renaissance Humanists like Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466 – 1536), the 
Prince of Humanists, referred to as “the labors of Hercules” [Herculei labors].78 This aphorism, 
which Bacon employs elsewhere in his oeuvre, can be traced back to Erasmus’ Adages (1508), 
where such labors are described as being “of a kind to bring the greatest advantage to others, 
and little or no profit to the doer, except a little fame, and a lot of envy”. (Erasmus, Adages, p. 
18) It was the Latin works of Roman authors like Horace and Cicero that Erasmus uncovered the 
Herculean laborer, that is, an individual who is eager “to pursue the advantage of others at the 
greatest expense to oneself, and to bring forth the finest fruits of virtue by being of the greatest 
service to the greatest number, and thus to imitate the immortal power as far as mortal may.” 
(Ibid., p. 20) A Humanist, as the concept is understood during the Renaissance, is someone who 
reads the classics, not merely as student of history, but as a gentleman of sorts in search of the 
 
78 Erasmus of Rotterdam, Adages. In Erasmus on His Times: A Shortened Version of the “Adages” of Erasmus, ed. 
Margaret Mann Phillips (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 18. 
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greatest examples of virtue. This is true, of course, with the exception of the Epicureans, whom 
he regards, like Cicero, with a sort of disdain—we must keep this in mind, for the honnêtes gens 
who emerge after the humanists do not share this disdain, and indeed those like Fontenelle even 
use Cartesian science as a context for advancing Epicurean doctrines.  
 Bacon’s understanding of the philosopher as a herculean laborer is a consistent theme 
throughout his oeuvre. And while it has roots in Cicero and other classical thinkers, there is no 
mistaking its overlap with Christianity. Thus, in the Preface to The Great Instauration (1620), he 
writes the following about the true philosopher:  
[They] consider what are the true ends of knowledge, and that they seek it not either for 
pleasure of the mind, or for contention, or for superiority to others, or for profit, or fame, 
or power, or any of these inferior things; but for the benefit and use of life; and that they 
perfect and govern it in charity. For it was from lust of power that the angels fell, from 
lust of knowledge that man fell; but of charity there can be no excess, neither did angel 
or man ever come in danger by it.79 
The humanist conception of virtue is informed by the Christian notion of charity. Likewise, the 
humanist shares the Christian disdain for vanity, which in Bacon’s case, translates to a critique of 
those who waste their time studying rhetoric and conversation, which he regards as being “trivial 
and effeminate”. In comparison to such types, whom he accuses of being inspired by a 
 
79 Francis Bacon, The Great Instauration, in Francis Bacon: Selected Philosophical Works, ed. Rose-Mary Sargent 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1999), p. 75. 
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“Pygmalion frenzy” for beauty, he offers the model of the herculean laborer, who spends his time 
studying matter instead:  
But the excess herein [in the study of words] is so justly contemptible, that as Hercules, 
when he saw the statue of Adonis, who was the delight of Venus, in the temple, said with 
indignation, “There is no divinity in thee”; so all the followers of Hercules in learning, that 
is, the more severe and laborious inquirers after truth, will despise these delicacies and 
affectations as trivial and effeminate.80 
This is quote is not, as one might imagine, a reproach of the “schoolmen” or scholastics. (Ibid., p. 
42) Rather, Bacon is criticizing a certain “luxuriance of style” that “strangely prevailed about the 
time of Luther”, who “was forced to awaken antiquity to make a party for him”. (Ibid., p. 42 – 43) 
The object of his critique was thus the excesses of the humanists, and more precisely, of a sort 
of wordsmithing they had developed in order to popularize their ideas. As Bacon maintains: 
“because the greatest labor then was to win and persuade the people, eloquence and variety of 
discourse grew into request as the most suitable for the pulpit, and best adapted to the capacity 
of the vulgar”. (Ibid., p. 43) 
 Though it might seem odd to focus on Bacon as a case study here, he helps us to better 
understand the sort of ideas that the honnêtes gens of the 17th century and the philosophes of 
the 18th are rejecting. Bacon, who is influenced both by classical and Christian authors, believes 
 
80 Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, in The Physical and Metaphysical Works of Lord Bacon, ed. Joseph 
Devey (London: George Bell and Sons, 1898), p. 44. 
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that paying too much attention to the art of conversation is a vice,81 while the honnêtes gens will 
conceive of good conversation as the highest end of the “universal man”. In addition, the 
philosophes will make it their principal aim to “win and persuade the people” of their doctrines. 
Neither they nor these honnêtes gens share Bacon’s classicism, and emerge in the wake of 
Querelle des Anciens et de Modernes, from which the moderns seem to emerge victorious. 
Though thinkers like Fénelon and Rousseau are not humanists, they often sight the same ancients 
authors, and similarly express what might be called an Augustinian admiration for the self-less 
philosopher who eschews pride. I believe that we can be understand how these positions are 
abandoned by studying the Republic of Letters, which begins as a humanist society and ultimately 








81 It should be mentioned however that Bacon did not universally regard rhetoric or the study of conversation as 
vicious. See Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, p. 44: “Yet the illustrating the obscurities of philosophy 
with sensible and plausible elocution is not hastily to be condemned; for hereof we have eminent examples in 
Xenophon, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and Plato […].” 
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Chapter III: Humanist Origins 
III. i. The Early Republic of Letters: Erasmus and the Revival of Ciceronian Humanism 
  If the private sphere of the philosophes was the salon, then that of the Humanists was 
the Respublica literaria [Republic of Letters], the vast epistolary network whose origins could be 
traced back to the early 1500s. The bonae literae—or lettered men—of this republic considered 
themselves civis mundi [citizens of the world] in the Socratic sense and discussed in their letters 
how they might resolve religious and social conflicts in their respective villages and kingdoms. 
They accomplished this by looking to ancient philosophers such as Seneca and Cicero, whom they 
regarded as “foregleams” of Christianity,82 and in whose works they discovered the moral and 
rhetorical tools for resolving the conflicts of their day; for instance, Hugo Grotius’ (1583 – 1645) 
subordinated matters of faith to a Ciceronian natural law framework in order to reduce both 
domestic and international religious tensions.83 Their contact with one another was not always 
confined to the world of letters however. For they not only bore witness to the advent of the 
printing press, but were also known to convene in person in publishing houses—albeit with far 
less frequency than the philosophes. It should be mentioned, however, that the early Republic of 
Letters of which men like Erasmus and Grotius were a part was a cloistered group, being 
 
82 See The Professors of Chicago Theology Seminary, Current Discussions in Theology, vol. 5 (Chicago: Congregational 
Sunday School and Publishing, 1888), p. 144: “From the time of Jerome until the period of the Humanists, Seneca 
was regarded as a Christian, so striking was the similarity between some utterances of his and those of the New 
Testament.” 
83 This is particularly apparent in the case of Grotius’ De fide et perfidia (1602) [Of Good and Bad Faith], where he 
appropriates Cicero’s concept of fides publica [public faith]. As one commentator has noted, “[Grotius …] suggests 
that fides is to be respected even towards those whose religious beliefs one does not share. Grotius mentions 
specifically the fidelity to one’s promises: he suggests that promises are to be kept even to heretics. Would this not 
be the case, he observes, human society itself would dissolve over religious disputes.” See Marc de Wilde, “Fides 




composed of “érudits” [erudites] and “savants” [scholars].84 Therefore, it did not appeal, as the 
salon discussions of the philosophes did, to a greater audience. This later changes in the 1670s, 
when a number of journals concerning the affairs of the Republic of Letters appear. For in 
addition to dealing with the usual erudite subjects, they introduce journalistic ones, thereby 
appealing to an audience of “curieux” [curious persons]. (Lambe, “Critics and Skeptics in the 
Seventeenth-Century Republic of Letters,” p. 277) Of course, it was around this time too that 
Fontenelle began composing his eulogies of the scientists of the Académie des Science—another 
hit among the curieux. 
 One might thus argue the following: whereas early members of the Republic of Letters, 
and particularly the Renaissance Humanists, were part of a cloistered and erudite society, those 
who replaced them toward the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th century engaged in 
popularizing and thereby vulgarizing the Republic of Letters’ goals. As Patrick Lambe points out, 
the honnête hommes regarded the erudition of the Humanists, and especially their interest in 
mastering Latin, as qualities of “picking grammarians concerned only with arguing over words” 
(Ibid., p. 280). In fact, they even compared such “picking” to the scholastic tendencies that the 
Humanists themselves had criticized as pointless word games. This attitude is borne out in Bayle’s 
Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697), where his exoteric praise of the Humanists’ erudition 
conceals an esoteric critique of their lack of cleverness and antiquarianism:  
 
84 Patrick Lambe, “Critics and Skeptics in the Seventeenth-Century Republic of Letters,” Harvard Theological Review 
81, no. 3 (July 1988): 271 – 296, p. 277. 
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Je crois que le XVIe siècle a produit un plus grand nombre de savants hommes que le 
XVIIe ; et, néanmoins, il s’en faut beaucoup que le premier de ces deux siècles de lumières 
que l’autre. Pendant que le règne de la critique et de la philologie a duré, on a vu par 
toute l’Europe plusieurs prodiges d’érudition. L’étude de la nouvelle philosophie et celle 
des langues vivantes ayant introduit un autre goût, on a cessé de voir cette vaste et cette 
profonde littérature ; mais en récompense, il s’est répandu dans la république des lettres 
un certain esprit plus fin et un discernement plus exquis. Les gens sont aujourd’hui moins 
savants et plus habiles.85 
The new generation of hommes des lettres are “less knowledgeable” but “cleverer”. Surely this 
is the seventeenth century equivalent of complementing one as being “book smart.” In Bayle’s 
view, the humanists are only interested in technical distinctions, but are unable to understand 
the normative significance of the ancients, Bayle, by contrast, presented “Les savants” (i.e., the 
great minds of antiquity) as heroes or even “‘media’ figures” (Ibid., p. 278), believing that his age 
not only required intellectual but also spiritual illumination.86 
 If the philosophes succeed in popularizing and vulgarizing a scholarly Republic of Letters, 
then it is by reshaping the ethical tenants and rhetorical tools of the Humanists. However, what 
they received from the Humanists had already been filtered through the minds of honnêtes gens 
of the 17th century. In order therefore to understand how the philosophes exploited this tradition 
 
85 Pierre Bayle, Aconce, in Dictionnaire historique et critique, vol. 1 (Paris: Desoer, 1820), note D, p. 183. 
86 “‘Les savants’ became in Bayle and in his readers ‘media’ figures who were more important in themselves than for 
their work; Rend Rapin, in his commentary on Thucydides and Titus Livy (which is paraphrased by Bayle in his article 
on "Aconce"), argues that the new generation is not satisfied merely with reconstructing the critical apparatus of 
the ancient authors, but wishes to gain greater illumination by entering into their spirit […].” (Lambe, ““Critics and 
Skeptics in the Seventeenth-Century Republic of Letters,” p. 279) 
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to advertise new mores, it should be important to study the development of the Republic in its 
various phases: (1) the Humanists, (2) the honnêtes gens and (3) the philosophes. One will note 
that, whereas the Humanists contented themselves with resolving the conflicts of their day, the 
philosophes did not hesitate to start new ones. This, as we shall see, results from the philosophes 
abandoning the Ciceronian manner of conversation [sermo] that Renaissance Humanists such as 
Erasmus had adopted in the Protestant-Catholic schism.  
 Among the bonae literae of the Republic of Letters one finds some of the greatest minds 
of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, including not only those whom we have mentioned, but 
many others like Rene Descartes (1596 – 1660), Marin Mersenne (1588 – 1638), and Gottfried 
W. Leibniz (1646 – 1716). Our study of the early Republic of Letters shall focus on two figures in 
particular however, Desiderius Erasmus (1466 – 1536) and Thomas More (1478 – 1535), as both 
are prime examples of the humanist ethic. They do not seek to enlighten the spirt of their age, 
but rather see themselves as arbiters, and search amongst the ancients for the rhetorical tools 
with which they might arbitrate the greatest conflict of their day, the Catholic-Protestant schism.  
The Renaissance Humanist is first and foremost a classicist, ambitious to restore ancient 
Greek and Latin thinkers to their former glory. One of the classical authors that attracted More 
and Erasmus the most was Cicero, the Roman orator and statesman who quite literally wrote the 
book on humanitas.87 Cicero composed the work that would later be published as De Officiis or 
On Duty as an instruction manual for his son on how to navigate life—and if it were not for the 
 
87 See Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Moral Duty, in Ethical Writings of Cicero, trans. Andrew P. Peabody (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1887). 
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fact that it would later become one of the most celebrated works in the Western canon, it would 
have been a wasted effort, as his son was a drunk.88 Nonetheless, Cicero sets out there to show, 
as Plato had done before him, that honestum [moral goodness/honor] and utile [utility] are not 
at odds with one another, but instead fellow travelers. Cicero’s humanist resembles most what 
one today would call a gentleman, “master of the ready word, of wit, of banter, of urbanity”.89 
His honestum furnishes him the probity and regard for one’s honor necessary for pursuing the 
truth in earnest. Without this quality, he would also fail to master the art of sermo [conversation], 
which obliges one to treat one’s interlocutor bona fida [in good faith] all the while showing 
decorum [propriety].90 Sermo is the dual art of pursing the truth and acquiring friends along the 
way, being akin to Socratic Dialogue—although Cicero deliberately refrains from calling it logos 
[dialogue] given the practical, rather than philosophical, aim of the work. One must distinguish 
sermo from the sort of conentio [disputation] in which the politician engages. As a statesman, 
Cicero was involved in and even welcomed numerous conentiones, but always with a view to 
minimizing its partisan and divisive effects. The humanist as Cicero conceives of him, must 
employ these gentlemanly virtues for the betterment of his family, his friends, his race and 
ultimately his commonwealth.91 
 
88 On Cicero’s son, see Peter White, Cicero in Letters: Epistolary Relations of the Late Republic (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), p. 9: “Cicero’s son, the only make of his family to survive the civil wars, gained a reputation 
in later life as a drunkard and a hothead.” 
89 On the Ciceronian humanist as gentleman, see E. K. Rand, “The Humanism of Cicero,” in Proceedings Amer. Philos. 
Soc. 71, no.4 (1932): 201 - 216, p. 207.  
90 On the role of sermo in Cicero’s De Officiis, see Michele Kennerly, “Stoic Sociality in Cicero’s De Officiis,” in 
Rhetorica 28, no. 2 (2010): 119 – 137, p. 119: “By connecting [stoic sociality] with sermo, and sermo with oratory-
glory, Cicero fits Stoicism to Rome’s political contours and also ushers future leaders of public affairs into both 
rhetorical and philosophical conversation—mild-mannered modes of discourse—during apolitically turbulent time.” 
91 See Cicero, On Moral Duty, I, (p. 35 – 36): “To take our departure from the tie of common humanity, of which I 




While the ambition of philosophes like the Marquis de Condorcet (1743 – 1794) was no 
less than establishing “equality of fortunes” between all empires, early men of letters inspired by 
Cicero adopted a bottom-up approach to improving humanity. Arbiters rather than advocates, 
patriots rather than cosmopolitans, they felt a deep connection to their respective communities. 
As Pierre Tuynman writes in his article on the lettered Petrus Scriverius (1576 – 1660):  
The bonae literae were either employed directly "for the common good," or they were 
deliberately intended as a contribution to the commonwealth of which one considered 
oneself to be a part: and that meant, at the very least, a further elevation of the glory of 
one's country or hometown.92 
The earthly relation that Cicero cherished the most however was friendship, the pursuit of the 
truth with likeminded and virtuous men. “But of all the relations,” writes the statesman in one 
beautiful passage, “none is more excellent, none more enduring, then when good men, of like 
character, are united in intimacy. For the moral rectitude of which I have so often spoken, even 
if we see it in a stranger, yet moves us, and calls out our friendship for him in whom it dwells.” 
(Cicero, On Moral Duty, p. 36) Humanists too held friendship in the highest esteem, which is 
evinced in a letter from Erasmus to Servatius, where the former seeks to regain the latter’s 
Platonic love for him: 
 
of feeling. […] the union of blood, especially, binds men in mutual kindness and affection; for it is a great thing to 
have the same statues of ancestors, the same rites of domestic worship, the same sepulchers. […] At the same time, 
nothing is more lovable, and nothing brings men into more intimate relations, than the common possession of these 
moral excellences; for those who have the same virtuous desires and purposes love one another as they love 
themselves, and they realize what Pythagoras would have in friendship, the unifying of plurality.” 
92 Pierre Tuynman, “Petrus Scriverius 12 January 1576 – 30 April 1660,” Quaerendo 7 (1977): 5 – 45, p. 11 
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As nothing in nature is so delightful or so sweet, as to love and be loved, so nothing to my 
mind is more distressing or more unhappy, than to love without return; and as nothing is 
more human than to love the being that loves you, so nothing is more alien to humanity 
or nearer to the nature of a wild animal than to repulse, not to say hate, such a being. 
You will perhaps suspect that I have composed this exordium, to attempt a reconciliation 
and patch up again our friendship.93 
It is through friendship and intimate conversation that one raises oneself above the animalistic 
to the dignity of humanity. Here, one does not win an argument at the other’s expense, but rather 
discovers the truth with him: “The friendly soul who shows one lost way, / Lights, as it were, 
another’s lamp from his. / Though he has lit another’s, his own still shines.”94 Of all the traditions 
that the humanists pass down to the honnêtes gens and philosophes of the following centuries, 
it is their esteem for sermo or the art of conversation that has the most lasting impact—studying 
how this art evolves will be essential for making sense of Rousseau’s eventual critique of its 
water-down practice amongst the philosophes. 
 Some might take issue with the characterization of Erasmus as an arbiter, for he was also 
a brilliant critic, and thus an instigator of controversies. Endowed with both pluck and wit, his 
arrows struck the fanatical and impious alike. In his satirical In Praise of Folly (1511), he took aim 
at the pageantry and petty one-upmanship of the monks, whom he accused of depriving the 
beggars of their income; only if they first learned to be content with themselves, if they learned 
 
93 Erasmus, Erasmus to Servatius (Epistle 8), in The Epistles of Erasmus, trans. Francis Morgan Nichols (New York: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1901), p. 48. 
94 A reference to a poem by Ennius in Cicero’s De Officiis (Cicero, On Moral Duties, p. 34). 
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“self-love”, could they again become useful to society.95 On the other hand, he shot through the 
bombast and pedantry of the Italian Ciceronians who had dared to invoke the displeasure of the 
“barbarian” classicist from the North.96 In the Ciceronianus (1528), he accuses them of being like 
schoolboys, more interested in proving that they have memorized their Cicero than in using the 
orators’ tools to advance the Christian message.97 And to his great fortune, Erasmus was able to 
loose his arrows from the imposing citadel of Pope Leo X’s favor—at least until the Pope died.98 
 Erasmus’ critiques, of course, were those of a moderate. To prove that he was an arbiter, 
and that he successfully employed Cicero’s rhetorical tools to this end, one need only examine 
his correspondence with Martin Luther (1483 – 1546). In addition to these works, the Prince of 
Humanists had re-translated the Greek passages of the New Testament into Latin, publishing a 
new edition in 1516 with critical philological commentary. In this edition, Martin Luther found 
considerable support for many of his proposals for reform.99 Erasmus thought many of Luther’s 
 
95 See Erasmus of Rotterdam, In Praise of Folly (London: Reeves and Turner, 1876), p. 37, where Erasmus writes the 
following about self-love: “In short, without self-love, instead of beautiful, you shall think yourself an old beldam of 
fourscore; instead of youthful, you shall seem just dropping into the grave; instead of eloquent, a mere stammerer; 
and in lieu of gentle and complaisant, you shall appear like a downright country clown; it being so necessary that 
everyone should think well of himself before he can expect the good opinion of others.” 
96 See Erika Rummel, The Erasmus Reader (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1990), p. 123: “Even Erasmus, who 
was considered the most eloquent of the northern humanists, was held in contempt and called a ‘barbarian’ by these 
[Italian Ciceronians].” 
97 See Erasmus of Rotterdam, The Ciceronian in Collected Works of Erasmus, vol. 6, ed. A.H.T. Levi (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1986), p. 368, where the fictional character Bulephorus characterizes the Italian 
Ciceronians in the following way: “One could approve of a speech like [that of a famous Italian Ciceronian] as being 
a demonstrated of ability and intelligence if it were delivered by a schoolboy before his fellow pupils in class […].” 
98 When, for instance, Erasmus was accused of heresy by the monks whom he had mocked, Pope Leo dismissed their 
claims without giving them any serious consideration. See Frank M. Gibson, “Erasmus: A Humanist among 
Reformers,”, The Sewanee Review 30, no. 1 (January 1922): 2 – 19, p. 13: “The University of Louvain now proposed 
to make a formal examination of the works of Erasmus with a view to delating him in due form to the Pope for 
heresy. Erasmus coolly re marked that in order to make the proposed examination they must first learn some Greek 
and Latin. The examination was made, however, and point after point was brought before Pope Leo, who placidly 
decided them all in Erasmus's favor as fast as they were made.” 
99 As Gibson writes, “Erasmus's New Testament had done more than anything else to put into the hands of educated 
men the proofs of many of Luther's assertions”. (Gibson, “Erasmus: A Humanist among Reformers”, p. 16) 
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criticisms just, writing to Melanchthon in 1519 that: “Martin Luther’s way of life wins all men’s 
approval here, but opinions vary about his teaching. […] He has made some just criticisms, but I 
wish they had been as happily expressed as they were outspoken.”100 As one notes however, he 
was disconcerted by Luther’s tone. In A Discussion of Free Will, a Warrior Shielding the Free Will 
against the Enslaved Will By Martin Luther (1526), Erasmus reproached the rising Protestant for 
engaging in contentiones [disputations] and for recruiting political partisans, when he might have 
succeeded in convincing his interlocutors with Ciceronian sermo.101 Inspired by Cicero, who once 
wrote that “skill in the settlement of controversies is more desirable than courage in disputing 
them by arms” (Cicero, On Moral Duties, p. 50), Erasmus sought to deescalate what would 
become the bloodiest controversy of the following century, the Thirty Years War. 
III. ii. The Renaissance Humanism of Thomas More: Science, Utopia and Tolerance  
 Both Erasmus and More exhorted Christians to eschew dogmatism and practice religious 
tolerance, but neither wavered in his devotion to the Catholic Church. In stark contrast, Voltaire 
advocated for religious tolerance, while setting out “to assemble the sacred flock” [rassembler le 
saint troupeau] of philosophes and “extirpate the Church” [extirper l’infâme].102 Indeed, More 
 
100 Erasmus, Erasmus to Melanchthon, 22 April 1519. In Collected Works of Erasmus, vol. 76, trans. Peter Macardle 
and Clarence H. Miller, and ed. Charles Trinkhaus, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), p. xxxi. 
101 See Gary Remer, Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1996), p. 96. Remer shows how Erasmus uses the language of Cicero in Hyperaspistes to reproach Luther for 
his contentious criticisms of the Church: “Erasmus refers to Luther’s argument as contentio in LB 10:1277B and 1290C 
[of the Hyperaspistes], and to Luther as contending [contendis] in LB 10:1281E and 1282B. Erasmus also distinguishes 
between his own ‘well-balanced inquiries [inquisitions] of learned men’ and Luther’s “quarrelsome disputes 
[contentiones] carried on before the populace.” 
102 For the first citation, “rassembler le saint troupeau”, see Voltaire to Damilaville, 19 September 1764, in Œuvres 
complètes de Voltaire, vol. 8, (Paris: Antoine Augustin Renouard, 1821), p. 562. For the second, “extirper l’infâme”, 
see Voltaire to Madame d’Épinay, 1 July 1759, in Œuvres complètes de Voltaire, vol. 28 (Paris: L. Hachette, 1861), p. 




was not only dedicated to the Church, but quite literally put his neck on the line for it. Serving as 
High Chancellor in the court of Henry VIII, More embodied the Ciceronian ideal of the vita activa 
of the statesman. The refusal to recognize that Tudor Monarch as the Supreme Head of the 
Church of England resulted in More’s beheading—a sacrifice for which Pope John Paul II would 
later venerate him as the patron saint of “Statesmen and Politicians”.103 While Thomas More’s 
actions demonstrate his devotion to the Catholic Church, works like his Utopia (1515) reveal a 
patriot concerned with the maintenance of our civic duties, and show that, despite his criticisms 
of the Church and his refusal to respect the State’s sanctioned sacrilege, he did not regard himself 
as standing above these institutions, unlike many of the philosophes.104 
 In Utopia More draws on another significant theme found in Cicero, opposing negotium 
[duty] to the otium [leisure] of his character Raphael Hythloday, a young nobleman who divided 
his inheritance among his brothers in order to travel the world and study philosophy without the 
interference of civic and domestic duties.105 Raphael describes to More a utopic island named 
 
complètes de Voltaire, vol. 6, (Paris: Antoine Augustin Renouard, 1821), p. 112, where he writes: “Courez tous sur 
l'Infâme habilement; ce qui m'intéresse, c'est la propagation de la foi, de la vérité, le progrès de la philosophie et 
l'avilissement de l'Infâme.” 
103 For more on this, see Pope John Paul II, “Proclaiming Thomas More Patron of Statesmen and Politicians”, Vatican, 
last modified October 31, 2000, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/motu_proprio/documents/hf_jp-
ii_motu-proprio_20001031_thomas-more.html: “Saint Thomas More […] distinguished himself by his constant 
fidelity to legitimate authority and institutions precisely in his intention to serve not power but the supreme ideal of 
justice. His life teaches us that government is above all an exercise of virtue. Unwavering in this rigorous moral 
stance, this English statesman placed his own public activity at the service of the person, especially if that person 
was weak or poor; he dealt with social controversies with a superb sense of fairness; he was vigorously committed 
to favouring and defending the family; he supported the all-round education of the young. His profound detachment 
from honours and wealth, his serene and joyful humility, his balanced knowledge of human nature and of the vanity 
of success, his certainty of judgement rooted in faith: these all gave him that confident inner strength that sustained 
him in adversity and in the face of death.” 
104 Thomas More, Utopia, ed. Stephen Duncombe (New York: Minor Compositions, 2012). 
105 As one commentator writes, “implicit in [the ethical framework of Utopian republicanism] is that individuals 
should reject otium and embrace negotium (the vita activa), performing their official to their friends and family, 
promoting the gloria of the civitas or patria, and securing honor for themselves”. See Eric Nelson’s “Greek Nonsense 
in More’s Utopia,” The Historical Journal 44, no. 4 (December 2001): 889 – 917, p. 893. 
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Utopia that he visited in his travels abroad—a theme that Bacon will reuse in New Atlantis. Utopia 
bears a marked resemblance to Plato’s Republic. For instance, Hythloday approvingly describes 
how private property has been abolished in Utopia and wealth redistributed equally among the 
citizenry, such that everyone has his or her needs met: 
In all other places it is visible that, while people talk of a commonwealth, every man only 
seeks his own wealth; but there, where no man has any property, all men zealously pursue 
the good of the public [… ;] in Utopia, where every man has a right to everything, they all 
know that if care is taken to keep the public stores full no private man can want anything; 
for among them there is no unequal distribution, so that no man is poor, none in 
necessity, and though no man has anything, yet they are all rich; for what can make a man 
so rich as to lead a serene and cheerful life, free from anxieties; neither apprehending 
want himself, nor vexed with the endless complaints of his wife? (More, Utopia, II, p. 184 
– 185) 
More rejects Raphael’s endorsement of Utopia’s communism however, for he argues that it also 
deprives nations of “all nobility, magnificence, splendour, and majesty”. (Ibid., p. 190) If Raphael 
is truly interested in improving the commonwealth, adds another character by the name of Peter, 
then he ought to make himself “useful” by entering into the service of the king. (Ibid., p. 35) 
Despite his reproaches, More is not entirely unsympathetic to Raphael’s description of the 
underclasses. As one commentator has indicated, Raphael’s account of the exploitation of the 
poor in other kingdoms, where “the condition of beasts might seem far preferable” (Ibid., p. 186), 
are frequent enough to conclude that “[one] of More’s greatest concerns is with the injustices 
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created by economic inequalities”.106 Renaissance humanist like More and Erasmus were 
sensitive to the abuses of the rich and noble, but always remained faithful to their institutions, 
and moderate in their critiques, owing to their Ciceronian sense of duty.107 Bacon and More in 
particular always sought to effect change in their capacity as statesmen, rather than as critics on 
the outside—something which Rousseau will remind the philosophes of in his first Discours.  
 Among other things, Raphael gives an account of the laws concerning religious tolerance 
in Utopia, were “every man might be of what religion he pleased, and might endeavour to draw 
others to it by the force of argument and by amicable and modest ways[…]; but that he ought to 
use no other force but that of persuasion, and was neither to mix with it reproaches nor violence; 
and such as did otherwise were to be condemned to banishment or slavery”. (More, Utopia, p. 
169) Neither More nor Peter offer any objection to these laws. Indeed, following Raphael’s long 
description of Utopia, More responds that “there are many things in the commonwealth of 
Utopia that I rather wish, than hope, to see followed in our own governments”. (Ibid., p. 190) 
More might have wished for King Henry VIII to adopt such a program for religious tolerance, but 
was unwilling to squander his “hope” on it. In any case, what we learn from Erasmus and More 
is that the duty-bound humanist is not an activist, but an arbiter. And one can be certain that 
 
106 See Mildred Witt Caudle, “Utopia: Origins and Purposes,” in Social Science 45, no. 3 (June 1970): 163 – 169, p. 
166 
107 Erasmus not only sought to repair divisions within the Catholic Church, but also between the classes, defending 
the plebeians against the abuses of the nobles in The Complaint of Peace (1521): “The people, the ignoble vulgar, 
despised as they are, are the very persons who originally raise great and fair cities to their proud eminence; who 
conduct the commercial business of them entirely; and, by their excellent management, fill them with opulence. 
Into these cities, after they are raised and enriched by plebeians, creep the satraps and grandees, like so many 
drones into a hive; pilfer what was earned by others’ industry; and thus, what was accumulated by the labour of the 
many, is dissipated by the profligacy of the few; what was built by plebeians on upright foundations, is leveled to 
the ground by cruelty and royal patrician injustice.” See Erasmus of Rotterdam, The Complaint of Peace, trans. 
Thomas Paynell (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1917), p. 34 – 35. 
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neither fear nor cowardice motivates him to adopt such a stance, for More gave his life when his 
principles would not have otherwise remained intact. By contrast, the honnêtes hommes sought 
















Chapter IV: Honnêtes Hommes and les Bons Airs 
IV. i. The Honnêtes Hommes of the Grand Monde: Nicolas Faret and the Chevalier de Méré 
The honnête homme evolves from the Renaissance Humanist. Like his predecessor, he is 
a student of Cicero’s De Officiis, and thus devoted to perfecting his speech and deportment. But 
unlike the Humanist, he places a greater emphasis on pleasure than utility, preferring to delight 
in the conversation of the salon rather than exercise his capacities as a statesman in the court. 
Indeed, men of letters such as Jean de la Bruyère (1622 – 1673) and Montesquieu (1689 – 1755) 
will later mock these honnêtes gens for their superficiality. In the Lettres Persanes for instance, 
the foreign travelers are astounded by the effeminate and superficial conversations to be heard 
in the salons.108 The honnête homme has Epicurean tendencies without being one per se, and 
would no doubt have rejected the life of one of Bacon’s scientists or More’s statesman for that 
of the “universal man”, as Michel de Montaigne (1533 – 1592) calls him. Science, politics and 
business quite simply do not produce the bons airs of conversation that a man well-versed in all 
subjects—but not overly infatuated with any one subject—might conjure.  
 One of the earliest accounts uniquely dedicated to the subject of the honnête homme is 
Nicolas Faret’s (1596 – 1646) L’Honneste homme où l’art de plaire au court (1630).109 He sets out 
 
108 See Montesquieu, Lettres Persanes, in Œuvres complètes de Montesquieu, vol. 1, ed. Édouard Laboulaye (Paris; 
Garnier Frères, 1875), letter 36, p. 141, where Usbek describes the superficiality of the conversations that he hears 
in the cafés of Paris.  See Jean de la Bruyère, Les Caractères de la Bruyère, suivis des Caractères des Théophraste 
(Paris: Librairie d’Abel Ledoux, 1836), where he mocks the effeminate and superficial nature of certain pseudo-
honnêtes hommes. Also see Molière, Les Femmes savantes: comédie en cinq actes (London: Librarie Hachette, 1892), 
where he tells the story of three honnêtes femmes—Philaminte, Armande and Henriette—who are duped by the 
pseudo-honnête homme Trissotin into thinking that he is a great man of letters and learned in the sciences, when in 
reality he is simply looking to marry for wealth. 
109 Nicholas Faret, L’Honnête homme ou l’art de plaire à la court (Genève: Slatkine, 2011) 
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there to advise noblemen on how “to live in the corruption of the court without being [morally] 
sullied” [vivre dans la corruption de la cour, sans estre souïllé]. (Faret, L’Honneste homme, p. 36) 
The text does not therefore instruct noblemen on how to be honorable and useful, but merely 
on how to preserve one’s own honor. That being said, the sort of obsequious deportment that 
Faret prescribes gives one the impression that he is not primarily interested in the preservation 
of the nobleman’s honor, but more simply in his own well-being. To this end, Faret counsels the 
following: one must study the humor of the prince, whether it be bellicose, peaceful or scholarly, 
and “conform” accordingly. (Ibid.) Furthermore, one must be submissive, abstain from giving 
one’s honest opinion, and learn to affirm the prince’s judgement without appearing overly 
sycophantic, which means “proposing his opinion”: 
Il n’y a rien qui choque si rudiment les esprits des Grands que cette obéissance forcée. 
[…] C’est pourquoy les plus subtiles Politiques […] enseignent de ne luy donner jamais que 
des conseils timides et douteux ; c’est à dire de parler à luy d’un accent plein de 
soumission, et qui semble plutost proposer son avis, que de l’approuver […]. (Ibid., p. 55) 
How different Faret’s guide on the art of conversation is from Cicero’s, who railed against Marc 
Antony and his followers in fourteen Philippicae delivered before the senate, and ultimately paid 
with his head—a sort of Humanist tradition. Faret’s guide also represents the beginning of the 
exodus of bonae literae from the public sphere to the private one. If honestum cannot be united 
with utile in the former, then perhaps it can at least be united with pleasure in the latter.  
 The retreat of the honnêtes gens of the 17th century into the private world of the salon is 
also evinced by Antoine Gombaud, the Chevalier de Méré (1607 – 1684), in an essay entitled “De 
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la vraïe honnêteté”. 110 According to de Méré, the ambitions of his fellow courtiers and the 
intrigues that they precipitate stifle the “bon air” [good atmosphere] after which the veritable 
honnête homme seeks. (de Méré, “De la vraïe honnêteté”, p. 70) One must distinguish, as the 
Chevalier holds, between the court and the “grand monde” [high society], or the world in which 
les grands circulate. (Ibid.) For it is in the latter environment that the honnête homme achieves 
with the greatest facility his aim of producing a light and joyous atmosphere by the art of 
conversation: 
[…] comme la Cour de France est la plus grande et la plus belle, qui nous soit connuë, et 
qu’elle se montre souvent si tranquille, que les meilleurs Ouvriers n’ont rien à faire, qu’à 
se reposer ; il y a toûjours eu de certains Faineans sans mêtier, mais qui n’étoient pas sans 
mérite, et qui ne songeoient qu’à bien vivre, et qu’à se produire de bon air. […] ce sont 
d’ordinaire des Esprits doux et des Cœurs tendres ; des gens fiers et civils ; hardis et 
modestes ; qui ne sont ni avers ni ambitieux […] : Ils ont guéres pour but, que d’apporter 
la joïe par-tout, et leur plus grand soin ne tend qu’à mériter de l’estime, et qu’à se faire 
aimer. (Ibid., p. 69 – 70) 
Like the Renaissance humanist and Cicero, the honnête homme described by de Méré holds the 
art of conversation in the highest esteem. Unlike the former however, it is not utility but rather 
living well, joy and being loved—decidedly epicurean ends—with which his honestum coincides. 
What is honest is necessarily pleasant. What is pleasant is not necessarily useful however. The 
 




honnêtes hommes that de Méré describes here are “certains Faineans sans mêtier” [certain do-
nothings without an occupation] who eschew business for leisure.111 Alas, the self-sacrificing 
herculean laborer has no place amongst these decidedly self-interested honnêtes hommes. This 
proclivity for leisure, good conversation and ultimately self-interest is one to what Montaigne 
also frankly admits in his essay “De la vanité”: 
Que ne feroy plustot que de lire un contrat, et plustot que d’aller secouant ces paperasses 
poudreuses, serf de mes négoces ? ou encore pis de ceux d’autruy, comme font de gens, 
à pris d’argent ? Je n’ay rien cher que le soucy et la peine, et ne cherche qu’à m’anonchalir 
et avachir.112 
The honnête homme eschews business and other duties, and instead “seeks only to make himself 
nonchalant and to recline”.  
IV. ii. The Honnête Homme as Universal Man: Montaigne, La Rouchefoucauld and Pascal 
The term honnête homme figures frequently in the Essais (1580 - 1595) of Montagne, who 
likewise advises against specialization, a trait surely required for success in any bourgeois 
endeavor, and prescribes instead the study of ethics and morality for the formation of what he 
 
111 Also see Le Chevalier de Méré, De l’Eloquence et de l’Entretien, in Œuvres posthumes de M. le Chevalier de Méré 
(Paris: Jean & Michel Guignard, 1700), p. 142 - 143, “Je ne voudrois parler que bien rarement des choses, qui ne sont 
point de la connoissance ordinaire du monde, comme de la Politique, de la Chicane, et des Affaires: Ce sont des 
sujets ennuïeux pour les esprits bien faits.” 
112 See Michel de Montaigne, “De la Vanité,” in Les Essais, ed. Jean Balsamo, Michel Magnien and Catherine Magnien-
Simonin (Paris: Gallimard, 2007), p. 998. 
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refers to as “les âmes universelles” [universal souls].113 That the honnête homme should avoid 
specializing, neither consecrating too much of his attention to his business affairs nor to the study 
of theoretical fields such as mathematics, is also reiterated by Blaise Pascal (1623 – 1662) in a 
fragment entitled  “Honnête homme” from the Pensées (1670): “We should neither be able to 
say: he is a mathematician, nor a preacher, nor eloquent, but that he is an honest man. This 
universal quality alone pleases me. When I see a man memorize his book, it is a bad sign. I prefer 
that one learns from nothing but experience and the occasion to use it.” [Il faut qu’on n’en puisse 
[dire] ni : il est mathématicien, ni prédicateur, ni éloquent, mais il est honnête homme. Cette 
qualité universelle me plaît seule. Quand en voyant un homme on se souvient de son livre, c’est 
mauvais signe. Je voudrais qu’on s’aperçût d’aucune qualité que par la rencontre et l’occasion 
d’en user.]114 It is neither the books one reads nor the knowledge that one possess that interests 
the honnête homme, but rather the character that one constructs from that knowledge—as 
Socrates explains in the Phaedrus, those who “put their trust in writing […] will know nothing. 
And they will be difficult to get along with, since they will merely appear to be wise instead of 
really being so.”115 
 Perhaps the universal nature of the honnête homme is summarized best in the Maximes 
morales (1665) of La Rochefoucauld (1613 – 1680): “The veritable honest man is one who boasts 
 
113 See Michel de Montaigne, “De la présomption,” in Les Essais, ed. Jean Balsamo, Michel Magnien and Catherine 
Magnien-Simonin (Paris: Gallimard, 2007), p. 691: “Mais les belles âmes, ce sont les âmes universelles, ouvertes, et 
prestes à tout: si non instruites, au moins instruisables.” 
114 Blaise Pascal, “Honnête homme,” in Pensées, opuscules et lettres (Paris: Garnier, 2010), p. 427. See “Pensées 
mêlées III”, # 532. Pascal, of course, differed in many ways from these honnêtes hommes, insisting elsewhere in the 
Pensées on the importance of “pure love” for the truth and the necessarily self-sacrificing nature of the philosopher. 
Thus, it would be unfair to characterize Pascal as an uncritical honnête homme.  
115 Plato, Phaedrus, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 275a-b, p. 552. 
Jackanich 70 
 
of nothing” [La vrai honnête homme est celui qui ne se pique de rien].116 Universality means 
moderation in all things; it means having a well-rounded character, knowledgeable in every field, 
but dedicated to none. For such are the qualities of a charming conversationalist—one who can 
discuss anything with any person. Dedication leads to dogmatism, which risks shocking one’s 
interlocuter, and as the hostess of one famous salon, Mademoiselle de Scudéry, writes in her 
Conversation sur divers sujets (1680), “For me, Amithone says, I avow that I would rather prefer 
there to be rules for conversation, as there are in many other things. – The principle rule, 
responds Valérie, is to never say anything that shocks one’s judgment” [Pour moi, dit Amithone, 
j’avoue que je voudrais bien qu’il y eût des règles pour la conversation, comme Il y en a pour 
beaucoup d’autres choses. – La règle principale, reprit Valérie, est de ne dire jamais rien qui 
choque le jugement].117 In order not to shock, honnête hommes, like the Epicureans, abstain from 
discussing and engaging in politics—what a difference between the 17th century honnêtes 
hommes and the 16th century Humanists, inspired by that Roman orator who accused the 
Epicureans of destroying Rome by abstaining from politics and conflating convenience and 
pleasure with justice!118 The refusal to discuss anything that might shock, in other words, 
anything controversial, limited their conversations in Montesquieu’s estimation to the trite and 
puerile. As the Muslim traveler Usbek writes to his friend Rhédi in the Lettres Persanes (1721): 
 
116 La Rochefoucauld, Réflexions ou sentences et maximes morales, suivi de réflexions diverses et des Maximes de 
Madame de Sablé (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), p. 76. See réflexion #203.  
117 Madeleine Scudéry, Les Conversations sur divers sujets (Amsterdam; Daniel du Fresne, 1685), p. 17.  
118 On Cicero’s critique of the Epicureans, see P.A. Vander Waerdt, “The Justice of the Epicurean Man,” in The 
Classical Quarterly 37, no. 2 (1987): 402 – 422, p. 421: “Many of Epicurus' ancient critics shared Cicero's view (De 
Fin. 2.74-7) that Epicureanism is incompatible with political life itself, that no statesman could responsibly proclaim 
publicly that pleasure and advantage are the sole criteria for right conduct. This is a telling objection against 




“Les cafés est très en usage à Paris […]. Mais ce qui me choque de ces beaux esprits, c’est qu’ils 
ne se rend partie, et qu’ils amusent leurs talents à des choses puériles.”119 [Cafés are very popular 
in Paris…. But what shocks me about these beautiful minds is that they do not intervene, and that 
they employ their talents to puerile ends.] If de Scudéry wished to prevent honnêtes gens from 
shocking their interlocuters, then she had failed. For Montesquieu was shocked by the banality 
of their discussions. The grand monde is therefore not the erudite world of the Renaissance 
humanists, but instead a polite one. 
IV. iii. The Hedonism of Honnêtes Hommes: Pierre Gassendi and the Epicurean Revival 
 Epicurean doctrines were not only prevalent among honnêtes hommes, but also among 
seventeenth century thinkers in general. As Catherine Wilson writes in her comprehensive study 
Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity (2008): 
Between the acceptable—corpuscles, secondary qualities—and the unacceptable for all 
except a radical fringe—atheism, libertinage—there were Epicurean teachings that were 
available for rethinking that became elements of the many particular versions of the ‘new 
philosophy’. […] Seventeenth and eighteenth-century controversies over thinking matter 
and mortalism were stimulated by Epicurean reflection, and by the attempt to purify 
religion of its extraneous, superstitious, and persecutory elements, leaving only a minimal 
core of belief, only so much as was essential for the coherence of the political community 
and the control of individual passions. The early modern philosophers whom we continue 
 
119 Charles de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, Lettres Persanes, in Œuvres de Montesquieu, ed. Collin de Plancy 
(Paris: Louis Duprat-Duverger, 1823), lettre XXXVI, p. 488. 
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to read because their concerns seem understandable to us and their argumentation 
sufficiently complex were those who had a certain feature in common.120 
Epicurus’ view of nature offered an alternative to Aristotle’s, opening up new epistemological 
avenues. Whereas the scholastics had uncovered in the latter’s physics justification for the ethical 
and religious doctrines of the Catholic Church, the philosophers of the seventeenth century used 
the former’s to reframe the ethical, religious and political problems of their epoch. Stumbling 
away from the Thirty Years War (1618 – 1648) with spiritual exhaustion, they wandered into 
Epicurus’s garden, where Venus acutely circumscribed man’s limits and ambitions, but bestowed 
her voluptuous delights in return. Epicurus had taught that man incurred “the greatest anxiety of 
the human soul” when he dared to ascribe to nature secret “volitions and actions and causality” 
for which his senses did not account.121 Pleasure and pain, these are the two certainties, and thus 
the guiding lights of human conduct. So cast aside, the Hedonist implored his students, all these 
vain inquiries into the transcendental nature of the world, and pursue the joys that Venus has 
made plain as day to you. Worlds form from clusters of atoms, and by time’s hand dissipate into 
the void. Your world is not eternal, nor even unique, since there are many other planets inhabited 
by creatures not wholly unlike yourselves. Such is the general import of the Epicurean philosophy, 
wherein the rewards for political ambition and religious observance are diminished, and those 
for prudent pleasure-seeking increased. Indeed, one might say that Epicurus’ garden is a place to 
which Westerners have, throughout their long history, routinely returned in times of spiritual 
 
120 Catherine Wilson, Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008), p. 37 – 38. 
121 Diogenes Laertius, “Epicurus,” in Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 2, trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1925), p. 611. 
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beleaguerment—from the decline of the Roman Republic there came Lucretius, from the Thirty 
Years War came Pierre Gassendi, Fontenelle and many other honnêtes gens, and from the Second 
World War the Sexual Revolution. 
 The mathematician Pierre Gassendi (1592 – 1655) is responsible for the modern revival 
of the Epicurean philosophy. Despised by Cicero and Renaissance Humanists alike, Epicurus had 
a longstanding reputation as an advocate of moral degeneracy, from which all of his insistence 
on “calculated” and “prudent” pleasure-getting could not save him. Epicurus, however, was not 
only an ethicists but also a physicist, whose reduction of nature to atoms (i.e., matter and form) 
resonated with early modern philosophers and their attempt to overcome the Scholastics, who 
reduced nature to Aristotelian essences (e.g., the essence of lux [light] in virtue of which a piece 
of wood is susceptible to fire). Gassendi criticized the Aristotelean, syllogistic logic that resulted 
in such essentialist explanations of phenomena early on his career in Exercitationes Paradoxicae 
Adversus Aristoteleos (1624).122 An empirically minded physicist and Copernican sympathizer, he 
attempted to adapt Epicurean atomism to early modern scientific discussions in later works like 
the posthumously published Opera Omnia (1658).123 Significantly, he thought that the Epicurean 
 
122 See Margaret J. Osler, “Pierre Gassendi,” in A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Steven Nadler (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 1988), p. 84: “Gassendi argued that the syllogisms favored by Aristotelians could not produce 
certainty about the world. Moreover, because the conclusion of a syllogism contains no information not already 
present in the premises, he argued that syllogistic demonstration alone cannot produce new knowledge. Thus, he 
concluded, the entire method of Aristotelian demonstration is without foundation or utility.” In particular, Gassendi 
criticizes the analytic-synthetic method that Aristotle describes in his Posterior Analytics, whereby the cause of a 
phenomenon is identified in a purely deductive manner, without the aid of experimentation. See Aristotle, Posterior 
Analytics, trans. Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), p. 2 – 3, 71b17-26.  
123 For more on Gassendi’s use of Epicurean atomism, see Saul Fischer, “Pierre Gassendi,” Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, last modified November 18, 2013, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/gassendi/#4, “In what we today 
think of as chemistry and physics, Gassendi develops a great range of applications for his atomist hypothesis. In his 
optics, the atomist theory of light provides a counter to Descartes's view of light as pressure. For Gassendi, light is a 




theory of nature offered not only epistemological benefits, but also ethical ones, in particular the 
view of man as the inventor—rather than receiver—of governments, language and laws.124 
Hence Gassendi undertook the controversial task of reconciling the Hedonist’s ethics with the 
Catholic faith, arguing in his Syntagma Philosophicum (1658) that Epicurus’ discussion of pleasure 
could be detached from his “polytheism, corporeal conception of the divine nature, the negation 
of all providence, the denial of creation ex nihilo, the infinitude and eternity of atoms and the 
universe, the plurality of worlds, the attribution of the cause of the world to chance, a 
materialistic cosmogony, the denial of all finality in biology, and the corporeality and mortality of 
the human soul.” (Osler, “Pierre Gassendi,” p. 82 – 83) As to be expected, Gassendi insisted that 
the greatest pleasures were not the basest ones, but instead the fruits of calculation, prudence, 
and contemplation of the Divine. One need not worry about a Hedonist sacrificing knowledge 
and piety for pleasure, for God had made these the most voluptuous of ends. 
Thus Gassendi planted the seeds of that saccharine trope that the philosophes could not 
but help themselves from sprinkling like confectionary over their letters and books: virtue is so 
 
Les Météores (1637) that different colors of light were produced when torsion was placed on corpuscles interfacing 
with a surface. This hypothesis was mathematically and experimentally unverifiable, and criticized both by Gassendi 
and Isaac Newton. 
124 Gassendi appropriated the Epicurean-Lucretian account of man, whereby he initially finds himself in the state of 
nature in a quasi-socialized state, and then enters into a civilized state by forming social pacts, the guiding principle 
of which is not some transcendental law (such as one finds in the Bible), but simply that which is expedient, where 
expediency is measured in terms of pain and pleasure. As Gassendi writes in his article on “Ethics” in the Opera 
Omnia, “Because life was uncomfortable and dangerous in that ferocious state or state without pacts, people formed 
an assemblage, so that they could life more comfortably and delightfully. […] Thus, from nature, the state can be no 
other than society, in which pacts are begun and preserved reciprocally. For this reason people determined in 
common to undertake these things among themselves, so that laws or narrowed rights are retained. Since laws are 
nothing else but pacts.” See Lisa T. Sarasohn, Gassendi’s Ethics: Freedom in a Mechanistic Universe (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), p. 153. This quote was translated by Sarahsohn. The original can be found in Pierre Gassendi, 
“Ethics,” Opera Omnia, vol. II (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Fronmann, 1964), p. 795. 
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desirable, pleasurable, voluptuous, sweet, delicious, felicitous and sublime! Gassendi writes in his 
Morale: 
 As one says that virtue is essentially the source of the greatest delights, one can also say 
that vice contains in itself the source of the greatest pains. Such that, on one hand, virtue 
is accompanied by the greatest goods, and on the other, vice is accompanied by the 
greatest evils.125 
This sweetened virtue would inspire the “enlightened self-interest” of thinkers like Fontenelle, 
Voltaire and Diderot. An impoverished Thomas Carlyle, having consecrated many years of his life 
to studying the philosophes and consuming nothing but this honeyed virtue, eventually became 
sick to his stomach, called it “enlightened egoism” and biliously dismissed the entirety of the 18th 
century as an Epicurean frolic.126 But Gassendi had cotemporaneous detractors. Méric Casaubon 
(1599 – 1671) accused Gassendi of having reduced “justice and injustice, virtue and vice” to 
“fancies, and empty sounds”, that is, expedient modes of pleasure-getting.127 After all, Epicurus 
had reduced justice to expediency, and concluded that retreat from the life of civic engagement 
 
125 This quote can be found in Charles Jeannel’s Gassendi Spiritualiste (Montpellier: Félix Seguin, 1859), p. 33: “Ut 
dictum est virtutem sive honestatem habere in se unde voluptatem pariet maximam, ita dici jam potest vitium sive 
dedecus esse id quod habet in se unde maximum dolorem inducat. Quare et, ut virtutem sive honestatem comitatur 
maximum bonum, sic vitium sive dedecus comitaris maximum malum.” Jeannel attributes it to book I, chapter 4 of 
Gassendi’s Morale. The translation is mine.  
126 For “enlightened Egoism”, see Thomas Carlyle, Past and Present (London: Chapman and Hall, 1870), p. 41. In his 
fictional tale Wotton Reinfred, the main character is purported to have “studied the skeptical writers of his own 
country; above all, the modern literature of France”, and to have came to the conclusion that the “philosophy of 
Epicurus was not made for him”. He continues: “But what, then, was virtue? Another name for happiness, for 
pleasure? No longer the eternal life and beauty of the universe, the invisible all-pervading effluence of God; but a 
poor earthly theorem, a balance of profit and loss resting on self-interest, and pretending to rest on nothing higher.” 
See Thomas Carlyle, “Wotton Reinfred,” in The Last Words of Thomas Carlyle (Boston: Dana Estes & Company, 1892), 
p. 23 – 24. 
127 Méric Casaubon, Of Credulity and Incredulity (London: 1668), p. 202 – 203.  
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was especially expedient.128 Despite such criticisms however, many philosophers of the 17th 
century were sympathetic to Epicurus’ physical and ethical theories, including honnêtes hommes 
like Fontenelle who dared to defend some of the more controversial doctrines of the hedonist, 
notably the plurality of worlds. Here, one remarks a trend: first Epicurus’ empirically-susceptible 
physical theories are introduced to offer explanations that are more consistent, so to speak, with 
modern mechanical theories; then his ethical theories are suggested—and oftentimes justified 
on the basis of Epicurus’ simplified view of nature.  
IV. iv. The Salon-Epicureanism of the Honnête Hommes: Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle 
 The first popularizer of the sciences was the most celebrated honnête homme of the 17th 
century, Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle (1657 – 1757). He was introduced into le grand monde 
at the ripe age of twenty, when Thomas Corneille and Donneau de Visé praised his character and 
talents in the Mercure Galant: “Il n’aime les belles connaissances que pour s’en server en honnête 
homme; il a l’esprit fin, délicat, galant.” [He loves great ideas only to edify himself as an honest 
man; his mind is fine, delicate, gallant.]129 Their description proved to be almost as accurate as it 
was flattering, for the aspiring honnête homme would become an honored guest of Madeline de 
Scudéry’s reputable salon, where his Neo-Epicureanism did not “shock” but instead co-mingled 
with all the pleasant airs that percolated and swirled about there. Fontenelle acquired literary 
repute with the publication of his Nouveaux dialogues des morts (1683), where he developed on 
a variety of philosophical subjects by imagining, for instance, how a modern lady of the Parisian 
 
128 Epicurus, “Fragments,” in Epicurus: The Extant Remains, trans. Cyril Bailey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), p. 
115. 
129 Thomas Corneille and Donneau de Visé, “L’Amour Noyé,” in Le Nouveau Mercure Galant, vol. 3 (May 1677), p. 
113 – 123.  
Jackanich 77 
 
salon might discourse with an ancient philosopher such as Plato.130 This theme (i.e., discoursing 
with a lady of the salon) would prove most successful, for Fontenelle would reuse it only a few 
years later in his Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes (1686), where he presented a simplified 
version of Descartes’ mechanical philosophy, in virtue of which he defended several Epicurean 
doctrines, including the birth and death of the stars, the plurality of worlds, and the existence of 
extraterrestrial beings.131 Whereas the latter work addressed Epicurean physical doctrines to the 
honnêtes gens of the Parisian salon, the former satirically read Epicurean ethical doctrines into 
the otherwise Epicurean-adverse philosophies of the ancients. Before examining his attempts to 
popularize Epicurean and other physical doctrines in the salons, it should first be necessary to 
define Fontenelle’s neo-Epicureanism.  
In Fontenelle’s Nouveaux dialogues for instance, Marguerite d’Écosse asks Plato whether 
or not love is purely intellectual in nature, and the sage provides a strikingly Epicurean response: 
“Telle est la nature [de l’amour]. Donnez-lui, si vous voulez, l’esprit seul pour objet, vous n’y 
gagnerez rien. […] Si vous n’aimez que l’esprit de votre savant, pourquoi le baisâtes-vous ? C’est 
que le corps est destiné à recueillir le profit des passions que l’esprit même auroit inspirées.” 
[Such is the nature of love. Give it, if you wish, the mind alone as an object, and you shall gain 
nothing from it… If you love the mind of your scholar, then why do you kiss him? It is because the 
body is destined to reap the fruits of the passions, which the mind itself has inspired.] (Fontenelle, 
Nouveaux dialogues des morts, p. 171) This response would certainly not have jibed with Plato’s 
 
130 Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, Nouveaux dialogues des morts, in Fontenelle: Oeuvres complètes, vol. 1 (Paris: 
Fayard, 1990). 
131 Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, Entretiens sur la plularité des mondes, in Fontenelle: Oeuvres complètes, vol. 2 
(Paris: Fayard, 1990). 
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Socrates, who admonishes Alcibiades’ efforts to seduce him in the Symposium, and explains that 
the true lover (of knowledge) would not trade eternal wisdom for fleeting sexual delights.132 The 
mind, according to Plato, does not depend on the body to reap the fruits of love. That being said, 
neither would Epicurus have advised his students to mix sexual desire with love, since “ataraxia” 
can more easily be attained through loveless sexual relations—though, to be sure, the Hedonist 
was content to make reason a tool of the passions.133 In light of this, one might say that 
Fontenelle was a neo-Epicurean, in a manner not entirely unlike that countryside gentleman 
Montaigne, who often invoked Epicurus in his Essais to lampoon various sorts of dogmatic 
philosophers. In “De l’Expérience” for example, Montaigne maintains that one cannot entirely 
dismiss the role that physical pleasures in motivating us to act, and mocks the Stoic way of 
thinking with an amusing double entendre, according to which putting on one’s boots and 
spending the night with one’s young bride, these both being “action[s] according to order”, ought 
to be regarded as equally pleasant or desirable: 
 
132 See Plato, Symposium, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul 
Woodruff (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), p. 500 218e-219a: “Dear Alcibiades, if you are right in what you 
say about me, you are already more accomplished than you think. If I really have in me the power to make you a 
better man, then you can see in me a beauty that is really beyond description and makes your own remarkable good 
looks pale in comparison. But, then, is this a fair exchange that you propose? You seem to me to want more than 
your proper share: you offer me the merest appearance of beauty, and in return you want the thing itself, gold in 
exchange for bronze.” 
133 See Diogenes Laertius, Epicurus, in Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 2, trans. Robert D. Hicks (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1925), book X. According to Diogenes Laertius, Epicurus considered sex desirable: “It is 
observed too that in his treatise On the Ethical End he writes in these terms: "I know not how to conceive the good, 
apart from the pleasures of taste, sexual pleasures, the pleasures of sound and the pleasures of beautiful form." (p. 
535) However, Diogenes also maintains that Epicurus counseled against both sexual love and marriage: “The 
Epicureans do not suffer the wise man to fall in love; nor will he trouble himself about funeral rites; according to 
them love does not come by divine inspiration: so Diogenes in his twelfth book. The wise man will not make fine 
speeches. No one was ever the better for sexual indulgence, and it is well if he be not the worse. Nor, again, will the 
wise man marry and rear a family: so Epicurus says in the Problems and in the De Natura. Occasionally he may marry 
owing to special circumstances in his life.” (p. 645) 
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Elle faict bien l'enfant, à mon gré, quand elle se met sur ses ergots pour nous prescher 
que c'est une farouche alliance de marier le divin avec le terrestre, le raisonnable avec le 
déraisonnable, le sévère à l'indulgent, l'honneste au des-honneste, que volupté est 
qualité brutale, indigne que le sage la gouste: le seul plaisir qu'il tire de la jouyssance 
d'une belle jeune espouse, que c'est le plaisir de sa conscience de faire une action selon 
l'ordre, comme de chausser ses bottes pour une utile chevauchée.134 
Interestingly, Montaigne goes on to claim that even Socrates “enjoys as he ought bodily pleasure; 
but he prefers that of the mind as having more force, constancy, facility, variety, and dignity”. 
(Ibid., p. 1163) One might even wonder whether Fontenelle discovered his Epicurean Plato here 
in Montaigne’s Essais. That being said, the former’s neo-Epicureanism does differ from the 
latter’s, for it places a great deal of emphasis on the unity of pleasure and virtue—a popular 
theme among the philosophes. To appreciate this, let us briefly turn to Epicurus.  
 According to Diogenes Laertius, Epicurus maintains that virtue is a means to the end of 
pleasure: “And we choose the virtues too on account of pleasure and not for their own sake, as 
we take medicine for the sake of health”. (Diogenes Laertius, Epicurus, p. 663) That being said, 
he also argues that virtue is the only necessary condition of pleasure: “Epicurus describes virtue 
as the sine qua non of pleasure, i.e. the one thing without which pleasure cannot be, everything 
else, food, for instance, being separable, i.e. not indispensable to pleasure”. (Ibid.) However, this 
does not mean that Epicurus defends all virtues, for Epicurus himself states: “Beauty and virtue 
 
134 Michel de Montaigne, “De l’Expérience,” in Les Essais, ed. Jean Balsamo, Michel Magnien and Catherine Magnien-
Simonin (Paris: Gallimard, 2007), p. 1163. 
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and the like are to be honoured, if they give pleasure; but if they do not give pleasure, we must 
bid them farewell”.135 Many virtues are nothing more than customs or “accidents” according to 
Epicurus, since they are not rooted in “natural justice” or what is most “expedient”.136 He might 
therefore reject certain patriotic or customary virtues, especially the self-sacrificing sort that end 
in death, which despite being “nothing to us”, certainly does not bring pleasure.137 To be sure, it 
is difficult to know exactly which virtues Epicurus would reject, since so few of his own works 
have survived and we mostly know him through Diogenes Laertius and Lucretius. Nevertheless, 
we can safely conclude that Epicurus did consider some virtues to be unpleasant, and therefore 
unworthy of practicing. What makes the neo-Epicureanism of honnêtes hommes like Fontenelle 
unique, is the fact that he appears to ignore any possible conflicts between virtue and pleasure. 
For instance, nowhere in Fontenelle’s essay “Du bonheur” (1690) are virtue and pleasure at odds 
with one another.138 In a word, Fontenelle’s Epicureanism is salon-Epicureanism. Easy-going, if 
not unserious, it could scarcely respond to the counter-arguments that Cicero poses in De finibus 
 
135 See Epicurus, “Fragments,” in Epicurus: The Extant Remains, trans. Cyril Bailey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), 
p. 123. The notion that Epicurus considers some virtues to be in conflict with pleasure is also evidenced in his Letter 
to Anaxarchus. See Epicurus to Anaxarchus, in Epicurus: The Extant Remains, p. 127: “But I summon you to 
continuous pleasures and not to vain and empty virtues which have but disturbing hopes of results.” 
136 See Diogenes Laertius, Epicurus, p. 627: “Natural justice is a symbol or expression of expediency, to prevent one 
man from harming or being harmed by another.” 
137 On Epicurus’ view of death, see Diogenes Laertius, Epicurus, p. 651: “Accustom thyself to believe that death is 
nothing to us, for good and evil imply sentience, and death is the privation of all sentience; therefore a right 
understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life an illimitable 
time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality.” 
138 See Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, “Du bonheur,” in Fontenelle: Oeuvres complètes, vol. 3 (Paris: Fayard, 1990). 
Here, Fontenelle argues that the source of happiness is “d’être bien avec soi” [to feel comfortable with oneself] (p. 
216), which can only be achieved if the way “has been prepared by the hands of virtue” (Ibid., my translation), and 
one has overcome “amour-propre” (Ibid.). Setting aside for the moment the fact that Rousseau will later incorporate 
these two concepts (amour-propre and amour de soi-même) in his own moral philosophy, one notices here that 
Fontenelle makes virtue a necessary condition of happiness, just as Epicurus does. He does not, however, consider 
whether certain virtues might conflict with happiness. In one passage, he writes that “it might very well happen that 
virtue leads neither to wealth nor promotion” (Ibid., my translation), but he goes on to argue that one’s pleasure 
will not diminish, since “his reason and his rectitude [are] the greatest sources of happiness”. (p. 217, my translation) 
Jackanich 81 
 
bonorum et malum, where he accuses the Epicureans of being unfit to endure those very same 
“dolours of […] Hercules” that Renaissance Humanists like Erasmus and Bacon were so eager to 
bear for the greater good of humanity: 
[…] Virtue must needs keep Pleasure at arm's length. […] would you prefer to pass your 
whole life in that state of calm which you spoke of so often, amidst the enjoyment of 
unceasing pleasures, free from all pain, and even […] free from all fear of pain, or to be a 
benefactor of the entire human race, and to bring succour and safety to the distressed, 
even at the cost of enduring the dolours of a Hercules? Dolours — that was indeed the 
sad and gloomy name which our ancestors bestowed, even in the case of a god, upon 
labours which were not to be evaded. I would press my question and drag an answer from 
you, were I not afraid lest you should say that Hercules himself in the arduous labours 
that he wrought for the preservation of mankind was acting for the sake of pleasure!"139 
This salon-Epicureanism, as it were, presents “la tranquillité de la vie, la société, la chasse, la 
lecture” [the tranquility of life, good company, hunting, reading] (Fontenelle, “Du Bonheur”, p. 
214) as the pleasant pastimes of the honnête homme, but never asks what one must be willing 
to sacrifice to uphold such traditions. Unlike Gassendi, Fontenelle does not seem interested in 
dealing with the deeper conflicts between pleasure, virtue and religion. And to be sure, it is 
precisely this salon-Epicureanism, always waxing poetic about how voluptuous virtue is, that gets 
thrashed in the Premier discours by Rousseau, who, it must not be forgotten, thought Cato the 
 
139 See Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malum, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931), book 
II, p. 209 – 211. For a summary of Cicero’s three main arguments against Epicureanism in De Finibus, see Julia Annas, 
“Epicurus on Pleasure and Happiness,” in Philosophical Topics 15, no. 2 (Fall 1987): 5 – 21. Of these three, one 
focusses on “cases where exercising the virtues conflicts with seeking pleasure”. (p. 14) 
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Younger the most virtuous of men, because he did not fight for his own happiness, but rather 
that of his compatriots, and tore out his entrails in an act of defiance to the tyranny with which 











140 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur l’économie politique, in Œuvres complètes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
vol. III, p. 255: “Osons opposer Socrate même à Caton: l'un était plus philosophe, et l'autre plus citoyen. Athènes 
était déjà perdue, et Socrate n'avait plus de patrie que le monde entier : Caton porta toujours la sienne au fond de 
son cœur; il ne vivait que pour elle et ne put lui survivre. La vertu de Socrate est celle du plus sage des hommes : 
mais entre César et Pompée, Caton semble un dieu parmi les mortels. L'un instruit quelques particuliers, combat les 
sophistes, et meurt pour la vérité : l'autre défend l'État, la liberté, les lois, contre les conquérants du monde, et 
quitte enfin la terre quand il n'y voit plus de patrie à servir. Un digne élève de Socrate serait le plus vertueux de ses 
contemporains; un digne émule de Caton en serait le plus grand. La vertu du premier ferait son bonheur, le second 
chercherait son bonheur dans celui de tous.” 
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Chapter V: Honnêtes Hommes and Salon-Science 
V. i. The Salon-Science of Honnête Hommes: Fontenelle’s neo-Lucretianism  
 Fontenelle’s Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes represents perhaps the paradigmatic 
example of 17th century popular science. A dialogue between an honnête femme of the Parisian 
salon and the author, the work presents a simplified version of Descartes’ astronomical views, 
focusing in particular on the plurality of worlds. Although Descartes does not explicitly advance 
this thesis in either his Principia philosophiae (1644) or his posthumous Traité du monde et de la 
lumière (1664), it would seem to follow from his arguments there on the formation of planets.141 
The existence of a plurality of worlds was an ancient physical doctrine, one that could be traced 
back to Lucretius’ De rerum natura.142 And if one has the impression that Fontenelle’s desire was 
to inject this and other Epicurean doctrines into the Cartesian mechanical framework, then it is 
because he does not actually employ Descartes’ arguments concerning the formation of planets 
to prove their plurality, but instead recurs to the very same arguments that Lucretius employs in 
De rerum natura. More precisely, Fontenelle explains to his interlocuter, the Marquise de G***, 
that planets must form and deteriorate all the time by invoking Lucretius’ argument by analogy, 
 
141 One might even contend that in the case of the Traité du monde et de la lumière, which Descartes did not publish 
in fear that it would be censored or worse, he goes out of his way to state that the crust required for the formation 
of habitable planets only accumulates on Earth (even though he provides no argument for this), and conclude from 
this that Descartes himself was opposed to the plurality of worlds. However, given that he did seek to publish the 
work in his lifetime, despite having composed it before the Principia philosophiae, one must hesitate to draw such a 
conclusion. Perhaps he wrote this to sanitize the work, or perhaps even believed it. See Descartes, Traité du monde 
et de la lumière (Paris: Théodore Girad, 1664), p. 62 - 63: “Enfin nous n’apercevons point de corps mêlez en aucun 
autre lieu que sur la superficie de la Terre […].” 
142 See Catherine Wilson, Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity, p. 97: “Lucretius followed Epicurus in maintaining 
the plurality and self-assembly of worlds. ‘[W]hen an abundant supply of matter is available, when space is at hand 




according to which planets, being composed of materials not unlike those of plants and animals, 
must also have a life-cycle. Fontenelle writes: 
[…] je crois aussi que l'univers peut avoir été fait de sorte qu'il s'y formera de temps en temps 
des Soleils nouveaux. Pourquoi la matière propre à faire un Soleil ne pourra-t-elle pas, 
après avoir été dispersée en plusieurs endroits différents, se ramasser à la longue en un 
certain lieu, et y jeter les fondements d'un nouveau monde ? […] N'aurait-elle le pouvoir 
que de faire naître et mourir des plantes ou des animaux par une révolution continuelle 
? Je suis persuadé, et vous l'êtes déjà aussi, qu'elle met en usage ce même pouvoir sur les 
mondes, et qu'il ne lui en coûte pas davantage. Mais nous avons sur cela plus que de 
simples conjectures. (Fontenelle, Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes, p. 112 – 113) 
Lucretius’ argument for the plurality of worlds in De rerum natura draws the very same analogy 
between plant and animal life, on the one hand, and the formation of planets, on the other: 
[W]hen there is much matter ready to hand, when space is there, and no thing, no cause 
delays, things must, we may be sure, be carried on and completed. As it is, if there is so 
great a store of seeds as the whole life of living things could not number, and if the same 
force and nature abides which could throw together the seeds of things, each into their 
place in like manner as they are thrown together here, it must needs be that you confess 
that there are other worlds in other regions, and diverse races of men and tribes of wild 
beasts.143 
 




Fontenelle’s recourse to Lucretius’ argument here is interesting, especially since Descartes had 
offered a mechanical explanation for the formation of planets in both his Principia philosophiae 
and Traité du monde et de la lumière. Chapter IX of the latter work is dedicated to explaining the 
origin of planets and comets, and argues that the heavier bodies of which these are composed 
amass when the circular motion of a vortex propels them into a neighboring vortex—Descartes 
gives the example of a skiff being launched against the water’s current at a bend in a river.144 And 
in the Principia philosophiae, Descartes maintains that planets are formed from dead stars, or 
crusted-over suns.145 Fontenelle was likely aware of this argument, for he explains the death of 
suns to the Marquise in precisely these terms: “[Descartes] suppose que les taches de notre Soleil 
étant des écumes ou des brouillards, elles peuvent s'épaissir, se mettre plusieurs ensemble, 
s'accrocher les unes aux autres, ensuite elles iront jusqu'à former autour du Soleil une croûte qui 
s'augmentera toujours, et adieu le Soleil.” [Descartes speculates that the spots of our sun being 
like foam of fog, can become denser, join together, bond with one another, and then form an 
ever increasing crust around the sun, at which point we can say goodbye to the sun.] (Fontenelle, 
 
144 See chapter IX “L’Origine, le cours, & les autres propriétés des Comètes, & des Planètes en général; & en 
particulier des Comètes” of Descartes’ Traité du monde et de la lumière, p. 124 – 125: “[…] si vous imaginez deux 
Rivières qui se joignent en quelques endroits l’une à l’autre, et qui se séparent derechef un peu après, avant que 
leurs eaux qu’il faut supposer fort calmes et d’une force assez égale, mais avec cela fort rapides, ayant loisir se 
mêler : les Bateaux ou les autres corps assez massifs et pesants qui seront emportés par le cours de l’une, pourront 
facilement passer en l’autre : au lieu que les plus légers s’en éloigneront et seront rejetez par la force de cette eau, 
vers les lieux où elle est le moins rapide.” 
145 One can piece together Descartes’ theory on the formation of stars and planets from sections 94 (p. 226 – 227) 
and 146 (p. 296 – 297) of Part III of Descartes, Les Principes de la Philosophie, trans. “un ami de Descartes”, (Paris: 
Compagnie des Libraires, 1723). Francisque Bouillier does this rather well in his Histore de la Philosophie Cartésienne, 
vol. 1 (Paris: Durande, 1854), p. 181 – 182: “[…] dans les Principes, [… Descartes] fait dériver le troisième élément 
non plus de l’agrégation des parties primitives de l’étendue, mais de l’agrégation des parties du premier élément, 
qui rejetées par les plus subtiles fors du globe liquide, ou du solier qu’elles composer, s’attachent les unes aux autres 
et nagent à sa superficie et lorsqu’elles sont en fort grande quantité, forment des taches semblables à celles du 
soleil. Ainsi, des étoiles ont pu se recouvrir entièrement de taches et de croûtes épaisses, et, impuissantes à se 
soutenir et à défendre leur tourbillon contre les tourbillons environnants, elles ont tourné autour du centre du 
tourbillon qui les a absorbées et sont devenues des planètes. Les planètes et la terre elle-même ne seraient donc 
que des soleils encroutés.” 
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Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes, p. 110) That being said, Fontenelle opted to invoke 
Lucretius’ instead. 
One therefore wonders: if Descartes provides us with an explanation of the formation of 
planets, why does Fontenelle invoke Lucretius’? It is important to bear in mind that at this time, 
physics is still bound to meta-physical and thus normative frameworks—it took more than half a 
century for physicists to follow Newton’s lead and radically separate the two. Mixing Lucretian 
or Epicurean arguments in with Descartes’ would therefore provide an opportunity to advance 
the formers’ world view, even if they were not mentioned in name. This seems probable, given 
that Lucretius’ arguments do not theoretically add anything to Descartes’ own. More precisely, 
the vortices or tourbillon that Descartes describes function like heuristic models, which can be 
mathematically and experimentally tested in order to prove that an identified cause really does 
produce the effect or phenomenon in question, whereas Lucretius’ analogical arguments are no 
more rigorous than the analytic method whereby Aristotle purports to discover the essence of a 
thing. What is more, Fontenelle not only injected Lucretian physical doctrines that would seem 
to confirm Descartes’ mechanics, but also ones that were totally alien to Descartes’ mechanics, 
but are sensational or at least “curious,” and therefore capable of attracting the attention of the 
salons.  
One of the most notable doctrines, which he discusses throughout the Entretiens, is the 
existence of extraterrestrial lifeforms, which Fontenelle places on the Earth’s moon, the planets 
of our solar system, such as Venus and Jupiter, their moons, and on the “infinite de mondes” 
[infinity of worlds] that ought to exist throughout the universe. (Fontenelle, Entretiens sur la 
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pluralité des mondes, p. 13) Fontenelle no doubt appreciates that from the perspective of the 
Catholic Church, this is a controversial topic, and therefore clarifies in the preface that these 
extraterrestrial lifeforms cannot be the sons of Adam and Eve, even if they resemble humans a 
great deal, and are more technologically advanced than ourselves in some cases—Fontenelle 
conjectures, for instance, that the inhabitants of earth’s moon might be more capable of inter-
planetary travel than ourselves)146: 
Quand on vous dit que la Lune est habitée, vous vous y représentez aussitôt des hommes 
faits comme nous, et puis, si vous êtes un peu théologien, vous voilà plein de difficultés. 
La postérité d'Adam n'a pas pu s'étendre jusque dans la Lune, ni envoyer des colonies en 
ce pays-là. Les hommes qui sont dans la Lune ne sont donc pas fils d'Adam. Or, il serait 
embarrassant, dans la théologie, qu'il y eût des hommes qui ne descendissent pas de lui. 
(Fontenelle, Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes, p. 13) 
Fontenelle describes the various cultures of the inhabitants of the planets of our solar system in 
great detail. “The climate [of Venus] is most favorable to love”, he asserts, with its inhabitants 
resembling the “Céladons and the Silvandres” of Honoré d’Urfé’s famous romance L’Astrée, and 
their conversations being akin to “the most beautiful of Clélie”, the main character of Madeline 
de Scudéry’s romantic novel Clélie, histoire romaine. (Fontenelle, Entretiens sur la pluralité des 
mondes, p. 78) If their climate is especially amorous, then it is because they are nearer to the 
sun’s light, and because heat excites the passions; however, too much exposure dulls the mind, 
 
146 On the capacity of the inhabitants of the Earth’s Moon for space travel, Fontenelle writes: “Les gens de la Lune 
savent peut- être déjà faire de petits voyages dans l'air, à l'heure qu'il est, ils s'exercent; quand ils seront plus habiles 
et plus expérimentés, nous les verrons, et Dieu sait quelle surprise.” (Fontenelle, Entretiens sur la pluralité des 
mondes, p. 54) 
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as in the case of the inhabitants of Mercury, whom he compares to “le plupart des nègres”. (Ibid.) 
Despite his gross speculations about the inhabitants of foreign planets, which in the case of Venus 
seem to be aimed at piquing the interest of honnêtes gens, there is a method to his reasoning, 
the very same that one finds in Lucretius’ De rerum natura: if the base components of the planets 
are all the same, and Earth produces humanoids, then other planets should be inhabited by them 
too—this also means that one can isolate factors like sun exposure to then predict what the 
makeup of extraterrestrials might be. However, it cannot be stressed enough that Descartes 
formulates no mechanical model that would permit us to conclude—or even to speculate on—
the existence of extraterrestrial humanoids. This is a Lucretian doctrine, which if it is true, has 
serious normative implications, namely that humans come into existence merely by chance, and 
therefore are not orientated to some transcendental good, as Plato, Aristotle and the Church 
Fathers all hold. If such is the case, then we are left with only a few remaining viable ethical 
doctrines, epicureanism no doubt being one. To be sure, Fontenelle attempts to remove this 
implication in the preface to the Entretiens, but his frequent comparisons of alien culture and 
technology to that of the sons of Adam, as it were, would seem to betray his words there. One 
must not forget that at the beginning of the very same century, Giordano Bruno was burned at 
the stake for advancing the Lucretian doctrine of a plurality of worlds without taking sufficient 
care of its implications.147 By Fontenelle’s time, the Church’s authority and strictness about such 
matters seems to have waned.  
 
147 See Alberto A. Martinez, “Giordano Bruno and the Heresy of Many Worlds” in Annals of Science 73, no. 4 (2016): 
345 – 374. 
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V. ii. The Salon-Science of Honnête Hommes (Continued): Fontenelle’s Progressivism 
 Fontenelle not only popularized normatively significant physical doctrines in the 
Entretiens, but also in his Digression sur les Anciens et les Modernes (1688), where he hoped to 
resolve one of the greatest controversies of the end of the century: whether the Ancients were 
superior to the Moderns, or vice versa.148 The controversy was rekindled in 1687 when Charles 
Perrault expressed in his poem Le Siècle de Louis le Grand that the age of the Sun King had 
eclipsed that of Augustus, writing that Homer would have been possessed of “une plus fine 
entente et d’un art plus habile” [a more refined understanding and a greater artistic genius] had 
he composed his epics under the former’s reign. For man had become so refined during this time 
that “mille mondes nouveaux ont été découverts” [a thousand new worlds had been 
discovered].149 In a way that Renaissance Humanists might have appreciated, Perrault exults in 
the Moderns’ triumph over “des fantômes vains” [the vain specters] (Perrault, Le Siècle de Louis 
le Grand, p. 291) with which Aristotle haunted nature. But the poet goes one step further in 
stating that while ancient orators like Virgil and Horace are admirable, they have the advantage 
of being known by many nations and ages. Thus, like a fine wine, the Moderns simply require 
some aging to ascend to their level. Nicholas Boileau-Despréaux took such offense to Perrault’s 
poem that he reportedly “shouted for the reading to stop”, and later recruited his friends, 
including Racine, to defend the Ancients against the Moderns.150 Perrault and Boileau were 
 
148 See Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, Digression sur les Anciens et les Modernes, in Fontenelle: Oeuvres complètes, 
vol. 2 (Paris: Fayard, 1990). 
149 See Charles Perrault, Le Siècle de Louis-le-Grand, in Oeuvres choisies de Charles Perrault (Peytieux: Collin de 
Plancy, 1826), p. 294 and 291. 
150 Douglas Lane Patey, “Ancients and Moderns”, in The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, vol. IV, ed. George 
A. Kennedy, H.B. Nisbet, Claude Rawson and Raman Selden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 34 
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longtime enemies, the former having sought out Jean-Baptiste Colbert to prevent the publication 
of the latter’s Satires and L’art poétique in the previous decade.151 So Perrault formed his own 
coalition of Modernists, gaining the support of a budding Fontenelle. 
The contention that the Ancients were intellectually superior to the Moderns was a 
longstanding one, which “climaxed” according to Hans Baron “by a criticism used in Scholastic 
times, that the relationship of the Moderns to the Ancients may be compared to the situation of 
dwarves who stand on the shoulders of giants”.152 Despite its Scholastic roots however, the 
opinion that the Ancients were somehow superior perdured among Humanists and honnêtes 
hommes alike, owing to the observation that Europe had only managed to stumble out of the 
“darkness and dense gloom” (as Petrarch famously puts it) of previous ages by rediscovering the 
Ancients.153 That being said, inventions like Huygens’ pendulum clock and developments in 
mathematics and physics in the 17th century emboldened the Moderns, who, assured of their 
scientific superiority, began to wonder if they could equal—and perhaps surpass—the cultural 
refinement of their Ancient models. Belief in the superiority of the Ancients was significantly 
 
151 Robert J. Nelson, “The Ancients and the Moderns”, in A New History of French Literature, ed. Denis Hollier, R. 
Howard Bloch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 365 
152 Hans Baron, “The Querelle of the Ancients and the Moderns as a Problem for Renaissance Scholarship”, in Journal 
of the History of Ideas 20., no. 1 (January 1959): 3 – 22. See p. 13. 
153 The phrase “darkness and dense gloom” [tenebris et densa caligine] comes from Petrarch’s (1304 - 1374) Apologia 
contra cuiusdam anonymi Galli calumnias. See Petrarch, Apologia contra cuiusdam anonymi Galli calumnias, in 
Opera omnia (Basel: 1554), p. 1195. His use of the term is notable, since he refers not only to days begore Christ as 
dark and gloomy, as was common during his time, but also to the Middle Ages, since they were deprived of the light 
of Classical thinkers. This literary—as opposed to religious—use of the phrase would later become popular among 
early Renaissance Humanists, who would then coin the term “Dark Ages”. For more on this subject, see Theodore E. 
Mommsen, “Petrarch’s Conception of the ‘Dark Ages’”, in Speculum 17, no. 2 (April 1942):226 – 242, p. 228: “Men 
like Boccaccio, Filippo Villani, Ghiberti and others contrasted the 'rebirth' of the arts and letters which, they held, 
had been effected by Dante, Giotto, and Petrarch, with the preceding period of cultural darkness.' With this change 
of emphasis from things religious to things secular, the significance of the old metaphor became reversed: Antiquity, 
so long considered as the 'Dark Age,' now became the time of 'light' which had to be 'restored'; the era following 
Antiquity, on the other hand, was submerged in obscurity.” 
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buttressed by the Christian worldview as well, “which identified change with deterioration and 
progress with man’s translation into a celestial realm of eternity.”154 To be sure, this Christian 
narrative had its origin in those very same passages from Denial that Lord Bacon reinterpreted in 
order to advance his own idea of progress.155 Some of the first thinkers to draw into question this 
Christian-reinforced belief in the superiority of the Ancients include Juan Luis Vives (1493 – 1540), 
“a member of Erasmus and More’s circle” (Baron, “The Querelle of the Ancients and the Moderns 
as a Problem for Renaissance Scholarship”, p. 13), and subsequently George Hakewill (1578 – 
1649). As Baron points out, Vives argued in his Querelle that “Nature is not yet so effete and 
exhausted as to be unable to bring forth, in our times, results comparable to those of earlier ages. 
She always remains equal to herself, and not rarely she comes forward more strongly and 
powerful in the past, as if mustering together all her forces” (Ibid., p. 14). Hakewill also argues 
that nature has not deteriorated: “[…] neither are we Dwarfs, nor they Giants, but all of equal 
stature, or rather we somewhat higher, being lifted up by their means, conditionally there be in 
us an equal intention of spirit, watchfulness of mind, and love of truth: for if these be wanting, 
then are we not so much dwarfs, as men of perfect growth lying on the ground”. (Ibid., p. 13) 
One notices here that the question of the superiority of the Ancients hinges on the question of 
whether or not nature per se deteriorates over time—oddly enough, the possibility that nature 
has remained stable, but men of have naturally (or genetically) deteriorated does not seem to be 
posed. This, of course, is a question that not concerns the moral philosopher, but also the natural 
 
154 See Herschel C. Baker, The Wars of Truth: Studies in the Decay of Christian Humanism in the Earlier Seventeenth 
Century (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 1959), p. 78. 
155 See Francis Bacon, Valerius Terminus, p. 118 : “[…] in the prophecy of Daniel, where, speaking of the latter times, 
it is said, “Many shall pass to and fro, and science shall be increased”; as if the opening of the world by navigation 
and commerce, and the further discovery of knowledge, should meet in one time or age”. 
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one, who seeks to establish universal laws. It is therefore easy to see how references to thinkers 
like Descartes and Newton might be made to buttress the Modern’s side. 
Although one cannot confirm that Fontenelle was familiar either with Vives or Hakewill, 
he comes to the very same conclusion in the Digression: the Moderns are not naturally inferior 
to the Ancients, for nature and thus man’s constitution remain constant. He does however give 
a seemingly novel argument for this. Just as Fontenelle recurs to Lucretius’ argument by analogy 
in the Entretiens to justify the formation of planets, he contends here that: if the “fibers” of the 
Ancients’ brains were better “formed”, then so too would the fibers of Ancient “trees” be better 
formed, yet we have no reason to believe this to be true; therefore, because ancient and modern 
trees do not differ in their constitution, neither do the “cerveaux” [brains] of the Ancients and 
the Moderns.156 Fontenelle then goes on to argue that the climate of a region plays a role in the 
development of its inhabitant’s brains, remarking that different regions produce different fruits: 
“Il est toujours sûr que par l’enchaînement et la dépendance réciproque qui est entre toutes les 
parties du monde matériel, les différences de climats qui se font sentir dans les plantes, doivent 
s’étendre jusqu’aux cerveaux, et y faire quelque effet.” [It is nonetheless certain that by the chain 
of reciprocal dependency between all the parts of the material world, the differences of climates 
that make themselves felt in plants, must extend up to brains, and have some effect there.] 
(Fontenelle, Digressions sure les Anciens et les Modernes, p. 414) However, he maintains that 
climate has less of an effect than “art and culture”, since the ideas of one nation can more easily 
 
156 More precisely, Fontenelle reasons from the idea that nature is always the same, to the idea that its products are 
always the same, thus proposing a sort of species stasis: “La nature a entre les mains une certaine pâte qui est 
toujours la même, qu’elle tourne et retourne sans cesse en mille façons et dont elle forme les hommes, les animaux, 
les plantes.” (Fontenelle, Digressions sur les Anciens et les Modernes, p. 414) 
Jackanich 93 
 
be introduced to another than its plants: “Cet effet cependant y est moins grand et moins 
sensible, parce que l’art et la culture peuvent beaucoup plus sur les cerveaux que sur la terre […]. 
Ainsi les pensées d’un pays se transportent plus aisément dans un autre que ses plantes […].” 
[This effect, however, is less significant and less noticeable, because art and culture influence 
much more the brain than the earth…. As such the thoughts of one country are transposed more 
easily into another country than its plants....] (Ibid.) Ultimately, Fontenelle concludes that “on ne 
peut pas juger quels climats sont les plus favorables pour l’esprit” [one cannot judge which 
climates are the most favorable to the mind]. (Ibid., p. 415) Therefore, with a few exceptions,157 
the natural capacity for learning is essentially the same across space and time for all peoples. 
Progress therefore appears to be almost exclusively the product of ideal cultural conditions for 
Fontenelle. But whereas the cultivation of plants depends greatly on their particular climate and 
constitution, Fontenelle does not believe that the same is true for humans, leaving the reader 
with the impression that they instead happen by chance, or as the result of some natural 
tendency. In any case, ideal cultural conditions permit humans to disabuse themselves of their 
“prejudices and fantasies” (Ibid., 424), and to “perfect” (Ibid., p. 427) their reason by cumulatively 
building upon the achievements of past generations. In order to illustrate this conception of 
progress, Fontenelle writes that Archimedes would have invented the plow instead of 
approximating pi had someone not done so before him.158 Thus, according to Fontenelle, there 
 
157 Fontenelle considers two possible exceptions: “Il y a de l’apparence que les nègres et les Lapons liraient les livres 
grecs, sans prendre beaucoup de l’esprit grec. Pour moi, j’ai de l’inclination à croire que la zone torride et les deux 
glaciales ne sont pas propres pour les sciences.” (Fontenelle, Digressions sur les Anciens et les Modernes, p. 415) 
158 “[…] tout ce qu’aurait pu faire Archimède dans l’enfance du monde, aurait été d’inventer la charrue. Archimède 
placé dans un autre siècle, brûle les vaisseaux des Romains avec des miroirs, si cependant ce n’est point là une fable.” 
(Fontenelle, Digressions sur les Anciens et les Modernes, p. 417) 
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is but one linear and upward bound path to progress on which every race and civilization are 
fellow travelers. 
Fontenelle’s conception of progress is undoubtedly the one that remains most popular to 
this day—as opposed for instance to Immanuel Kant’s conception, according to which scientific 
progress does indeed depend on the heritability of intellectual capacities that only a handful of 
persons and groups possess.159 What is more, one recognizes how closely subsequent accounts 
of progress conform to his. For just as Fontenelle minimizes the uniqueness of Antiquity and its 
geniuses, reducing the great Archimedes to the inventor of the plow, and transforming Athens 
into a mere steppingstone on the path to progress for the Moderns, Turgot similarly reduced all 
nations to but discardable steps on the path to progress, as we saw above. Everything unique is 
hammered out into an instrument of universal progress, a story in which humans are no longer 
transcendental beings, but instead clusters of atoms formed by chance along with their cultures, 
and driven to uncover the hidden mechanisms of nature by the light of earthly happiness alone. 
Unlike Bacon, who proclaimed in Valerius Terminus that man’s scientific progress would free him 
from the pagan cycles of history and restore him to the divine state from which he originally fell, 
Fontenelle advanced what might be called the secular version of this idea of progress. The New 
 
159 Kant was no doubt an advocate of progress, for as he writes in his Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan 
Point of View: “[History] allows us to hope that, if it examines the exercise of the human will on a large scale, it will 
be able to discover a regular progression among freely willed actions, In the same way, we may hope that what 
strikes us as confused and fortuitous may be recognized, in the history of the entire species, as a steadily advancing 
but slow development of man’s original capacities.” See Kant, Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point 
of View, in Political Writings, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 41. That being 
said, he also believes that progress depends on the development of man’s “natural capacities”: “The history of the 
human race as a whole can be regarded as the realization of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally—
and for this purpose also externally—perfect political constitution as a the only possible state within which all natural 
capacities of mankind can be developed completely.” (Ibid., p. 50) 
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Testament creed that all human beings were equally capable of being saved was conserved, but 
justified rather on the basis of tree fibers. 
If les âmes universelles had once considered scientific specialization noisome to the bons 
airs of the salon, Fontenelle’s Lucretian-laden tales of the voluptuous extraterrestrial beings of 
Venus and the eternal progress of the human race had converted them to the scientific cause. 
And if the honnêtes hommes had lost their taste for Herculean heroes and great statesmen cast 
in the Ciceronian mold,160 Fontenelle gave them new ones in the Éloges that he composed as 
Perpetual Secretary of the Académie des Sciences. Thus, in his Éloge de M. Newton, he praises 
the English for raising Newton to the level of glory that heroes in Tacitus’ day could not hope to 
attain: 
[La] philosophie [de Newton] a été adopté par toute l’Angleterre, elle domine dans la 
Société Royale, & et dans tous les excellents ouvrages qui en font sortis, comme si elle 
étoit déjà consacrée par le respect d’une longue suite de Siècles. […] Tacite qui a reproché 
aux Romains leur extrême indifférence pour les grands Hommes de leur nation, eût donné 
aux Anglois la loünge tout opposée. […] Tacite […] eût répondu [à celle-là] que le grand 
mérite n’étoit jamais commun, ou que même il faudroit, s’il étoit possible, le rendre 
commun par la gloire qui y seroit attachée.161 
 
160 Indeed, Rousseau makes precisely this criticism of the philosophes in his Dernière réponse à Bordes, Dernière 
réponse à M. Bordes, in Œuvres complètes de J.-J. Rousseau, vol. 3, ed. Bernard Gagnebin et Marcel Raymond (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1964), p. 83 : "Je suis sûr qu’il n’y pas actuellement un sçavant qui n’estime beaucoup plus l’éloquence 
de Ciceron que son zèle, et qui n’aimât infiniment mieux avoir composé les Catilinaires que d’avoir sauvé son pays." 
161 Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, Éloge de M. Newton, in Fontenelle: Œuvres complètes, vol. 7 (Paris: Fayard, 
1990), p. 128. 
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By popularizing the sciences among honnêtes hommes, Fontenelle gives rise to the philosophes 
of the 18th century. A strange blend of neo-Epicurean politesse and scientific amateurism,162 the 
philosophes would promote their own heterodox theories of human nature by popularizing first 
Cartesian and then Newtonian science, thus transforming their previously apolitical salons into 
forums for “shocking” doctrines. Like the Humanists, they are politically engaged, unlike them 
however, they are not operating as statesman, but rather on the fringes of society. 
V. iii. The Salon-Science of the Philosophes: Voltaire’s Lockean-Newtonianism  
 Voltaire was introduced into the society of honnêtes gens by an affluent, libertine deist 
named Lord Bolingbroke, whose troop of writers and poets included men like Jonathan Swift and 
Alexander Pope.163 A natural wit with a penchant for the sardonic, he spent nearly a year in the 
Bastille in 1717 when, in his satire of the French government and elite, he accused Phillipe, the 
Duc d’Orléans, of having an incestuous relationship with his own daughter.164 And he would have 
enjoyed another extended stay in the Bastille in 1726 for insulting the Duc de Rohan, if he did 
not have friends in high places who managed to convert his imprisonment to exile in Great 
Britain. His exile in England however proved to be one of his most fortune opportunities. For he 
 
162 Although, as his Préface des elémens de la géométrie de l’infini (1727) would suggest, Fontenelle possessed a 
genuine understanding of the mathematical advancements that had prepared the way for modern physics, the 
philosophe par excellence, Voltaire, advocated for a Newtonianism in his Lettres which he surely did not understood, 
but nonetheless believed to coincide perfectly with Locke’s views on the human soul. See Leonard M. Marsak, 
“Bernard de Fontenelle: The Idea of Science in the French Enlightenment”, in Transactions of the American 
Philosophical Society 49, no. 7 (1959): 1 – 14: “Mathematics was the language of science, the shorthand or language 
of metaphor, a necessary complement to experiment's language of analysis. Fontenelle's understanding of this 
placed him in the company of Galileo and Newton, and his explanation of this idea was welcomed as a worth-while 
contribution to scientific thought.” (p. 34) 
163 See J.B. Shank, The Newton Wars and the Beginning of the French Enlightenment (Chicago: University of Chicago, 
2008), p. 258. 
164 See Robert Zaretsky and John T. Scott, The Philosophers’ Quarrel: Rousseau, Hume and the Limits of Human 
Understanding (Grand Rapids, MI: Sheridan Books, 2009), p. 58. 
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imbibed English philosophy, science and customs there, and on returning to his native France, 
cemented his reputation as a first-rate honnête homme by popularizing the ideas of Locke and 
Newton. In particular, he compiled their ideas in his Lettres philosophiques, but having learned 
from his past experiences, he first sent the unpublished manuscript to the royal censor, the abbé 
Rothlein, for approval. The abbé suggested that he reformulate certain parts, and Voltaire, ever 
confident in his ability to sneak esoteric ideas past lesser minds, would have done so had his 
publisher not printed and sold the Lettres without his consent.165 Instead, he was forced to leave 
Paris and seek refuge with his mistress Émilie du Châtelet. Unaltered, the Lettres Philosophiques 
provide us with special insight into his ambitions to popularize heterodox ideas under the guise 
of honest science. 
If Fontenelle promoted Neo-Epicurean morality and secular progressivism by fashioning 
himself into an advocate of Cartesian mechanism and, more generally, natural philosophy, then 
Voltaire advocated for Lockean materialism and English tolerance by pairing them with Newton’s 
discovery of the force of attraction. More precisely, Voltaire attempted to present John Locke’s 
controversial epistemology, which attributed thinking to matter and placed the soul beyond the 
pale of human knowledge, as “modeste” (Voltaire, Lettres philosophiques, p. 41) by arguing that 
it simply conformed with the limits that Newton had placed on his scientific method. How, if 
Edmund Halley could predict the course of comets by applying Newton’s method, could one 
reject the implications of an epistemology that perfectly conformed with the later?166 So went 
 
165 See J.B. Shank, Before Voltaire: Newtonianism and the Origins of the Enlightenment in France: 1687 – 1734, p. 
588. 
166 For the reference to Halley in the Lettres philosophiques, see p. 87. 
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the esoteric message of the Lettres. 
Voltaire draws the parallel between Locke’s epistemology and Newton’s method against 
the background of Descartes’ philosophy. He explains that, on the one hand, Newton’s rejection 
of the hypothetical reasoning that leads Descartes to found his physics on “les qualités occultes 
des anciens” [occult qualities of the ancients] (Ibid., p. 64) allowed him to discover action at a 
distance, i.e., gravity. On the other hand, Locke’s rejection of “les idées innées” [innate ideas] 
(Ibid., p. 39) convinces him to reject Descartes’ position that “l’âme est la même chose que la 
pensée” [the soul is the same thing as thinking] (Ibid., p. 38), and to instead propose that thinking 
can be explained in material terms, placing the soul beyond the pale of epistemology. Of course, 
Voltaire does not explicitly state that if one embraces Newton’s theory of attraction, then one 
must also accept Locke’s theory of the mind, but he places these conclusions together. For 
instance, in the letter on Descartes and Newton he writes: 
L'essence même des choses a totalement changé. Vous ne vous accordez ni sur la 
définition de l'âme ni sur celle de la matière. Descartes assure que l'âme est la même 
chose que la pensée, et Locke lui prouve assez bien le contraire. Descartes assure encore 
que l'étendue seule fait la matière; Newton y ajoute la solidité. Voilà de furieuses 
contrariétés. (Ibid., p. 54) 
Similarly, in the letter on Locke, Voltaire reports that the English sage’s ‘modest’ history of the 
soul was guided by the light of (Newton’s) physics: 
Tant de raisonneurs ayant fait le roman de l'âme, un sage est venu, qui en a fait 
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modestement l'histoire. Locke a développé à l'homme la raison humaine, comme un 
excellent anatomiste explique les ressorts du corps humain. Il s'aide partout du flambeau 
de la physique. (Ibid., p. 38) 
In addition to this, Voltaire dismisses out of hand the theologians who interpret Locke’s theory 
as a “déclaration scandaleuse que l'âme est matérielle et mortelle” [scandalous declaration that 
the soul is material and mortal], writing that Locke has only relegated the soul to the realm of 
faith, and adding that “les théologiens commencent trop souvent par dire que Dieu est outragé 
quand on n'est pas de leur avis. C'est trop ressembler aux mauvais poètes, qui criaient que 
Despréaux parlait mal du roi, parce qu'il se moquait d'eux” [the theologians start off all too often 
by saying that God is outraged when one is not of their opinion. They resemble all too well those 
bad poets, who cried that Despréaux spoke poorly of the king because he mocked them] (Ibid., 
p. 39 – 40). 
 It goes without saying that Voltaire exaggerated the extent to which Newton’s scientific 
method paralleled Locke’s epistemology. For instance, Newton conceives of God in the General 
Scholium as “incorporeal aether ‘who would move bodies without offering resistance to them in 
turn’”, which would certainly seem to qualify God as an “occult quality of the ancients”.167 What 
is more, Voltaire was likely aware of this incongruency, since he contends in the article entitled 
“Descartes and Newton” from his Dictionnaire philosophiques (1764) that many readers have 
 
167 See Edward Grant, Much Ado about Nothing: Theories of Space and Vacuum from the Middle Ages to the Scientific 
Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 247: “But ‘what could an immaterial aether be? To 
Newton, it was the infinite omnipotent God, who by His omnipotence is actively present throughout it.’ God was 
conceived as an incorporeal aether ‘who could move bodies without offering resistance to them in turn,’ as the 
General Scholium would declare.” 
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discovered metaphysical ideas at the end of the Principia, where Newton published the General 
Scholium: “Bien des gens, en lisant le peu de métaphysique que Newton a mis à la fin de ses 
Principes mathématiques, y ont trouvé quelque chose d’aussi obscur que l’Apocalypse” [Many 
people, in reading the trace of metaphysics that Newton left at the end of the Principia 
Mathematica, found there some things as obscure as the Apocalypse].168 It would therefore seem 
that Voltaire knowingly exaggerated the similarity between Locke and Newton to advance the 
former’s epistemology, along with its implications concerning the soul. 
 There is a second, esoteric parallel that Voltaire attempts to draw in the Lettres between 
Locke’s conclusion that the soul is beyond the scope of human knowledge, on the one hand, and 
the tolerance of the English, on the other. More precisely, if we cannot know the nature of the 
soul, then we should not make religious institutions that basis of society, but instead institutions 
that we can know, particularly the free market. Thus, in his sixth letter on the Presbyterians, he 
explains that the English are the most tolerant people because they occupy themselves with 
practical matters like commerce rather than metaphysical ones like religion, and save the word 
“heretic” alone for the man who goes “bankrupt”: 
Entrez dans la Bourse de Londres, cette place plus respectable que bien des cours; vous y 
voyez rassemblés les députés de toutes les nations pour l'utilité des hommes. Là, le juif, 
le mahométan et le chrétien traitent l'un avec l'autre comme s'ils étaient de la même 
religion, et ne donnent le nom qu'à ceux qui font banqueroute; [...] S'il n'y avait en 
 




Angleterre qu'une religion, le despotisme serait à craindre; s'il y en avait deux, elles se 
couperaient la gorge; mais il y en a trente, et elles vivent en paix et heureuses. (Voltaire, 
Lettres Philosophiques, p. 27) 
Voltaire therefore popularized the idea that multi-confessional societies can succeed if diverse 
peoples are united in their shared interest for commerce, which he thinks is stronger than their 
religious group interests. Hence, science justifies liberal values like tolerance, which, in turn, are 
conducive to making practical affairs like commerce and free market capitalism the lynchpins of 
society. This line of reasoning is remarkable—and seems to go to heart of liberal thinking. Recall 
how Colbert justified economic reforms, like the introduction of meritocratic institutions, in the 
name of science. Voltaire is doing something similar, but instead of meritocracy, he maintains 
that science and tolerance go hand in hand.  
 The general impression that one gets reading the Lettres philosophiques is the following: 
if English philosophers and scientists refrain from speculating about the “inner nature” of things 
and “occult qualities”, and as a result, tend to invent epistemological and physical doctrines that 
are superior to those of Frenchmen such as Descartes, then it’s because they are an exceptionally 
reasonable people. Indeed, not only do the English defend religious tolerance, but also freedom 
of speech: 
Il y a à Londres environ huit cents personnes qui ont le droit de parler en public et de 
soutenir les intérêts de la nation; environ cinq ou six mille prétendent au même honneur 
à leur tour; tout le reste s'érige en juge de ceux-ci, et chacun peut faire imprimer ce qu'il 
pense sur les affaires publiques. Ainsi, toute la nation est dans la nécessité de s'instruire. 
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(Ibid., p. 89) 
What Leo Strauss calls the Enlightenment’s “struggle against prejudice” is perfectly apparent in 
the Lettres, which draws a strict dichotomy between reason on the one hand, and authority on 
the other.169 As the quote suggests, the English are obliged to exercise their freedom of speech, 
since instruction, not authority, is their guiding light. Of course, Voltaire attempted to downplay 
the implications of the Lettres, writing that philosophers are interested in reason alone, and will 
never form a religious sect with the intention of subverting society: “Jamais les philosophes ne 
feront une secte de religion. Pourquoi? C'est qu'ils n'écrivent point pour le peuple, et qu'ils sont 
sans enthousiasme” [Never will philosophers form a religious sect. Why? Because they only write 
for the people, and are without zeal]. (Voltaire, Lettres Philosophiques, p. 42) Of course, one 
doubts the genuineness of these lines, which are calculated to sound like those of a humanist. 
For in due time, Voltaire will grow accustomed to calling the philosophes his “saint troupeau” 
[holy flock], and lead them to do battle with the Catholic Church under the banner of “écrasez 
l’infâme!” [crush that infamy!]. 170 
 What ultimately distinguishes Voltaire from honnêtes hommes such as Fontenelle, and 
 
169 See Leo Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), p. 181: “With a view to the 
radical meaning of revealed religion it must be said: there exists the prejudice pure and simple. Therefore freedom—
falling away from revelation—also exists. Therefore the struggle of the Enlightenment against prejudice has an 
absolute meaning. For this reason the age of prejudice and the age of freedom stand opposed to one another. For 
the age of freedom it is essential that it be preceded by the age of prejudice. “Prejudice” is an historical category. 
This precisely constitutes the difference between the struggle of the Enlightenment against prejudice and the 
struggle against appearance and opinion with which philosophy began its secular journey.” 
170 See Pierre Milza, “20 - ’Écrasez l’infâme’”, in Voltaire (Paris: Éditions Perrin, 2015), p. 731 – 732, for an explanation 
of the history of Voltaire’s use of this phrase: “Signe d’appartenance à une coterie extrêmement réduite, il ne 
commence à circuler dans le public cultivé et favorable aux Lumières que dans le courant de 1760. Apparaît alors, 
sous la plume de Voltaire, l’expression qui reste jusqu’à aujourd’hui indéfectiblement attachée à son nom : il faut 




makes him the first true philosophe, are his political ambitions. Whereas the cultural architype 
of the honnête homme was created by humanists seeking to escape the business and politics of 
the royal court in order to take in the bons airs of the private salon, Voltaire knowingly set out to 
alter the structure of society. Indeed, Fontenelle also spread heterodox views in the salon, but 
the playful dialogues of a kindly old man with honnêtes femmes differed substantially from the 
acerbic critiques of Voltaire, ever sharpening his pen like a dagger to thrust unperceived in 
between the ribs of tradition and authority. What then, one might ask, was the catalyst for this 
shift in cultural architypes, from honnête homme to philosophe? The scientific advances of the 
previous century provided too great an opportunity for restructuring society. Colbert’s reforms 
had already shown that meritocratic, rather than traditional, institutions increased the material 
production and military and commercial strength of the Sun King’s Empire. An opportunity thus 
provided itself to smuggle in, as it were, other social reforms into Western societies, so long as 
they were paired with science. Diderot’s Encyclopédie, for instance, is another great example of 
this attempt to couple social reforms with science.  
However, one must not lose sight of the fact that Newtonian science has nothing to say 
about ethics, morality or politics. As Voltaire pointed out, Newton and Locke disabused humanity 
of its prejudice for speculating on the inner nature of things, from which past thinkers like Plato, 
Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, etc., all developed their moral, ethical and political 
philosophies. Essentially, Voltaire was arguing that if Newton and Locke claim to be ignorant of 
nature as such, then religious and governmental authorities must also be. But this is somewhat 
misleading, I believe. For as Jürgen Habermas explains in his critique of positivism, when science 
becomes the standard for epistemology, it tends, despite its claims about its ignorance of nature 
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as such, to become a normative force.171 And this is precisely the issue with Voltaire’s esoteric 
arguments for social reform in the Lettres: to the extent that they conform with epistemological 
limits, they are presented as being reasonable, when in fact they belie Voltaire’s own prejudices 
against religious authority and for free market capitalism. In other words, it does not necessarily 
follow from Locke’s epistemology or Newton’s scientific method that free market capitalism is a 
more reasonable or neutral way of organizing society than religious tradition. This is what Hans-
Georg Gadamer calls the Enlightenment’s “prejudice against prejudice” in Truth and Method172: 
If Voltaire conceives of authority and tradition as prejudices, and in opposition to reason, then it 
is because he considers these to be obstacles to independent reasoning, when in truth they are 
preconditions of knowledge. To be more precise, when we respect authority and tradition, we 
are recognizing “superior” (Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 281) knowledge, and therefore the 
possibility of degrees of knowledge. If however, we did not recognize degrees of knowledge, or 
think that all knowledge is the same, then it would not be knowledge but only opinion. The 
Enlightenment prejudice against authority assumes that authority is never “earned” (Ibid.), and 
 
171 For an explanation of Habermas’ position, see Richard J. Bernstein, “Introduction”, Habermas and Modernity 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), p. 5: “Habermas […] is speaking of ‘positivism’ in a broad encompassing matter. He 
wants to identify that tendency, to which many independent movements have contributed, that narrows and 
restricts the scope of rationality. Reason, from this perspective, can enable us scientifically to explain the natural 
and even the social world. It can discern nomological regularities, predict, and grasp the empirical consequences of 
different courses of action. It can evaluate rational decision procedures and assess the cost of competing means to 
achieve specified ends. But it is beyond the scope of reason to justify ends or warrant universal norms. If we accept 
this characterization of reason, then we disavow the type of critical reflection where, through a depth of explanation 
and understanding of social processes, we can further human emancipation from hidden forms of domination and 
repression.” 
172 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: 
Continuum, 1989), p. 308 – 309: “[…] the fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment is the prejudice against 
prejudice itself, which denies tradition its power. […] The only thing that gives a judgement dignity is its having a 
basis, a methodological justification (and not the fact that it may actually be correct). For the Enlightenment the 
absence of such a basis does not mean that there might be other kinds of certainty, but rather that the judgement 
has no foundation in the things themselves—i.e., that it is “unfounded”. This conclusion follows only in the spirit of 




that tradition is thereby arbitrary. But taken to its logical consequence, this prejudice undercuts 
the very sciences that Voltaire is championing. Although Rousseau does not critique Voltaire and 
the philosophes on these grounds, it is worth keeping in mind, because he will propose his own 
version of reasonableness in opposition to them. Before we discuss this however, I would like to 














Chapter VI: The Philosophes and Social Science 
VI. i. The Sources of Inspiration of the Philosophes: Early Modern Social Science 
 The philosophes are motivated by two intellectual trends in particular: on the one hand, 
the shift from the “idealistic” political philosophies of the Ancients to the “realist” or “scientific” 
ones of Early Modern thinkers like Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, which is reflected in 
their doctrine of doux commerce; and on the other, the epistemological consequences of 
Newtonian physics, which were a clear source of motivation in Voltaire’s Lettres philosophiques, 
as we see above. In this chapter, I will focus on the former, which Pierre Manent discusses in 
earlier works such as his Naissances de la politique moderne: Machiavel, Hobbes, et Rousseau 
(1977), as well as more recent ones like La Loi naturelle et les droits de l’homme (2018). After 
studying Manent’s discussion of this shift in political philosophy, I shall examine the latter point 
in the following subsection in the context of thinkers like Jean le Rond d’Alembert and David 
Hume. 
 Even before Newton rejects those metaphysical or ad hoc arguments whereby Descartes 
sought to grasp nature, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469 – 1527) and Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679) had 
already begun the process of proscribing the naturalist arguments that political philosophers like 
Aristotle and St. Aquinas had employed in their basic structure of society. More precisely, in both 
Machiavelli and Hobbes nature is reduced to a bare minimum: self-preservation, or the fear of 
death. This shift however predates Newton’s methodological advances—and although we will 
not touch on the subject here, Dieter Henrich has argued that the psychology of self-preservation 
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paved the way for Newtonian concepts such as inertia.173 In any case, the shift occurs as a result 
of Machiavelli substantially lowering the bar for humanity, whether because he was a callous and 
“evil man” as Leo Strauss maintains,174 or because he was “an honest man” who wanted to write 
a “handbook for republicans” under the guise of advising tyrants.175 Nonetheless, Machiavelli 
holds that the prince should not occupy himself with the lofty and spiritual ambitions of men, 
since they are in truth “ungrateful, fickle pretenders and dissemblers, evaders of danger, eager 
for gain”, and that men speak of the noble only to satisfy their base desires; rather, the prince 
should strive to instill “the dread of punishment” in his people, since the “fear” of being deprived 
of their basic needs, their life most of all, is what primarily motivates them.176 In this way, 
Machiavelli rejects the sort of naturalist arguments that one finds in Aristotle, who contends that 
man’s nature is such that he strives to perfect himself and achieve his essential ideal, just as fire 
 
173 See Dieter Henrich, “The Concept of Moral Insight and Kant’s Doctrine of the Fact of Reason”, in The Unity of 
Reason: Essays on Kant’s Philosophy, ed. Richard Velkley, trans. J. Edwards, L. Hunt, M. Kuehn and G. Zoeller, 55 - 88 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 67: “The development of ethics in the seventeenth century and 
eighteenth century was determined especially by the dissolution of scholastic philosophy, in which system ethic 
possessed a well-defined place. It was part of the teleology of finite and immaterial being. The first attack that 
Thomas Hobbes leveled against this perspective shook it in its foundation. The view of government that forms the 
context for his ethics was conceived in accordance with the ideal of geometry. He meant to construe the complicated 
body of the state from simple elements and thus make it comprehensible. These simple elements were the basic 
drives of human beings, the most important being the desire to preserve one’s existence. This drive for self-
preservation is the extreme counterinstance to all anthropological teleology, for it is the only subjective motivational 
impulse that is by definition without a goal. It forms in psychology the predecessor of Newton’s force of inertia (vis 
inertiae), that is, the force that ultimately liberated physics from the Aristotelian teleology of “natural locations”.”  
174 See Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1958), p. 9: “If it is true that only an evil 
man will stoop to teach maxims of public and private gangsterism, we are forced to say that Machiavelli was an evil 
man.” 
175 See Lionel A. McKenzie, “Rousseau’s Debate with Machiavelli in the Social Contract”, in Journal of the History of 
Ideas 43, no. 2 (April – June 1982): 209 – 228: “With respect to finding continuity between The Prince and the 
republican works, Rousseau might have received some guidance from preceding interpretations. For the most part, 
however, he was probably justified in concluding that in the past Machiavelli had found only "superficial or 
corrupted" readers. He chose to reconcile The Prince with Machiavelli's republican works by insisting that it was a 
"hand- book for republicans" under the guise of giving advice to kings; Machiavelli himself was "an honest man" and 
"a good citizen.” (p. 215) 




strives to achieve its essential ideal by rising up toward the heavens. Another way of putting the 
matter is to say that Machiavelli is interested only in what man is, but not what he ought to be—
therefore, even before David Hume shows why no ought can be derived from what is, Machiavelli 
had already abandoned the ought for the is. 
As Manent argues, by reducing man’s nature to the fear of death, and by simply taking 
man for what he is, Machiavelli suppresses the inner life of man.177 That is to say, if men formerly 
distinguished themselves by their moral character, and the extent to which each exercised his 
freedom to perfect himself and approach the ideal, now they were all individuals. Lacking any 
inner life, they all became the same, and could therefore more easily be arranged from the point 
of view of statecraft like pieces on a board. The rejection of ideals like beauty and the good, and 
the reduction of all men to the same (i.e., weak, cowardly, deceptive, etc., beings) is according 
to Manent necessary for the “hypertrophy of theory” and the modern creation of the political 
sciences:  
L’hypertrophie de la théorie, caractéristique de l’approche que nous essayons de cerner, 
est interprétée ordinairement comme l’advenue ou l’introduction du point de vue 
‘réaliste’ ou ‘scientifique’ sur les choses humaines, point de vue qui l’a emporté 
décisivement – cette victoire définissant la modernité elle-même – sur le point de vue 
 
177 See Pierre Manent, La Loi naturelle et les droits de l’homme (Paris: PUF, 2018), p. 28. More precisely, Manent 
argues that Machiavelli succeeds in depriving man of what the Stoics referred to as “that which depends on me”, 
i.e., that which one can personally change. “Plus précisément, « les choses qui changent parce qu’elles dépendent 
de nous » ne peuvent être regardées comme on regarde « les choses qui ne changent pas parce qu’elles ne 
dépendent pas de nous », sauf si nous ôtons aux premières le caractère pratique et don l’indétermination spécifique 
qui est au principe de leur mutabilité. Cela apparaîtra de la façon la plus nette si nous considérons le geste de 
Machiavel, couramment célébré comme le fondateur du point de vue réaliste, voire scientifique, sur l’action 
humaine, singulièrement l’action politique.” 
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‘idéaliste’, celui de la belle ou de la bonne action, des Anciens ou des chrétiens.” (Ibid., p. 
28) 
Since Machiavelli contends that it is not fundamentally morality and justice but rather 
coercive force that secures the prince against the miseries of fortuna [chance], the state 
ultimately rests not on natural law but rather the threat of violence. In consequence, Manent 
points out, Machiavelli cuts out the thing (i.e., natural law) in virtue of which “les hommes 
s’imaginent être réunis” [men imagine themselves to be united] (Ibid., p. 33). If pre-modern 
accounts of nations all begin with a story of their natural origins—and they do, for Virgil begins 
the Aeneid by tracing the Roman’s lineage back to the Trojans,178 just as Geoffroy of Monmouth’s 
History of the Kings of Britain begins his account with the tale of how the Trojans freed their 
enslaved brothers and thereby formed Britain179 —then modern social science disposes of these, 
or treats them merely as a means of coercing peoples to obey the law. (We ought to keep this in 
mind for when turn to Rousseau’s accounts of the origin of civilization in the second Discours in 
the final chapter.) 
  Hobbes offers a similarly reductionist view of humanity, and if he describes our natural 
origins, then it is only to justify his reduction of humans to their desire for self-preservation, on 
 
178 See Virgil, The Aeneid, trans. John Dryden (New York: P.F. Collier and Son, 1909), p. 78: “A race of wand’ring 
slaves, abhorr’d by me, / With prosp’rous passage cut the Tuscan sea; / To fruitful Italy their course they steer, / And 
for their vanquish’d gods design new temples there”. 
179 See Geoffroy of Monmouth, History of the Kings of Britain, trans. Aaron Thompson (Cambridge, ON: Medieval 
Latin Series, 1999), p. 5: “Brutus, general of the remainder of the Trojans, to Pandrasus, king of the Greeks, sends 
greeting. As it was beneath the dignity of a nation descended from the illustrious race of Dardanus, to be treated in 
your kingdom otherwise than the nobility of their birth required, they have betaken themselves to the protection of 
the woods. For they have preferred living after the manner of wild beasts, upon flesh and herbs, with the enjoyment 
of liberty, to continuing longer in the greatest luxury under the yoke of slavery.” 
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which he can construct his hypertrophic political theory. More precisely, as Manent points out, 
Hobbes recreates the state of nature—of which he himself doubts the historical validity180—in 
order to then show how society is not itself natural. The effect of this, Manent continues, is to 
deprive humans of the power of their inner sphere (i.e., the natural rationality in virtue of which 
they formerly distinguished themselves within society) and to reduce them to individuals on 
equal footing. At the same time, this also renders their traditions, customs, and in a word, 
everything that encompasses their sociability, as artificial, and therefore as something that can 
be deconstructed and reconstructed. In this way, humans become more susceptible to being 
studied in terms of the arrangement of their outer sphere:  
Un tel type de raisonnement abolit toute distance entre l’espèce et l’individu appartenant 
à cette espèce. […] Dans la conception traditionnelle de l’homme comme animal 
rationnel, on considérait que l’universalité rationnelle de l’homme n’était pas comme 
telle toujours actuellement donnée mais seulement potentiellement et que chaque 
individu devait faire effort sur lui-même pour rejoindre—dans la mesure de ses 
capacités—l’universel inscrit dans sa nature […] ; dans la vision hobbesienne, il n’y a pas 
d’universalité potentielle, […] il n’y aurait d’universalité que présente actuellement, 
toujours déjà là en chaque individu […]. Dès lors, l’individualité humaine est absolument 
close sur elle-même ; non seulement l’individu n’a plus accès par la raison à ce qui était 
 
180 See Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1909), part I, 13, p. 97: “It may per adventure be thought, 




la vérité du monde extérieur, mais il n’a plus accès à l’autre individu […].181 
In other words, if man abandons his nature (i.e., his narcissistic drive to preserve his life in the 
face of his fear of death) by entering into society, and if the possibility of society itself is based 
on contracting individuals on equal footing, then no one, once in that society, can recur to nature 
to claim either his or her group’s moral superiority; hence, all change must be effected globally 
and from the outside. Put otherwise, the first act of the social scientist is to kill off the heroes—
this, by the way, is why works like Carlyle’s On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History182 
or Rousseau’s Discours sur la vertu des héros183 are deeply anti-modern or romantic, as they are 
attempts to restore nature and therefore power to the hero.184 Nevertheless, this sub-section 
should suffice to show that the philosophes’ turn to social science is prepared by early modern 
thinkers like Hobbes and Machiavelli, and not merely the consequence of what some call the 
Scientific Revolution, to which we now turn. 
VI. ii. The Sources of Inspiration of the Philosophes (Continued): Newton’s Physics 
With great insight David Hume observed in the History of England (1754 – 1761) that the 
Scientific Revolution, crowned by Isaac Newton, had born man a gift not unlike Promethean fire: 
 
181 See Pierre Manent, Naissances de la politique moderne: Machiavel, Hobbes, Rousseau (Paris: Payot, 1977), p. 92 
– 93. 
182 See Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History (London: James Fraser, 1841) 
183 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur cette Question: Quelle est la Vertu la plus nécessaire aux Héros ; et quels 
sont les Héros à qui cette Vertu a manqué ? in Œuvres complètes de J.-J. Rousseau, vol. 2. ed. Bernard Gagnebin et 
Marcel Raymond. Paris: Gallimard, 1995. 
184 I discuss Rousseau’s romantic vision of the hero in the Rêveries in a forthcoming contribution: Jackanich, Paul. 
“L’homme du monde et l’homme vrai dans les Rêveries de Rousseau : s’immoler pour la verité.” In Collectif sur les 
Rêveries (Éditions Hermann) 
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While Newton seemed to draw the veil from some of the mysteries of nature, he shewed 
at the same time the imperfections of the mechanical philosophy; and thereby restored 
her ultimate secrets to that obscurity, in which they ever did and ever will remain.185 
In virtue of the Newtonian method, one might predict the course of nature, as Edmund Halley 
did in 1705 when he predicted that the comet, after whom he is named, would return to Earth in 
1758.186 Such mastery over nature, if one could call it that, came at a great price however. For 
the crown jewel of the Newtonian method was his famous statement “hypotheses non fingo” [I 
do not feign hypotheses] from the second edition of the Principia.187 By this Newton surely did 
not mean that he had altogether dispensed with hypotheses—indeed, we still use them today. 
Rather, he meant that he did not form ad hoc, or what might be called metaphysical hypotheses. 
How can the elimination of such hypotheses come at a great price to man though? 
 To the extent that Newton proclaims hypotheses non fingo in opposition particularly to 
the “mechanical philosophy” of Descartes, it should be useful here to look at the latter. In his 
Discours de la méthode, Descartes himself proves both a successful geometer and physicist, 
discovering not only (Snell’s) law of refraction, but also the cause of rainbows188. For there he 
manages, albeit briefly, to harness the heuristic power of deductive hypotheses. That is, he first 
 
185 David Hume, The History of England, vol. 6 (Indianapolis: The Liberty Fund, 1983), p. 542. 
186 Donald K. Yeomans and Tao Kiang, “The Long-term motion of comet Halley,” in Monthly Notices of the Royal 
Astronomical Society 197 (Nov. 1981): 633-646. 
187 Isaac Newton, The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, trans. Bernard Cohen and Anne 
Whitman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 943. 
188 See Mark A. Smith, “Descartes's Theory of Light and Refraction: A Discourse on Method,” in Transactions of the 
American Philosophical Society 77, no. 3 (1987): 1-92, for Descartes’ discovery of the law of refraction. Also see Jed 
Z. Buchwald, “Descartes’ Experimental Journey Past the Prism and Through the Invisible World of the Rainbow” in 
Annals of Science 65, no. 1, (January 2008): 1-46, for his discovery of the cause of rainbows. 
Jackanich 113 
 
identifies a phenomenon (a rainbow) and then considers its likely causes (sunlight, rain droplets, 
etc.). He then constructs a middle term, i.e., the hypothesis, that converts features of both the 
possible causes and the observed effect into common terms that can then be represented in a 
mechanistic model (Descartes’ corpuscle theory), mapped onto a geometric plane with algebraic 
values, and reproduced in experiments. Following this approach, Descartes successfully shows 
that rainbows are caused by the refraction of sunlight through rain droplets. However, he then 
goes on to argue that the different colors of the rainbow are caused by the varying degrees of 
spin placed on the corpuscles of light, as it were.189 This is an ad hoc hypothesis. For it makes the 
hypothesis itself (i.e., the mechanistic model) the cause of the observed phenomenon. Descartes 
errs because he believes that his mechanistic models are not merely heuristic tools (i.e., middle 
terms that link cause and effect), but really constitutive of nature. Still, what is the great cost of 
eliminating such ad hoc hypotheses? 
 Descartes not only argues that his mechanical models really constitute nature, but also 
that they can be deduced from first principles, which we know with certainty. Thus, when Newton 
shows such ad hoc hypotheses to be useless in predicting the course of nature, he also cuts away 
the metaphysical ground of certainty on which it was formerly possible to found physics. Hence 
Hume’s observation that Newton “restored her [nature’s] secrets to that obscurity, in which they 
ever did and ever will remain”. To be clear, Newtonian physics does not definitively refute either 
metaphysics or the possibility of a metaphysically grounded physics. Rather, Newton has simply 
articulated a method whereby the course of nature can be predicted—not perfectly, but with an 
 




accuracy hitherto unknown to man—without recurring to a metaphysical ground. 
 If the Newtonian revolution compelled natural philosophers of the day to consider the 
Descartes’ mechanism with suspicion, it also put the final nails in the coffin of Aristotle’s physics, 
and the sort of naturalist arguments used by Christian thinkers like St. Aquinas that had up until 
then played a significant role in grounding Western values. More precisely, it deprived us of the 
ability to draw moral and political conclusions from the study of physical nature, as Aristotle and 
Aquinas had done. Indeed, this process is precisely what Hume had in mind when we argued in 
his Treatise of Human Nature that no (moral) ought can be derived from what (naturally) is.190 
The reason for this is simple. Newton reduces physics to effective cause, therefore eliminating 
both formal and final causation, which had served as the basis for arriving at such conclusions. 
For instance, Aristotle argues in his Physics that fire is drawn up into the sky in virtue of its form 
or essence: lightness.191 By the same token, an animal’s form or soul compels it to perpetuate 
itself and to serve the needs of man.192 In this way, how we ought to understand the place of 
things like plants, animals, slaves and so forth, could be discovered through our study of what 
nature is.193 Thus, the Newtonian revolution not only draws into question the metaphysical 
 
190 For more on this, see David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1869), p. 469: “In every 
system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time 
in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human 
affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I 
meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, 
however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis 
necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what 
seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different 
from it.” 
191 Aristotle, Physics. In Complete Works (Aristotle), trans. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1991), p. 19; 192b35-193a2. 
192 Aristotle, Politics, trans. C.D.C Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1998), p. 14; 1256bl5-20. 
193 Ibid., p. 23; 1260a4-14. 
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ground of physics, which formerly served as the basis for our certainty about nature, but also 
teleological claims about man’s moral and political ends that were once derived from the study 
of physics. To put things rather dramatically, man now risks becoming a simple quantity of mass 
propelled aimlessly through space. The cost of Newton’s revolution now seems clear. 
 However, when Newton claimed that the cause of attraction could not be deduced from 
the first principles of the mechanical philosophy, he did not deny that attraction had a cause. 
Rather, he simply maintained, as the “General Scholium” attests, that God must be its cause, 
even if we are incapable of precisely articulating the relationship between the two. (See Newton, 
The Principia, p. 943) This is significant. For even if the Newtonian revolution renders dubious 
those attempts to derive man’s purpose from the study of physical nature, it leaves open the 
possibility of understanding his purpose through God and Providence. Boyle’s Lectures, which 
exist to this day, were no doubt conceived of as an attempt to understand God and Providence, 
and thereby man’s purpose in life, within the newly imposed limits of Newton’s natural 
philosophy.194 John Locke too, despite doing away with those obscure qualities as Voltaire calls 
them, employs the notion of divine providence to great effect, making it the foundation of man’s 
natural rights.195 But attempts by Enlightenment “idealists” like Christian Wolff to revive 
teleological reasoning seem mostly in vain, and as Ernst Cassirer will later point out, provide more 
inspiration for anti-modernists or romantics like Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749 – 1832) than 
for thinkers like Kant.  
 
194 John J. Dahm. “Science and Apologetics in the Early Boyle Lectures.” In Church History 39, no. 2 (Summer 1970): 
172-186. See pp. 184-186. 
195 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (London: Whitmore and Fenn, 1821), p. 208-230. 
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 One might then ask what the true consequences of the Newtonian revolution are. The 
answer is two-fold. First, if certain Enlightenment thinkers work within similar epistemological 
boundaries, then it is because they express a similar deference concerning the limits of human 
knowledge—as Voltaire’s Lettres philosophiques reveal. Second, and as a result of the shaking of 
our metaphysical foundations, the philosophers of the Enlightenment will look for new ways of 
understanding man. Inspired by the Newtonian revolution and above all by its predictive power, 
they will set, as we will see in the next chapter, to harness that power in the social sphere. It is 
this ambition to predict the course of human affairs, I argue, that Enlightenment philosophers 
take from Newton’s physics, and attempt to add onto the social science of their forerunners. 
VI. iii. Simple and Predictable: D’Alembert’s and Hume’s Conceptions of Man 
At this point, rationalist attempts to derive man’s purpose from the study of nature start 
to become unpopular—with the exception, of course, of a few philosophers like Christian Wolff 
(1679 – 1754), who, in attempting to revive this way of thinking, coins the term “teleologia”.196 
In their place, empiricist doctrines that reduce man’s knowledge to his sensations appear. One 
paradigmatic example of this is Jean Le Rond d’Alembert’s epistemological theory, which serves 
as the introduction to the first edition of Diderot’s Encyclopédie (1751), and helps to justify the 
goals of that project. There, d’Alembert maintains that “toutes nos connaissances se réduisent 
primitivement à des sensations, qui sont à peu près les mêmes dans tous les hommes” [all of our 
knowledge is reducible to our sensations, which are more or less the same in all people].197 He 
 
196 See Jonathan Cohen, “Teleological Explanation”, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 51 (1950 – 1951): 255 
– 292. See p. 255. 




then adds that logic, or the ability to combine the ideas we receive directly from our sensations, 
does not properly speaking add anything to them, but only allows us to arrange them in a more 
or less exact manner, and to communicate them to others.198 However, because languages are  
“nées avec les sociétés” [born with societies] (d’Alembert, Discours préliminaire, p. 51), they are 
not free from “caprice national” [national caprice] (Ibid., p. 52), and therefore stand in need of 
perfecting—a project for which the Encyclopédie will no doubt be indispensable:  
La science de la communication des idées ne se borne pas à mettre de l'ordre dans les 
idées mêmes; elle doit apprendre encore à exprimer chaque idée de la manière la plus 
nette qu'il est possible, et par conséquent à perfectionner les signes qui sont destinés à 
la rendre […]. (Ibid., p. 51) 
We then see how, after reducing man to his sensations and desires (which are posited as being 
the same for all men), the project for perfecting and thereby universalizing what was formerly 
particular, i.e., language, is quickly proposed. What has hitherto held the French language back, 
d’Alembert contends, are its national prejudices, as well as its “préjugé” [prejudice] for ancient 
writers like “Ciceron ou Virgile” (Ibid., p. 87) and the use of Latin. 
The strict dichotomy between reason and authority of which Strauss and Gadamer speak 
is particularly evident in d’Alembert’s Discours préliminaire, where nationalism, antiquarianism 
and religion are routinely framed as prejudices and hindrances to science. What I wish to point 
 
198 See d’Alembert, Discours préliminaire de l’Encyclopédie, p. 25: “[…] l'art de combiner et de rapprocher des idées 
directes [la logique], n'ajoute proprement à ces mêmes idées, qu'un arrangement plus ou moins exact, et une 
énumération qui peut être rendue plus ou moins sensible aux autres.” 
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out here is this: in order to catalogue man’s affairs, as Diderot intends in the Encyclopédie, man 
must be reduced to his sensations and basic desires, which has the effect of stripping him of 
those things that not only make him unique, but are also sources of power. In other words, the 
attempt to universalize man, as we see in the cases of Hobbes and Machiavelli, is the attempt to 
instead place power in the hands of the social scientist. At the same, this universalizing tendency 
also plays into the hands of oligarchs and tyrants, since a people’s particular and shared history 
is a great source of unity. While it would be wrong to assert that d’Alembert’s purpose here is 
Machiavellian, as it were, his project conforms quite well to the latter’s. By cutting man off from 
the rational and transcendental, modern empiricism makes for good Machiavellian subjects. The 
ability to catalogue is the power to control and to exercise libido dominandi.  
The effects of empirical attempts to reduce humanity to its sentiments and passions are 
perhaps nowhere more pronounced in the 18th century than in the epistemology of David Hume. 
Inspired by the Scientific Revolution begun by Bacon and crowned by Newton, Hume proposes 
in A Treatise of Human Understanding (1739 – 1740) to found all of the sciences on what he calls 
the “the science of man”: 
[…] the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid 
foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation. 
’Tis no astonishing reflection to consider, that the application of experimental philosophy 
to moral subjects should come after that to natural [subjects] at the distance of above a 
whole century; since we find in fact, that there was about the same interval betwixt the 
origins of these sciences; and that reckoning from Thales to Socrates, the space of time is 
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nearly equal to that betwixt my Lord Bacon and some late philosophers in England, who 
have begun to put the science of man on a new footing, and have engaged the attention, 
and excited the curiosity of the public. So true it is, that however other nations may rival 
us in poetry, and excel us in some other agreeable arts, the improvements in reason and 
philosophy can only be owing to a land of toleration and of liberty.199 
Hume intends to ground the other sciences, including Newton’s physics, on the science of man. 
In distinction with traditional metaphysics, the science of man attempts “to describe the way in 
which we come to believe that one thing is necessarily connected with another—which is just 
descriptive psychology”.200 It does this by applying to psychological phenomena the very same 
methods that Newton successfully applied to physical phenomena. That is, it takes “experience 
and observation” as its starting point, and rejects theories that attempt to justify our beliefs by 
recurring to “any [ad hoc] hypothesis that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of 
human nature” (Hume, A Treatise, p. 6). In order to make the connection between psychological 
phenomena (e.g., our belief in something and the sensation that causes it), Hume contends that 
we can devise “careful and exact experiments” whereby we can discern the same psychological 
patters across “different circumstances and situations” (Ibid.). 
 In articulating a science of man, Hume hopes not only to determine the possibilities and 
limits of “the other sciences”, but also those of “moral philosophy”. Given his belief that “the 
toleration and liberty” of the English are what make this project possible in the first, one can 
 
199 See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), p. 6. 
200 See John Passmore, Hume’s Intentions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 12. 
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already guess what sort of morals “science” will prescribe. In this sense, Hume’s science of man 
not only reaffirms, but is essentially built upon the Enlightenment’s “prejudice” against authority. 
The question, of course, is whether or not Hume believes that the science of man will be as 
rigorous as Newton’s. That is, will it be capable of predicting the course of human affairs with the 
same rigor, for instance, that the latter predicts the course of celestial bodies? Indeed, Hume 
seems to think that the answer is ‘yes’. For in Part III, Section I of the Treatise, where he sets out 
to explain passions like “desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear” (Ibid., p. 209), he even 
argues that reason is “better” able to discover the “necessary principles” on which “human 
society is founded” than those on which natural objects like “matter” are: 
We must certainly allow, that the cohesion of the parts of matter arises from natural and 
necessary principles, whatever difficulty we may find in explaining them: And for a like 
reason we must allow, that human society is founded on like principles; and our reason 
in the latter case, is better than even that in the former; because we not only observe, 
that men always seek society, but can also explain the principles, on which this universal 
propensity is founded. (Ibid., p. 210) 
There is no doubt about it. Hume’s “science of man” does not even come close to approaching 
the rigor of Newton’s science of nature. In the first place, the principle of association on which 
Hume bases his project, and which he likens to Newton’s principle of “attraction” (Ibid., p. 13), is 
precisely the sort of ad hoc hypothesis that Newton rejects in the introductory passages of the 
of the Treatise. For, as John Passmore explains, his ‘experiments’ never show us why we should 
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adopt associationism and not some other theory.201  
What is more, in the eight “’experiments to confirm this system” (Ibid., p. 174) that Hume 
proposes to us in Part II, Section II, what we find are merely linguistic deductions. In his third 
experiment for instance, Hume concludes that it is neither “pride” nor “love” that a traveler feels 
when he remarks the “beauty” (Ibid., p. 176) of a foreign country, because these emotions are 
inspired only by objects that are related to us. But as James Noxon points out, “one could just as 
easily invent counter-examples, imagining the pride of a traveler who ‘adopts’ a country as his 
own”.202 Another obvious problem is that we cannot isolate factors in psychological experiments 
like we can in physical experiments. For instance, we could not raise a child in a cell or some other 
closed environment, and deprive him of every object that he begins to grow attached to, in order 
then to confirm that he lacks the sentiment of love. Thus, the “science of man” is really no science 
at all—at least not according to the standards of the science of physics that inspires it.  
 The social science of the philosophes reduces man to his passions, but rather than calling 
upon him to overcome them in the name universal rationality or some other ideal, it encourages 
him to embrace them. Hume, for instance, considers the pursuit of “luxury” beneficial to society 
as a whole.203 Voltaire, in kind, sings an encomium to “le luxe” [luxury] in his poem, Le 
 
201 “A genuine experiment is exploratory: Hume’s ‘experiments’ are elaborate ways of asserting such commonplaces 
as that we are only proud of what is of some consequence. A genuine experiment confirms a hypothesis in some 
unexpected place: Hume’s ‘experiments’ give us no reason for preferring associationism to any other ad hoc account 
of the workings of pride. They are illustrations, merely, and have not the force of genuine experiment.” (Passmore, 
Hume’s Intentions, p. 157 – 158) 
202 See James Noxon, Hume’s Philosophical Development (Minnesota: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 119. 
203 See Margaret Schabas and Carl Wennerlind, “Hume on Money, Commerce, and the Science of Economics,” in 




Mondain.204 If the Enlightenment guides man from out of the darkness of religious tradition and 
authority, then it is by stripping away his natural and cultural differences and casting light on his 
basest aspects. And although this is done in the name of tolerance and liberty, in effect it reduces 
men to neat social units that can be easily arranged like pieces on a chessboard. One might even 
be willing to accept the ugliness of modern man, if one could be sure that it was based on 
something more than Machiavelli’s misanthropic or “evil” character, or on certain inaccurate 
parallels between Newton’s method and Locke’s epistemology. But it’s not. As we have seen, 
Newton’s method does not disprove metaphysics; it simply provides a predictive model that does 
not require any metaphysics. Furthermore, Enlightenment philosophers like David Hume are 
misguided in their belief that the study of psychological phenomena can be just as rigorous as 
that of physical ones. Hence the paradox of the Enlightenment: it understands itself as the 
“struggle against prejudice” in Strauss’ words, but is itself motivated by a host of prejudices about 







204 Voltaire, Le Mondain, in Œuvre complètes de Voltaire, vol. II (Paris: Furne et Cie, 1886), p.716-717. 
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Part II: Libido Sentiendi and Dominandi: Unmasking the Philosophes 
Introduction to Part II 
 Having conducted our genealogy of the philosophes, we now turn to Rousseau’s critique 
of them in the Premiers discours. Although commentators such as François Bouchardy and Ernst 
Cassirer have dismissed what Rousseau once called his “prosopopoeia of Fabricius”, I argue that 
it constitutes a unique contribution to the history of ideas. In the first place, Rousseau does not 
invoke Seneca and other classical authors to merely garnish the Discours, but instead to reject 
the philosophes’ conception of progress, which they inherited from the Querelle des Anciens et 
des Modernes. More precisely, Rousseau affirms the judgement of Seneca, Polybius, and a long 
list of Roman historians who characterized the so-called golden age of civilizations not in terms 
of their wisdom, but rather their simplicity. Rousseau, of course is not the first to embrace this 
modern anti-progressive conception of history, as one also finds it in Vico, Montesquieu, and 
other modern thinkers. However, and this brings us to our second point, he is the first to make it 
the basis of a unique method which he begins to fashion in the Premier discours: unmasking. That 
is, when Rousseau unmasks the philosophes as vain, idle, weak, effeminate, slaves to the world 
of appearances, it is this simple—and later in the Deuxième discours, natural—self that he is 
attempting to expose.  
 With regard to the first point, one notes that long before Joseph de Maistre and other 
reactionaries, Rousseau characterizes Enlightenment progress as the slippery slope to moral 
degeneration. Of course, Bertrand de Jouvenel already articulated this thesis in his “Essai sur la 
politique de Rousseau” (1947), where he contends that Rousseau’s critique of the philosophes 
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“est centrée sur une forme de la libido, et la plus noble, la libido sciendi” [is centered on a form 
of the libido, and the most noble one, libido sciendi]. 205 Although he does not mention him in 
name, de Jouvenel is undoubtedly referring to what Augustine calls “libido sciendi” [the desire 
for knowledge] in De vera religione, which is intimately connected there with “libido sentiendi” 
[desires of the flesh].206 Far from considering the philosophes as agents of progress, Rousseau 
considers them mere popularizers and vulgarizers207 of science, and thus precipitators of moral 
decadence: 
Maintenant comme alors, la société développe ses maux à mesure de l’évolution dont 
elle se flatte. Chaque pas qu’elle croit faire en avant l’approche de sa perte : son progrès 
n’est qu’une décadence. (de Jouvenel, “Essai sur la politique de Rousseau”, p. 24) 
Rousseau neither considers scientific progress nor the advancement of knowledge per se to be 
 
205 See Bertrand de Jouvenel, “Essai sur la politique de Rousseau”, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Du Contrat social (Paris: 
Librarie Générale Française, 1978), p. 30. 
206 The concept of libido sciendi can be found in Augustine’s De vera religione, where it is closely associated with 
libido sentiendi. See Augustine, De vera religione, in Œuvres de saint Augustin, vol. 8, trad. Joseph Pegon (Paris: 
Desclée, 1951), p. 70, 127. Augustine also explains the relation between the former and the latter in detail the 
Confessions, where libido sciendi is presented as “curiositas” [curiosity] and “concupiscentia oculorum” 
[concupiscence of the gaze], and is associated with “vanitas” [vanity]. See Augustine, Confessions, trad. William 
Watts (London: Loeb Classics, 1912), p. 175 – 176: “For besides that concupiscence of the flesh, which lurketh in the 
delight of all our senses and pleasures, (wherein those the slaves of it, who go far from thee, waste and perish ;) 
there is conveyed into the soul by the same senses of the body, a certain vain and curious itch ; not of delight taking 
in the flesh, but of making experiments by help of the flesh ; which is masked under the title of knowledge and 
learning. Which, because it is seated in the appetite of knowing, and that for the attaining of knowledge the eyes be 
the principal of all the senses, is in Holy Writ called the lust of the eyes. […] And out of this disease of curiosity are 
all those strange sights presented unto us in the theatre. Hence also men proceed to investigate some concealed 
powers of that nature which is not beyond our ken, which it does them no good to know, and yet men desire to 
know for the sake of knowing. Hence proceeds it also, if with that same end of perverted learning, the magical arts 
be made use of to enquire by.” Interestingly, this would suggest a further connection with Rousseau’s critique in the 
first Discours, throughout which he criticizes the “vanité” of the philosophes.  
207 Pierre Manent argues that de Jouvenel’s reading of Rousseau focuses not merely on the latter’s critique of the 
arts and science, but more precisely on what Manent refers to as their “vulgarization”. See Manent, Naissances de 
la politique moderne, p. 140. 
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threats to morality, but rather the “progress with which [society] flatters itself”. In other words, 
it is the concept of progress, the notion that we are better because we know more, because we 
are further removed from simplicity and nature, that Rousseau takes issue with.208 For he sees 
this concept, and particularly its popularization throughout society, as an attempt to promote 
what was once thought vicious. Sallust’s and Tacitus’ respective accounts of the simplicity and 
thus purity of the early Romans and German tribes play an equally important role here. Among 
the few men capable of remaining sober in times of moral decay, they watched on helplessly as 
a once noble race plunged itself into the deepest excesses, gaining special insight into the causes 
of man’s corruption—from whence comes Hegel’s saying, “The owl of Minerva takes its flight 
only when the shades of night are gathering.”209 So too does Seneca’s argument in the Letters, 
that philosophical doctrines [docti] increase in proportion our desires, inspire Rousseau’s critique 
of progress here. As de Jouvenel proclaims, it was as the “champion” of “classical morality” that 
Rousseau leveled his critique in the first Discours. (Ibid., p. 29) 
That being said, I consider de Jouvenel’s thesis incomplete. For Saint Augustine not only 
speaks of the connection between libido sciendi and libido sentiendi, but also of the one betwixt 
these and libido dominandi [the desire for power].210 In addition to unmasking the philosophes’ 
 
208 Given that de Jouvenel has framed Rousseau’s critique of scientific progress in Augustinian terms, it should also 
be important to remember that Bacon’s doctrine of scientific progress also drew inspiration from Augustine, 
particularly his City of God. Hence, one cannot help but ask: did Bacon fail to consider whether scientific progress 
was a form of concupiscence? As it shall become apparent in chapter eight, the Enlightenment conception of 
scientific progress differed greatly from that of Bacon. For Bacon kept epistemology rooted in the ontological order 
of things, and thus submissive to God, whereas the philosophes, inspired by Descartes’ radical epistemological shift, 
turned knowledge into a secular tool that would be put into the service of man alone. In short, it is ultimately the 
secular conception of progress that becomes the object of Rousseau’s critique. 
209 See G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. S.W. Dyde (New York: Dover Publications, 2005), p. xxi. 
210 See Augustine, De Civitate Dei, vol. 1 (Lipsiae, 1825), book I, chapter XXX, p. 34; book XIV, chapter XV, p. 24; and 
book XV, chapter XVIII, p. 37, for his conception of libido dominandi. 
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popularization of progress as an attempt to corrupt society’s mores, Rousseau also reveals their 
desire to dominate society by multiplying its institutions—salons, academies, universities, and 
the like—accruing bureaucratic power, and resocialization or even hyper-socializing its citizens. 
Recalling Habermas’ study from chapter one, we might even argue that the philosophes wish to 
appropriate the bureaucratic power of absolute monarchy for themselves. In any cause, I believe 
that Rousseau identifies in the philosophes something like the ‘intellectual’ or ‘expert’, who does 
not pursue the truth, but rather seeks to manage or gatekeep it. If Rousseau is “history’s greatest 
militant lowbrow” as Berlin mockingly writes, then it’s only because he foresaw what the world 
would become under such types, who disdain the common man for his prejudices, only to impose 
a thousand others on sharper minds. 
 In addition, I argue that the success of Rousseau’s critique of the philosophes depends on 
his development of a unique methodology, the unmasking method. In The Unmasking Style in 
Social Theory, Peter Baehr contends that “the opening salvo in the unmasking war” was fired by 
Rousseau, whose insistence upon the qualities of autonomy, sincerity and authenticity motivated 
him to excoriate society’s appearances without the reservations of his predecessors, such as 
Montaigne or Molière.211 Interestingly, Baehr is relying here on Lionel Trilling’s reading of 
Rousseau in Sincerity and Authenticity, which traces these qualities back to the first Discours. 
That being said, I deny the presence of anything like authenticity there, and argue that, at best, 
one merely uncovers the seeds of this virtue in the Rêveries. The importance of autonomy and 
sincerity in the Premier Discours is not to be overlooked however. And as before, I demonstrate 
 
211 Peter Baehr, The Unmasking Style in Social Theory (New York: Routledge, 2019), p. 17. 
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that Rousseau successfully reinterprets these ancient virtues in order to mobilize his unmasking 
method. Whereas the stoics understood autonomy as self-mastery, the Genevan interprets it as 
self-definition in order to recover his “shredded soul” from the hyper-socializing processes that 
are unique to modernity. At the same time, Rousseau’s unmasking of society in the Premier and 
Deuxième discours seems all the more convincing precisely because of the sincerity with which 
he unmasks himself in the Confessions. What Aristotle would have deemed an extreme version 
of sincerity, Rousseauian autobiography operates within the same framework as his unmasking 
method, being the author’s attempt to expose his unsocialized or true self. 
 I believe that the method with which Rousseau unmasks the philosophes can be clarified 
by (a) venturing past modernity and examining the differences between the Ancient Greek and 
Christian moral frameworks, and by (b) studying two forerunners of the unmasking method, La 
Bruyère and Molière. Though Alasdair MacIntyre considers unmasking part of the “distinctively 
modern moral scheme”212 I argue that the Christian moral framework provides one of the 
requisite conditions for the method, insofar as it turns our gaze away from one’s actions and 
focuses it on his motives. To recall, arete [virtue] translates as excellence in Homer, and Aristotle 
judges a man to be virtuous only if he succeeds in undertaking what he proposes. Hence, for the 
Greeks, failure is nearly synonymous with viciousness, meaning that there is less occasion to 
suppose a man virtuous despite his actions, or on the basis of his intentions. The relative 
unimportance of intentions in the Greek world is reflected in the difference between their 
definition of hupokrisis [hypocrisy] and the one found in the New Testament, and particularly in 
 
212 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), p. 68. 
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Matthew. Aristotle, for instance, merely distinguishes the hypocritical method from his scientific 
one, claiming that the former is suited to prose and politics. Demosthenes even says that 
hypocrisy is the first, second and third rule of oratory. However, if the meek, impoverished and 
wretched are virtuous in the Christian framework, then it is only because they are judged in spite 
of their actions, and on the basis of their intentions. But the latter are much more easily 
concealed than the former, which explains why the New Testament regards hypocrisy not merely 
as vicious, but according William Barclay, as the greatest sin. For hypocrisy threatens the whole 
Christian framework.  
 It is therefore not surprising that the unmasking style first gains traction in plays such as 
Molière’s Tartuffe, who conceals his cupidity behind the mask of Christian righteousness. There, 
Elmire states her desire to “faire poser le masque à cette âme hypocrite”.213 Molière, however, 
practiced unmasking with reservation, for Cléante cautions that righteous unmasking can itself 
become a mask, and advises the audience to improve society by setting a good example, rather 
than by hounding out hypocrites. Similarly, in his Caractères (1688) Jean de la Bruyère removes 
“le masque de l’hypocrisie” worn by false honnêtes hommes, exposing their vanity, conformity, 
effeminateness, hedonism and other vices.214 One wonders here if Jean-Jacques’ critique of the 
philosophe is not simply a reproduction of La Bruyère’s. However, there are major differences. 
Like Molière, La Bruyère believes that there are limits to unmasking, and neither wishes to tear 
away “le voile de la modestie” that guards others from our pride, nor abandon the model of the 
 
213 Jean-Baptiste Poquelin Molière, Tartuffe, ou l’imposteur (Paris: E. Flammarion, 1894), p. 97. 
214 Jean de la Bruyère, Les Caractères de la Bruyère, suivis des Caractères des Théophraste (Paris: Librairie d’Abel 
Ledoux, 1836), p. 233. 
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honnête homme, whose ‘artless charm’ renders society agreeable. What distinguishes Rousseau 
from his predecessors, I believe, is not merely the fact that he pursues unmasking without their 
reservations, tossing the veil of modesty into the mud. No, in distinction with these writers, the 
man whom Rousseau unmasks is an unwitting hypocrite, one who, unlike Tartuffe, hides behind 
the mask without knowing it. Instead of unmasking the sinner, Rousseau unmasks the artificial 
or hyper-socialized man, not holding up Christian virtue as the ideal, but rather the simplicity of 
which Tacitus and Sallust speak, the simplicity that Victor Goldschmidt identifies in the first 
Discours in the “cité cynique”.215 By accusing modern society of being artificial, Rousseau is able 
propose another society embedded in reality or nature (i.e., the cité cynique) and then remove 
the mask imposed by the former, not to castigate people, but rather to show them their true 
selves, as they should be. Rousseau refines this unique method in the Premier discours, and later 
deploys it in the Deuxième. In following years, not only will philosophes such as Holbach and 
Condorcet appropriate this method, but so too will numerous thinkers the 19th and 20th 
centuries—Freud, Marx and Adorno to name a few. Marx, for instance, lifts the “Jammertales” 
[veil of tears] from Christianity to reveal the historical subject, the unwitting product of an 
exploitative and artificial and society. There is a major difference, however, between these other 
thinkers and Rousseau, who would have regarded their attempts to institutionalize unmasking as 
contradictory, given that unmasking serves primarily to liberate man from societal institutions, 
and thereby restore his autonomy. Unmasking belongs to the dissident, not the managers of 
truth. 
 
215 Victor Goldschmidt, Anthropologie et politique: les principes du système de Rousseau (Paris: Librarie 
Philosophique J. Vrin, 1982), p. 67. 
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 Of the ancient civilizations, Rome inspired Rousseau the most. Aside from Socrates and 
his commentators Plato and Xenophon, he confirmed Cato the Elder’s judgement regarding the 
Athenians: they were masters of the arts and rhetoric, but the “words of the [Athenians] were 
born on their lips, [while] those of the Romans in their hearts”.216 And though he greatly admired 
Spartans like Lycurgus for their honesty and the simplicity of their wisdom, it was ultimately by 
imagining himself as that Roman diplomat to King Pyrrhus, the poor but incorruptible Fabricius, 
that he delivered his first Discours before the Académie de Dijon. The first chapter of this part, 
or chapter seven, thus examines the difference between the philosophes’ and Rousseau’s view 
of the Romans. According to Voltaire, the Romans owed their best laws (like religious tolerance) 
to the Athenians, and Turgot even claimed that the Romans had only managed to extend their 
empire across the known world by supplementing their rude language with Greek eloquence. In 
general, the philosophes sought to demystify Rome. Diderot equated the first Romans to a pack 
of brigands who had only won the admiration of future generations by the scale of their crimes, 
and Voltaire, denouncing patriotism, cited the Romans as proof that to love one’s country, one 
must also hate one’s neighbours. Hume’s criticisms cut the deepest however. Years before the 
Académie’s essay contest, he had already put his finger on the Roman prejudices that Rousseau 
would later hope to defend in the first Discours: whereas commerce and luxury were associated 
with effeminacy and tyranny (i.e., the antitheses of virtue) by the Romans, modernity has shown 
that it was only by these that peasants became artisans and small business owners, thus giving 
the average man a greater share of liberty. 
 
216 See The Life of Cato the Elder, in Parallel Lives, vol. II, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1914), p. 337. 
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 Rousseau was born in Geneva, the Protestant city state that had fought desperately for 
its sovereignty from the Papacy during the Thirty Years War. To such people patriotism was not 
the vice of brigands, but rather the aegis of liberty. Reading to him the ancient tales of Plutarch, 
of those Spartans and Romans who had lived and died for their fatherland, Jean-Jacques’ father 
made certain that his son took this wisdom to heart. Plutarch was the first author that he read in 
his youth, and the last in his old age, and throughout the Confessions de J.-J. Rousseau we see his 
admiration for these classical heroes rise up through his being. His mind wanders in sublime 
contemplation through the arches of the Pont du Gard, and Rousseau pronounces: “Would that 
I was born a Roman!” For many years Rousseau sought to become a playwright and a composer, 
but the patriotic sentiments that he had inherited from his forebearers, and his admiration for 
the austere virtue and rusticity of the ancients never abandoned him. Thus, suffocating on the 
bons airs and sociabilité of the Parisian salon, he cast aside his artistic ambitions, and resolved to 
take up the classical banner: to battle the world of appearances. (What Strauss identifies as the 
classical dichotomy between reason and appearance is fundamental in Rousseau’s thought.) 
With this banner in hand, Rousseau made sure to remind the cosmopolitans, always assembled 
in their great urban centers, that inequality and indifference to humanity abounds among them 
the most. His criticisms are prescient: the cosmopolitan progressive lectures us on our duties to 
foreigners, giving the appearance of virtue, so that he can step over his neighbor in the street. 
The philosophes, who entertain the prejudices of the women of the salon, give the appearance 
of respect, only in order to seduce them. They are virtue-signalers, interested only in convincing 
others of their virtue so that they don’t have to act virtuously. 
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 Having established Rousseau’s classical roots, our goal in chapter eight is to further flesh 
out de Jouvenel’s thesis, which will permit us to better understand the classical arguments that 
he mobilizes in the Discours sur les sciences et les arts. In the first place, this means articulating 
how libido sciendi devolves into libido sentiendi, or “scientific progress” into moral degeneracy. 
Drawing on previous chapters, we define scientific progress not merely as the advancement of 
physical theories and technological innovations, but more fundamentally as a particular world-
view that can be traced back to Descartes’ epistemological shift. When Descartes asserts cogito 
ergo sum, he uproots the subject from the ontological world that it once occupied in Plato and 
Aristotle, making the subject its own, radically autonomous ground. It is here that the classical 
dichotomy between reason and appearance is abandoned for the modern one between reason 
and authority, which rejects all authority—especially its religious and nationalist variants—that 
does not come from the autonomous individual. Hence, whereas reason was once a divine key 
for accessing the highest forms, virtue and beauty, and communing with the divine, it becomes 
a cold tool in the hands of man. And though Fontenelle, Voltaire and Hume were all highly critical 
of Cartesian epistemology, their efforts to advance the sciences each flow from it. Fontenelle’s 
secular conception of scientific progress as the linear accumulation of knowledge simply would 
not have made sense in the Platonic world for instance, where harmony is the starting point and 
all the world’s knowledge already exists in the heavens. Voltaire’s endorsement of John Locke’s 
epistemology, as well as Hume’s psychology or “science of man”, are also both indicative of the 
radically autonomous Cartesian ego. The question therefore becomes: how does libido sciendi 
degenerate into libido sentiendi? Or from the perspective of the classical dichotomy between 
reason and appearance, how does this form of libido sciendi lead us back into the cave? 
Jackanich 133 
 
 Having uprooted man from his place in the ontological hierarchy, and made the subject 
its own ground, few options remain for orientating humanity. One appears to be Epicureanism, 
whose reduction of the world to matter and form resonated with modern philosophers such as 
Gassendi and Fontenelle. Epicurus however not only grounded his physics on this ontology, but 
also his ethics, making the immanently available—pain and pleasure—humanity’s guiding lights. 
In chapters four and five, we studied how this ethics devolved into salon-Epicureanism, which 
severed the relationship between virtue and action, and replaced the latter with flowery words, 
politeness and, in sum, appearances. Salon-Epicureanism is not, however, the only product of 
enlightened libido sentiendi as it were. For its effects are also manifest in the modern science of 
man, which only makes man calculable by reducing him to an individual that is everywhere the 
same, driven merely by his most selfish desires, and indistinguishable by his virtues. The basest 
ends (e.g., commerce) are likewise transformed into the lynchpins of society, for once again, it’s 
easier to calculate money than virtue. Having elaborated the relationship between libido sciendi 
and libido sentiendi, I show that Bertrand de Jouvenel’s thesis remains incomplete: Rousseau is 
not simply interested in the relationship between scientific progress and moral decline; he also 
thinks that the philosophes invoke the sciences in order to distinguish themselves and acquire 
power. In other words, his critique also draws on the relation between libido sciendi and libido 
dominandi. To be sure, libido dominandi is an Augustinian concept, but it was Blaise Pascal who 
emphasized the special connection between the three in his Pensées. 
 With a better comprehension of the battlefield (Rousseau’s classism vs. the philosophes’ 
modernism) and the overall framework of the first Discours (libido sciendi → libido sentiendi → 
libido dominandi), we turn in chapter nine to elaborating the classical themes that Jean-Jacques 
Jackanich 134 
 
mobilizes there. Diderot apparently tells Voltaire that Rousseau initially came to him expressing 
his desire to defend the positive moral influence of the sciences and arts, and only resolved to 
argue the contrary on his advice. In this way, Diderot attempts to explain why the first Discours 
is more the work of rhetoric than substantive thinking. Rousseau, on the other hand, maintains 
that his “prosopopoeia of Fabricius” was inspired by an illumination, and interpreters like de 
Jouvenel and Roger Masters have even characterized the Discours “prophetic”. By explicating the 
deeper classical themes of this work, we hope to affirm the latter’s judgement. The first of these 
that we shall explore was developed in the days of the late Republic and early Empire, when 
Rome’s moral degeneration had finally precipitated a series of dictators. Present throughout the 
texts of Sallust, Tacitus and Seneca to name a few, is the idea that the Romans (and Germans) 
were more virtuous in their early days, when civilization had yet to corrupt them. If their 
simplicity and ignorance guarded their virtue, then it was because their desires were still natural, 
and they’d yet to fabricate and multiple more complicated ones. Rousseau invokes these classical 
thinkers in order to combat the modern prejudice according which the most ‘complex’ and 
‘progressive’ (i.e., furthest from their origins) cultures are the most moral. For what pretends to 
be complex and progressive—spectacles, theatrical performances, polite discourses—trades on 
appearances and distractions. As Rousseau expresses in a letter to M. Bordes in 1752: “Brutus 
n’étoit point un homme doux; qui auroit le front de dire quʼil n’étoit pas vertueux? Au contraire, 
il y a des âmes lâches et pusillanimes qui n’ont ni feu ni chaleur, et qui ne sont douces que par 
indifférence pour le bien et pour le mal. Telle est la douceur qu’inspire aux Peuples le goût des 
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Lettres.”217 [Brutus was not a soft man; who would have the audacity to claim that he was not 
virtuous? On the other hand, there are cowardly and timid souls who have neither fire nor 
warmth, and who are only soft by indifference to good and evil. Such is the softness that the taste 
for letters inspires in men.] Rousseau thus comes to the opposite conclusion of the philosophes: 
the first men of Rome were not brigands, but the most virtuous. 
 Rousseau also sees this classical theme—which equates corruption with civilization and 
virtue with simplicity—reflected in Plato’s Apology, where Socrates claims that he is the wisest 
of all men, because he does not think he knows what he does not know, and thus recognizes the 
extent of his ignorance. Knowledge of ignorance is the best protection of virtue. That being said, 
Rousseau does not consider this knowledge to be the reserve of Socrates alone, as he also sees 
it embodied in Cato the Elder, who expels the Athenian philosophers from Rome for distracting 
the youth from fulfilling its duties to its people, and thus for corrupting them. Hence, what first 
appears to be hostile to philosophy—Cato expelling the Athenian philosophers—is presented as 
being in greater conformity with true philosophy. For the true philosopher is not fundamentally 
one who teaches or argues about ideas, but rather one who lives out his philosophy. 
 Chapter ten is dedicated to developing a classical theme just as fundamental to the first 
Discours as the dichotomy between reason and appearances. Here, we speak of the dichotomy 
between action and words, which is no doubt an expression of the former. When, for instance, 
Aristotle defines a moral argument, he maintains that one proposes in the premises a plan, and 
 
217 Rousseau, Dernière Réponse de J.-J. Rousseau de Genève, in Œuvres complètes de J.-J. Rousseau, vol. 3, ed. 
Bernard Gagnebin et Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), p. 72. 
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then concludes by acting or undertaking that plan—this would mean, of course, that the worst 
formulators of arguments are all those intellectuals who stand above society. For Aristotle, the 
virtuous man is therefore a man of action. However, it was not Aristotle’s theory of virtue that 
inspired Rousseau. Nor was it Plato’s, for although Socrates argues in the Apology that acting in 
ignorance is the cause of evil, he rebuts Callicles’ reproach in the Gorgias that philosophers who 
never apply their knowledge as statesmen, but instead continue to philosophize into their final 
days, rather resemble old men playing children’s games. Rousseau, whose liberal translation of 
the Apology skillfully omits Socrates’ visit among the statesmen, would have undoubtedly taken 
Callicles’ side. Rousseau, it seems, is most inspired by Seneca’s theory of virtue, according to 
which Cato the Younger the “wisest” and most “immortal” of men precisely because he was 
willing to undertake the Herculean labors of a statesman who fought tyranny in Rome’s darkest 
of hours. Rousseau’s subsequent veneration of Cato the Younger over Socrates is surely a 
reflection of Seneca’s reasoning in his essays On Providence and Continence. 
 Rousseau was not only directly influenced by ancients thinkers, but also by their modern 
interpreters. One of the most useful resources in this regard proves to be Montaigne’s essay on 
Pédantisme, which assembles history’s greatest denouncers of useless knowledge. Jean-Jacques 
discovers four accounts here and reproduces them in the first Discours: King Agesilaus’ judgment 
(from the Parallel Lives) that the Spartan youth should not be taught for school, but rather for 
“what they shall do as men”; Diogenes’ observation that the orators “study how to speak of 
justice, but not how to act so”, and should therefore practice tennis instead, for at least then 
they improve their feeble bodies; Xenophon’s remarks on the science of ruling; and lastly, 
Seneca’s observation that “since the reasoners have begun to appear among us, […] good men 
Jackanich 137 
 
have been abandoned”. Of all these however, Seneca’s words seem to have been taken most to 
heart by Rousseau. For if we examine the Epistolae in which he utters them, we uncover one of 
the guiding themes of the Discours: once people forsake simple living and “honest labor”, 
replacing them with various kinds of luxuries, they multiple and complicate their desires and 
hence their problems; in turn, they require increasingly complicated remedies to solve them. In 
other words, what appears at first to be philosophical progress, is instead the multiplication of 
justifications for vice. Rousseau, no doubt, shall see Enlightenment progress through the same 
lens. From these sources and others, Rousseau imagines in the first discours what Goldschmidt 
calls the “cité cynique”, where simplicity is the aegis of virtue, and most importantly, man still 
has la force de l’âme or courage to assert himself and lay claim to his freedom.  
 In chapter eleven, we turn to Rousseau’s critique of the arts and sciences in the Premier 
discours, mobilizing the ancient resources that we’ve unearthed above. While Rousseau argues 
that the arts and sciences are products of vices like luxury, he does not consider them vicious as 
such. For he regards mechanical arts (i.e., engineering) as useful, and lauds Bacon, Newton and 
Descartes as “preceptors of the human race”. Rather, the focus of his critique, I maintain, is the 
institutionalization of the arts and sciences. More than a decade before Émile, one discovers in 
the first Discours what Rousseau will later refer to as “negative education”, the goal of which is 
not to teach virtue, which must be learned in the course of life, but to protect the student from 
those vicious institutions—spectacles, hollow pleasantries, etc.—that might otherwise prevent 
him from developing a natural sense of right and wrong. The basic idea of negative education is 
therefore the following: to be virtuous, to have the courage to uphold the truth, and ultimately 
attain to physical and spiritual freedom, one must be the author of one’s virtue. In other words, 
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one’s virtue must be one’s own, not the product of some abstract system or institutional power 
that can be manipulated like a light switch. For Rousseau, the institutionalization of the arts and 
sciences means the total erasure of such negative education programs—the ideal expression of 
which is found among the first Romans, Spartans and Germanic Tribes—and their replacement 
with what might be called positive education, which does not seek to teach virtue or love of the 
truth, but instead to socialize the youth. While the effect of Émile’s negative education program 
is to render him an individual, I will prove that Rousseau also conceives of a negative education 
program for patriots in the first Discours—one equally rooted in nature, despite his claim in the 
Émile and elsewhere that the foremost legislators of patriots (e.g., Lycurgus) “denatured” their 
citizens to make them so. In any case, the goal of the negative education program for patriots is 
not merely to inoculate one boy against those intellectual types who would make him a hollow 
cosmopolitan, but the whole nation. 
 Rousseau believes that the institutionalization of education (i.e., positive education) has 
made the youth idle, physically weak, cowardly, forgetful of their duties to God and nation, and 
ultimately slavish. Whereas negative education is concrete, meaning that the youth learn virtue 
by practicing the duties “they must fulfill as adults”, positive education is abstract, sequestering 
the youth to the classroom where there’s little occasion for the practice of virtue, but plenty for 
its denial. What use do those who live “easy and agreeable” lives, hidden away from the ills and 
struggles of the world, have for virtue? Who is more likely to display courage, the man who has 
read several books on the subject, or the one who has formed bonds with his countrymen? The 
institutionalization of the arts and sciences not only corrupts the youth, socializing them rather 
than teaching virtue, it also becomes an incubator for the philosophe, the popularizer of science, 
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who might be regarded here as the ascendant ‘intellectual’ or ‘expert’. Such individuals are not 
scientists themselves, nor are they interested in the pursuit of the truth, but rather seek only to 
“distinguish themselves” and manage it. To label them bureaucrats is not to be hyperbolic, but 
merely to state a fact—Fontenelle was on the state’s payroll. Rather, it is the idea that they are 
bureaucrats first, and philosophers second or not all, that forms the core of Rousseau’s polemic 
here, which, I show, paints the philosophe as someone more interested in institutional power 
than the pursuit of the truth. The philosophe, or the nascent intellectual, is according to Rousseau 
the enemy of the people and geniuses alike.  
 Chapter twelve, of course, examines the method of unmasking that Rousseau mobilizes 
in the Premier discours to level this critique of the philosophes. As I have already introduced this 
method, I’ll simply restate my position here that this method constitutes a unique contribution 
in the history of philosophy. In thirteenth and concluding chapter, I will compare this method to 
the one that Claude Levi-Strauss discovers in the Deuxième discours, which he identifies as the 
foundation of the social sciences. If it can be demonstrated that the former influenced the latter 
in some way, then we must ask the following question: to what extent can the social sciences be 
regarded as attempts to unmask society? In the end, does the intellectual class adopt the very 
same method that Rousseau used against them? Has the intellectual bureaucracy absorbed this 
method? To an extent, the answer to these questions seems to be yes. I argue, however, that if 
Rousseau founded the social sciences, then he never intended them to become institutionalized, 
and would have been horrified by the prospect of institutionalized unmasking, which represents 
a contradiction. The goal of unmasking is restoring our autonomy, where autonomy means 
freedom from the desires and self-images that society’s institutions impose on us. But when the 
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very same institutions unmask the people, they do not grant but only subvert their autonomy. In 
addition, when Rousseau unmasks the philosophes and accuses them of being unwitting 
hypocrites, he deprives them of their agency in a sense. The philosophes can dispute this 
assertion, as they did. Though we must ask ourselves what happens when society and its 
institutions—academia and media for instance—deprive peoples of their agency in this way? 
When such institutions unmask peoples as hateful, intolerant, prejudiced and so forth, and the 
whole machinery of society is activated to reinforce the imputation of these motives, begging to 
differ can have serious consequences. Holbach and Condorcet, I demonstrate, both conceive of 
institutionalized unmasking as means of spreading ‘enlightened reason’. But whereas Holbach 
merely wishes to empower a sovereign to do so, Condorcet conceives of an entire model for 
society—his version of Bacon’s New Atlantis—ruled by an intellectual class of “social 
mathematicians” who are not simply interested in studying the motives behind people’s beliefs, 
but also in discerning which motives are good or bad. Confident in their struggle against prejudice 
and authority, the philosophes fail to conceive of the potential abuses of reason, and thus lay the 
foundations for the technocratic complexes of the future, where the common man’s motives are 







Chapter VII: Rousseau, the Philosophes and Rome 
VII. i. Rome According to the Philosophes: A Hive of “Patriots”, a.k.a “Brigands” 
 The philosophes praised certain aspects of the Romans, particularly those that they had 
learned from the Greeks, and which conformed to their preferences. In his Essais sur les moeurs 
et l’esprit des nations (1756) for example, Voltaire praises the Romans for imitating the religious 
tolerance of the Greeks: 
J’observerai ici sur [la] religion [des Romains] deux choses importances, c’est qu’ils 
adoptèrent ou permirent les cultes de tous les autres peuples, à l’exemple des Grecs ; et 
qu’au fond, le sénat et les empereurs reconnurent toujours un dieu suprême, ainsi que la 
plupart des philosophes et des poètes de la Grèce. La tolérance de tous les religions étai 
une loi nouvelle, gravée dans les cœurs de tous les hommes […].218 
Turgot too, in his Discours sur les progrès successifs de l’esprit humain (1750), lauds Cicero and 
the Latin tongue for their eloquence, without which the Romans could not have governed over 
Africa, Spain and Gaul successfully, according to him. But he attributes their speechcraft to the 
Greeks, who lifted them up from their “austere rudeness”: 
Les Romains, conquérants de la Grèce, connurent un nouvel empire, celui de l’esprit et 
du savoir ; leur rudesse austère s’apprivoisa : Athènes trouva des disciples dans ses 
vainqueurs, et bientôt des émules. Cicéron déploya au Capitole et sur la tribune aux 
 
218 Voltaire, Essais sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations, in Oeuvres de Voltaire, vol. 6, ed., M. Beuchot (Paris: Lefevre, 
1829), p. 179 – 180. 
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harangues une éloquence puisée dans les leçons des Grecs, et dont ses maîtres asservis 
ne connaissaient plus que les règles. La langue latine adoucie, enrichie, poliça l’Afrique, 
l’Espagne et les Gaules. (Turgot, Discours sur les progrès successifs de l’esprit humain, p. 
477) 
The aim of the philosophes, it would seem, is to demystify Rome, and more generally antiquity, 
just as Perrault and Fontenelle had done in the quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns 
nearly half a century before them.219  
Hume makes this clear in his essay Of Refinement in the Arts (1742), where he refers to 
“the Latin classics, whom we peruse in our infancy”, and asserts that men like Sallust always see 
the past with rosy retrospection—what the Romans themselves called memoria praeteritorum 
bonorum.220 Such historians, Hume continues, are always extolling virtues they no longer seem 
to possess, and with an eloquence that betrays their predilection for the arts: 
All the Latin classics, whom we peruse in our infancy, are full of these sentiments, and 
universally ascribe the ruin of their state to the arts and riches imported from the East: 
Insomuch that Sallust represents a taste for painting as a vice, no less than lewdness and 
drinking. And so popular were these sentiments, during the later ages of the republic, that 
this author abounds in praises of the old rigid Roman virtue, though himself the most 
egregious instance of modern luxury and corruption; speaks contemptuously of the 
 
219 This theme was discussed in Part I, Chapter IV.  
220 David Hume, “Of Refinement in the Arts”, in Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, vol. 1, ed. T.H. Green and T.H. 
Grose (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1882), p. 350. 
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Grecian eloquence, though the most elegant writer in the world […]. (Hume, Of 
Refinement in the Arts, p. 350) 
Although it is to be doubted that Rousseau read Hume’s essay before composing the Discours, 
one notes that the latter argues precisely the contrary of the former, in order to prove that the 
rejuvenation of the sciences and “progress in the arts is rather favorable to liberty, and […] free 
government” (Ibid., p. 306). To be more precise, Hume rejects a fundamental aspect of classical 
morality, according to which commerce and the arts are to be associated with effeminacy, 
tyranny and slavery. This view was so commonplace that it could be remarked in everyone from 
Sallust to Alexander the Great’ soldiers, who associated his “white Persian tunic” with his newly 
acquired censorious tendencies.221 And we find, of course, its paradigmatic example in Cato the 
Elder, for when asked “‘What is to be said of making profit by usury?’ Cato replied, “What is to 
be said of making profit by murder?”222 But Hume maintained that it is precisely commerce that 
raises peasants to the level of “tradesmen and merchants [who] acquire a share of the property, 
and draw authority and consideration to that middling rank of men, who are the best and firmest 
basis of public liberty”. (Ibid.) Indeed, as we shall see, much of Rousseau’s critique in the Discours 
will focus on this notion, that commerce draws men together and makes them equal and free.  
 The philosophes not only took issue with Rome’s antipathy for commerce, but also with 
its patriotic and militaristic tendencies, which they regarded as antagonistic to the former. In his 
contribution “Vanité” to the Encyclopédie, Diderot singles out the Romans as a prime example of 
 
221 See Plutarch, Life of Alexander, in The Parallel Lives, vol. 7, trans., B. Perrin (Cambridge: Loeb Classics, 1919), p. 
373. 
222 Cicero cites this quote in De Officiis, p. 168.  
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what he defines as vanity: “un homme qui tâche de se faire honneur par de faux avantages” [a 
man who attempts to honor himself by false advantages].223 By faux advantages, Diderot means 
that which grants one power, but which either does not reflect one’s character (e.g., wealth), or 
which reflects one’s character poorly (e.g., crimes). According to Diderot, one finds the greatest 
example of the latter in “the Rome of old”—hence the Rome that Sallust and Polybius venerate 
most—where a host of brigands “osent non seulement justifier leurs fameux larcins, mais ils les 
consacrent” [not only dare to justify their larcenies, but consecrate them] (Diderot, “Vanité”, p. 
242). A man who thieves and murders is despised, but the warlord who conquerors and pillages 
erects shrines and arches at which people come in numbers to celebrate his legacy. To be sure, 
Diderot hated the “old Rome” for its eagerness to celebrate its crimes and injustices:  
La vieille Rome […] fut dans sa naissance une colonie de voleurs, qui y cherchèrent 
l’impunité de leurs crimes. Elle fut dans la suite une république de brigands, qui 
étendirent leurs injustices par toute la terre. […] Ils assemblent […] l’univers dans la 
pompe de leurs triomphes pour étaler le succès de leurs crimes ; et ils ouvrent leurs 
temples, comme s’ils voulaient rendre le ciel complice de leurs brigandages et de leur 
fureur. (Ibid.) 
Diderot does more than demystify Rome. He charges Rome with being “a republic of brigands”. 
If, however, the thuggery of the Romans owed to their vanity, then the success with which they 
acquired their “false advantages” owed to their patriotism, at least according to Voltaire. 
 
223 Denis Diderot, “Vanité”, in Encyclopédie méthodique, vol. 4 (Paris : Panckoucke, 1791), p. 241. 
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At the heart of all this “brigandage”, Voltaire writes In his Essais sur les moeurs et l’esprit 
des nations, one uncovers “love for the fatherland”: 
Au milieu du brigandage, l’amour de la patrie domina toujours jusqu’au temps de Sylla. 
Cet amour de la patrie consista, pendant plus de quatre cents ans, à rapporter à la masse 
commune ce qu’on avait pillé chez les autres nations : c’est la vertu des voleurs. (Voltaire, 
Essais sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations, p. 179) 
Patriotism “is the virtue of thieves”. And in his entry “Patrie” to the Dictionnaire philosophique 
(1764), Voltaire reminds us that the paragon of republican and patriotic virtue, Cato the Elder, 
always had “delenda est Carthago” [death to Carthage] on his lips.224 To be a good patriot, 
Voltaire argues, one must necessarily be a bad neighbor: “Telle est donc la condition humaine, 
que souhaiter la grandeur de son pays, c’est souhaiter du mal à ses voisins. Celui qui voudrait que 
sa patrie ne fût jamais ni plus grande, ni plus petite, ni plus riche, ni plus pauvre, serait le citoyen 
de l’univers” [Such is the human condition, that to desire the greatness of one’s country, is to 
wish harm upon one’s neighbors. He who would neither wish for his country to be greater, nor 
smaller, nor richer, nor poorer, is a citizen of the universe.] (Voltaire, “Patrie”, p. 143) In the 
estimation of the philosophes, the moral man, who neither profits by false advantages, nor at the 
expense of his fellow neighbor, is a cosmopolitan and a commercialist, who is far too sober to be 
moved by the rose-tinted myths of republican virtue and patriotic heroes, or rather brigands. The 
philosophes undoubtedly sided with the Moderns against the Ancients. And while Rousseau did 
not side with the Ancients in the traditional sense (i.e., by affirming the metaphysical claim that 
 
224 Voltaire, Dictionnaire philosophique, in Œuvres complètes de Voltaire, vol. 26 (Paris : Crapelet, 1818). 
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nature has declined since antiquity), he found another way of opposing the Moderns: insisting, 
along with Sallust and others, that old Rome was better not because it was wiser, but instead 
because its was simpler. 
VII. ii. The Origins of Rousseau: “Would that I was born a Roman!” 
 Rousseau was a Genevan son, a citizen of that city state whose republican history dated 
back to the 14th century—to long before the Protestant Revolution and Calvin’s ascent there.225 
The Genevans were fierce patriots, and when they took up the Protestant cause, fighting off the 
Duke of Savoy’s papal army in 1534, they did not hesitate to scorch their own earth to hinder his 
ingress into the fatherland.226 The independence they won in 1536 was the fruit of self-sacrifice, 
and thus cherished greatly among them. In the years to come, Calvin would fashion around it a 
heavy armor of moral laws, proscribing gambling, theatrical entertainment and other frivolities, 
while coercing community and church participation. Indeed, Rousseau will later defend the ban 
on theatre in his Lettre à d’Alembert (1758), arguing that even if the playwright aspires to teach 
good morals, the success of his play will always depend on “pleasing” the audience, even at the 
cost of the former—Rousseau cites Alexis from Virgil’s Eclogues “Trahit sua quemque volptas” 
 
225 For an account of the republican history of Geneva, see Herbert Darling Foster, “Geneva before Calvin (1387 – 
1536): The Antecedent of a Puritan State”, in The American Historical Review, vol. 8, no. 2 (Jan. 1903): 217 – 240: 
“The communal records of the next century and a half (1387- 1536) show marked skill in municipal housekeeping 
and in defense and extension of rights of self-government. Besides the primary assembly of all citizens (consilium 
generale), which elected syndics and acted upon treaties, three indirectly representative councils were developed: 
the little council (consilium ordinarium, or petit conseil), the administrative body; the council of sixty, for diplomatic 
affairs; and the council of two hundred established in 1527 on the model of that of the new allies, Freiburg and Bern 
[…].” (p. 220) 
226 “From the end of July, 1 534, Geneva was fighting to maintain, against the attacks of both duke and bishop, its 
declarations of independence. The task called for great sacrifice and energy. Bells were melted for cannon, and the 
suburbs (faubourgs) which enabled the enemy to approach were destroyed, in spite of repeated objections of 
property owners.” (Foster, “Geneva before Calvin”, p. 222) 
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[Each is led by his pleasure] here.227 According themselves greater freedom on their reading of 
the Book of Revelation, the Genevans also imposed greater duties upon themselves. 
The “fils d’un père dont l’amour de la patrie était la plus forte passion” [son of a father 
whose strongest passion was love for the fatherland], Rousseau naturally inherited his patriotism 
from his father.228 In the Confessions (1782), he reports reading Plutarch’s Parallel Lives with his 
father at the ripe age of seven, and imbibing the heroic tales of “Agésilas, Brutus [et] Aristide” 
(Rousseau, Confessions, p. 9) like mother’s milk. It was in those moments, when “I believed 
myself Greek or Roman” Rousseau writes, that “[my] free and republican spirit” was cast: 
De ces intéressantes lectures  [de Plutarque], des entretiens qu’elles occasionnaient entre 
mon père et moi, se forma cet esprit libre et républicain, ce caractère indomptable et fier, 
impatient de joug et de servitude, qui m’a tourmenté tout le temps de ma vie dans les 
situations les moins propres à lui donner l’essor. Sans cesse occupé de Rome et d’Athènes, 
vivant pour ainsi dire avec leurs grands hommes, né moi-même citoyen d’une république, 
et fils d’un père dont l’amour de la patrie était la plus forte passion, je m’en enflammais 
à son exemple ; je me croyais Grec ou Romain ; je devenais le personnage dont je lisais la 
vie : le récit des traits de constance et d’intrépidité qui m’avaient frappé me rendait les 
yeux étincelants et la voix forte. Un jour que je racontais à table l’aventure de Scaevola, 
 
227 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Lettre à d’Alembert, in Œuvres complètes de J.-J. Rousseau, vol. 5 (Paris: Gallimard, 
1995), p. 17: “Quant à l’espèce des Spectacles, c’est nécessairement le plaisir qu’ils donnent, & non leur utilité, qui 
la détermine. Si l’utilité peut s’y trouver, à la bonne heure; mais l’objet principal est de plaire, &, pourvu que le 
Peuple s’amuse, cet objet est assez rempli. […] Trahit sua quelque volptas. Il faut, pour leur plaire, des Spectacles qui 
favorisent leurs penchans, au lieu qu’il en faudroit qui les modérassent.” For the passage from Virgil, see Eclogues, 
in Virgil, vol. I, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough (London: William Heinemann, 1916), p. 14, book II, line 65.  
228 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Les Confessions de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in Œuvres complètes de J.-J. Rousseau, 
vol. 1, ed. Bernard Gagnebin et Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1959), book I, p. 9. 
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on fut effrayé de me voir avancer et tenir la main sur un réchaud pour représenter son 
action. (Ibid.) 
Of all the philosophers that he read, Plutarch inspired Rousseau the most. For as he would later 
write in Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire (1782), his final work, Plutarch “was the first reading 
of my childhood” and would be “the last of my old age”.229 Though Rousseau was instilled with 
the patriotism and morals that would have permitted him to enjoy the even keel life of a middle 
class man of Geneva, circumstances dictated otherwise. 
When he was only ten years old, Rousseau’s father was involved in a controversy with a 
gentleman. Accused of reaching for his sword during a quarrel, he faced imprisonment, but fled 
the country instead, only to see Rousseau years later. And because his mother had died shortly 
after giving birth to him, Rousseau was now alone. Placed first in the care of relatives, and then 
bouncing from one apprenticeship to another, he quit Geneva under the cloak of night when he 
was still a boy—later regretting in his Confessions the tranquil life he might have enjoyed there, 
were it not for this unhappy “accident”.230 The peregrinations of his youth carried him first into 
the arms of the Baroness de Warens, or “Maman” [Mama] as Rousseau would call her.231 First 
 
229 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Rêveries d’un promeneur solitaire, in Œuvres complètes de J.-J. Rousseau, vol. 1, ed. 
Bernard Gagnebin et Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), fourth promenade, p. 1024. 
230 “Ce train d’éducation fut interrompu par un accident dont les suites ont influé sur le reste de ma vie”, Rousseau 
writes. (Rousseau, Confessions, I, p. 12) In turn, he is deprived of the simple but pleasant life he might have had: 
“J’aurais passé dans le sein de ma religion, de ma patrie, de ma famille et de mes amis, une vie paisible et douce, 
telle qu’il la fallait à mon caractère, dans l’uniformité d’un travail de mon goût et d’une société selon mon cœur. 
J’aurais été bon chrétien, bon citoyen, bon père de famille, bon ami, bon ouvrier, bon homme en toute chose. J’aurais 
aimé mon état, je l’aurais honoré peut-être, et après avoir passé une vie obscure et simple, mais égale et douce, je 
serais mort paisiblement dans le sein des miens.” (Rousseau, Confessions, book I, p. 43 - 44) 
231 “Dès le premier jour, la familiarité la plus douce s’établit entre nous au même degré où elle a continué tout le 
reste de sa vie. Petit fut mon nom ; Maman fut le sien ; et toujours nous demeurâmes Petit et Maman, même quand 
le nombre des années en eut presque effacé la différence entre nous.” (Rousseau, Confessions, III, p. 106) 
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his teacher, and then lover, Rousseau later recounts in his Rêveries that the spent the happiest 
and most idyllic days of his life with Maman.232 Ambitious however to become a playwright and 
a composer, he then ventured across Europe, taking odd jobs along the away as a secretary, a 
tutor, etc., and by the age of thirty found himself in the cultural capital of Paris, where Voltaire 
was already busy fashioning himself into a philosophe and popularizing heterodox doctrines. The 
substance of his character having already been forged however, Rousseau will ultimately reject 
Voltaire’s coterie of urbanites and cosmopolitans. 
VII. iii. The Rustic vs. The Cosmopolitan Progressive: Rousseau on “Virtue Signaling”  
Only one object ever “surpassed the expectations” of Rousseau, and it was the Pont du 
Gard. The first century Roman aqueduct stands to this day, and after so many bridges built after 
it have fallen, it remains a testament to Roman ingenuity, organization and will. Visiting the Pont 
du Gard was a spiritual experience for Rousseau, who spent the entire day wondering its floors, 
caressing its walls, and letting his mind wonder in “entrancing contemplation” for hours on end. 
Lost in that wondrous “reverie”, Rousseau’s “imagination reached its zenith”, and the sentiment 
of his youth returned to him: “Que ne suis-je né Romain!” [Would that I was born a Roman!]233 
 
232 In the final promenade of the Rêveries, Rousseau recollects these days: “J’engageai maman à vivre à la campagne. 
Une maison isolée au penchant d’un vallon fut notre asile, et c’est là que dans l’espace de quatre ou cinq ans j’ai joui 
d’un siècle de vie et d’un bonheur pur et plein qui couvre de son charme tout ce que mon sort présent a d’affreux. 
J’avais besoin d’une amie selon mon cœur, je la possédais. J’avais désiré la campagne, je l’avais obtenue ; je ne 
pouvais souffrir l’assujettissement, j’étais parfaitement libre, et mieux que libre, car assujetti par mes seuls 
attachements, je ne faisais que ce que je voulais faire.” (Rousseau, Rêveries, p. 1099) 
233 Rousseau recounts his trip to the Pont du Gard in the Confessions: “[J’allai] voir le pont du Gard. C’était le premier 
ouvrage des Romains que j’eusse vu. Je m’attendais à voir un monument digne des mains qui l’avaient construit. 
Pour le coup l’objet passa mon attente, et ce fut la seule fois en ma vie. Il n’appartenait qu’aux Romains de produire 
cet effet. […] Je parcourus les trois étages de ce superbe édifice, que le respect m’empêchait presque d’oser fouler 
sous mes pieds. Le retentissement de mes pas sous ces immenses voûtes me faisait croire entendre la forte voix de 
ceux qui les avaient bâties. […] Je sentais […] je ne sais quoi qui m’élevait l’âme ; et je me disais en soupirant : Que 
ne suis-je né Romain !” (Rousseau, Confessions, p. 255 - 256) 
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How different was Rousseau’s first trip to Paris, whose beautiful outline concealed the greatest 
miseries. In the Confessions, Jean-Jacques reports being “disgusted” by the indifference, poverty 
and stench of the big city from the moment he enters it: 
Combien l’abord de Paris démentit l’idée que j’en avais ! […] Je m’étais figuré une ville 
aussi belle que grande, de l’aspect le plus imposant, où l’on ne voyait que de superbes 
rues, des palais de marbre et d’or. En entrant par le faubourg Saint-Marceau, je ne vis que 
de petites rues sales et puantes, de vilaines maisons noires, l’air de la malpropreté, de la 
pauvreté, des mendiants, des charretiers, des ravaudeuses, des crieuses de tisanes et de 
vieux chapeaux. Tout cela me frappa d’abord à tel point, que tout ce que j’ai vu depuis à 
Paris de magnificence réelle n’a pu détruire cette première impression, et qu’il m’en est 
resté toujours un secret dégoût pour l’habitation de cette capitale. (Ibid., p. 159) 
The greatest inequalities are always to be found in the big cities. Their charming skylines—the 
residences and businesses of the wealthy—are all buttressed by the “filthy and fetid” streets of 
the squalid and poor. That was Jean-Jacques’ impression, and the most beautiful architectures 
and gardens could not shake it. It was not only the city that reviled him, but its people and habits 
too. “La solitude est toujours triste à la ville” [Solitude is always miserable in the city], Rousseau 
would later write to the Countess d’Houdetot, remarking upon urban indifference.234 Alone with 
 
234 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Lettres Morales, in Oeuvres complètes de J.-J. Rousseau, vol. 4, ed. Bernard Gagnebin 
et Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1959), p. 1114: “La solitude est toujours triste à la ville. Comme tout ce qui 
nous environne montre la main des hommes et quelque objet de société, quand on n’a pas cette société, l’on se 
sent hors de sa place […]. C’est tout le contraire à la campagne, les objets y sont riants et agréables, ils excitent au 
recueillement et à la rêverie on s’y sent au large hors des tristes murs de la ville et des entraves du préjugé. Les bois, 
les ruisseaux, la verdure écartent de notre cœur les regards des hommes, les oiseaux voltigeant çà et là selon leur 
caprice nous offrent dans la solitude l’exemple de la liberté […].” 
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nature, solitude heals the soul. For the sights and sounds of trees, birds and flowing rivers 
unburden the mind, allowing it to wander into a “reverie” and therein rediscover the sentiment 
of existence. Alienated, however, among a heterogenous mass of unknowns indifferent to our 
suffering, solitude deals a harsh blow to our humanity. 
How could that be? For do not the greatest lovers of humanity, all those self-professed 
“citizens of the universe”, live in the big city? This was a charade according to Jean-Jacques. The 
cosmopolitan only waxes poetic about our ever-increasing duties to humanity, not least of all to 
foreign peoples on the other side of the world, so that he can step over the corpse of his neighbor 
and think himself virtuous all the same. With great prescience, Rousseau thus identifies one of 
the prototypical traits of the cosmopolitan progressive, what one calls “virtue-signaling” today, 
which means convincing others of your virtue without doing anything virtuous.235 As Rousseau 
advises in Émile, ou de l’éducation (1762): “Défiez-vous de ces cosmopolites qui vont chercher 
loin dans leurs livres des devoirs qu'ils dédaignent de remplir autour d'eux. Tel philosophe aime 
les Tartares, pour être dispensé d'aimer ses voisins.” [Beware of these cosmopolitans who go to 
great lengths in their books to find duties that they disdain to fulfill around themselves. Such a 
philosopher loves the Tartars, in order to dispense with loving his neighbors.]236 If appearances 
reign supreme in the big city, then it is because everyone there profits by them, the usurer with 
his interest rates, the actor with his plays, etc. On the contrary, if the common good reigned in 
 
235 Geoffrey Miller describes this concept in Virtue Signaling: Essays on Darwinian Politics and Free Speech (Cambrian 
Moon, 2019). 
236 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Émile, ou de l’éducation, in Oeuvres complètes de J.-J. Rousseau, vol. 4, ed. , ed. Bernard 
Gagnebin et Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1965), book I, p. 249.  
Jackanich 152 
 
Rome, then it owed to “the taste of the first Romans for the life of the countryside”, where one 
does not deal in appearances but rather honest labor.237  
So too did the philosophes and their salons greatly distress Jean-Jacques. In his Lettre à 
d’Alembert (1758), he compared the Parisian salon to a “serrail” [seraglio], the castle in which 
Turkish sultans lodged their hordes of slave-girls.238 But rather than being managed by a sultan, 
the Parisian seraglio is always overseen by some woman, and rather than being entertained by 
slave-girls, she instead amuses herself with the philosophes, whom Rousseau accuses of being 
“more effeminate than she”. (Rousseau, Lettre à d’Alembert, p. 93) Again however, Rousseau 
accuses the philosophes of merely virtue-signaling. For he notices how they avoid more difficult 
subjects, and instead confirm the women’s’ sensibilities and prejudices, so that flattering them 
without loving them, they can “usurp […] all their rights”, that is, more bluntly, so they can exploit 
their sexual favors: 
On les flatte sans les aimer; on les sert sans les honorer; elles sont entourées d’agréables, 
mais elles n’ont plus d’amans; et le pis est que les premiers, sans avoir les sentiments des 
autres, n’en usurpent pas moins tous les droits. (Ibid., p. 95) 
 
237 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du contrat social, in Œuvres complètes de J.-J. Rousseau, vol. 3, ed. Bernard Gagnebin 
et Marcel Raymond (Paris : Gallimard, 1965), book IV, chapter IV, p. 445 : “On connoît le goût des premiers Romains 
pour la vie champêtre. Ce goût leur venoit du sage instituteur qui unit à la liberté les travaux rustiques et militaires, 
et reléga pour ainsi dire à la ville les arts, les métiers, l’intrigue, la fortune et l’esclavage […].” 
238 “[…] lâchement dévoues aux volontés du sexe que nous devrions protéger & non servir, nous avons appris à le 
mépriser en lui obéissant, à l’outrager pat nos soins railleurs; & chaque femme de Paris rassemble dans son 
appartement un serrail d’hommes plus femmes qu’elle, qui savent rendre à la beauté toutes d’hommages, hors celui 
du cœur dont elle est digne. Mais voyez ces mêmes hommes toujours contraints dans ces prisons volontaires, se 
lever, se rasseoir, aller & venir sans cesse à la cheminée, à la fenêtre, prendre & poser cent fois un écran, feuilleter 
des livres, parcourir des tableaux, tourner, pirouetter par la chambre, tandis que l’idole étendue sans mouvement 




Rousseau thought that big city denatured men and women. Surrounded by nothing but human 
art or artifice, the most ontologically impoverished form according to Plato’s view, the urbanite 
lives in a world of appearances. Rousseau’s classical sensibilities reveal themselves here. For as 
Leo Strauss observes, the distinction between a philosophe and a classical philosopher might be 
expressed as follows: whereas the former opposes reason to authority, the latter opposes reason 
to appearance. Rousseau is not opposed to authority as such, especially not republican authority, 
but he is violently opposed to the world of appearances. 
 Hence, the grand monde of philosophes rekindled Rousseau’s classicism and romanism. 
Visions of Fabricius standing before King Pyrrhus, his virtue incorruptible, poured into his mind, 
and on the road to Vincennes he experienced an “illumination”.239 All those Plutarchian heroes, 
ennobling the world spirit by their actions alone, came rushing back to the wayward Genevan. 
Thus he built up a pyre and thereupon immolated his artistic ambitions, resolving instead to wage 
war on the world of appearances. The patriotic sacrifices of his Genevan ancestors had, in the 
end, shaped the die from which Rousseau’s heart had been cast. And so he would become the 
 
239 Rousseau describes his “illumination” in his second Lettre à Malesherbes, in Œuvres complètes de J.-J. Rousseau, 
vol. 1, ed. Bernard Gagnebin et Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1965), p. 1135: “J'allois voir Diderot, alors 
prisonnier à Vincennes; j'avais dans ma poche un Mercure de France que je me mis à feuilleter le long du chemin. Je 
tombe sur la question de l'Académie de Dijon qui a donné lieu à mon premier écrit. Si jamais quelque chose a 
ressemblé à une inspiration subite, c'est le mouvement qui se fit en moi à cette lecture: tout-à-coup je me sens 
l'esprit ébloüi de mille lumières […]. Oh Monsieur si j'avois jamais pu écrire le quart de ce que j'ai vu et senti sous 
cet arbre, avec quelle clarté j'aurais fait voir toutes les contradictions du système social; avec quelle force j'aurais 
exposé tous les abus de nos institutions; avec quelle simplicité j'aurais démontré que l'homme est bon 
naturellement, et que c'est par ces institutions seules que les hommes deviennent méchans. Tout ce que j'ai pu 
retenir de ces foules de grandes vérités qui dans un quart d'heure m'illuminèrent sous cet arbre, a été bien 
faiblement épars dans les trois principaux de mes écrits; celui sur l'inégalité, et le traité de l'éducation; lesquels trois 
ouvrages sont inséparables, et forment ensemble un même tout. Tout le reste a été perdu, et il n’y eut d’écrit sur le 
lieu même que la prosopopée de Fabricius.” 
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“patron saint of the enemies of intellectuals” as Isaiah Berlin will later refer to him. 240 Though I 
suspect that Rousseau would have relished the title, for it was neither the classical philosopher 
nor even the scientist whom he opposed, but the intellectual: neither a statesman, nor even apt 
to consider himself a citizen of his country, he stands above everyone and everything, rejecting 
every form of authority so that he alone can lay claim to it, not in order to do anything, but only 
to signal his virtue from upon high, and perhaps to oblige others. He is everything that is meant 
by the word critic: neither doing nor belonging to anything, he deigns to judge everything, most 
especially all the prejudices—what free peoples call morality and common sense—that make 
common society agreeable. Depriving a people of their national virtues and reducing everything 
to a matter of economic interest, he establishes what Aristotle identifies as the preconditions of 
tyranny, and thereby delivers the host into the mouth of absolute monarchists and oligarchs.241 
Self-satisfied, he believes that he has made them all free, for the glint in the tyrant’s fangs, he 
reasons, can only be the reflection of les lumieres. “What have we gained” by all those “writers 
who regard […] the sciences, the arts, luxury, commerce, and laws” as “the linchpins of society”, 
 
240 See Isaiah Berlin, “The Idea of Freedom”, in Political Ideas in the Romantic Age: Their Rise and Influence on the 
Modern Thought, ed. Henry Hardy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 135: “Rousseau is a poor, or 
rather deliberately self-blinded, sociologist, who threw dust in the eyes of many generations by representing as a 
rustic idyll or Spartan simplicity—the immemorial wisdom of the land—what is, in fact, an expression of that small-
town bourgeois and class-conscious outlook […]. In short, he was a militant lowbrow and the patron saint of the 
enemies of intellectuals, long-haired professors, avant-garde writers and the intelligentsia—the advanced thinkers—
everywhere.” 
241 Aristotle discusses the relation between money-getting and tyranny throughout the Politics, and particularly in 
the context of whether or not the happiness of the individual and the state ought to be regarded as one: “There 
remains to be discussed the question, Whether the happiness of the individual is the same as that of the state, or 
different? Here again there can be no doubt—no one denies that they are the same. For those who hold that the 
well-being of the individual consists in his wealth, also think that riches make the happiness of the whole state, and 
those who value most highly the life of a tyrant deem the city the happiest which rules over the greatest number; 
while they who approve an individual for his virtue say that the more virtuous a city is, the happier it is.” See Aristotle, 
The Politics of Aristotle, trans. B. Jowett, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885), book VII, 2.1-3, p. 208. 
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Jean-Jacques asks in the preface to his play Narcisse ou l’Amant de lui-même (1752).242 “A lot of 
babble, moneyed men and reasoners, that is to say, the enemies of virtue and common sense.” 
(Rousseau, Narcisse ou l’Amant de lui-même, p. 969) The intellectual, as Rousseau imagines him, 













242 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Préface à Narcisse ou l’Amant de lui-même, in Œuvres complètes de J.-J. Rousseau, 
vol. 2, ed. Bernard Gagnebin et Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1965), p. 968 – 969. My translation. 
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Chapter VIII: Scientific Progress, Moral Decline and Power 
VIII. i. Libido Sciendi: Scientific Progress and the Autonomous, Cartesian Subject 
 Our goal here is to identify the different classical arguments that Rousseau advances in 
the first Discours. As de Jouvenel maintains, the main thrust of Rousseau’s critique is that libido 
sciendi, or the desire for knowledge, ultimately serves the ends of libido sentiendi, or the desire 
for physical pleasure. Put differently, when a society primarily organizes itself around scientific 
progress, license and moral decadence follow—the prejudice against Epicureanism or what Plato 
calls the “city of pigs” is therefore maintained.243 In the context of the Enlightenment, scientific 
progress not only entails advances in physics and the mechanical arts, i.e., technology, but also 
the radical reframing of fields like epistemology and ethics, and ultimately our understanding of 
man and his relationship to society. This also means that the relationship between commerce, 
meritocracy, and tolerance on the one hand, and scientific progress on the other hand, is more 
profound than it might seem at first glance. For the former do not merely facilitate advances in 
physics, but more fundamentally increase the autonomy the scientific man. At the heart of the 
Enlightenment concept of scientific progress, one finds the Cartesian subject, whose knowledge 
no longer depends on a preexisting ontological hierarchy—as one finds in Plato or Aristotle for 
 
243 See Plato, The Republic, in Plato: Complete Works, ed., John M. Copper, trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), p. 1011, 372d-e, where Socrates discusses what Glaucon calls the “city of 
pigs”, which represents the desires of the lowest order of men—those with iron or bronze souls—who seek pleasure 
rather than honor or knowledge. Socrates will then demonstrate to Glaucon that the desire for pleasure easily 
transforms into one for luxury, which exceeds the needs of a healthy city and thus sickens it: “If you were founding 
a city for pigs, Socrates, he replied, wouldn’t you fatten them on the same diet? Then how should I feed these people, 
Glaucon? I asked. In the conventional way. If they aren’t to suffer hardship, they should recline on proper couches, 
dine at a table, and have the delicacies and desserts that people have nowadays. All right, I understand. It isn’t 
merely the origin of a city that we’re considering, it seems, but the origin of a luxurious city.” 
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instance—but instead serves as a self-sufficient ground. Scientific progress therefore ultimately 
depends upon the autonomy of the subject, who acquires all knowledge methodologically, and 
rejects what is simply passed down (i.e., national traditions) or revealed (i.e., religion).  
By taking Descartes’ radical epistemological turn as the foundation of scientific progress, 
we can also understand why the latter entails (1) the gradual and methodological accumulation 
of knowledge, typified by Fontenelle’s vision of progress; (2) the rejection of everything else as 
mere “prejudice”, which is characteristic of Voltaire’s reflections on the nation and religion; and 
(3) the attempt to comprehend man in radically autonomous terms, and to make the individual 
the self-sufficient foundation of knowledge—this being the ambition of Hume’s science of man, 
which purports to grant us knowledge of the “necessary principles” on which “human society is 
founded” with a superior degree of certainty than Newton achieves in physics. Indeed, one will 
object that Fontenelle, Voltaire and Hume are all highly critical of Descartes’ epistemology, and 
this is very true.244 However, each preserves—and in Hume’s case, deepens—the fundamental 
epistemological shift that Descartes effectuates: in distinction to Plato, Aristotle and Scholastic 
thinkers, Descartes denies that the subject is grounded within some ontological hierarchy, and 
instead makes the subject his own ground. That is, if Plato thinks that the highest activity of the 
mind consists in the contemplation of the Ideas, which possess a superior degree of being and 
 
244 For Fontenelle’s divergence from Cartesian epistemology, see Leonard M. Marsak, “Bernard de Fontenelle: The 
Idea of Science in the French Enlightenment”, in Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 49, no. 7 (1959): 
1 – 64: “Convinced that the senses are the source of all knowledge, Fontenelle was led to deny specifically the "clear 
and distinct idea" of Descartes and, with it, the entire Cartesian ontology. He did this in two ways: first, by positing 
the real existence of matter, that is known by its secondary as well as its primary qualities, and second, by insisting 
that even our notion of the infinite is derived from our experience with the finite.” (p. 30) The divergences from 
Descartes’ epistemology are more well-known in the case of Voltaire and Hume, for both made experience rather 
than intellection the starting point of knowledge. 
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teach us about virtue, beauty and the like;245 and if Aristotle holds that the mind merely presents 
a potentially, which must be aroused by Nous, in virtue of which we acquire our connection with 
the world and learn our true purpose in life;246 then Descartes reasons that “clear and distinct” 
knowledge of these things is impossible, and that only if we “get rid of all our previous wisdom, 
renounce all our opinions, and make ourselves free of all blindly accepted certainties, [and] reject 
all existing authorities” can we arrive at the one certainty: ego cogito ergo sum.247 Thus the ego, 
the pure undifferentiated individual, becomes the starting point and foundation of knowledge, 
the ultimate authority. Of course, as we shall below, this does not mean that Descartes denies 
the existence of God or some higher metaphysical order, but because the individual must first 
draw these into question in order to then affirm them, their authority is weakened in his favour 
of his own, opening the door to subsequent secular doctrines.  
Fontenelle’s view of progress as the linear accumulation of knowledge, which turns the 
mind into some immense warehouse where parcels of knowledge are neatly stacked up, simply 
would not make sense to Plato or Aristotle, for whom the universe itself is the warehouse, as it 
were. For Plato in particular, harmony is the original state, not some infinitely perfectible goal off 
 
245 See Zuzana Parisnukova, David Hume, Sceptic (New York: Springer, 2016), p. 4 – 5: “For Plato, philosophical 
knowledge is rather contemplation on the divine that brings the ultimate joy (eudaimonia). Philosophers are able to 
get into the proximity of Ideas when they contemplate the highest virtues and values, like beauty, justice, truth, love 
or numbers; philosophers are thus able to ‘touch’ the highest idea of Good. In this picture, our souls have in 
themselves an intermediary, a spiritual force, to help them to approach the essences; it is a daimon, daemon, 
Socrates’ daimonion.” 
246 See Zuzana Parisnukova, David Hume, Sceptic, p. 6: “Nous causes motion by waking the desire in the lower spheres 
of being to reach the same or the maximum possible perfection and get to the closest proximity of Nous. In Aristotle’s 
words, Nous ‘causes motion as being an object of love, whereas all other things cause motion because they are 
themselves in motion’.” 
247 See Zuzana Parisnukova, David Hume, Sceptic, p. 8. Parisnukova is citing from Alexander Koyré, “Introduction”, in 
Descartes: Philosophical Writings. Trans. E. Anscombe and P.T. Geach (New York: Pearson, 1979), p. vii–xlv. 
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in the distance.248 The same Cartesian thread is also woven into Voltaire’s thought. Owing to his 
endorsement of Lockean epistemology, which makes the subject the foundation of knowing by 
conceiving of it as a “tabula rasa”, neither predisposed nor bound to this or that end, man might 
make of himself what he wishes. However, even more so than Locke, who “naïvely presumed 
that primary qualities come from external things”, (Parisnukova, David Hume, Sceptic, p. 16) 
Hume conceived of the subject as radically autonomous. For his “science of man” was in fact a 
“science of the mind”, which made psychological experience the ground of knowledge. As Zuzana 
Parisnukova writes in David Hume, Sceptic (2016): 
Hume’s philosophy grew from this [Cartesian] foundation though Hume endeavoured to 
create a new science of man, not of nature. But he took it for granted that philosophy 
starts with man and his mind, not with Being and its ontological structure. Hume 
considered the mind and its operations a primary focus of philosophy and the basis of 
other sciences. In this sense epistemology was a foundational discipline, though in the 
end Hume had to accept defeat regarding the rational foundations of knowledge. The fact 
that Hume turns to experience while Descartes turns to pure intellectual insight testifies 
to a secondary level of differences. The new focus of philosophy, the status of the mind, 
and the rejection of metaphysics represent their common ground. The problem of 
 
248 Contra Thucydides, Plato argues that harmony is not some fleeting reward that city states might win when they 
manage to briefly triumph in war and against vice; rather, harmony is the natural state of man, having direct support 
from the heavens. See Leo Strauss, “Thucydides: The Meaning of Political History” in The Rebirth of Classical Political 
Rationalism, ed. Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 101: “Plato […] believed in the 
primacy of rest, Greekness, harmony. Plato and Thucydides agree as to this-that for man, rest and Greekness and 
peace are the highest. But according to Plato, the highest for man and the highest in man is akin to the highest 
simply, to the principle or principles governing the whole; whereas according to Thucydides, the highest in man is 
not akin to the highest simply. According to Plato, the highest in man, man's humanity; has direct cosmic support. 
According to Thucydides, the highest in man lacks such support: man's humanity is too remote from the elements 
to be capable of receiving such support.” 
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establishing access to – or the mere existence of – the world was a new challenge to be 
faced, after the world and our knowledge about it lost the unproblematic self-evidence 
that it had in the age of metaphysics. These issues constitute the deepest form of 
scepticism and link Hume to Descartes. Hume understood these implications of the 
position of the autonomous self perfectly, unlike some of his fellow-empiricists (e.g. 
Gassendi or Locke). (Parisnukova, David Hume, Sceptic, p. 2) 
It is precisely because this new, radically autonomous individual can be found at the core of the 
Enlightenment concept of scientific progress that something more than the mere advancement 
of physics is meant by the latter. In order to progress the sciences, so the reasoning goes, all of 
society must be reframed, which does not simply mean promoting commerce and meritocracy. 
For if such things prove beneficial to the sciences, then it is ultimately because they grant more 
authority to the individual, who does not exist within some external ontological order, but whose 
own internal psychological order is the basis of all things.  
VIII. ii. Libido Sentiendi: Neo-Epicureanism and Progressivism 
 The question is now the following: what is the link between scientific progress qua libido 
sciendi and moral degeneration qua libido sentiendi? To begin with, the radical epistemological 
shift effectuated by Descartes uproots man from his place in the ontological hierarchy, and thus 
closes off the highest realm of being where virtue, justice, beauty and the divine ends by which 
man might orientate himself lie waiting. Hence, reason is no longer a key to the heavens, to the 
highest forms and the greatest happiness, as Aristotle so idyllically describes this elysian power 
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of the mortals.249 Rather, in Descartes, reason appears more like a tool, wielded by a man who is 
so narrowly circumscribed that he is at pains to prove that God exists outside of his mind. For as 
Immanuel Kant will later point out, Descartes’ ontological argument for the existence of God, 
which reasons that the concept of a perfect being implies its existence, conflates the existence 
of “an object of pure thought” with that of an empirically or sensibly verifiable object.250 Given 
the precarity of this argument—which Hume also rejects on the basis of its a priori nature—the 
Cartesian subject is dangerously close to being trapped within its own subjectivity. For God is in 
Descartes’ philosophy our assurance of the outside world. Thusly cast into the ontological void, 
and on the precipice of, in the worst case scenario, being no more than a disembodied mind, a 
lost soul traipsing across the nightmare world of a great demonic illusionist, modern man must 
regain his sense of orientation. This is not to criticize Descartes’ epistemology, which played no 
 
249 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 198, 
X.VII.1178b,: ““[…] everyone assumes that they are at least alive and therefore engage in activity, since we do not 
take them to sleep like Endymion. So if we remove from a living being the possibility of action, and furthermore the 
very possibility of producing anything, what is left apart from contemplation? So the god's activity, which is superior 
in blessedness, will be contemplative; and therefore the human activity most akin to this is the most conducive to 
happiness. There is an indication of this in the fact that the other animals have no share in happiness, being 
completely deprived of the activity in question. For while the life of the gods is entirely blessed, and that of human 
beings is so to the extent that it contains something like this sort of activity, none of the other animals is happy, 
because they have no share at all in contemplation. Happiness, then, extends as far as contemplation, and the more 
contemplation there is in one's life, the happier one is, not incidentally, but in virtue of the contemplation, since this 
is honourable in itself. Happiness, therefore, will be some form of contemplation.” 
250 Immanuel Kant levels this critique in a chapter entitled The Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence 
of God from his Critique of Pure Reason: “The proposition, 'God is omnipotent', contains two concepts, each of which 
has its object God and omnipotence. The small word 'is' adds no new predicate, but only serves to posit the predicate 
in its relation to the subject. […] The content of both must be one and the same; nothing can have been added to 
the concept, which expresses merely what is possible, by my thinking its object (through the expression 'it is') as 
given absolutely. Otherwise stated, the real contains no more than the merely possible. A hundred real thalers do 
not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers. For as the latter signify the concept, and the former 
the object and the positing of the object, should the former contain more than the latter, my concept would not, in 
that case, express the whole object, and would not therefore be an adequate concept of it. My financial position is, 
however, affected very differently by a hundred real thalers than it is by the mere concept of them […].” See 
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan and Co., 1929), p. 504 – 
505; A598 – 599, B626 – 627) 
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small role in the development of the modern scientific method, but only to underline its radical 
implications. Every domain of thought will, in the years to come, be affected.  
 Circumscribed to the narrow subjectivity of the Cartesian ego, man has limited options 
for regaining his bearings. One seems to be Epicureanism. As we discussed in previous sections, 
if Epicureanism is revived around this time by Gassendi and then adopted by honnêtes hommes 
like Fontenelle, then it owes to a certain congruency between Epicurus’ reductionist ontology, 
which reduces everything to arrangements of matter and basic forms, and increasingly popular 
attempts to mathematize phenomena in order to explain them.251 Of course, Epicurus not only 
reduces the world to matter and basic forms, but also frames his ethics within this world-view, 
explaining how humans can navigate life without divine providence, teleology or transcendental 
knowledge of virtue, justice and beauty: they must take pleasure and pain as their sole guiding 
lights, to the extent that these are immanently self-evident. The Epicurean will insist, of course, 
that his prescriptions are not morally degenerate. Gassendi, for instance, goes to great lengths 
to show the parallel between Epicurean and Christian morality—in addition to sanitizing certain 
radically heterodox conclusions of the ancient master. Within the century however, Fontenelle 
will popularize a version of Epicureanism that is not only less apologetic to Christian orthodoxy, 
but also less capable of defending itself against the accusation of moral corruption. One speaks 
of salon-Epicureanism; that Epicureanism which, always waxing poetic about how sweet and 
delightful virtue is, made Carlyle sick to his stomach; that Epicureanism which no longer cared to 
ask whether and when virtue and voluptuousness are at odds, and was therefore even further 
 
251 We discussed this theme in Part I, Chapter IV, Section III.  
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removed from the thankless Herculean labours of Cicero and the Humanists. It is precisely this 
salon-Epicureanism, which finally replaces noble actions with polite speech and cosmopolitan 
progressivist virtue-signaling, that Jean-Jacques considers a consequence of the reestablishment 
of the sciences and arts. For these luxuries engender idle, selfish and hollow men, confirming that 
libido sentiendi is a thousand routes to moral decline, and perhaps only a few toward virtue. How 
different was the virtue of frugal and laconic men like Lycurgus, Cato the Elder and Brutus, so 
Rousseau will remind the philosophes! 
 Fontenelle’s progressivism, which is grounded on the Cartesian subject as we discussed 
above, would also constitute an instance of libido sentiendi, not only for Rousseau, but also the 
Christian forerunners of progressivism. This is true for different reasons however. If one recalls, 
Bacon holds that the goal of Christianity is to free man from the endless pagan cycles of history, 
where civilizations rise and fall in perpetuity, and to restore him to the Garden of Eden. But this 
is not a goal of man’s making. And indeed, the very reason that such a goal must be imposed on 
him, owes to the fact that he is tainted by original sin, and thus predisposed to libido sentiendi. 
Progress, for Bacon, is therefore not an affirmation of either man’s autonomy or authority, but 
quite the contrary, of his submission to the Lord. Although it is not Christian theology but rather 
ancient wisdom that inspires Rousseau’s critique of progress, the theme is the same: man is not 
in control of his destiny. (Rousseau’s for believing this are utterly unique however, as I shall 
explain in the last chapter.) 
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Surely Rousseau, whom commentators have frequently associated with the concept of 
authenticity, i.e., the authoring one’s own ends, could not have leveled such a critique!252 We 
will not descend here into a discussion of Rousseau’s status as a precursor of authenticity, which 
is fraught with all the difficulties of attributing a post-modern concept to a modern philosopher. 
Rather, it will suffice to say that aspects of this critique are borne out across the oeuvre of Jean-
Jacques. In the Discours sur l’origine de l’inégalité (1754) for instance, he compares modern man 
to Glaucus, who, in Plato’s account, desires to become an immortal god and thus independent 
from the constraints of time and history, but is instead transformed into a monster.253 And both 
in his Discours sur l’économie politique (1758) and Du contrat social (1762), Rousseau draws upon 
the wisdom of Sallust and Plutarch, who were wont to remind us that nations degenerate to the 
extent that their institutions are changed, and no longer reflect the desires, or common good, 
that first compelled men to form them.254 Once this natural bond has been eroded, no amount 
of legislation can restore it: “quand la philosophie a une fois appris au peuple à mépriser ses 
coutumes, il trouve bientôt le secret d’éluder ses loix. Je dis donc qu’il en est des mœurs d’un 
 
252 For the relationship between Rousseau and the concept of authenticity, see Charles Taylor, The Ethics of 
Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 27: “Rousseau frequently presents the issue of morality 
as that of our following a voice of nature within us. This voice is most often drowned out by the passions induced by 
our dependence on others, of which the key one is ‘amour propre’ or pride. Our moral salvation comes from 
recovering authentic moral contact with ourselves. Rousseau even gives a name to the intimate contact with oneself, 
more fundamental than any moral view, that is a source of joy and contentment: ‘Ie sentiment de l' existence.’”  
253 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur l’origine et les fondemens de l’inégalité parmi les hommes, vol. 3, ed. 
Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 122: “[…] semblable à la statue de Glaucus que 
le tems, la mer et les orages avoient tellement défigurée, qu’elle ressembloit moins à une Dieu qu’à une Bête féroce, 
l’ame humaine altérée au sein de la société par mille causes sans cesse renaissantes, par l’acquisition d’une 
multitude de connoissances et d’erreurs, par les changements arrivées à la constitution des Corps, et par le choc 
continuel des passions, a, pour ainsi dire, changé d’apparence au point d’être presque méconnoissable […].” 
254 See, for instance, Rousseau’s discussion of the Roman censure in book IV, chapter VII of Du contrat social, p. 459: 
“Les opinions d’un peuple naissent de sa constitution; quoique la loi ne règle pas les moeurs, c’est la législation qui 
les fait naître; quand la législation s’affoiblit les moeurs dégénèrent, mais alors le jugement des Censeurs ne fera pas 
ce que la force des loix n’aura pas fait. Il suit de-là que la Censure peut être utile pour conserver les moeurs, jamais 
pour les rétablir. Etablissez des Censeurs durant la vigueur des loix; si-tôt qu’elles l’ont perdue, tout est désespéré; 
rien de légitime n’a plus de force lorsque les loix n’en ont plus.” 
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peuple comme de l’honneur d’un homme ; c’est un trésor qu’il faut conserver, mais qu’on ne 
recouvre plus quand on l’a perdu.” [once philosophy teaches a people to despise its customs, it 
soon finds the secret of eluding the laws. I say therefore that the mores of a people are like the 
honor of a man; they are a treasure that must be conserved, but which ones does not recover 
after losing.] (Rousseau, Préface à Narcisse, p. 971)  
VIII. iii. Libido Dominandi: The Science of Man, or Scientism 
 We therefore see how Fontenelle’s salon-Epicureanism and secular progressivism will 
qualify for Rousseau as instances of libido sciendi expressing itself as libido sentiendi. That being 
said, Rousseau will certainly not argue that the former necessarily entails the latter. Rather, this 
only occurs when society is primarily organized around the sciences, and libido sciendi becomes 
its dominant and guiding desire. This means that Rousseau is not anti-science but instead anti-
scientism, to use a contemporary phrase. For scientism is characterized by the attempt to erect 
science as the sole authority, and consequently the dismissal of all others, including traditional, 
religious and national authority.255 Voltaire’s attempt to justify Lockean epistemology and thus 
religious tolerance by praising Newton’s physical discoveries, Hume’s attempt to found morality 
on a “science of man”, Turgot’s contention that civilizations are merely steppingstones on the 
 
255 For a definition of scientism see Ian Hutchinson, Monopolizing Knowledge: A Scientist Refutes Religion-denying, 
Reason-destroying Scientism (Massachusetts; Fias Publishing, 2011), p. 14: “My single sentence definition of 
scientism focuses on this underlying and foundational aspect: "Scientism is the belief that all valid knowledge is 
science." However, the repercussions of this viewpoint are so great that scientism rapidly becomes much more. It 
becomes an all-encompassing world-view; a perspective from which all of the questions of life are examined; a 
grounding presupposition or set of presuppositions which provides the framework by which the world is to be 
understood. Therefore, from scientism spring many other influences on thought and behavior, notably the principles 
that guide our understanding of meaning and truth; the ethical and social understanding of who we are and how we 
should live; and ultimately our answers to the `big questions': our religious beliefs.” 
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road to scientific progress, etc., all reflect this goal. Of course, each of these philosophers would 
argue that it is not himself, but rather man in general, whom he intends to authorize. 
The belief that the people would benefit the most from science, and that science would 
replace religion and tradition as their guiding lights, goes to the heart of the Enlightenment and 
the modern understanding of democracy. However, it is precisely this contention that Rousseau 
rejects. Moreover, it is in these terms that Leo Strauss frames his study of the Premier discours:  
Modern democracy might seem to stand or fall by the claim that ‘the method of 
democracy’ and ‘the method of intelligence’ are identical. To understand the implications 
of this claim one naturally turns to Rousseau, for Rousseau, who considered himself the 
first theoretician of democracy, regarded the compatibility of democracy, or of free 
government in general, with science not as a fact which is manifest to everyone but rather 
as a serious problem.256 
Rousseau’s perception of science as a potential source of domination owes, according to Strauss, 
to his reading of Montesquieu’s De l’esprit des lois (1748), which was published a few years 
before the Discours. There, Montesquieu identifies virtue as the principle of free government, 
while emphasizing its superfluity in monarchies, where the average man does not promote or 
vote on the laws, and is therefore not expected to do as he says, which requires honesty and 
courage.257 The sort of virtue that Montesquieu has in mind here is ancient and republican in 
 
256 See Leo Strauss, “On the Intentions of Rousseau,” in Social Research, vol. 14, no. 4 (1947): 455-486, p. 456. 
257 See Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois (Paris : Gallimard, 1995), III, 3, p. 32. “Mais, dans un État populaire, il faut 
un ressort de plus, qui est la vertu. Ce que je dis est confirmé par le corps entier de l'histoire, et est très conforme à 




nature, being inspired by thinkers like Xenophon, who considered idleness and hence the arts to 
be vices: “La plupart des arts, dit Xénophon, corrompent le corps de ceux qui les exercent; ils 
obligent de s'asseoir à l'ombre, ou près du feu: on n'a de temps ni pour ses amis, ni pour la 
république.” [Most arts, claims Xenophon, corrupt the body of those who practice them; they 
oblige one to sit in the shade, or next to the fire: one does not have time for friends, nor for the 
republic.] (Montesquieu, Esprit des lois, IV, 8, p. 43) While Strauss demonstrates that Rousseau 
strays from Montesquieu in certain regards, he argues that his thesis in the Premier discours is 
essentially the following: while virtue is useless in despotic governments, it is the basis of free 
ones, which reject those things that attend the arts (e.g., luxury and idleness) and that despots 
popularize to destroy virtue; hence “he attacks the Enlightenment as a pillar of despotism or of 
absolute monarchy.” (Strauss, “On the Intention of Rousseau,” p. 457) 
This thesis is interesting especially since Strauss advanced it years before Habermas set 
out to prove its general validity in the Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. According 
to Strauss, the dissymmetry between the method of democracy and the method of intelligence 
that Rousseau identifies is akin to the dissymmetry between the body and the mind. Rousseau 
more or less agrees with Hobbes that physical self-preservation is the impetus behind forming 
political societies: “L'esprit a ses besoins, ainsi que le corps. Ceux-ci sont les fondements de la 
société […].” [The mind has its needs, just as the body. The latter are the foundations of society] 
(Rousseau, Premier discours, p. 6) But participating in society requires forsaking one’s natural 
freedom for a civil and therefore constrained freedom, which requires one to be active, social 
 
lois, on a besoin de moins de vertu que dans un gouvernement populaire, où celui qui fait exécuter les lois sent qu'il 
y est soumis lui-même, et qu'il en portera le poids.” 
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and contribute to a certain idea of the common good. However, it is precisely natural freedom 
that the philosopher and the mind in general require. For contemplating the truth—though a 
kind of activity—requires physical inactivity, solitude and the ability to reject what is commonly 
accepted. But when the philosopher attempts to enlighten the citizen, he not only corrupts the 
latter by causing him to call into question his commitment to the republic, but also philosophy 
itself, which becomes entangled with political power. The negative effects of such attempts are 
all too apparent today, when protesting in the name of science (e.g., climate change) or some 
social theory (e.g., critical race theory) is very fashionable, despite the general inability of the 
protestors to cite a single article or empirical study to justify their protests. Instead, one finds 
signs comparing whatever threat is identified by the “science” to fictional characters from films 
and television series—modern versions of the theater that Rousseau also wanted banned. At the 
same, this pressures academies to publicly endorse one “science” or another, and to censor 
dissenting views, no matter how well-founded. Unironic slogans like “believe science” perfectly 
demonstrate how public institutions and the state invoke “science” to funnel public resources 
into the hands of those “scientists” who popularize such subjects, and to undermine rigorous 
science—popularizing climate science for instance undermines its validity. Rousseau’s Discours 
presages the effects of democratizing science with greater lucidity than any Enlightenment text I 
believe. 
Strauss concludes that unlike his contemporaries, Rousseau perceives this antagonism 
between science and democracy because he accepts, like the ancients, the natural inequality of 
humans. However, unlike the ancients, he does not think that this natural inequality should be 
reflected in political inequality. Instead, he argues that political equality can only be preserved 
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by segregating scientists and philosophers from the people, and limiting them to “teaching the 
peoples their duties” (Strauss, “On the Intentions of Rousseau,” p. 479); otherwise, the people 
will be led to call into question the origins of their nation and thus the common good, but will be 
unable to understand that, despite the somewhat fantastical nature of these, they must be 
maintained. Recall the passage above: “I say therefore that the mores of a people are like the 
honor of a man; they are a treasure that must be conserved, but which ones does not recover 
after losing.” (Rousseau, Préface à Narcisse, p. 971) Rousseau believes that there are no other 
means of binding a people together and convincing them to respect the political equality of each 
citizen—and political equality is essential to society, since the latter’s raison d’être is the 
preservation of each individual. In short, Rousseau neither trusts the people to act rationally, nor 
the intellectuals to act disinterestedly.  
Despite the natural freedom in which they are based, science and philosophy seem to be 
inclined to political power, insofar as they owe their origin to luxury and leisure, which itself is a 
luxury.258 Rousseau, of course, is not the first to attribute science and philosophy to luxury and 
leisure, for Aristotle clearly does so in his Metaphysics: “the sciences which relate neither to 
pleasure nor yet to the necessities of life were invented, and first in those places where men had 
leisure.”259 Nevertheless, science and philosophy seek power because they require these 
luxuries, which can only be obtained politically. But to obtain them in a democracy, they must 
convince the people of their worth. This can be achieved without undermining the democracy by 
 
258 “Le défaut de leur origine ne nous est que trop retracé dans leurs objets. Que ferions-nous des arts, sans le luxe 
qui les nourrit?” (Rousseau, Premier discours, p. xx) 
259 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, vol. 17, trans. H. Tredennick (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), I, 981b. 
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practicing philosophy and science and private, and limiting the intellectual’s interaction with the 
people to teaching or fortifying their existing duties. However, when intellectuals teach the truth 
about the origin of society, or more precisely, our ignorance about it, then it undermines the 
democracy. This explains why Rousseau affirms Hobbes doctrine that self-preservation is the 
origin of society while also denouncing his “dangereuses rêveries” [dangerous fantasies] 
(Rousseau, Premier discours, p. 28) in the Premier discours. While Rousseau does agree with 
Hobbes on the matter of self-preservation, he certainly does not think that this goal is best 
achieved by enshrining private property and making commerce the lynchpin of society:  
Nos Ecrivains regardent tous comme le chef-d’œuvre de la politique de notre siècle les 
sciences, les arts, le luxe, le commerce, les loix, et les autres liens qui resserrant entre les 
hommes les nœuds de la société par l’intérêt personnel, les mettent tous dans une 
dépendance mutuelle […].” (Rousseau, Préface à Narcisse, p. 968). 
Indeed, private property and commerce are rooted in physical necessity, but they are also among 
those things that divide humans the most—this is the fundamental paradox of civilization that 
Rousseau identifies according to Pierre Manent.260 Rather, Rousseau believes that society can 
only achieve its original goal of ensuring the self-preservation of its members by playing a trick 
 
260 See Pierre Manent, Naissances de la politique moderne, p. 145 – 146: “Dès lors, la société est corrompue 
radicalement par suite de cette origine contradictoire. En effet, dans a société moderne, les hommes ne se veulent 




on them, as it were, and by “persuading”261 them of its mystical origins—hence the role of the 
great legislator in Du contrat social. 
 To be precise, it is not the true philosopher or scientist who desires power, for he knows 
that leisure can always be obtained in the fashion of Diogenes. Rather, it is the half-philosopher 
or half-scientist, who is unprepared to accept natural freedom and solitude. As Rousseau would 
remark in works like his Discours sur l’économie politique, one can often determine the strength 
of another’s truth by how viciously the mob persecuted him in this life.262 The philosopher does 
not and cannot live for the people, who demand his death while he lives, and worship him after 
he dies. The half-philosopher/scientist on the other hand is fundamentally characterized by his 
attempts to popularize his doctrines and thereby acquire the mob’s approval. Hence Rousseau’s 
assertion in the Premier discours that the philosophes seek only to distinguish themselves: “Ô 
fureur de se distinguer, que ne pouvez-vous point?” [Oh the mania of distinguishing oneself, what 
can’t it wreck?] From this perspective, the origin of scientism, which makes “science” the sole 
authority in society, can be traced back to the democratization of science. To be sure, the 
sciences had been advanced up until this point to expand the power of Louis XIV’s monarchy, and 
the philosophes—such as Diderot and those who published the Encyclopédie—genuinely 
believed that the fruits of science could be shared among the people. But Rousseau was more 
 
261 As Rousseau explains there the great legislature does not “convince” using reason, but instead “persuades” the 
people to respect the laws: “Ainsi donc le législateur ne pouvant employer ni la force ni le raisonnement, c'est une 
nécessité qu'il recoure à une autorité d'un autre ordre, qui puisse entraîner sans violence et persuader sans 
convaincre.” (Rousseau, Du Contrat social, p. 383) 
262 “La vertu de Socrate est celle du plus sage des hommes : mais entre César et Pompée, Caton semble un dieu 
parmi les mortels. L'un instruit quelques particuliers, combat les sophistes, et meurt pour la vérité : l'autre défend 
l'État, la liberté, les lois, contre les conquérants du monde, et quitte enfin la terre quand il n'y voit plus de patrie à 
servir.” (Rousseau, Discours sur l’économie politique, p. 255) 
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pessimistic, and understood that philosophy and science consume nations like great furnaces. 
Turgot and more elitist philosophes seem to have perceived this as well, as discussed above. 
 While de Jouvenel’s reading of the Premier discours focuses on the connection between 
libido sciendi and libido sentiendi, one can argue that Rousseau is equally drawing a connection 
there between the former and Augustine’s libido dominandi: the will to power.263 Of course, to 
argue this is not to merely impose an Augustinian framework upon the Genevan. Yes, Rousseau 
is not an Augustinian. He not only rejects the doctrine of original sin, but also accuses the Saint 
of dwelling on its gloomy consequences.264 But the influence of Augustine on Rousseau cannot 
be denied, for his amour sui [vanity] plays a central role in his thinking, even before he explicitly 
mobilizes the term in the Deuxième discours. It was from Jansenists like Pierre Nicole and Blaise 
Pascal that Rousseau inherited the concept, already translated as amour propre and prominent 
in their works. In his manuscript on amour propre for instance, Pascal writes that “we hate the 
truth, we hide from it; we want to be flattered, we flatter ourselves; we love to be deceived; we 
deceive. […] Man is thus nothing but a disguise, a liar and a hypocrite, to himself and others.”265 
 
263 As Augustine expresses in the City of God, libido dominandi is the main impetus of pagan Rome, which is not 
organized around the glory of God, but that of men, who happily betray one another and seek personal power in 
names of equality and freedom. See the preface of Augustine, De Civitate Dei, vol. 1 (Lipsiae, 1825), p. 4 (praefatio, 
5): “Unde etiam de terrena civitate, quae cum dominari adpetit, etsi populi serviant, ipsa ei dominandi libido 
dominatur, non est praetereundum silentio quidquid dicere suscepti buius operis ratio postulat et facultas datur.”  
Regarding the connection between this desire and others, Augustine also explains how the “carnis concupiscentia” 
(i.e., libido sentiendi) of Cain inspired in him the libido dominandi whereby he murdered his brother. See p. 46; XXIX, 
25. 
264 See the Lettre à Christophe de Beaumont, 1762 octobre, p. 936-938 : “D’abord il s’en faut bien, selon moi, que 
cette doctrine du péché originel, sujette à des difficultés si terribles, ne soit contenue dans l’écriture, ni si clairement 
ni si durement quʼil a plu au rhéteur Augustin & à nos Théologiens de la bâtir; & le moyen de concevoir que Dieu 
crée tant d’âmes innocentes & pures, tout exprès pour les joindre à des corps coupables, pour leur y faire contracter 
la corruption morale, & pour les condamner toutes à l’enfer, sans autre crime que cette union qui est son ouvrage?” 
265 See Blaise Pascal, “Texte amour propre,” in Copies manuscrites du XVIIe siècle. Accessed February 23, 2021. 
http://www.penseesdepascal.fr/Hors/Hors2-moderne.php: “Nous haïssons la vérité, on nous la cache ; nous 
voulons être flattés, on nous flattés, on nous flatte ; nous aimons à être trompés, on nous trompe. […] L’homme 
n’est donc que déguisement, que mensonge et hypocrite, et en soi-même et à l’égard des autres.”  
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What is more, for Pascal, amour propre is the fountainhead of those Augustinian desires, those 
rivers of fire, that inundate the world and drown the truth. Drawing the three together as one 
unholy triumvirate of concupiscence, he asserts in the Pensées that: “Everything of the world is 
concupiscence of the flesh or concupiscence of the eyes or pride of life. Libido sentiendi, libido 
sciendi, libido dominandi. Unhappy is the cursed earth that these three rivers of fire consume 
rather than watering.”266 
 To note, Pascal equates libido dominandi with pride [orgueil]. Pride, as he writes in the 
text on amour propre, is opposed to the truth, insofar as it makes one dependent upon others, 
requiring one to flatter, dissemble and in short, pursue one’s “self-interest.” So profound is the 
opposition between self-interest and the truth, Pascal contends—in a line that might have been 
Rousseau’s own267—that “the truth is useful to those to whom it is told, but disadvantageous to 
those who say it, because they make themselves hated.”268 One therefore discovers in Pascal a 
different formulation of the opposition above between civic liberty and philosophical freedom, 
the latter requiring solitude to remain uncorrupted—or, if practiced in society, a Socratic death 
wish. Hence the absurdity of philosophy becoming “fashionable” and “elegies” in the names of 
scientists. Pascal claims that a prince must be ignorant, since he can only surround himself with 
self-interested philosophers. The same must apply to a people to whom philosophers ingratiate 
 
266 See Blaise Pascal, Pensées sur la religion et quelques autres sujets (Paris : Abraham Wolfgank, 1627), pensé XXVII, 
p. 186 : “Tout ce qui est au monde est concupiscence de la chair ou concupiscence des yeux ou orgueil de la vie. 
Libido sentiendi, libido sciendi, libido dominandi. Malheureuse la terre de malédiction que ces trois fleuves de feu 
embrasent plutôt qu’ils n’arrosent.” 
267 “Jamais vue particulière ne fouilla le désir d’être utile aux autres qui m’a mis la plume à la main, et j’ai presque 
toujours écrit contre mon propre intérêt.” (Rousseau, Lettre à d’Alembert, p. 120) 
268 “dire la vérité est utile à celui à qui on la dit, mais désavantageux à ceux qui la disent, parce qu’ils se font haïr.” 
(Pascal, “Texte amour propre") 
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themselves. For who dares to speak the truth that displeases them? Surely not those who have 
had the good “fortune” to be employed by them, and to have accrued many objects that might 
be lost: “each degree of good fortune that improves our standing in the world brings us further 
from the truth” (Pascal, “Texte amour propre”). Of course, as in the case of Montesquieu, Jean-
Jacques does not admit to being inspired by Pascal in the Premier discours; however, the same 
rigid opposition between self-interest and the truth underpins the text, where the philosophes 
are consistently accused of being “orgueilleux raisonneurs” [prideful reasoners] (Rousseau, 
Premier discours, p. 12) complicit in the enslavement of man.  
 The philosophes are proud, first and foremost, of their “vain talents” (Ibid., p. 15). Hence 
why “they smile disdainfully at those old words Fatherland and Religion” (Ibid., p. 19), on which 
the untalented must rely as a means of solidarity and thus self-preservation.269 But they are not 
as talented as they imagine themselves to be. For if they were, then they would appreciate, as 
Socrates does in the Crito, the extent to which they are indebted to their countries, even if they 
are imperfect. Moreover, they fail to perceive how their ivory towers, erected upon the corpses 
of nation and religion, might easily become corrupted by pride, and transformed into towers of 
Babel where the truth is only a means to bursaries, distinctions and awards. There is a problem 
with Rousseau’s critique however, as Michael Locke McLendon points out in The Psychology of 
Inequality: Rousseau’s “Amour-Propre”.270 For it is precisely the sort of Roman civic virtue that 
Rousseau mobilizes here that Augustine regards as the fountainhead of libido dominandi in the 
 
269 ”Ils sourient dédaigneusement à ces vieux mots de Patrie et de Religion, et consacrent leurs talens et leur 
Philosophie à détruire et avilir tout ce quʼil y a de sacré parmi les hommes.” 
270 Michael Locke McLendon, The Psychology of Inequality: Rousseau’s Amour-Propre (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2019). 
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City of God: “The civic virtue and patriotism expressed by the citizens living under the general 
will, Augustine might argue, most likely reflects little more than the traditional, vicious form of 
amour-propre.” (p. 187) This might be true. But recall, Rousseau, like Augustine, does not think 
that the stain of amour propre can be removed without trace from the human heart. If we are to 
have amour propre, then it best that we have a version that tends toward equality, and the 
preservation of the political community. Incidentally, thymos [θυμός] or “spiritedness” plays a 
very similar role in Plato’s Republic, where it is recognized as inferior to reason, but also as an 












Chapter IX: Rousseau’s First Discours: Simplicity vs. Civilization 
IX. i. Rhetoric or Prophecy: The Prosopopoeia of Fabricius Delivered to the Moderns 
 In the first chapter of this part, we outlined the differences between the philosophes’ 
reading of ancient history and Rousseau’s. The former consider the Romans a pack of brigands, 
while the latter’s admiration for their simple and honest virtues compels him to rail against the 
urbanity, cosmopolitanism and progressivism of the philosophes. Affirming the classical disdain 
for appearances, Rousseau regards these as hollow virtue-signaling. In the second chapter, we 
then outlined and addended the theoretical framework within which de Jouvenal makes sense 
of Rousseau’s critique in the Premier discours. There, Rousseau does not merely argue that the 
philosophes’ promotion of scientism leads to moral degeneracy, but also that such promotion 
offers a path to distinguishing themselves and therefore acquiring power: libido sciendi leads 
then both to libido sentiendi and libido dominandi. It is against this backdrop that we hope to 
elaborate Rousseau’s arguments proper in the Discours, to which we now turn. 
To recall, the question posed by the Académie de Dijon in 1750 was the following: “if the 
reestablishment of the sciences and the arts has contributed to purifying mores”. (Ibid., p. 1) As 
he later expresses in a letter to Malesherbes in 1765, it was on the road to Vincennes to visit his 
then friend Diderot, who had been imprisoned there for his Lettre sur les aveugles (1749), that 
Rousseau experienced the “illumination” from which flowed his polemic against “the science of 
man” in the first Discours. Browsing the Académie de Dijon’s pamphlet on the side of the road, 
the themes of the first and second Discours, in addition to those of Émile, came rushing to him. 
His mind swirling with visions, he stumbled against a tree—perhaps resembling the one under 
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which Newton discovered the secrets of gravity as Voltaire recounted in the Lettres—and felt 
impelled forthwith to compose the “prosopopée” [prosopopoeia] of Fabricius: 
Tout ce que j'ai pu retenir de ces foules de grandes vérités qui dans un quart d'heure 
m'illuminèrent sous cet arbre, a été bien faiblement épars dans les trois principaux de 
mes écrits; celui sur l'inégalité, et le traité de l'éducation; lesquels trois ouvrages sont 
inséparables, et forment ensemble un même tout. Tout le reste a été perdu, et il n’y eut 
d’écrit sur le lieu même que la prosopopée de Fabricius. (Rousseau, Lettre à Malesherbes, 
p. 1136) 
Hence, when Rousseau delivered his first Discours to the Académie de Dijon, he would imagine 
himself as Fabricius speaking before a modern audience. Although, as we shall see, Diderot will 
dispute this claim, it is worth describing here the sort of hero that Rousseau has in mind.  
We know Caius Fabricius Luscinus from Plutarch’s story of the Molossian King Pyrrhus.271 
Considered inferior only to Alexander the Great in the art of commanding, Pyrrhus invaded Italy 
in the Second Century B.C. with the ambition of taking Rome, only to be rebuffed after a series 
of costly battles.272 Having captured a number of Roman soldiers, an ambassador by the name of 
Fabricius was sent to negotiate with the King. Fabricius was a man of little means, but Pyrrhus 
neither succeeded in bribing him, nor in impressing the rustic with his elephants.273 And when 
 
271 See Plutarch, Pyrrhus, in The Parallel Lives, vol. IX, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1920), p. 401 – 413. 
272 From whence comes the phrase “pyrrhic victory”.  
273 Plutarch recounts these episodes in Pyrrhus, p. 407 – 409: “After this, an embassy came from the Romans to treat 
about the prisoners that had been taken. The embassy was headed by Caius Fabricius, who, as Cineas reported, was 




Fabricius discovered that the King’s physician was planning to poison him for profit, he wrote to 
Pyrrhus, both forewarning him and insisting on Rome’s intention to win by means of skill rather 
than deception. So magnanimous was the comportment of this poor man from the countryside 
that Pyrrhus insisted on freeing the prisoners without recompense, causing Rome to respond in 
kind. So too did Fabricius mock the Epicurean philosophy spreading across Greece at the time, 
for as Plutarch recounts:  
At supper […] Cineas, by accident, had occasion to speak of Epicurus, and explained the 
opinions his followers hold about the gods and the commonwealth, and the objects of 
life, placing the chief happiness of man in pleasure, and declining public affairs as an injury 
and disturbance of a happy life, removing the gods afar off both from kindness or anger, 
or any concern for us at all, to a life wholly without business and flowing in pleasures. 
Before he had done speaking, "O Hercules!" Fabricius cried out to Pyrrhus, "may Pyrrhus 
and the Samnites entertain themselves with this sort of opinions as long as they are in 
war with us." (Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus, p. 409) 
Fabricius embodies the Roman ethos: frugal, rustic, stolid, honorable and distrustful of all those 
philosophers who would persuade men to be otherwise. He is the opposite of the philosophes: 
luxurious, urban, verbose, a virtue-signaler and disdainful of patriots. 
 
then, Pyrrhus privately showed kindness and tried to induce him to accept gold, not for any base purpose, indeed, 
but calling it a mark of friendship and hospitality. But Fabricius rejected the gold, and for that day Pyrrhus let him 
alone; on the following day, however, wishing to frighten a man who had not yet seen an elephant, he ordered the 
largest of these animals to be stationed behind a hanging in front of which they stood conversing together. This was 
done; and at a given signal the hanging was drawn aside, and the animal raised his trunk, held it over the head of 
Fabricius, and emitted a harsh and frightful cry. But Fabricius calmly turned and said with a smile to Pyrrhus: ‘Your 
gold made no impression on me yesterday, neither does your beast to-day.’” 
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 Rousseau confirms in the Confessions the epiphany that he experienced under the tree, 
and immediately relating the “prosopopoeia of Fabricius” that he wrote there: “j’étois dans une 
agitation qui tenoit du délire. Diderot l’appercût; je lui en dis la cause, et je lui lus la prosopopée 
de Fabricius écrite en crayon sous un Chêne.” [I was in an agitated state of delirium. Diderot 
perceived it; I told him the cause, and read him the prosopopoeia of Fabricius written in pencil 
under an oak.]  (Rousseau, Confessions, p. 351) Diderot, however, remembers things differently. 
And according to Jean-François Marmontel’s account, Rousseau came to Diderot expressing his 
intention to affirm the moral benefits of scientific and artistic progress, and only resolved to 
argue the contrary on the advice of his friend Diderot. Marmontel reconstructs the conversation 
in which Diderot informs Voltaire of this: 
J’étais […] prisonnier à Vincennes ; Rousseau venait m’y voir. […] Un jour, nous promenant 
ensemble, il me dit que l’Académie de Dijon venait de proposer une question 
intéressante, et qu’il avait envie de la traiter. […] Quel parti prendrez-vous ? lui demandai-
je. Il me répondit : ‘Le parti de l’affirmative.’ C’est le pont aux ânes, lui dis-je ; tous les 
talens médiocres prendront ce chemin-là, et vous n’y trouverez que des idées communes, 
au lieu que le parti contraire présente à la philosophie et à l’éloquence un champ 
nouveau, riche et fécond. ‘Vous avez raison, me dit-il […]’.274 
Thus, Diderot is purported to claim that Rousseau’s Premier discours was inspired by nothing 
more than contrarianism and the desire to distinguish himself by his eloquence. This would mean 
 
274 See Jean-François Marmontel, Mémoires, in Œuvres complètes de Marmontel, vol. 1 (Paris: A. Belin, 1819), book 
VII, p. 223 
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that Rousseau is a hypocrite, for his critique of the philosophes—that they contradict common 
sense and virtue with eloquence only in order to distinguish themselves—would apply especially 
to him.  
Indeed, many contemporary commentators seem to agree with Diderot, at least in part. 
Ernst Cassirer refers to the first Discours as “a mere rhetorical display piece”, and contends that 
because “this rhetoric has lost its hold on us; it [the Discours] no longer has the overwhelming 
power over us that it had on his [Rousseau’s] contemporaries”.275 François Bouchardy confirms 
Cassirer’s analysis in his introduction to the first Discours in the Pléiade, asserting that: “À la 
détacher de son contexte biographique, il perdrait sans doute la majeure partie de son intérêt 
auprès du lecteur d’aujourd’hui” [Outside of its biographical context, it would without a doubt 
lose the majority of its interest for today’s readers].276 And should one be interested in this 
context, Bouchardy goes on, then one must be prepared to educe “useful suggestions” from the 
“hyperbolic remarks” of a troubled and agitated Rousseau. (Bouchardy, Introduction, p. xli) The 
conclusion that the first Discours is merely of rhetorical interest, whether it proceeds from 
Cassirer or Diderot, is surely one to which de Jouvenel would have objected: “Comment n’en pas 
reconnaître aujourd’hui le caractère prophétique?” [How could one not recognize its prophetic 
character today?] he asks.  (de Jouvenel, Essai sur la politique de Rousseau, p. 32) Neither is de 
Jouvenel alone in thinking Rousseau’s first Discours prophetic. For in addition to Strauss, Roger 
Masters contends, “the First Discourse is, of all Rousseau’s philosophic works, the one which 
 
275 See Ernst Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, trans. Peter Gay (New Have: Yale University Press, 
1954), p. 48. 
276 See François Bouchardy, “Introduction au Discours sur les sciences et les arts.”, in Oeuvres complètes de J.-J. 
Rousseau, vol. 3., ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. xl.  
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speaks most directly to the crises of our time”.277 What a difference of opinions among our 
political theorists, for whom this text is either a mere rhetorical flourish or a veritable prophecy 
for the modern industrial society to come! 
We will outline Rousseau’s arguments from the first Discours forthwith. And by showing 
that they constitute more than hyperbolic ravings and neo-luddite waxing poetic, make crystal 
clear the prophecies they reveal: that technology will no longer serve to fulfill our basic desires 
but will multiply artificial ones, replacing social relations with cheap stimulation and spectacles; 
that the most technologically advanced civilizations will be humiliated martially again and again 
by ruder and simpler peoples; that our politicians shall speak only of the economy and neglect 
national virtues, scratching their heads at why the former declines; that we shall be surrounded 
on all sides by clicks of cosmopolitan progressivists, virtue-signaling about foreign peoples while 
they step disdainfully over their countrymen; that, in sum, humanity shall lay to waste all that is 
local, simple and inspires love for one’s own, so that it can calculate its ‘progress’. “Given the 
unquestioned acceptance of the pursuit of wealth and material well-being in modern industrial 
society,” Roger Masters writes, “Rousseau’s insistent challenge commands attention: ‘what will 
become of virtue when one must get rich at any price?” (Masters, The Political Philosophy of 
Rousseau, p. 440) No enlightenment philosopher seems to better predict the ails of industrial 
society and its future. 
 
 
277 See Roger D. Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 443. 
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IX. ii. Sallust, Tacitus and Polybius: Virtue in Simplicity and the Trappings of Civilization 
 We have already framed the basic thesis of the first Discours: the philosophes popularize 
the notion of scientific progress in order to liberate the individual from the authority of religion 
and the nation; in so doing however, they reduce the subject to a narrow set of selfish desires, 
which do not increase his autonomy, but instead put him at the mercy of absolute monarchists 
and oligarchs. This judgement is borne out in the opening passages of the first Discours: 
Tandis que le Gouvernement et les lois pourvoient à la sûreté et au bien-être des hommes 
assemblés; les Sciences, les Lettres et les Arts, moins despotiques et plus puissans peut-
être, étendent des guirlandes de fleurs sur les chaînes de fer dont ils sont chargés, 
étouffent en eux le sentiment de cette liberté originelle pour laquelle ils sembloient être 
nés, leur font aimer leur esclavage et forment ce qu’on appelle des peuples policés. 
(Rousseau, Discours sur les sciences et les arts, p. 6 – 7) 
As we also explained above, the philosophes uproot the subject from the ontological world, that 
place where reason is a key to divine concepts like beauty, justice and virtue. And in accordance 
with Descartes’ epistemological shift, they make the subject his own ground, therefore opening 
the floodgates to libido sciendi. Where the desire for knowledge goes unchecked, St. Augustine 
warns, the desires of the flesh quickly follow. So, as de Jouvenel argues, the pursuit of scientific 
progress quickly degenerates, subjecting itself to the demands of libido sentiendi. 
This process affects the philosophes and common men alike. With regard to the former, 
Rousseau writes in the first Discours: 
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Bientôt les Sciences suivirent les Lettres; à l’Art d’écrire se joignit l’art de penser; 
gradation qui paroît étrange, et qui n’est petit-être que trop naturelle; et l’on commença 
à sentir le principal avantage du commerce des muses, celui de rendre les hommes plus 
sociables en leur inspirant le désir de se plaire les uns aux autres par des ouvrages dignes 
de leur approbation mutuelle. (Ibid., p. 6) 
If salon-Epicureanism, the taste for bons airs and voluptuous virtue, is perfectly suited to the 
proclivities of the popularizers of science, then according to Jean-Jacques, it is not only because 
the pursuit of philosophy in general requires “luxury” and “idleness” (Ibid., p. 19), but also owes 
to the fact that their philosophy in particular sets them above national institutions. Thus, unlike 
a thinker such as Bacon, they will not be statesmen engaged in fulfilling their duties, but instead 
versifiers criticizing society from their privileged salons: 
L’âme se proportionne insensiblement aux objets qui l’occupent, et ce sont les grandes 
occasions qui font les grands hommes. Le Prince de l’éloquence fut Consul de Rome, & le 
plus grand, peut-être, des Philosophes, Chancelier d’Angleterre. (Ibid., 29) 
How then, on Rousseau’s account, do the philosophes submit the common man to the demands 
of libido sentiendi? 
This is achieved not merely by replacing national virtues with commerce and luxury, but 
more fundamentally by corrupting their simplicity. In a passage dripping with the regrets of those 
mournful Roman historians, Rousseau asserts: 
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Opposons à ces tableaux celui des mœurs du petit nombre de Peuples qui, préservés de 
cette contagion des vaines connoissances ont par leurs vertus fait leur propre bonheur et 
l’exemple des autres Nations. […] tels [furent] les Germains, dont une plume, lasse de 
tracer les crimes et les noirceurs d’un Peuple instruit, opulent et voluptueux, se soulageait 
à peindre la simplicité, l’innocence et les vertus. Telle avoit été Rome même, dans les 
tems de sa pauvreté et de son ignorance. (Ibid., p. 11) 
Far from thinking that the first Romans were no more than brigands, Rousseau affirms Sallust’s 
judgement in Cataline’s Conspiracy.278 The sons of Romulus cherished “manly virtue” above all 
things. (Sallust, Cataline’s Conspiracy, p. 13; 7.5) They passed their days honing their martial 
prowess instead of squandering them on “prostitutes and parties” (Ibid.), and as such, were 
prepared to win their allies “by conferring kindnesses [rather] than be receiving them” (Ibid., p. 
13; 6.5 – 6). Nothing, in their estimation, paralleled the glory earned by courageous and noble 
deeds. “They thought this was true wealth” (Ibid., p. 14; 7.6). And just as Rousseau will compare 
the virtues of Athenian poetry to those of Roman action,279 Sallust writes:  
It is because writers of great talent flourished there that the deeds of the Athenians are 
celebrated as if they were the greatest. […] The Roman people, on the other hand, never 
had those resources, because their most thoughtful men were most engaged in public 
business. No one used their intellectual talents independent of their body, and the best 
 
278 Sallust, Cataline’s Conspiracy, in Cataline’s Conspiracy, The Jugurthine War, Histories, trans. William Batstone 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 
279 See Rousseau, Discours sur les sciences et les arts, p. 7: “[…] en un mot, les apparences de toutes les vertus sans 
en avoir aucune. C’est par cette sorte de politesse, d’autant plus aimable qu’elle affecte moins de se montrer, que 
se distinguèrent autrefois Athènes et Rome dans les jours si vantés de leur magnificence et de leur éclat […].” 
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men preferred action to words. They preferred that their activities be praised by others 
rather than that they themselves tell another’s story. (Ibid., p. 14; 8.3 – 5) 
According to the classical view of virtue, even that of Athenians like Aristotle, action is the locus 
of virtue. Tacitus paints a similar picture of the German tribes in Germania. Hoping to curb the 
corruption of his fellow Romans, he describes the moral superiority of this supposed barbarian 
race whom civilization has yet to corrupt. The Germans are indifferent to gold and silver alike;280 
their generals lead by way of example, meaning that they are honest;281 their men and women 
are chaste, and thus their marriages endure; and most of all, they make no excuse vice as merely 
being “the spirit of the age” or fashionable: 
There is no arena with its seductions, no dinner-tables with their provocations to corrupt 
them. Of the exchange of secret letters men and women alike are innocent; adulteries 
are very few for the number of the people. […] For prostituted chastity there is no pardon; 
beauty nor youth nor wealth will find her a husband. No one laughs at vice there; no one 
calls seduction, suffered or wrought, the spirit of the age. (Tacitus, Germania, p. 291)  
Civilization is the process whereby man willingly enslaves himself, according to Tacitus. Though 
he was not merely being hyperbolic. For as he writes in Agricola, Rome succeeded in subduing 
the Britons in the end, not with iron chains but rather “liberal education”, courses in “rhetoric”, 
 
280 See Tacitus, Germania, in Dialogus, Agricola, Germania, trans. by Maurice Hutton and William Peterson (London: 
William Heinemann, 1914), p. 271: “The gods have denied them gold and silver, whether in mercy or in wrath I find 
it hard to say; not that I would assert that Germany has no veins bearing gold or silver: for who has explored there 
.^ At any rate, they are not affected, like their neighbours, by the use and possession of such things.” 
281 See Tacitus, Germania, p. 275: “They take their kings on the ground of birth, their generals on the basis of courage: 
the authority of their kings is not unlimited or arbitrary; their generals control them by example rather than 
command, and by means of the admiration which attends upon energy and a conspicuous place in front of the line.” 
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“fashion”, “the lounge, the bath, [and] the well-appointed dinner table.”282 Cynically, he remarks: 
“The simple natives gave the name of ‘culture’ to this factor of their slavery” (Ibid. p. 207) This, 
of course, did not make Rome master, for she had already enslaved herself. 
 What Rousseau discovers in these Roman historians—and what makes his use of them 
more than merely rhetorical—is an alternative view of history, which he opposes to the modern 
doctrine of progress. Sallust and Tacitus do not think that the first men were superior because 
they were wiser, as one finds in other ancient accounts of the so-called golden age, but rather 
because they were simpler. While this conception of history is present in many Roman and late 
Hellenic thinkers, its clearest formulation seems to be in Polybius’ Histories. An historian rather 
than philosopher per se, Polybius skillfully traces the rise and fall of Rome. Rome beings its life, 
he tells us, as a small city state menaced early on by one of the greatest Mediterranean empires 
of the age, Carthage. Rome is poor but virtuous, and sees freedom and moral purity as one and 
the same. Carthage, on the other hand, is a vast, multi-cultural empire that has been made rich 
by trade and invented technologies that far surpass those of the Romans. They are, however, in 
the eyes of the Romans, a luxurious, effeminate and thus cruel and tyrannical people. Polybius 
describes how in the course of three wars and several centuries, this poor city state conquered 
the latter. The Romans, he writes, had never built a single seafaring ship when Carthage began 
its assault in Italy and Sicily. The Romans stole one, and with the coordination that only a state 
built on the common good can achieve, reorganized its entire nation overnight to build copies of 
 
282 See Tacitus, Agricola, in Dialogus, Agricola, Germania, trans. by Maurice Hutton and William Peterson (London: 
William Heinemann, 1914), p. 207. 
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that ship, and to rebuff the Carthaginians.283 But many years after they leveled Carthage, the 
Romans transformed into the same empire, ruled by effeminate and theatre-loving tyrants who 
wasted vast funds on luxurious gardens and ships. Like the stoics, Polybius believes that history 
is cyclical but not for metaphysical reasons (i.e., the deterioration and reformulation of matter); 
rather, observing Rome’s trajectory, he explains the cycle of nations in moral terms, in terms of 
what he calls the “cycle of political revolution” [ἀνακύκλωσις] (Polybius, Histories, book VI. p. 
289). More precisely, he argues that men first come together to form political societies in order 
to meet their physical needs, and then elect leaders who are superior in “bodily strength” and 
“courage” (Ibid., p. 279), who are best able to achieve this. But then “sociability” (Ibid.) arises, 
and along with notions of justice, as well as social roles. The strong and courageous give birth to 
weak and cowardly men, who abuse their titles. Finally, society collapses, and the opportunity 
arises for the strong and courageous to lead again.  
 This vision of history not only had a profound impact on Rousseau, but also on modern 
philosophers such as Vico, Montesquieu and Fénelon. In the New Science, Giambattista (1668 – 
1774) maintains that the “simplicity” of young nations protects them from the “fraud” of “civil 
monarchy”: “in the extreme simplicity and crudeness of a life content with the spontaneous fruits 
of nature, satisfied to drink the water of the springs and sleep in the caves, in the natural equality 
of a state in which each of the fathers was sovereign in his own family, one cannot conceive of 
 
283 Polybius, Histories, vol. 1, trans. W.R. Patton (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), book I, p. 61 – 63: “On 
this occasion the Carthaginians put to sea to attack them as they were crossing the straits, and one of their decked 
ships advanced too far in its eagerness to overtake them and running aground fell into the hands of the Romans. 
This ship they now used as a model, and built their whole fleet on its pattern.” 
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either fraud or violence by which one man could subject all the others to a civil monarchy.”284 As 
Patrick Hutton writes, Vico believes that as civilizations progress, man’s “life becomes 
institutionalized”.285 That is, titles, bureaucracies and the like replace natural human 
relationships, and rather than seeking to satisfy the people’s needs, institutions focus on their 
pleasures; hence, adopting the mentality of slaves, the whole state prepares to be enslaved to 
another. In these final days, he writes, one uncovers within the rotting carcass of the nations a 
“new barbarism of oversophistication” (Hutton, “The New Science of Giambattista Vico”, Ibid.). 
Significantly, the focus on simplicity as the source of virtue causes these thinkers to reconsider 
the traditional Augustinian conception of the decline of nations, which made “self-love” [amor 
sui] the cause of their fall, and argued instead for founding them on a pure or selfless love for 
God. For it essentially argues that simplicity or barbarism makes men virtue by restricting them 
to the satisfaction of their needs, that is, to the most basic expression of their self-interest. This 
is indeed what Rousseau expresses in the Préface à Narcisse, where he clarifies his position in 
the Premier discours: “Il est très-possible qu’un Sauvage fasse une mauvaise action, mais il n’est 
pas possible qu’il prenne l’habitude de mal faire, car cela ne lui serait bon à rien." [It quite likely 
that a savage commits a bad deed, but impossible that he makes a habit of it doing bad, because 
that servers nobody’s interests.] (Rousseau, Préface à Narcisse, p. 970) 
 The gives rise to an interesting dilemma: Rousseau is leveling an Augustinian critique of 
the philosophes, accusing them of libido dominandi, but his solution is almost anti-Augustinian, 
 
284 Giambattista Vico, The New Science, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1948) book II, p. 161.  
285 Patrick H. Hutton summarizes Vico’s conception of history in “The New Science of Giambattista Vico: Historicism 
in Its Relation to the Poetics,” in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 30, no. 3 (Spring 1972): 359 – 367. 
See p. 362. 
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insofar as it affirms the doctrine of self-interest. As we have discussed above, this is resolved by 
Rousseau’s adoption of a double standard: the intellectual must be selfless, but must treat the 
common people as self-interested. In any case, we see here that Rousseau invokes the ancients 
not simply in order to improve his rhetorical style, but rather to frame his conception of history, 
and to oppose as thinkers like Vico did the modern, progressivist view of history. We shall later 
return to Rousseau’s unique interpretation of history. 
IX. iii. Plato and Cato Sapiens: The Classical Dichotomy of Reason and Appearance 
 If the philosophes failed to see that what they called progress consisted in nothing more 
than these superficial trappings, whereby nations either enslaved themselves or their enemies, 
then it was because they rejected the classical dichotomy of philosophy, which opposed reason 
to appearance, replacing it with the Cartesian one, which opposed reason to authority. Though 
Rousseau does not state the matter in exactly these terms, throughout the Discours he will rely 
on the classical dichotomy to reproach the modern one, accusing the philosophes of enslaving 
themselves to a world of appearances: 
Heureux esclaves, vous leur devez ce goût délicat et fin dont vous vous piquez; cette 
douceur de caractère et cette urbanité de mœurs qui rendent parmi vous le commerce si 
liant et si facile; en un mot, les apparences de toutes les vertus sans en avoir aucune. 
(Rousseau, Discours sur les sciences et les arts, p. 7) 
Rousseau does not merely draw on Tacitus and Sallust, however, in order to demonstrate that 
the philosophes are slaves to the world of appearances. For he also invokes the method of that 
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ancient philosopher in whose teachings this classical dichotomy is perhaps the most apparent, 
Socrates. To recall, Socrates establishes three categories of being in The Republic: there are the 
forms, which are made by God and possess the greatest share of being; then individual objects, 
which are made by men and inferior in being to the first; and finally imitations of things, such as 
paintings, which are the most ontologically impoverished of all three.286 To the three categories 
of being there corresponds three types of knowledge: the one who uses objects possesses true 
knowledge of them, just as the jockey knows the form and function of horses best; the one who 
makes things knows them second best, since, for instance, the manufacturer of bridles can only 
hope to attain the “right opinion” about horses on the advice of the jockey; finally, the imitator 
of things knows them least of all, as the painter might have an uninformed opinion of the speed 
and endurance of horses, for example, but nonetheless represent them.287 Socrates’ ontological 
and epistemological categories reflect the classical dichotomy between reason and appearance, 
for what is known merely by the senses and the passions, such as paintings and poems reveal to 
us, is inferior to what is known by experience and reflection. Here, artists multiply appearances 
 
286 Socrates explains the three types of being in Plato, The Republic, p. 1206; 597b – c: “We get, then, these three 
kinds of beds. The first is in nature a bed, and I suppose we’d say that a god makes it, or does someone else make 
it? No one else, I suppose. The second is the work of a carpenter. Yes. And the third is the one the painter makes. 
Isn’t that so? It is. Then the painter, carpenter, and god correspond to three kinds of bed? Yes, three.”  
287 Socrates explains the three types of knowledge in Plato, The Republic, p. 1206; 601d – 602a: “It’s wholly necessary, 
therefore, that a user of each thing has most experience of it and that he tell a maker which of his products performs 
well or badly in actual use. A flute-player, for example, tells a flute-maker about the flutes that respond well in actual 
playing and prescribes what kind of flutes he is to make, while the maker follows his instructions. Of course. Then 
doesn’t the one who knows give instructions about good and bad flutes, and doesn’t the other rely on him in making 
them? Yes. Therefore, a maker—through associating with and having to listen to the one who knows—has right 
opinion about whether something he makes is fine or bad, but the one who knows is the user. That’s right. Does an 
imitator have knowledge of whether the things he makes are fine or right through having made use of them, or does 
he have right opinion about them through having to consort with the one who knows and being told how he is to 
paint them? Neither. Therefore an imitator has neither knowledge nor right opinion about whether the things he 
makes are fine or bad. Apparently not. Then a poetic imitator is an accomplished fellow when it comes to wisdom 
about the subjects of his poetry! Hardly.” 
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without understanding them and thereby sow confusion, while philosophers cut through these 
falsities to learn the true nature of things. 
 Although Rousseau does not explicitly refer to these categories of being and knowing in 
the first Discours, he does draw on Socrates’ method from the Apology, wherein the former are 
reflected. For there Socrates concludes that, despite the impression the poets might at first give 
with their sweet sounding and impassioned verses, they are deprived of “any understanding of 
what they say.”288 And if even Socrates himself fails to comprehend what they mean, he is wiser 
than they, since he has taken the time to reflect on the matter and to conclude that “I do think I 
know what I do not know”. (Plato, Apology, p. 21; 21d) His avowed ignorance therefore reflects 
the classical dichotomy between reason and appearance, being the disposition of a philosopher 
who gives appearances no quarter. There is no doubting that this passage from the Apology had 
a profound influence on Rousseau’s first Discours, for he incorporated a long, but also very liberal 
translation of it into his polemic there: 
‘Des Poètes, continue Socrate, j’ai passé aux Artistes. Personne n’ignoroit plus les Arts 
que moi; personne n’étoit plus convaincu que les Artistes possédoient de fort beaux 
secrets. Cependant je me suis aperçu que leur condition nʼest pas meilleure que celle des 
Poètes et qu’ils sont, les uns et les autres, dans le même préjugé. Parce que les plus 
habiles d’entre eux excellent dans leur Partie, ils se regardent comme les plus sages des 
hommes. Cette présomption a terni tout-à-fait leur savoir à mes yeux: de sorte que me 
 
288 See Plato, Apology, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis; Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1997) p. 22; 22c. 
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mettant à la place de l’Oracle, et me demandant ce que j’aimerois le mieux-être, ce que 
je suis on ce qu’ils sont, savoir ce qu’ils sont appris on savoir que je ne sais rien; j’ai 
répondu à moi-même et au Dieu: Je veux rester ce que je suis.’ ‘Nous ne savons, ni les 
Sophistes, ni les Poètes, ni les Orateurs, ni les Artistes, ni moi, ce que c’est que le vrai, le 
bon et le beau. Mais il y a entre nous cette différence, que, quoique ces gens ne sachent 
rien, tous croient savoir quelque chose, au lieu que moi, si je ne sais rien, au moins je n’en 
suis pas en doute. De sorte que toute cette supériorité de sagesse qui m’est accordée par 
l’Oracle, se réduit seulement à être bien convaincu que j’ignore ce que je ne sais pas.’ 
(Rousseau, Discours sur les sciences et les arts, p. 13) 
Rousseau insists however: what at first seems to be a gift reserved for the Oracle’s favorite son, 
is in truth the wisdom of simple and incorruptible Romans like Cato the Elder. 
Cato was born a plebian, but won by his military accomplishments multiple consulships, 
and even the honor of censor—as Plutarch recounts in the Parallel Lives. Preferring honor to 
wealth, and hateful of excess and its displays, he wore the same vestment year-round, and drank 
the same wine as his slaves even when he held the highest offices in Rome. He rose early to 
defend his friends’ cases in the market, and never once hesitated to upset the wrong people, as 
it were, having been the defendant in no less than fifty cases.289 His reputation as an honest 
Roman triumphed upon the petty conspiracies of decadent aristocrats, always suffering higher 
taxes under Cato, though he frequently insisted, as Plutarch writes, “that he preferred to do right 
 
289 See Plutarch, The Life of Cato the Elder, p. 345: “It is said that he was defendant in nearly fifty cases, and in the 
last one when he was eighty-six years of age. It was in the course of this that he uttered the memorable saying: ‘It is 
hard for one who has lived among men of one generation, to make his defense before those of another.’” 
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and get no thanks, rather than to do ill and get no punishment; and that he had pardon for 
everybody's mistakes except his own”. (Plutarch, The Life of Cato the Elder, p. 327) When he was 
censor, a group of Athenian philosophers visited Rome to dispute a tax hike, and began 
instructing the Roman youth in their ideas while waiting for their case to be heard. The populus 
rejoiced at how civilized their boys were becoming, but Cato Sapiens—or Cato the Wise as they 
would later call him—knew better. For here were the vanquished teaching their vanquishers, 
distracting them from the fulfillment of the very same duties that had propelled them to victory, 
and all the while passing themselves off as “lovers of wisdom”. Thus, Cato took their case from 
the bottom of the stack of complaints, had it heard that day, and immediately expelled the 
philosophers. Now, by the standards of the philosophes, Cato the Censor would surely be a brute, 
but by Rousseau’s, his wisdom paralleled that of Socrates. For he too understood that knowledge 
and virtue have less to do with words, which always afford some opportunity for artifice and 
deception, than with actions: 
Socrate avoit commencé dans Athènes, le vieux Caton continua dans Rome, de se 
déchaîner contre ces Grecs artificieux et subtils qui séduisoient la vertu et amollissoient 
le courage de ses concitoyens. (Rousseau, Discours sur les sciences et les arts, p. 14) 
For Rousseau, Cato the Elder embodies the ideal of the selfless philosopher, whose interactions 
with the public are limited to fortifying or “teaching the peoples their duties” (Strauss, “On the 
Intentions of Rousseau,” p. 479). Cato’s instructions are designed to prevent the people from 
being seduced by appearances, and while they might remain ignorant of many philosophical 
doctrines, they will know virtue. 
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Chapter X: Rousseau’s First Discours: Actions vs. Words 
X. i. Aristotle, Plato and Seneca: On the Classical Dichotomy between Action and Words 
 The dichotomy between actions and words goes to the very heart of the ancient concept 
of virtue. In Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey, virtue or aretê is synonymous with “excellence”, and as 
such, not only concerns excellence in forming moral judgements, but also in athletic and martial 
affairs.290 Thus, Achilles and Ulysses are virtuous to the extent that they are excellent warriors. 
Virtue depends here on success, and neither Achilles nor Ulysses would have been regarded as 
virtuous had they been continually bested by their foes. This means that Homeric virtue can be 
reduced to successful action, which is reflected in Aristotle’s account of virtue. For, as Alasdair 
Macintyre points out in After Virtue: “To be vicious is, on Aristotle's view, to fail to be virtuous. 
[…] It is therefore very difficult in Aristotelian terms to distinguish between failure to be good on 
the one hand and positive evil on the other […].” (Macintyre, After Virtue, p. 176) Aristotelean 
virtue places great emphasis on successful action, to the point that it regards the conclusion of 
any moral argument as the successful undertaking of what has been suggested in the premises: 
“[…] la conclusion qui découle des deux prémisses, c’est l’action. […] ‘Je dois faire quelque chose 
de bon ; or une maison est quelque chose de bon’, et l’on fait aussitôt une maison. […] Que donc 
l’action soit la conclusion, c’est manifeste.”291 In the world of Aristotelean virtue, where one is 
 
290 For the meaning of virtue in Homer, see Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, p. 122: “The 
word aretê, which later comes to be translated as 'virtue', is in the Homeric poems used for excellence of any kind; 
a fast runner displays the arete of his feet (Iliad 20. 411) and a son excels his father in every kind of arete-as athlete, 
as soldier and in mind (Iliad 15. 642).” 




required to do what he says in order to make his case, people have a logical obligation to ignore 
all those do-nothing critics reigning down their judgements from upon high.  
 The case is somewhat different in Plato. Indeed, Socrates considers philosophy a way of 
life, claiming in the Apology that it would be impossible for him to conduct himself otherwise.292 
He would refuse, however, to become a statesman if it required him to abandon the pursuit of 
philosophy. For he responds negatively to the charge of Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias: 
Philosophy is no doubt a delightful thing, Socrates, as long as one is exposed to it in 
moderation at the appropriate time of life. But if one spends more time with it than he 
should, it’s a man’s undoing. For even if one is naturally well favored but engages in 
philosophy far beyond that appropriate time of life, he can’t help but turn out to be 
inexperienced in everything a man who’s to be admirable and good and well thought of 
is supposed to be experienced in. Such people turn out to be inexperienced in the laws of 
their city or in the kind of speech one must use to deal with people on matters of business, 
whether in public or private, inexperienced also in human pleasures and appetites and, in 
short, inexperienced in the ways of human beings altogether. So, when they venture into 
 
292 See Plato, Apology, p. 33; 37e-38a: “Perhaps someone might say: But Socrates, if you leave us will you not be able 
to live quietly, without talking? Now this is the most difficult point on which to convince some of you. If I say that it 
is impossible for me to keep quiet because that means disobeying the god, you will not believe me and will think I 
am being ironical. On the other hand, if I say that it is the greatest good for a man to discuss virtue every day and 
those other things about which you hear me conversing and testing myself and others, for the unexamined life is 
not worth living for men, you will believe me even less.” 
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some private or political activity, they become a laughingstock, as I suppose men in 
politics do when they venture into your pursuits and your kind of speech.293 
There is much in Callicles’ critique that resonates with Rousseau’s own in the first Discours, where 
the latter’s ‘liberal translation’ of the Apology skillfully omits Socrates’ visit with the statesmen, 
whom he considers more ignorant than he, the philosopher. We will return to this matter soon 
enough. For the time being however, it should suffice to show that, despite Socrates’ judgment 
regarding the inferiority of politicians, action is doubtless central to his understanding of virtue, 
the general thrust of the dialogues being this: do not act without knowing, for ignorance is the 
cause of vice, and vice the undoing of the soul. Unlike Aristotle, Socrates appears to be content 
with the internal rewards of virtue, and even confirms in the Apology that no evil can be visited 
on the man who has not himself done evil.294 Such is not the case for Aristotle, for whom virtue 
has both external preconditions (e.g., wealth) as well as rewards (e.g., political influence). That 
being said, it neither seems to be Plato’s nor Aristotle’s account of virtue at work in Rousseau’s 
first Discours, but rather Seneca’s, which presents the ideal of the Roman statesman.  
 In De Providentia, Seneca maintains that that greatest exemplar of Stoic virtue is not the 
philosopher dialoguing in the forum, but rather the statesman who, surrounded on all sides by 
moral decay and the hardships with which Fortuna tests better men, resolves to battle tyranny. 
 
293 See Plato, Gorgias, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper, trans. Donald J. Zeyl (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1997), p. 829; 484c – e. 
294 See Plato, Crito, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1997), p. 36; 41c – d: “You too must be of good hope as regards death, gentlemen of the jury, and keep 
this one truth in mind, that a good man cannot be harmed either in life or in death, and that his affairs are not 
neglected by the gods.” 
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According to Seneca, such a man was Cato the Younger. When the Republic was overburdened 
with vice, on the verge of being swallowed up by the sea, Cato refuses to abandon ship:  
I do not know, I say, what nobler sight the Lord of Heaven could find on earth, should he 
wish to turn his attention there, than the spectacle of Cato, after his cause had already 
been shattered more than once, nevertheless standing erect amid the ruins of the 
commonwealth.295 
“Cato the Immortal” Seneca calls him in De Constantia.296 There was Hercules grappling with the 
Nemean lion, and Cato with the unbridled ambition of Caesar. And to battle the latter, Cato had 
to be wiser than Hercules:  
[…] in Cato the immortal gods had given to us a truer exemplar of the wise man than 
earlier ages had in Ulysses and Hercules. […] Cato did not grapple with wild beasts—the 
pursuit of these is for the huntsman and the peasant; he did not hunt down monsters 
with fire and sword, nor did he chance to live in the times when it was possible to believe 
that the heavens rested on one man's shoulders. In an age when the old credulity had 
long been thrown aside, and knowledge had by time attained its highest development, 
he came into conflict with ambition, a monster of many shapes, with the boundless greed 
for power which the division of the whole world among three men could not satisfy. He 
stood alone against the vices of a degenerate state that was sinking to destruction 
 
295 See Seneca, De Providentia, in Seneca: Moral Essays, vol. 1, trans. John W. Basore (London: William Heinemann, 
1928), p. 11; 2.9-10. 
296 See Seneca, De Constantia, in Seneca: Moral Essays, vol. 1, trans. John W. Basore (London: William Heinemann, 
1928), p. 51; 2.9. 
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beneath its very weight, and he stayed the fall of the republic to the utmost that one 
man's hand could do to draw it back […]. (Seneca, De Constantia, p. 50 – 53; 2.1 – 2) 
Rousseau neither mentions Seneca nor Cato the Immortal in the first Discours. That being said, 
no modern text inspires Rousseau’s Fabrician prosopopoeia more than Montaigne’s essay Du 
pédantisme, which is one of the very few that he explicitly cites here or elsewhere.297 And in this 
uncharacteristically un-Epicurean essay, it is Seneca, with all his insistence on patriotism and the 
wise statesman, whom Montaigne fashions into the enemy of pedants and academic quibblers. 
In demonstrating the influence of this essay on Rousseau’s Discours, it should be possible to show 
how Seneca’s understanding of virtue is operative there. Of course, there is little questioning the 
influence of Seneca on Rousseau’s subsequent oeuvres. In the Discours sur l’économie politique, 
Rousseau will raise Cato the Immortal above Socrates, just as Seneca had done.298 And in his 
novel Julie ou la nouvelle Héloïse, he reproduces Seneca’s judgement in De Providentia that virtue 
is tested by the hardships of Fortuna, in the same that a father designs the most difficult trials 
for his strongest sons.299 
 
297 See Montaigne, Du pédantisme, in Les Essais, ed. Jean Balsamo, Michel Magnien and Catherine Magnien-Simonin 
(Paris: Gallimard, 2007), I.XXIV p. 138 – 149. 
298 See Rousseau, Discours sur l’économie politique, p. 225: “Osons opposer Socrate même à Caton: l’un étoit plus 
philosophe, et l’autre plus citoyen. Athènes étoit déjà perdue, et Socrate n’avoit plus de patrie que le monde entier : 
Caton porta toûjours la sienne au fond de son cœur ; il ne vivoit que pour elle et ne put lui suivre. La vertu de Socrate 
est celle du plus sage des hommes : mais entre César et Pompée, Caton semble un dieu parmi les mortels. L’un 
instruit quelques particuliers, combat les sophistes, et meurt pour la vérité : l’autre défend l’état, la liberté, les lois 
contre les conquérans du monde, et quitte enfin la terre quand il n’y voit plus de patrie à servir. Un digne élève de 
Socrate seroit le plus vertueux de ses contemporains ; un digne émule de Caton en seroit le plus grand.” 
299 See Julie ou la nouvelle Héloïse, in Œuvres Complètes de J.-J. Rousseau, vol. 2, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel 
Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), part II, letter XI, p. 224: “c’étoit l’Athénien buvant le ciguë, c’étoit Brutus mourant 
pour son pays; c’étoit Regulus au milieu des tourments, c’étoit Caton déchirant ses entrailles, c’étoient tous ces 
vertueux infortunés qui te faisoient envie, et tu sentois au fond de ton cœur la félicité réelle que couvraient leurs 




X. ii. Montaigne and the Enemies of Pedantry: Seneca, Xenophon, Spartans and Diogenes 
 Montaigne begins his essay on Pédantisme remarking that the men whom he considers 
“most gallant” are also those who hate pedantry the most. (Montaigne, Du pédantisme, p. 138) 
For a gallant man is one who has earned many honors by noble deeds, but a pedant the inverse 
of this, having a great deal of knowledge but never making use of it. Thus, a pedant is one who 
possesses useless knowledge.300 But his existence is not indifferent to us, since he also burdens 
many, especially the youth, with the dead weight of his ideas. Seneca was particularly aware of 
this phenomenon, as Montaigne quotes him from the Epistulae Morales saying: “Non vita, sed 
scolae discimus” [We do not study for life, but only for school]”. (Ibid., p. 145) The Roman Stoic 
was not alone this judgement, Montaigne continues, for when the Spartan Agesilaus was asked 
what boys should instead learn, he responded: “Ce qu’ils doivent faire estans hommes” [What 
they must do as men]. (Ibid., p. 148) Rousseau surely read the essay on Pédantisme, given that 
he cites the latter passage in the first Discours, referencing Montaigne there: “Que faut-il donc 
qu’ils apprennent? Voilà certes une belle question! Qu’ils apprennent ce qu’ils doivent faire étant 
hommes”. [What then should they learn? That is indeed a good question! They should learn what 
they must do as men.] (Rousseau, Discours sur les sciences et les arts, p. 24) This, however, was 
only one of many passages from Montaigne’s essay that Rousseau reproduces in the Premier 
discours. 
 
men to match with her; some she passes by in disdain. Those that are most stubborn and unbending she assails, 
men against whom she may exert all her strength. Mucins she tries by fire, Fabricius by poverty, Rutilius by exile, 
Regulus by torture, Socrates by poison, Cato by death. It is only evil fortune that discovers a great exemplar. 
300 Or, as Cicero says in De Officiis, “Nequicquam sapere sapientem, qui ipse sibi prodesse non quiret” [That the wise 
man who cannot profit by his own knowledge knows nothing]. (p. 206)  
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 Amongst those who praised virtuous actions and despised hollow speech, were not only 
Spartans and stoic Romans, but also Diogenes of Sinope. An enemy of appearances, he fulfilled 
his bodily functions in public;301 an enemy of pride, he asked Alexander the Great to move from 
his sunlight;302 an enemy of flattery, he mocked Aristippus’ for modeling an effeminate robe from 
Persia to please a tyrant;303 and a lover of simplicity, he threw away his cup upon watching a child 
drink with his hands, astonished that he had needlessly complicated his life for so long.304 Such 
qualities predisposed the cynic of Sinope—perhaps more than any other man—to sniffing out 
pedants. Hence, Montaigne explains how Diogenes reproached men for spending their time 
learning so that they could avoid improving themselves, suggesting instead that they play some 
tennis, which would at least improve their body: 
[Diogène] se moquoit des grammariens qui ont soin de s’enquérir des maux d’Ulysses, et 
ignorent les propres ; des musiciens qui accordent leurs fleutes et n’accordent pas leurs 
meurs ; des Orateurs qui estudient à dire justice, non à la faire. Si nostre ame n’en va un 
meilleur bransle, si nous n’en avons le jugement plus sain, j’aymeroy aussi cher que mon 
 
301 See Diogenes Laertius, Diogenes of Sinope, in Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 2, trans. R.D. Hicks (London: 
William Heinemann, 1925), p. 71; 69: “It was his habit to do everything in public, the works of Demeter and of 
Aphrodite alike.” 
302 “When he was sunning himself in the Craneum, Alexander came and stood over him and said, ‘Ask of me any 
boon you like.’ To which he replied, ‘Stand out of my light.’” (Diogenes, Diogenes of Sinope, p. 41; 38) 
303 See Montaigne, Apologie de Raimond Sebond, II, XII, p. 617 : “Dionysius le tyran offrit à Platon une robe à la mode 
de Perse, longue, damasquinée et parfumée ; Platon la refusa, disant qu’estant un homme, il ne se vestiroit pas 
volontiers de robe de femme ; mais Aristippus l’accepta, avec cette responce que nul accoutrement ne pouvoit 
corrompre un chaste courage. Ses amis tançoient sa lascheté de prendre si peu à cœur que Dionisius luy eust craché 
au visage : Les pescheurs, dict-il, souffrent bien d’estre baignés des ondes de la mer depuis la teste jusqu’aux pieds 
pour attraper un goujon.” 
304 “One day, observing a child drinking out of his hands, he cast away the cup from his wallet with the words, ‘A 
child has beaten me in plainness of living.’ He also threw away his bowl when in like manner he saw a child who had 




escolier eut passé le temps à jouer à la paume ; au moins le corps en seroit plus allègre. 
(Montaigne, Du pédantisme, p. 143) 
Rousseau recalls Diogenes’ advice in the first Discours, arguing that if our preceptors are neither 
willing to teach “temperance, humanity, [nor] courage”, nor “speak of God”, nor even permit the 
“the sweet name of the Fatherland” to be mentioned, then the youth would benefit more from 
being taught tennis, for at least then they would not be idle: “J’aimerais autant, disoit un Sage, 
que mon écolier eût passé le tems dans un Jeu de paume, au moins le corps en seroit plus dispos. 
Je sais quʼil faut occuper les enfants, et que l’oisiveté est pour eux le danger le plus à craindre.” 
[I would rather, said the sage, that my student had passed his time playing tennis, so at least his 
body would be fit. I know that one must keep children occupied, and that laziness is for them a 
danger to be feared.] (Rousseau, Discours sur les sciences et les arts, p. 24) 
 Pedantry is characterized by burdensome knowledge to the extent that it weighs down 
the spirit and the body, preventing us from making decisions and taking action. Insofar as this is 
true, the greatest enemies of the former also place the greatest emphasis on the latter. Among 
the men who cherish virtuous action the most, Montaigne counts the Roman stoics Seneca and 
Cicero, the Spartan Kings Lycurgus and Astyages, the cynical Diogenes of Sinope, and Socrates’ 
other biographer Xenophon, who had far more admiration for the sage’s self-discipline than his 
epistemology.305 What unites these classical thinkers in their high estimation of virtuous action 
 
305 Xenophon defends Socrates’ character throughout the Memorabilia by demonstrating, again and again, (1) his 
self-mastery [enkrateia] over bodily desires, (2) his endurance [karteria] for physical pain and (3) his self-sufficiency 
[autarkeia]. As he opens his defense: “It appears to me a wonder also that some were persuaded that Socrates 
corrupted the young. To begin with, in addition to what has been said, he was the most continent [enkrateia] of all 




is their determination, above all else, to master themselves. As Montaigne recounts in his essay, 
when Xenophon was asked why he sent his boys to be raised in Sparta, he responded: “ce n’est 
pas pour y apprendre la Rhétorique ou Dialectique, mais pour apprendre (ce dict-il) la plus belle 
science qui soit : à sçavoir la science d’obeïr et de commander.” [it is neither for them to learn 
rhetoric or dialectic, but to learn (he says) the most beautiful science in existence, that is, the 
science of obeying and commanding.](Montaigne, Du pédantisme, p. 149) According to 
Xenophon, the most beautiful science is learning how to obey and commend, both oneself 
(morality) and others (statecraft), not how to speak well. He does not therefore merely oppose 
reason to appearances, but reason qua self-mastery [enkrateia]. For reason can easily go astray, 
creating another world of abstract appearances. Thus it came to be, Montaigne writes in a third 
passage that will appear Rousseau’s first Discours, that when the Goths ravaged Greece, they 
made sure not to burn their libraries, so that the Greeks would continue to distract themselves 
and accept their slavery: 
Quand les Gots ravagèrent la Grèce, ce qui sauva toutes les librairies d’estre passées au 
feu, ce fut un d’entre eux qui sema cette opinion, qu’il faloit laisser ce meuble entier aux 
ennemis, propre à les destourner de l’exercice militaire et amuser à des occupations 
sedentaires et oysives. (Ibid., p. 149) 
 
summer, and all labors. Moreover, he had educated himself to have such measured needs that, although he 
possessed very little, he quite easily had what was enough for him. How, then, being himself of this sort, would he 
have made others impious, lawbreaking, gluttonous, incontinent with regard to sex, or soft with regard to labor? 
Instead, he rid many individuals of these things, after making them desire virtue and providing them with hopes that 
if they attended to themselves they would be gentlemen (noble and good).” See Xenophon, Memorabilia, trans. 
Amy Bonnette (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), in p. 5 – 6; 1.2.1-2. 
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Rousseau cites this passage without attributing it to Montaigne, and then adds a list of wealthy 
and ‘well educated’ nations that were savaged by poorer ones whose simplicity protected them 
from the world of appearances.306  
 Of the citations that Rousseau reproduces in the first Discours from Montaigne’s essay, 
the one that influenced, or perhaps confirmed, his reasoning the most was Seneca’s judgement 
in his letter on “The Usefulness of Basic Principles”, where the stoic proclaims “Postquam docti 
prodierunt, boni desunt” [Since the doctrines have appeared, good men have been deserted]. 
(Ibid., p. 146) Rousseau neither attributes his words to Montaigne nor Seneca. Given, however, 
his numerous references to the former’s essay, and their resemblance to the latter’s own words, 
one can hardly doubt their origins: “Depuis que les Savans ont commencé à paroître parmi nous 
[…] les Gens de bien se sont éclipsés” [Since the reasoners have begun to appear amongst us … 
good men have been eclipsed”. (Rousseau, Discours sur les sciences et les arts, p. 14) One need 
only understand what these words mean in the context of Seneca’s letter on “The Usefulness of 
 
306 Rousseau’s words are nearly identical to Montaigne’s. see Rousseau, Discours sur les sciences et les arts, p. 22: 
“Quand les Gots ravagèrent la Grèce, toutes les Bibliothèques ne furent sauvées du feu que par cette opinion semée 
par l’un d’entre eux, qu’il falloit laisser aux ennemis des meubles si propres à des occupations oisives et sédentaires. 
Charles VIII se vit maître de la Toscane et du Royaume de Naples sans avoir presque tiré l’épée ; et toute sa Cour 
contribua cette facilité inespérée à ce que les Princes et la Noblesse d’Italie s’amusoient plus à se rendre ingénieux 
et savans, qu’ils ne s’exerçoient à devenir vigoureux et guerriers.” For the list of luxurious nations savaged by simpler, 
poorer ones, see p. 20: “La Monarchie de Cyrus a été conquise avec trente mille hommes par un Prince plus pauvre 
que le moindre des Satrapes de Perse; et les Scythes, le plus misérables de tous les Peuples, a résisté aux plus 
puissans Monarques de l’Univers. Deux fameuses Républiques se disputèrent l’Empire du Monde; l’une étoit très 
riche, l’autre n’avoit rien, et ce fut celle-ci qui détruisit l’autre. L’Empire Romain à son tour, après avoir englouti 
toutes les richesses de l’Univers, fut la proie des gens qui ne savoient pas même ce que c’étoit que richesse. Les 
Francs conquirent les Gaules, les Saxons l’Angleterre sans autres trésors que leur bravoure et leur pauvreté. Une 
troupe de pauvres Montagnards dont toute l’avidité se bornoit à quelques peaux de moutons, après avoir dompté 
la fierté Autrichienne, écrasa cette opulente et redoutable Maison de Bourgogne qui faisoit trembler les Potentats 
de l’Europe. Enfin toute la puissance & toute la sagesse de l’héritier de Charles-Quint, soutenues de tous les trésors 
des Indes, vinrent se briser contre une poignée de pêcheurs de harengs. Que nos politiques daignent suspendre leurs 
calculs pour réfléchir à ces exemples, et qu’ils apprennent une fois qu’on a de tout avec de l’argent hormis des 
mœurs et des Citoyens. 
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Basic Principles” to perceive the extent of their influence on the first Discours.307 There, Seneca 
argues that such “doctrines” have increased in proportion to the ills that man has brought upon 
himself by forsaking simple living and “vero labore” [real work], and by yielding to his appetites. 
(Seneca, Epistolae, p. 109) Thus, luxury and idle time are not merely material preconditions of 
philosophy; they also create the need for philosophy (i.e., complex doctrines) by complicating 
life. But philosophy, especially the kind that does not make self-mastery its foremost goal, only 
compounds and complicates our desires, thus throwing humanity into a vicious cycle. Here, one 
can appreciate the extent to which not only Seneca’s dichotomy between action and words, but 
also his understanding of virtue in terms of simplicity, inspire much of Jean-Jacques’ thinking in 
the first Discours. 
X. iii. The Cardinal Virtue of the First Discours: Fortitude, or Force de l’âme 
Self-mastery, or what Cicero and St. Thomas Aquinas might have called “temperance”, is 
only one of the cardinal virtues mobilized by Rousseau in the first Discours.308 And according to 
Victor Goldschmidt it plays second fiddle to “la force de l’âme” [force of the soul], which might 
be translated as fortitude or courage.309 As Goldschmidt writes in Anthropologie et politique: les 
principes du système de Rousseau: 
 
307 See Seneca, Epistolae Morales, in Omnia Opera: L. A. Senecae, Philosophica, Declamatoria et Tragica (Paris: M. 
Ehrmann, 1829), Ep. XCV.  
308 See Cicero, De inventione: de optimo genere oratorum, trans. H.M. Hubbell (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1949), p. 327: “Virtue may be defined as a habit of mind in harmony with reason and the order of nature. Therefore 
when we have become acquainted with all its parts we shall have considered the full scope of honour, pure and 
simple. It has four parts: wisdom, justice, courage, temperance.” Also see St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 
trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: Burns Oates et Washbourne, 1922), IaIIae, 61.2. 
309 Victor Goldschmidt, Anthropologie et politique: les principes du système de Rousseau (Paris: Librarie 
Philosophique J. Vrin, 1982), p. 67. 
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D’abord, Rousseau brise le cadre des vertus cardinales : non seulement, comme il le 
répète après Bacon, la force de l’âme est « la plus héroïque des vertus » ; « elle est la 
source ou le supplément des vertus qui [...] composent [l’héroïsme] » et, dans le Discours, 
suffit à définir la vertu en général. Sa supériorité sur les autres vertus qui entrent dans le 
canon traditionnel, se marque dans l'indépendance où elle nous dispose à l’égard des 
circonstances […]. (Goldschmidt, Anthropologie et politique, p. 64) 
If Rousseau considers fortitude the father of all virtues, then it’s because our independence and 
freedom depend on it more than any other. Why not justice, temperance or prudence? Though 
he will not articulate his famous thesis, that man’s naturals sentiments are good but corrupted 
by civilization, until his Discours sur l’inégalité, it is partially expressed in the accounts of Sallust, 
Tacitus and Seneca that he invokes here. Constrained by necessities like agricultural production 
and military defense, youthful nations live in a state of simplicity wherein the virtues of justice, 
temperance and prudence come all too naturally to men. Such is the “Cité cynique” [Cynic City].  
(Goldschmidt, Anthropologie et politique, p. 67) Justice (i.e., giving a man his due) reigns there, 
not because there are a thousand laws on the books, but because each man realizes the extent 
to which his existence depends on that of his neighbor. The people are temperate, not because 
they strictly discipline themselves, but because they have not yet invented a host of vices. Even 
their poems do not aim to please the ear, but to remind them of their duties to the gods, and of 
the heroic actions of their noblest ancestors.310 Last of all, they are prudent because the effects 
 
310 See Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, Essai sur l’origine des connoissances humaines (Paris: Libraries Associés, 1787), 
p. 258: “Dans l'établissement des sociétés, les hommes ne pouvaient point encore s’occuper des choses de put 




of poor decisions, being unmitigated by vast stores of wealth and technological advantages, are 
swift and harsh. What such a people truly require is courage. They must have the confidence to 
fulfill these virtues in the face of death, and the magnificence to take pride in them. Courage is 
the aegis of virtue, and ensured, as Seneca writes, that Regulus did not forsake a noble life in his 
last hour on the rack.311 The other virtues, it might be said, need only to be relearned once they 
are forgotten. But a man’s courage is singular. Have I fought to perfect my faculties and uphold 
the gifts of virtue that God has granted me, or have I idled and cowered? All men are born with 
the necessary qualities according to Jean-Jacques, but few have the force de l’âme to put them 
into action. And the courageous man, acting on his virtues rather than the will of another, alone 
is free and independent. For that is the essence of freedom, to do only what virtue commands, 
even in the face of death. “For life itself is slavery when one lacks the courage to die.”312 
 Confidence, especially the confidence to present oneself without putting on airs, is one 
of the most important aspects of courage for Rousseau—not only in the first Discours, but even 
in his final work, Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire, where he concludes that he only ever lied 
when he lacked the “strength” and “courage” to expose his character.313 Confidence means not 
 
nécessaire. La poésie et la musique ne furent donc cultivées que pour faire connaître la religion, les lois et pour 
conserver le souvenir des grands hommes et des services qu'ils avaient rendus à la société […].” Passage quoted by 
Goldschmidt (Anthropologie et politique, p. 51) 
311 Seneca, Letters on Ethics, trans. Margaret Graver and A.A. Long (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015): “Do 
you really think Regulus did not choose to arrive at Carthage? Clothe yourself in the mind of a great man; stand aside 
for a while from the opinions of the common crowd. Form an impression of virtue that is as great as its merits—
virtue at its greatest and most magnificent, virtue that we should honor not with incense and garlands but with 
sweat and blood.” (letter LXVII, p. 203) 
312 Ibid., letter LXXVII, p. 249. 
313 See Rousseau, Rêveries (IV, p. 1039): “Il falloit avoir le courage et la force d’être vrai toujours en toute occasion, 
et quʼil ne sortît jamais ni fictions ni fables d’une bouche et d’une plume qui s’étoient particulièrement consacrées 
à la vérité. Voilà ce que j’aurois dû me dire en prenant cette fière devise, et me répéter sans cesse tant que j’osai la 




hiding behind fine clothing and makeup, behind obsequious and polite speech, behind titles and 
customs, and in a word, behind appearances. A man who possesses true confidence is perfectly 
honest and sincere. He is, Rousseau writes, an athlete who wrestles naked, and shuns all of the 
vestments with which sickly and weak men conceal their deformities: 
La richesse de la parure peut annoncer un homme opulent, et son élégance un homme 
de goût; l’homme sain et robuste se reconnoît à d’autres marques; c’est sous l’habit 
rustique d’un Laboureur, et non sous la dorure d’un Courtisan, qu’on trouvera la force et 
la vigueur du corps. La parure nʼest pas moins étrangère à la vertu, qui est la force et la 
vigueur de l’ame. L’homme de bien est un Athlète qui se plaît à combattre nu: il méprise 
tous ces vils ornemens qui gêneroient l’usage de ses forces, et dont la plupart n’ont été 
inventés que pour cacher quelque difformité. (Rousseau, Premier Discours, p. 8) 
The good man not only possesses la force de l’âme but also du corps, that is, both spiritual and 
physical fortitude. To recall, the City of Cynics is not virtuous because it possesses some special, 
esoteric knowledge, but rather because life there is simple and rooted in necessity, which has no 
need of entertainers, merchants, usurers, and in general, idlers who live on another’s labor and 
deal only in appearances. Sowing the land and defending it with arms are the only occupations 
there, and to succeed in these fields, one must be “healthy” and “robust”. “Quel spectacle nous 
presenteroit le Genre-humain composé uniquement de laboureurs, de soldats, de chasseurs et 
de bergers? Un spectacle infiniment plus beau que celui du Genre-humain compose de Cuisiniers, 
 
Avec une ame foible on peut tout au plus se garantir du vice, mais c’est être arrogant et téméraire d’oser professer 
de grandes vertus.” 
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de Poètes, d’Imprimeurs, d’Orfèvres, de Peintres et de Musiciens.” [What spectacle would the 
human race presents us with, composed uniquely of laborers, soldiers, hunters and shepherds? 
A spectacle infinitely more beautiful than one of the human race composed of cooks, poets, 
printers, engravers, painters and musicians.] 314 When Cato the Elder was not leading his men 
into battle, he was working in the fields with his slaves, and only wore one toga year round. 
Physical excellence might engender the arrogance of an Achilles, but also permit a Hector to 
express his love for his family and country. Despite our Christian and Liberal prejudices, healthy 
people have healthy ideas. And a healthy state is not merely a metaphor for a virtuous one, but 
also a precondition of it.315 Richard III’s twisted spine meant for his family and kingdom his 
twisted jealousy and vengeance. 
 It should be pointed out here that Rousseau’s estimation of courage as the father of all 
virtues is not limited to his first Discours or early thought. For the same sentiment is expressed 
in his unpublished Discours sur la vertu la plus necessaire aux héros (1751),316 and even in his last 
work, Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire. As he clearly states in the former, courage clears and 
expands the mind, giving life to all the other virtues, and alone is capable of reaping their fruits 
in this life. One might be prudent, temperate and just in his judgements, but if he does not dare 
 
314 See Rousseau, Dernière réponse à M. Bordes, p. 82. 
315 As Goldschmidt writes, “C’est que la portée normative du concept de nature, mis en œuvre dans le 1er Discours, 
se détermine essentiellement par l'idée de santé, et que cette idée, ici, suffit pour opérer la discrimination entre les 
sociétés pures et les sociétés corrompues.” (Anthropologie et politique, p. 67) 
316 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur cette Question: Quelle est la Vertu la plus nécessaire aux Héros ; et quels sont 
les Héros à qui cette Vertu a manqué ? in Œuvres complètes de J.-J. Rousseau, vol. 2, ed. Bernard Gagnebin et Marcel 
Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1995). 
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to apply them, then they shall be squandered. “Waste no more time arguing what a good man 
should be. Be one.”317 Thus, Rousseau writes in his Discours sur le héros:  
Voilà ce que produit la force de l'âme; c'est ainsi qu'elle peut éclairer l'esprit, étendre le 
génie et donner de l'énergie et de la vigueur à toutes les autres vertus; elle peut même 
suppléer à celles qui nous manquent […]. La force est donc la vertu qui caractérise 
l'Héroïsme, et elle l'est encore par un autre argument sans réplique que je tire des 
réflexions d'un grand homme : les autres vertus, dit Bacon, nous délivrent de la 
domination des vices; la seule force nous garantit de celle de la fortune. (Rousseau, 
Discours sur le héros, p. 1273.) 
Even in his final years, courage remains that first virtue for Rousseau, which should not surprise 
us. For Rousseau is a philosopher of the heart, and to have courage literally means having cœur 
[heart]. Rousseau’s goal in the Rêveries is to determine if he is truly dignified of Juvenal’s maxim 
“vitam vero impendenti” [a life consecrated to the truth]. (Rousseau, Rêveries, IV, p. 1027) This 
he undertakes by examining the occasions where he invented fictions in order to save face, for 
instance, when Ms. Vacassin asked if he had really abandoned all of his children to the ward of 
the state. Rousseau concludes that his lack of strength and courage, which made him subject to 
the opinions of others, made him lie almost “mechanically” (Ibid., p. 1034). To consecrate one’s 
life to the truth, one must be free, and to be free, one must have the courage to sacrifice one’s 
interests and even life. Hence, Rousseau proclaims that there are essentially two types of men, 
 
317 See Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, trans. Francis Hutcheson and James Moor (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008), 
bk. X, p. 126. 
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“l’homme du monde” [the man of the world] and “l’homme vrai” [the man of truth]; while the 
former is only willing to utter “the truth that costs him nothing”, the latter is prepared even “to 
immolate himself” for it. (Ibid., p. 1031) To know the truth, one must love it more than life itself 
and have the courage to die for it. We shall now see what the advancements of the sciences and 
arts, and more precisely the education of men in them, has wrecked upon the courage and thus 














Chapter XI: “History’s Greatest Militant Lowbrow”: Rosseau’s Critique of the Intellectual 
XI. i. “Rousseauian Children, Happy Little Savages”: The Negative Education of Patriots 
Rousseau does not criticize the arts and sciences per se, as he regards “mechanical arts” 
(i.e., engineering) as “useful”, and has profound respect for those “geniuses” like Descartes and 
Newton who set out alone to uncover the inner workings of nature.318 Nor is his critique reducible 
to those fine arts “relating to morality” (Rousseau, Dernière Réponse à M. Bordes, p. 72) that 
convert vices like luxury and idleness into the theatrical spectacles and other false appearances 
that lead men further astray. Rather, Rousseau focuses mainly on the education of the arts and 
sciences, which threatens to replace man’s natural sense of right and wrong with an artificial or 
positive one. As early as the Premier Discours, one therefore discovers a critique of what might 
be called positive education, in addition to a defense of what Rousseau shall later call “negative 
education” in Émile. We can trace the concept of culture back to Cicero’s Tusculan Meditations, 
where the famous orator writes that: “as a field, though fertile, cannot yield a harvest without 
cultivation, no more can the mind without learning.”319 Rousseau, by contrast, would argue that 
the human mind is not a plant that requires cultivation to bear its fruits, but once transplanted 
into civilized soil, requires careful attention, lest it be marred by the crook of vice. The goal of a 
 
318 Rousseau clarifies the object of his critique in his Dernière Réponse à M. Bordes, p. 72 : “Les Sciences sont le chef-
d’œuvre du génie et de la raison. L’esprit d’imitation a produit les beaux-Arts, et l’expérience les a perfectionnés. 
Nous sommes redevables aux arts mécaniques d’un grand nombre d’inventions utiles qui ont ajoute aux charmes et 
aux commodités de la vie. Voilà des vérités dont je conviens de très-bon cœur assurément. Mais considérons 
maintenant toutes ces connoissances par rapport aux mœurs.” 
319 See Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, trans. Andrew P. Peabody (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1886), p. 96: 
“To continue the figure: as a field, though fertile, cannot yield a harvest without cultivation, no more can the mind 
without learning; thus each is feeble without the other. But philosophy is the culture of the soul. It draws out vices 
by the root, prepares the mind to receive seed, and commits to it, and, so to speak, sows in it what, when grown, 
may bear the most abundant fruit.” 
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negative education is not to augment or reshape the mind, but instead remove the constricting 
institutions that civilization has littered across the soil, allowing its natural expression. Like the 
English garden, it seeks natural harmony over man-made order. 
Rousseau will not fully develop his conception of negative education until Émile, where 
every lesson is calculated to give full expression to his student’s natural inclinations in a world of 
masked and spiritually deformed creatures. There, negative education “protects the heart from 
vice” without “teaching either virtue or truth”, which instead must come from nature: 
Si les enfants sautaient tout d'un coup de la mamelle à l'âge de raison, l'éducation qu'on 
leur donne pourrait leur convenir ; mais, selon le progrès naturel, il leur en faut une toute 
contraire. […] La première éducation doit donc être purement négative. Elle consiste, non 
point à enseigner la vertu ni la vérité, mais à garantir le cœur du vice et l'esprit de l'erreur. 
(Rousseau, Émile, ou de l’éducation, II, p. 323) 
That being said, the basic premise of Émile presents itself in the Premier discours, as well as the 
Deuxième for that matter. In the first place, Émile learns only those truths that will prove useful 
for his survival, for instance cosmography. Secondly, he does not learn them from his desk, but 
in the world, where their necessity presents itself: Émile must first become lost in the woods in 
order to appreciate the true utility of cosmography. In this way, Émile’s knowledge is not tied to 
some institution or authority, but rather to nature. Yes, his preceptor has carefully orchestrated 
the chain of events whereby Émile learns this science, but in so doing, has recreated the natural 
conditions in which man first discovered it, not in order to offer it up to some authority such as 
the Sun King’s absolute monarchy, but rather for his own survival. The same principle applies in 
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the Premier discours, where the youth are educated by undertaking the duties that they will be 
obliged to fulfill as men: cultivating and defending the fatherland. There is however a significant 
difference here, as the former’s negative education makes him an individual, while the latter’s 
produces a patriot or citizen. 
 To be sure, the patriotic citizen of the cité cynique is presented differently in subsequent 
works like Émile, which, to recall, Rousseau considers part of a threefold oeuvre comprising the 
Premiers and Deuxième Discours. For in Émile, the foremost king of the cité cynique, Lycurgus, is 
presented as having “denatured” the Spartans.320 Published the same year in 1762, Rousseau’s 
Du contrat social mobilizes the same language, arguing that a “great legislator” is required to 
“change so to speak human nature” [changer pour ainsi dire la nature] and “to persuade” people 
to see their fates as bound up with one another.321 This would suggest that the education of 
patriots is anything but “negative”, and instead treats men as blank slates upon whom its positive 
content might be written. At first, the language of denaturalization in these subsequent works 
seems to suggest a break with that of the Premiers discours. One might attempt to resolve this 
seeming break by arguing that negative education only produced patriots in earlier times, since 
civilization had yet to thoroughly corrupt people, who might still satisfy their “natural needs” by 
investing in their nations. As Rousseau asks in the Premier discours: “Qui voudroit en un mot 
 
320 See Émile, I, p. 250: “Platon n’a fait qu’épurer le cœur de l’homme ; Lycurgue l’a dénaturé. L’institution publique 
n’existe plus ; parce qu’où il n’y plus de patrie il ne peut plus y avoir de citoyens.” Also see p. 249: “L’homme naturel 
est tout pour lui : il est l’unité numérique, l’entier absolu qui n’a de rapport qu’à lui-même ou à son semblable. 
L’homme civil n’est qu’une unité fractionnaire qui tient au dénominateur, et dont la valeur est dans son rapport ave 
l’entier, qui est le corps social.” 
321 See Rousseau, Du contrat social, II. VII., p. 381: “Celui qui ose entreprendre d’instituer un people doit se sentir en 
état de changer, pour ainsi dire, la nature humaine ; de transformer chaque individu, qui par lui-même est un tout 
parfait et solitaire, en partie d’un plus grand tout dont cet individu reçoive en quelque sorte sa vie et son être ; de 




passer sa vie à des stériles contemplations, si chacun ne consultant que les devoirs de l'homme 
et les besoins de la nature, n'avait de temps que pour la patrie, pour les malheureux et pour ses 
amis?” [Who in a word would pass his life in sterile contemplation, if everyone but consulted the 
duties of men and the needs of nature, having time only for the fatherland, for the unhappy and 
his friends?] (Rousseau, Premier discours, p. 17 – 18) The problem with this reading is that Moses, 
Lycurgus and Numa, the three greatest legislators of nations according to Rousseau, hail from 
such early times, and are presented as having denatured men.322 
 There must however be a way of resolving this seeming contradiction. For in Rousseau’s 
Considérations sur le government de Pologne, where the Genevan advises the King of Poland on 
how to “donner aux âmes la force nationale” [instill the national character in souls] (Rousseau, 
Considérations, p. 966), he remains a proponent of negative education: “Je ne redirai jamais assés 
que la bonne éducation doit être négative” [I could never repeat enough that a good education 
must be negative.] (Ibid., p. 968). To make sense of Rousseau’s negative education program for 
patriots, as it were, I think we must first admit that patriotism, like any institution, is artificial. 
That being said, Émile’s preceptor mobilizes numerous artificial devices to ensure that the boy 
learns from the world, and exercises his natural sense of right and wrong when dealing with 
others. Actors, for instance, are often employed to personify a worldview that Émile must 
decipher in order to resolve some moral dilemma. Similarly, Rousseau believes that national 
identity is a product of “amour-propre” (i.e., love for one’s self-image) as opposed to the 
 
322 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne et sur sa réformation projetée, in 
Œuvres complètes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, vol. 3, ed. Bernard Gagnebin et Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 
1964), p. 956 : “Je regarde les nations modernes j'y vois force faiseurs de lois et pas un législateur. Chez les anciens, 
j'en vois trois principaux qui méritent une attention particulière : Moïse, Lycurgue et Numa.” 
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healthier “amour de soi” (i.e., love for one’s true self), but it is the only form of amour-propre 
that he defends throughout his oeuvre.323 For when we share a national identity with our fellows, 
other forms of amour-propre (i.e., other identities) are unable to divide and prevent us from 
feeling the natural sentiment of “pitié” that another’s suffering evokes in the state of nature.324 
Rousseau, it goes without saying, refutes any such notion of cosmopolitan identity, for instance 
of the kind the philosophes wish to cultivate, on the grounds that pité is a visceral rather than 
intellectual sentiment, and that humans are moved more by the sight of suffering than stories of 
it.325 Though Rousseau does not explicitly suggest mobilizing amour-propre to this end in the 
Premier discours, one discovers precisely this idea in the Discours sur l’économie politique: “Il est 
certain que les plus grands prodiges de vertu ont été produits par l'amour de la patrie : ce 
sentiment doux et vif qui joint la force de l'amour-propre à toute la beauté de la vertu, lui donne 
une énergie qui sans la défigurer, en fait la plus héroïque de toutes les passions.” [It is certain 
that the greatest prodigies of virtue were produced by love for the fatherland: this sweet and 
lively sentiment that joins the force of pride to the beauty of virtue, gives it an energy without 
 
323 Rousseau first defines “amour-propre” and “amour de soi” in his Deuxième discours, p. 219: “L'amour de soi-
même est un sentiment naturel qui porte tout animal à veiller à sa propre conservation et qui, dirigé dans l'homme 
par la raison et modifié par la pitié, produit l'humanité et la vertu. L'amour-propre n'est qu'un sentiment relatif, 
factice et né dans la société, qui porte chaque individu à faire plus de cas de soi que de tout autre, qui inspire aux 
hommes tous les maux qu'ils se font mutuellement et qui est la véritable source de l'honneur.” 
324 For a definition of the “sentiment naturel” of “pitié”, see Rousseau, Deuxième discours, p. 156: “Il est donc bien 
certain que la pitié est un sentiment naturel, qui modérant dans chaque individu l'activité de l'amour de soi-même, 
concourt à la conservation mutuelle de toute l'espèce. C'est elle qui nous porte sans réflexion au secours de ceux 
que nous voyons souffrir: c'est elle qui, dans l'état de nature, tient lieu de lois, de mœurs, et de vertu, avec cet 
avantage que nul n'est tenté de désobéir à sa douce voix: c'est elle qui détournera tout sauvage robuste d'enlever à 
un faible enfant, ou à un vieillard infirme, sa subsistance acquise avec peine, si lui-même espère pouvoir trouver la 
sienne ailleurs […].” 
325 Rousseau discusses the limits of the sentiment of pity in his Discours sur l’économie politique: “Il semble que le 
sentiment de l'humanité s'évapore et s'affaiblisse en s'étendant sur toute la terre, et que nous ne saurions être 
touchés des calamités de la Tartarie ou du japon, comme de celles d'un peuple européen. Il faut en quelque manière 
borner et comprimer l'intérêt et la commisération pour lui donner de l'activité.” (p. 254) 
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disfiguring it, in fact the most heroic of all the passions.] (Rousseau, Discours sur l’économie 
politique, p. 255) Moreover, not only does Rousseau think that patriotism safeguards our natural 
sentiment of pity, he also argues in a fragment entitled “De la patrie” that patriotism is grounded 
in the most natural sentiment of them all, l’amour de soi-même: 
D’où il suivroint que par un effet de l’amour d’eux-mêmes tous les peuples étant 
également attachés aux objets de leurs appétits et de leurs habitudes qui sont aussi les 
instruments de leur conservation devroient avoir le même attachement pour le sol qui les 
nourrit dès leur naissance et qui seule offre à leurs sens ces objets. […] Ce qu’on aime 
dans son pays, ce qu’on appelle proprement la patrie n’est donc pas ce qui rapporte à nos 
appétits et aux habitudes qui en naissent, ce n’est pas simplement le lieu, ce ne sont pas 
simplement les choses, l’objet de cet amour est plus près de nous.326 
The artificial identity cultivated by the patriotic education program does not therefore prevent it 
from being understood as negative, for it secures the expression of what Rousseau will identify 
in the Deuxième discours as the two most fundamental aspects of human nature, self-love and 
pity. Incidentally, this interpretation should help to reduce the distance between texts like Émile 
and Du contrat social, since it demonstrates that the latter’s efforts to denature man in fact leave 
his basic nature intact. 
 Rousseau is often attributed with inventing the idea that people are born naturally good 
and only corrupted by society. As such, he has frequently been blamed by conservative thinkers 
 
326 See Rousseau, “De la patrie”, in Œuvres complètes de J.-J. Rousseau, vol. 3, ed. Bernard Gagnebin et Marcel 
Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 535 – 536. 
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for embarking Western nations upon a thousand crusades against ‘institutional discrimination’, 
‘systematic inequality’, etc., all of which minimize the personal responsibility of the individual. 
This sort of criticism can be traced back to Edmund Burke, who affirms both the prejudicial and 
artificial nature of society, but defends them on the grounds that (1) prejudices are based upon 
time-tested truths, and (2) what Rousseau believes to be the vicious “mask” of custom is in fact 
“the decent drapery of life”.327 Ever since, Burkean conservatives have blamed the Genevan for 
inspiring a host of anti-social movements that might be characterized as unpatriotic at best. For 
instance, Robert Nisbet once famously inculpated Rousseau for inspiring “the student mania of 
the 1960s”, a generation of lotus-eaters frolicking and fornicating in “the mud of obscenity”, in 
the literal “physical dirt”, all “Rousseauian children of nature, happy little savages.”328 “To both 
liberal applauders and conservative critics,” Nisbet holds, “the student mania was an exercise in 
romanticism, in demonstrating how human beings are when stripped of the habits and customs 
of their civilization.” (Ibid.) 
 Now is a good time to disabuse ourselves of this interpretation of Rousseau’s education 
program, which if one recalls, was partly shared by the liberal theorist Isaiah Berlin, who refers 
to the Genevan as the grandfather of “longhaired professors”. For his part, Nisbet was trying to 
understand why Tocqueville’s American dream, the liberalism of the duty-bound individual, had 
collapsed into that of his baser brother, the hedonistic individual of the American cattle farm. If 
however Rousseau seemed to him a likely culprit, then it was because Nisbet had not examined 
 
327 See Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), p. 90. 
328 See Robert Nisbet, The Present Age: Progress and Anarchy in Modern America (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1988), 
p. 103 – 104.  
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the Premier discours. For there he would have found the education program that Rousseau only 
hints at in Émile, but no longer thinks possible.329 We speak of course of the negative education 
of patriots. If, by the time of Émile, Rousseau has abandoned the prospect of forming patriots, 
then it is because he had resigned himself to the fate of young Émile, i.e., his exile to the world 
of French cosmopolitanism. In such a place, words like ‘patriot’ and ‘citizen’ are at best sneered 
at from behind a mask, and at worst twisted on its plastic lips: “Ces deux mots patrie et citoyen 
doivent être effacés des langues modernes. J'en sais bien la raison, mais je ne veux pas la dire ; 
elle ne fait rien à mon sujet.” [These two words fatherland and citizen should be effaced from 
the modern languages. I know the reason well, but I don’t want to say it; they have nothing to do 
with my subject.] (Rousseau, Émile, p. 250) Hence, like Robinson Crusoe, Émile shall learn the 
talents of a man who lives alone and scavenges in the ‘physical dirt’. Émile shall be an individual. 
My point is this: if Rousseau thinks positive education a threat to humanity’s natural sentiments 
and freedom, then it is not so that flower-children might venerate their ancestors’ sacrifices by 
dancing in the mud—the majority of which was done by hyper-socialized university students, not 
the farmer’s children. To the contrary, when one’s sense of right and wrong does not depend on 
such educational institutions, but naturally forms from his life-experiences, then he'll be inclined 
to defend his neighbor and live virtuously. In favorable conditions, he becomes a patriot, while 
less happy ones oblige him to become an individual. 
 
 
329 See Émile, p. 250: “L’institution publique n’existe plus, et ne peut plus exister ; parce qu’où il n’y a plus de patrie 
il ne peut plus y avoir de citoyens.” 
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XI. ii. The Fruits of an Abstract Education: Idle, Weak, Cowardly and Slavish Men  
 In the Premier discours, Rousseau accuses the academies of making men idle, physically 
weak, cowardly, ignorant of their duties to God and country, and ultimately slavish. His critique, 
however, does not merely take aim at the academies of his day, but at education per se. For as 
he later clarifies in the Préface à Narcisse, “L’étude use la machine, épuise les esprits, détruit la 
force, énerve le courage, et cela seule montre assez qu’elle n’est pas faite pour nous : c’est ainsi 
qu’on devient lâche et pusillanime, incapable de résister également à la peine et aux passions." 
[Study uses up the machine, exhausts spirits, destroys strength, saps courage, and this alone is 
enough to show that it is not made for us: it is also how one becomes lazy and pusillanimous, 
equally incapable of resisting pain and passions.] (Rousseau, Préface de Narcisse, p. 966) And as 
Goldschmidt points out, Rousseau agrees with Bacon that the arts and sciences “rendent les 
âmes plus douces, simples, ductiles et dociles au commandement” [make souls softer, simpler, 
more malleable and docile to ordering].330 But if, as Rousseau maintains in the Discours, simplicity 
itself is the fount of all virtue, then it would be unnecessary to render men supple so as to impress 
morality upon them. Doing so, furthermore, would prove fatal to their courage, the virtue that 
they require above all others to express their natural sentiments and defend their freedom. In 
any case, Rousseau’s numerous and incendiary criticisms of education in the Premier discours 
take at aim at both its positive and abstract character.  
 That education must possess a negative character, permitting the youth to express their 
natural judgement rather than burdening them with some positive doctrine, is expressed in the 
 
330 See Anthropologie et Politique, p. 51. Passage cited from Bacon’s Advancement of Learning. 
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first Discours in passages like the following: “C’est dès nos premières années qu’une éducation 
insensée orne notre esprit et corrompt notre jugement.” [It’s from our first years that a senseless 
education ornaments our spirit and corrupts our judgement.] (Rousseau, Premier discours, p. 24) 
The spirit shall not suffer itself to be “ornamented”, even with images of the statues and portraits 
of our greatest ancestral heroes. As Rousseau continues: “Nos jardins sont ornés de statues et 
nos galeries de tableaux. Que penseriez-vous que représentent ces chefs-d’œuvre de l’art 
exposés à l’admiration publique? Les défenseurs de la partie? ou ces hommes plus grands encore 
qui l’ont enrichie par leurs vertus? Non.” [Our gardens are ornamented with statues and our 
galleries with paintings. What do you think is represented by these masterpieces of art exposed 
to public admiration? The defense of the fatherland? or those even greater men who enriched it 
by their virtues? No.] (Ibid., p. 25) So often are patriotism and nationalism accused of being 
buttressed by propaganda, but recall that Rome’s exemplar of patriotism, Cato the Elder, insisted 
that no statue be made in his likeness after he passed on. Virtue is its own reward. The patriot 
does not defend his family and community so that his image might be circulated, but for their 
own sake. How might the youth learn to be virtuous or patriotic? For Cato the Younger, it sufficed 
to watch an innocent boy suffer, as Rousseau reminds us. Where simplicity is preserved and men 
are virtuous, Rousseau believes, “the air itself of the country seems to inspire virtue”: 
Le tableau de Lacédémone est moins brillant. Là, disaient les autres peuples, les hommes 
naissent vertueux, et l'air même du pays semble inspirer la vertu. Il ne nous reste de ses 
habitants que la mémoire de leurs actions héroïques. De tels monuments vaudraient-ils 
moins pour nous que les marbres curieux qu'Athènes nous a laissés? (Ibid., p. 12) 
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Indeed, the Spartans educated their youth, but Rousseau regards their education program as a 
negative one that protects their judgement from vicious institutions. If this required Lycurgus to 
‘denature’ them in some respects, as Rousseau later writes in Émile, then it also preserved their 
natural inclinations, which proved to be sources of patriotic virtue. 
On the other hand, positive education uproots virtue from its natural sources, rendering 
it dependent on systems of thought, institutional powers, etc. Since the youth are sequestered 
to classrooms when they are taught such systems, they rarely have an occasion to understand 
their significance. Therefore, they neither learn truth nor virtue, but only how to argue about 
them: “ils sauront composer des vers qu'à peine ils pourront comprendre: sans savoir démêler 
l'erreur de la vérité, ils posséderont l'art de les rendre méconnaissables aux autres par des 
arguments spécieux: mais ces mots de magnanimité, de tempérance, d'humanité, de courage, ils 
ne sauront ce que c'est.” [they’ll know who to compose verses that they can hardly understand; 
without knowing how to distinguish error from truth, they will master the art of rendering both 
unrecognizable by specious arguments: but these words, magnanimity, temperance, humanity, 
courage, they won’t know what they are.] (Ibid., p. 24) Worse yet, neither have the so-called 
philosophes who conceive of and teach such systems had any occasion for virtue. Hence, in the 
best case, they will become engrossed with abstractions, and in order to distinguish themselves, 
make absurd claims: “L'un prétend qu'il n'y a point de corps et que tout est en représentation. 
L'autre, qu'il n'y a d'autre substance que la matière ni d'autre dieu que le monde. […] Ô grands 
philosophes !” [One claims that the body does not exist and that everything is a representation 
of it. The other, that there is no other substance than matter nor god than the earth.] (Ibid., p. 
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27) A far more dangerous possibility, however, is that their “vie facile et agréable” 331 from behind 
the desk convinces them that virtue, country and God—in a word, everything their forefathers 
fought and died for in order to make their existence so “facile and agreeable”—appear to them 
as pointless superfluities: “Mais ces vains et futiles déclamateurs vont de tous côtés, armés de 
leurs funestes paradoxes; sapant les fondements de la foi, et anéantissant la vertu. Ils sourient 
dédaigneusement à ces vieux mots de Patrie et de Religion, et consacrent leurs talents et leur 
Philosophie à détruire et avilir tout ce qu'il y a de sacré parmi les hommes.” [But these vain and 
futile declaimers will from all sides, armed with their fatal paradoxes, sap the foundations of faith, 
and annihilate virtue. They smile disdainfully at these old words, Fatherland and Religion, and 
consecrate their talents and their Philosophy to destroying and swallowing everything that is 
sacred amongst men.] (Ibid., p. 19) What makes such positive education programs possible is 
luxury, but what makes them so dangerous is their abstract character, their removal from the 
concrete vicissitudes of life.  
If Rousseau praises Cato the Elder in the first Discours for expelling the Greek academics 
from Rome, insisting that the youth already knew their duties and had only to fulfill them, then 
it’s because he understood the concrete nature of virtue, that is, its need to be practiced, and 
realized that it could not be grasped abstractly. Thus, as Rousseau writes there: “Depuis que les 
savants ont commencé à paraître parmi nous, disaient leurs propres philosophes, les gens de 
 
331 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Lettre à Grimm, in Œuvres complètes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, vol. 3, ed. Bernard 
Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 64: J’ai fait voir que les Sciences et les Arts énervent le 
courage. M. Gautier appelle cela une façon singulière de raisonner, et il ne voit point la liaison qui se trouve entre le 
courage et la vertu. Ce n’est pourtant pas, ce me semble, une chose si difficile à comprendre. Celui qui s’est une fois 




bien se sont éclipsés. Jusqu'alors les Romains s'étaient contentés de pratiquer la vertu, tout fut 
perdu quand ils commencèrent à l'étudier.” [Since the reasoners have begun to appear amongst 
us, said their own philosophers, good men have been eclipsed. Until now, the Roman had been 
content to practice virtue, but everything was lost when they began to study it.](Ibid., p. 14) The 
difference between a concrete and abstract education is one between “reasonable” men and 
mere “reasoners”, between “felicity” and “weakness”, between “humanity” and “politeness”, 
between the Epicurean state of having all of our pleasures “outside” of us and the Stoic one of 
containing them “within” ourselves, as Rousseau’s Lettres Morales to M. d’Houdetot highlight: 
Nous le sommes, s’écrient-ils tristement, que de ressources pour le bien être, quelle foule 
de commodités inconnues à nos pères, combien nous goûtons de plaisirs qu’ils ignoraient. 
Il est vrai, vous avez la mollesse, mais ils avaient la félicité ; vous êtes raisonneurs, ils 
étaient raisonnables ; vous êtes poils, ils étaient humains ; tous vos plaisirs sont hors de 
vous, les leurs étaient en eux-mêmes. (Rousseau, Lettres morales, p. 1089.) 
Simplicity not only protects men from all those “commodities” to which they become attached 
and will doing anything, no matter how treacherous and cowardly, to preserve. It also ensures 
that we do not abstract ourselves from the world, where pain and adversity separate the wheat 
from the chaff, the virtuous from the vicious. No study of courage will ever make the difference 
between the man who sacrifices himself for his comrades and the one who betrays them. “Mon 
cœur s’est purifié à la coupelle de l’adversité” [My heart is purified by the cup of adversity.] 
(Rousseau, Rêveries, p. 1000). It is in this light that Rousseau explains in the first Discours Bacon’s 
superiority to the philosophes: “L'âme se proportionne insensiblement aux objets qui l'occupent, 
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et ce sont les grandes occasions qui font les grands hommes. Le prince de l'éloquence fut consul 
de Rome, et le plus grand, peut-être, des philosophes, chancelier d'Angleterre.” [The soul 
unconsciously proportions itself to the objects that occupy it, and it is great occasions that make 
great men. The prince of eloquence was consul of Rome, and the greatest of philosophes, 
perhaps, was the chancellor of England.] (Rousseau, Premier discours, p. 29). Bacon learned more 
about virtue as a statesman than he ever did in his study, Rousseau maintains. By contrast, the 
philosophes learn virtue from one of the most commodious places in all the world, the salon 
percolating with its faineants and bons airs.  
 Virtues like courage are acquired in the course of life, but the ‘well-educated’ man, i.e., 
the product of an abstract and positive education, idles away at his desk. The free man, having 
learnt honesty by watching lies destroy an innocent man, feels virtue a part of himself, and is 
thus willing to fight and die for it. But to the ‘well-educated’ man, it is simply part of a system, 
something to be discussed but not necessarily acted upon. Idling at his desk, the ‘well-educated’ 
man lacks the physical strength and courage to fight for what he professes. Yes, he forms a fist 
with his right hand, but an open palm for the university and his donners with the left. Principles 
are important to him, but not more than an “easy and agreeable life”. For him, God and nation 
are at best ideas, and at worst prejudices to be exploited or criticized: “ce doux nom de patrie ne 
frappera jamais l’oreille [de vos enfants]; et s'ils entendent parler de Dieu, ce sera moins pour le 
craindre que pour en avoir peur.” (Ibid., p. 24). Aside from whatever “talents” or ‘expertise’ that 




XI. iii. The Philosophe, or the Enemy of the People 
 Rousseau’s Premiers discours is a polemic aimed at all those “beaux esprits” and “gens à 
la mode” who, calling themselves “philosophes”, would have been “fanatique[s] du temps de la 
Ligue” (Ibid., p. 3). In our previous analyses, the philosophe proved to be a mixture of scientism, 
activism and sociability. Born from the artificial salon world of the honnête homme, where one 
must always please but “never shock”, the philosophe is a hyper-socialized creature.332 Indeed, 
as César Chesneau Dumarsais expresses in praise of the “Philosophe” in his contribution to the 
Encyclopédie, “Le tempérament du philosophe, c'est d'agir par esprit d'ordre ou par raison ; 
comme il aime extrêmement la société, il lui importe bien plus qu'au reste des hommes de 
disposer tous ses ressorts à ne produire que des effets conformes à l'idée d'honnête homme.” 
[The temperament of the philosophe is to act with a mind to order or with reason; as he loves 
society in the extreme, it is more important to him than the majority of men to dispose of all his 
resources to alone produce results in conformity with the idea of an honnête homme.]333 
According to Rousseau, the philosophe is not a scientist but a popularizer thereof, not a virtuous 
man but a virtue-signaler, not a Socratic self-master but a social reformer with pleasant Epicurean 
 
332 The concept of “hypersocialization” is increasingly invoked by critics of 21st century technocracy and those who 
would diagnose the pathologies of social media: see, for example, Alberto Melucci, Challenging Codes: Collective 
Action in the Information Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 94 – 95. However, we might trace 
the concept back to the 17th century, to the salon-world that valued “bons airs” above all else—see chapter IV for a 
discussion of this phenomenon. Other commentators have traced the first diagnosis of hyper-socializations back to 
Molière and La Bruyère; see Cédric Cornet, “Une masculinité en crise à la fin de la XVIIe siècle ? La critique de 
l’efféminé chez La Bruyère”, in Genre & Histoire, vol. 2 (Spring 2008): 1 – 19: “Deux perceptions fortement 
ambivalentes de la masculinité coexistent au XVIIe siècle : d’un côté le rustre mal dégrossi, hyposocialisé, proche de 
la nature (de la rusticité d’un Monsieur de Pourceaugnac moliéresque à l’animalité paysanne chez La Bruyère1), de 
l’autre, le courtisan, construction sociale artificielle hypersocialisée.” 
333 Emphasis mine. See César Chesneau Dumarsais, “Philosophe”, in Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des 




penchants. To sing encomiums to Newton, to expatiate on the plight of the Tartars, to propitiate 
the salon mistress and regale Holbach’s dinner guests, these simultaneously made one 
“fashionable” [à la mode] and philosophical. The term “bel esprit” [beautiful mind] is of course a 
pejorative, signifying an individual possessing all the distinctions and pretentions of knowledge, 
but nothing resembling the thing itself. Hence, if Jean-Jacques believes that the 18th century 
philosophe might have been a “fanatic in the time of the Crusades”, then it is because, despite 
whatever actual “talents” that he might possess, he “extremely loves society”.  
In Arthur Melzer’s view, these critiques of the philosophes make Rousseau the first 
modern anti-intellectual, “the first to denounce the modern intellectual as a secular priest and 
the first to warn […] of the transformation of modern philosophy into ‘ideology,’ that is, into a 
dangerous new source of partisan crusading and sectarian persecution as well as, more generally, 
of intellectual tyranny and personal dependence.”334 For Rousseau, the philosophe is essentially 
an upstart, a man who hopes “to distinguish” (Ibid., p. 19) himself through his “vain talents” (Ibid., 
p. 15) and thereby acquire power. In the end however, he proves either a cowardly or fanatical 
conformist. His lack of genuine insight means that it is not he, but rather Machiavelli’s prince who 
benefits most from his attempts to subvert his country, making the philosophe ultimately a useful 
idiot of sorts:  
Puissances de la terre, aimez les talents, et protégez ceux qui les cultivent. Peuples 
policés, cultivez-les : heureux esclaves, vous leur devez ce goût délicat et fin dont vous 
 
334 See Arthur M. Melzer, “The Origin of the Counter-Enlightenment: Rousseau and the New Religion of Sincerity”, 
in The American Political Science Review 90, no. 2 (1996): 344 – 360, p. 349. 
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vous piquez; cette douceur de caractère et cette urbanité de mœurs qui rendent parmi 
vous le commerce si liant et si facile; en un mot, les apparences de toutes les vertus sans 
en avoir aucune. (Ibid., p. 7) 
We have already elaborated upon many of the ways in which the philosophe delivers his nation 
into the tyrant’s maw, deracinating and individualizing citizens, extoling vice, etc. There remains 
however an interesting critique of this phenomenon in the first Discours, according to which the 
philosophes attempt to make the admiration of “talents” the basis of society, as opposed to the 
veneration of virtues, beliefs and national loyalties. In the healthy state, the greatest merits are 
bestowed on the magnanimous man giving back to his community, the faithful man reassuring 
his people of the good and its rewards, the soldier sacrificing himself for their defense. But the 
philosophes wish to establish what might called a value-neutral meritocracy, where the highest 
accolades are instead laid upon to the most talented artists and scientists. A prolific scientist or 
watchmaker is indeed praiseworthy, but such talents can only flourish if the virtues required for 
maintaining social bonds are maintained.  
 Once the old heroes, the exemplars of virtue and self-sacrifice, are displaced by the new 
ones—artists, actors, intellectuals, inventors of gadgets, millionaires, etc.—the nation is made 
vulnerable for a host of reasons. In the first place, the talents of such people rarely prove useful 
for discerning virtue or leading nations, which is made evident both by the superficiality of their 
principles and their near universal conformity to them. The reasons for this have already been 
explained: such people typically make their living by appearances. Secondly, when these talents 
replace the old virtues that disdain appearances, nothing prevents a people from pursing them 
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merely for the sake of “distinguishing” oneself, as opposed to producing something “useful” for 
his neighbor and country:  
Voilà ce qu'à la longue doit produire partout la préférence des talents agréables sur les 
talents utiles, et ce que l'expérience n'a que trop confirmé depuis le renouvellement des 
sciences et des arts. Nous avons des physiciens, des géomètres, des chimistes, des 
astronomes, des poètes, des musiciens, des peintres; nous n'avons plus de citoyens; ou 
s'il nous en reste encore, dispersés dans nos campagnes abandonnées, ils y périssent 
indigents et méprisés. (Rousseau, Premiers discours, p. 26) 
Reading Rousseau’s critique, one thinks of all those intellectuals who, flattering themselves as 
elites, revile and denigrate all those supposedly ‘backward’, ‘fly-over state’ ‘hicks’ and ‘trailer 
trash’ who, having nothing left but God and country, are cruelly mocked for the paltry shreds of 
hope to which they cling.335 The joke however is on this inflated clique, which brings us to the 
third point. For, yes, they care only about distinguishing themselves, and will thus utter the 
greatest absurdities: “Celui-ci avance qu'il n'y a ni vertus ni vices, et que le bien et le mal moral 
sont des chimères. Celui-là, que les hommes sont des loups et peuvent se dévorer en sûreté de 
conscience.” [This one claims that there are neither virtues not vices, and that moral good and 
evil are chimeras. That one, that men are wolves and can devour themselves in good conscience.] 
(Ibid., p. 27) However, given that they seek to distinguish themselves only to win riches or favor, 
 
335 As Rousseau argues in the Préface de Narcisse, the philosophe’s “amour-propre” is inflated at a direct inversion 
proportion to his mocking hatred of the common man: “Bientôt il réunit en sa personne tout l’intérêt que les 
hommes vertueux partagent avec leurs semblables : son mépris pour les autres tourne au profit de son orgueil ; son 
amour-propre augmente en même proportion que son indifférence pour le reste de l’univers. La famille, la patrie 
deviennent pour lui des mots vides de sens : il n’est ni parent, ni citoyen, ni homme ; il est Philosophe.” (Rousseau, 
Préface à Narcisse, p. 966) 
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what they utter is never distinct or unique, but always determined by convention. Newton and 
Descartes had something new to say, and both distanced themselves from the academies. 
Fourthly, such ‘talented’ persons are rarely independently wealthy, and must therefore 
rely on patrons who either seek power, or have already come to the conclusions that they wish 
their ‘experts’ merely to affirm. To recall, it was not Bacon’s noble King Solomon from the New 
Atlantis who founded the first academies in France, but an absolute monarchist who exhausted 
the kingdom’s resources bringing war to its neighbors. Neither does one discover those selfless 
herculean laborers from the caves of Bensalem in these first academies, but rather philosophes 
and popularizers like Fontenelle. As Rousseau asserts in his Observations or Réponse au Roy de 
Pologne, the notion of a paid philosopher presents a serious problem: 
Dans aucun tems les richesses n’ont été l’appanage des Sçavans. C’est en cela même que 
le mal est plus grand, les riches et les sçavans ne servant qu’à se corrompre 
mutuellement. Si les riches étoient plus sçavans, ou que les sçavans fussent plus riches; 
les uns seroient de moins lâches flatteurs; les autres aimeroient moins la basse flatterie, 
et tous en vaudroient mieux.336 
We observe how easily a tyrant might establish himself in a nation organized by such ‘talented’ 
persons, whom our contemporary word “expert” describes well. For they are paid by the rich and 
powerful to come to their conclusions, alienate the common man, disdain national loyalties, 
 
336 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Observations de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, de Genève: Sur la Réponse qui a été faite à 
son Discours, in Œuvres complètes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, vol. 3, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 50. 
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beliefs and virtues, and are willing to say anything to distinguish themselves, i.e., gain acceptance 
among their peers. 
 Fifth and finally, a nation that venerates the so-called ‘talented’ above all its members 
risks destabilizing those egalitarian institutions on which freedom depends. To be sure, virtue is 
not a perfectly egalitarian institution, as some are by nature more robust and therefore require 
fewer devices to conceal their flaws, as it were—Rousseau also makes this point in the Rêveries 
where he claims that he only ever lied, or told “fictions”, to conceal a certain natural weakness 
and timidity.337 That said, even the poorest man, a soldier like Fabricius, might prove himself an 
exemplar of Roman virtue. One does not require wealth, a beautiful voice, a dexterous hand, or 
great intelligence to be honest, temperate or just. Thus Rousseau writes:  
D'où naissent tous ces abus, si ce n'est de l'inégalité funeste introduite entre les hommes 
par la distinction des talents et par l'avilissement des vertus? Voilà l'effet le plus évident 
de toutes nos études, et la plus dangereuse de toutes leurs conséquences. On ne 
demande plus d'un homme s'il a de la probité, mais s'il a des talents; ni d'un livre s'il est 
utile, mais s'il est bien écrit. Les récompenses sont prodiguées au bel esprit, et la vertu 
reste sans honneurs. (Rousseau, Premiers discours, p. 25) 
 
337 See Rousseau, Rêveries, p. 1039: “Cette devise mʼobligeoit plus que tout autre homme à une profession plus 
étroite de la vérité, et il ne suffisoit pas que je lui sacrifiasse par-tout mon intérêt & mes penchans, il falloit lui 
sacrifier aussi ma foiblesse, et mon naturel timide.” 
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Virtue, Rousseau concludes the first Discours, is the “sublime science of simple souls” [science 
sublime des âmes simples] whose principles are “engraved upon every heart” [gravés dans tous 
les cœurs] and avalable for all to practice. (Ibid., p. 30) 
XI. iv. The Critical Reception of the Premier discours 
When the Académie de Dijon awarded Rousseau first place for his Premier discours, he 
received both praise from figures like the King of Poland, but also sharp criticism those like M. 
Lecat. In a series of subsequently published letters in which he responds to them, as well as in his 
Préface à Narcisse, Rousseau both clarifies his position in the Premier discours and reveals some 
of his influences. In the Lettre à Grimm for instance, he writes that “Herodotus, Justinus, Quintus 
Cursus [and] Tacitus” all demonstrated that simple peoples might be modest without clothing, 
and eat raw meat without being viscous.338 And in the Lettre à Lecat, it becomes clear that many 
of his criticisms in the Premier discours were also leveled at the scholastic and mystic thinkers: 
“Les Peuples avoient perdu le sens commun, non parce qu’ils étoient ignorans, mais parce qu’ils 
avoient la bêtise de croie sçavoir quelque chose, avec les mots d’Aristote et l’impertinente 
doctrine de Raymond Lulle." [The people had lost common sense, not because they were 
ignorant, but because they had the stupidity to believe something with the words of Aristotle 
and the impertinent doctrine of Raymond Llull.]339 That being said, Rousseau insists in these 
responses that he his criticizing the arts and sciences in general. Yes, he concedes in the opening 
 
338 « Le moyen qu’on ne puisse jamais supposer de la pudeur à des gens qui vont tout nus, et de la vertu à ceux qui 
mangent de la chair cruë ?Il faudra donc disputer. Voilà donc Hérodote, Justin, Quinte-Curce, Tacite […]. » (Rousseau, 
Lettre à Grimm, p. 61) 
339 Rousseau, Lettre à M. Lecat, in in Œuvres complètes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, vol. 3, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and 
Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), pp. 101 – 102. 
Jackanich 232 
 
passages of his Dernière réponse à M. Bordes that the “mechanical arts” are “useful” (Rousseau, 
Dernière réponse à Bordes, p. 72), but he later affirms that “Everything is a source of evil beyond 
physical necessity” [Tout est source de mal au-delà du nécessaire faire physique. La nature ne 
nous donne que trop de besoins ; et c’est au moins une très-haute imprudence de les multiplier 
sans nécessité] (p. 95). Incidentally, one is reminded here of Vico’s account of the decline of 
nations, which seek to satisfy physical necessities in their first stage, to produce what is useful in 
their second stage, and to satisfy their pleasures in their final stage, where, adopting the 
mentality of the slave, they prepare to be physically enslaved by another nation.  
 If Rousseau’s responses to the critical reception of his Discours merit our attention, then 
it’s because he further fleshes out his cyclical view of history there. That is, while he affirms that 
virtue is rooted in physical necessity in his letter to M. Bordes, he also explains in both his letter 
to the King of Poland (i.e., his Observations) and in the Préface à Narcisse that one cannot hope 
to repair the morality of a civilization once it is corrupted, and again make physical necessity its 
main impetus:  
Arrêtons-nous un instant sur cette dernière conséquence, et gardons-nous d’en conclure 
qu’il faille aujourd’hui brûler toutes les Bibliothèques et détruire les Universités et les 
Académies. […] on n’a jamais vu de peuple une fois corrompu, revenir à la vertu. En vain 
vous prétendriez détruire les sources du mal ; […] leurs cœurs une fois gâtés le seront 
toûjours ; il n’y a plus de remède, à moins de quelque grande révolution presque aussi à 
craindre que le mal qu’elle pourroit guérir, et qu’il est blâmable de désirer et impossible 
de prévoir. (Rousseau, Observations, pp. 55 – 56) 
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While our present age seems to have forgotten this, “revolution” is not a progressivist concept 
but instead one founded on the cyclical view of history, which Rousseau opposes to the former. 
But as Rousseau also maintains, it is “reprehensible to desire and impossible to predict” such a 
revolution: reprehensible because it would both be violent and utterly confound all those who 
have consecrated their lives to pleasure; and impossible to predict because Rousseau does not 
consider history a science in the same way as, say, Hegel and Marx. 
 Moreover, while Rousseau regards the arts and sciences as corrupting, he also believes 
that they’re the last form of virtue that exists in Modernity, even if they are but a thin “varnish” 
[vernis] (Rousseau, Préface à Narcisse, p. 972) covering our vicious hearts. Rousseau compares 
the taste for the arts and sciences to medicine, and more precisely, the very ignorant medicine 
of his day. He explains that once a man acquires the habit of seeking remedies, that even if they 
are useless, his system nonetheless becomes dependent upon them, and would even collapse if 
they were denied.340 To be sure, Seneca invokes the same medical analogy in his own Letters to 
criticize the multiplication of philosophical docti. Thus, Rousseau does believe that the sciences 
and arts are useful in a sense—perhaps in the same way that it useful to slowly wean the addict 
off, rather than forcing him to go cold turkey, as it were. Civilizations must be allowed to slowly 
degenerate, with each generation feeling the effects of pleasure-seeking and vice slightly more, 
 
340 “Mais quand un peuple est une fois corrompu à un certain point, soit que les sciences y aient contribué ou non, 
faut-il les bannir on l’en préserver, pour le rendre meilleur, ou pour l’empêcher de devenir pire ? C’est une autre 
question dans laquelle je me suis positivement déclaré pour la négative. Car premièrement, puisqu’un peuple vicieux 
ne revient jamais à la vertu, il ne s’agit pas de rendre bons ceux qui ne le sont plus, mais de conserver tels ceux qui 
ont le bonheur de l’être. En second lieu, les mêmes causes qui ont corrompu les peuples, servent quelquefois à 
prévenir une plus grande corruption ; c’est ainsi que celui qui s’est gâté le tempérament par un usage indiscret de la 
médecine, est forcé de recourir encore aux médecins pour se conserver en vie ; et c’est ainsi que les arts et les 
sciences, après avoir fait éclore les vices, sont nécessaires pour les empêcher de se tourner en crimes ; elles les 
couvrent au moins d’un vernis qui ne permet pas au poison de s’exhaler aussi librement.” (Rousseau, Préface à 
Narcisse, p. 972) 
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so that it can begin raising honest and courageous men again. One does not place a house cat in 
the wild, maybe a barn cat though. Of course, Rousseau does think that the philosopher might 
still furnish us with something other than the varnish of virtue, as it were. But it is a rare type of 
man who might do this, one who possesses both the intelligence of the scientist and the virtue 
of the hero: 
Car vrais Sçavans sont en petit nombre, je l’avoue ; car pour bien user de la Science, il faut 
réunir de grands talens et de grandes Vertus ; or, c’est qu’on peut à peine espérer de 
quelques ames privilégiées, mais qu’on ne doit point attendre de tout un peuple. 











Chapter XII: The Critical Methodology of the Premiers discours: Unmasking  
XII. i. The Origins of Unmasking: Christianity and Modernity 
 The Premier discours is not a critique of the sciences and arts as such, but rather of their 
institutionalization. Positive education re-socializes the youth, replacing what has been learned 
in the natural course of life with artificial mores, products of one institution or another that can 
be easily turned on and off by their managers. Cato the Younger, Rousseau reminds us, learned 
justice as a young boy by watching an innocent suffer.341 Abstract education, at the same time, 
removes any occasion for virtue, decoupling it from action, so that people might become active 
only when directed. Cato saved the innocent himself, but in our times, he would have tattled on 
the boy’s tormentors, waiting for the institution to serve justice—hence why there are no more 
Catos. If Rousseau’s critique is prophetic, as de Jouvenel believes, then it’s because he unmasks 
the philosophes as a new class of bureaucratic managers, whose praise of the arts and sciences 
conceals their libido dominandi, or their desire to control such educational institutions. Hence, 
the philosophe appears the forerunner of the so-called expert, who popularizes science so that 
he might advance his political agenda in its name; he is the nascent intellectual who abominates 
the common man for his prejudices, and then imposes a thousand others on the genius foolish 
enough to partake in this travestied pursuit of the truth. What makes Jean-Jacques’ critique so 
 
341 See Plutarch, The Life of Cato the Younger, in Parallel Lives, vol. 8, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Cambridge: Loeb 
Classics, 1919), p. 241 – 243: “At another time a relation of his who was celebrating a birthday, invited Cato and 
other boys to supper, and the company were diverting themselves at play in a separate part of the house, older and 
younger together, their play being actions at law, accusations, and the conducting of the condemned persons to 
prison.  Accordingly, one of those thus condemned, a boy of comely looks, was led off by an older boy and shut into 
a chamber, where he called upon Cato for help. Then Cato, when he understood what was going on, quickly came 
to the door, pushed aside the boys who stood before it and tried to stop him, led forth the prisoner, and went off 
home with him in a passion, followed by other boys also.” 
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penetrating, I argue, is the unmasking style that he adopts in the Premier discours, which not only 
constitutes a novel form of critique, but one that shall come to characterize his entire oeuvre.  
  Unmasking is typically thought to be a product of modernity, a part of “the distinctively 
modern moral scheme” as Alasdair MacIntyre calls it in After Virtue.342 According to MacIntyre, 
this scheme is trifold, not only comprising “unmasking” but also the concepts of “protest” and 
“rights”. (Ibid.) Each of these, he argues, centers around the idea of a pre-social individual, who 
is able to reflect on the mores and customs of his civilization by abstracting himself from them, 
as the Cartesian or modern subject no doubt does. Where there is no such pre-social individual, 
one’s mores and customs cannot appear to be a mask, but rather only as an integral part of the 
self. As MacIntyre points out, such was the case in ancient and particularly heroic civilizations: 
What Finley says of Homeric society is equally true of other forms of heroic society in 
Iceland or in Ireland. Every individual has a given role and status within a well-defined and 
highly determinate system of roles and statuses. The key structures are those of kinship 
and of the household. In such a society a man knows who he is by knowing his role in 
these structures; and in knowing this he knows also what he owes and what is owed to 
him by the occupant of every other role and status. (MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 122) 
This point can be understood by highlighting the fact that epic heroes like Ulysses and Beowulf 
never question the moral system within which they operate, as opposed to our modern heroes, 
 
342 See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, p. 68: “Once we have understood this it is possible 
to understand also the key place that three other concepts have in the distinctively modern moral scheme, that of 
rights, that of protest, and that of unmasking.” 
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who are riddled with inner conflicts. Hence, there is no occasion for supposing that the former 
are hiding their true beliefs behind the mask of custom. The epic hero is one with his social role 
as warrior, king, etc., and this symmetry explains why the mask is not considered vicious in such 
civilizations. Indeed, let us not forget that Ulysses, the exemplar of virtue in Homer’s epics, won 
the Trojan war by disguising himself as an honorary present, saved his men from the cyclops by 
disguising them as sheep, and restored order to his household by disguising himself as a beggar. 
Cleverness, hence deception, might even be regarded as Ulysses defining virtue. 
 There are additional reasons that unmasking does not figure into heroic civilizations. As 
mentioned above, virtue (or aretê) was for Homer synonymous with excellence.343 And even for 
Aristotle, the man who had good intentions but failed to achieve success might be regarded as 
vicious. Yes, the ancients considered a man’s motives, but his virtue ultimately depended on his 
actions. What might be discovered by looking past one’s actions, or treating them as a veil, was 
therefore of relatively little importance. The emergence of unmasking would first require virtue 
to be decoupled from action, which occurs long before the modern era. Rather, it is the spirit of 
Christianity that first decouples the two. “Blessed are the meek”, Christ utters in his sermon on 
the mount, “for they shall inherit the earth.”344 According to the Christian religion, a man might 
be meek, impoverished and thoroughly unsuccessful in life, but owing to the purity of his heart, 
considered virtuous above all others. Christianity thus trains one’s judgement on the intentions 
of others, as opposed to their actions or any worldly glory they might reap from them. As Christ 
also preaches in his sermon on the mount, “Take heed that ye do not do your alms before men, 
 
343 See chapter X. i. 
344 See Matthew 5:5 in The Bible: Authorized King James Version (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 7. 
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to be seen of them; otherwise ye have no reward of your Father which is in heaven.”345 Worldly 
glory belongs to the City of Man, not that of God. Aristotle regarded meekness and humbleness 
as vices, but it is precisely these Christian virtues that compel humanity to look past Roman law 
and custom, and instead examine the soul.346 Man ceases to be one with his social role, thereby 
transforming it into a mask: “Then saith he unto them. Render therefore unto Caesar the things 
which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that God’s.”347 Outwardly one conforms to secular 
law, but this reveals nothing about one’s innermost beliefs. 
Christianity provides the template for the modern individual, who is neither reducible to 
his natural abilities nor his social role.348 Perhaps the relationship between the two is borne out 
best in the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel, whose conception of Christian reconciliation is mirrored 
in his theory of recognition. As Hegel writes in his Early Theological Writings, the Christian must 
refrain from avenging himself in order to reconcile his “heart” with his offender, and participate 
together in the divine.349 Similarly, he argues in Philosophy of Mind that liberalism signifies the 
 
345 Matthew 6:1 (King James Bible, p. 8) 
346 See MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 184: “The New Testament's account of the virtues, even if it differs as much as it 
does in content from Aristotle's - Aristotle would certainly not have admired Jesus Christ and he would have been 
horrified by St Paul-does have the same logical and conceptual structure as Aristotle's account. A virtue is, as with 
Aristotle, a quality the exercise of which leads to the achievement of the human telos.” 
347 Matthew 22:21 (King James Bible, p. 32) 
348 For more on the relationship between Christianity and modern individualism, see Larry Siedentop, Inventing the 
Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), p. 61: “‘Dying in Christ’ 
means acquiring a will properly so called. It is liberation or, as Paul often calls it, the beginning of a ‘new creation’. 
And the act of faith required is an individual act, an internal event. Paul overturns the assumption of natural 
inequality by creating an inner link between the divine will and human agency. He conceives the idea that the two 
can, at least potentially, be fused within each person, thereby justifying the assumption of the moral equality of 
humans. That fusion is what Christ offers to mankind. It is what Paul means when he speaks of humans becoming 
‘one in Christ’. That fusion marks the birth of a ‘truly’ individual will, through the creation of conscience.”  
349 See G. W. F. Hegel, On Christianity: Early Theological Writings, trans. T.M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1984), p. 237, on the message of the crucifixion: “In reconciliation with one who hurts us, the 
heart no longer stands on the right acquired in opposition to the offender. By giving up its right, as its hostile farce, 




triumph over the seemingly endless dialectic between the master and slave throughout history; 
that is, one race asserts itself as the master of another, grows weak through its dependence on 
them, and is then vanquished and enslaved by its former slave race.350 This cycle, he holds, can 
only be broken if the master and slave set aside all their hatreds and differences, and recognize 
one another as being fundamentally individuals who are equally desirous of freedom. Only then 
can they form a liberal society, where ‘rights’ are not the victor’s spoil, the heritage of one class 
or faction, but instead based upon the individual being of each person. At any rate, our primary 
objective here is not to demonstrate the extent to which Christianity motives the conception of 
the modern individual, but only to understand how “unmasking”, “rights” and “protest” all find 
themselves in his orbit. 
As MacIntyre reminds us, the ancients never spoke of ‘rights’.351 If a man possessed the 
privileges of land and freedom, then it was because his ancestors shed their blood conquering a 
territory and their sweat cultivating it. He was therefore the material result of their actions, and 
no argument was required to enjoy his privileges. For these were not the fruits of rights, which 
can always be disputed, but rather of duties successfully fulfilled. The ancients spoke of duties, 
 
field of life, has made friendly just so much life as was hostile to it, has reconciled the divine to itself; and the fate it 
had aroused against itself by its own deed has dissolved into the airs of the night.” 
350 See G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1894), p. 57, on the 
resolution of the master-slave dialectic: “Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in another 
self: each self as a free individuality has his own ‘absolute’ independence, yet in virtue of the negation of its 
immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other. Each is thus universal self-conscious and 
objective; each has a ‘real’ universality in the shape of reciprocity, so far as each knows itself recognized in the other 
freeman, and is aware of this in so far as it recognizes the other and knows him to be free.” 
351 See MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 69: “It would of course be a little odd that there should be such rights attaching to 
human beings simply qua human beings in light of the fact, which I alluded to in my discussion of Gewirth's argument, 
that there is no expression in any ancient or medieval language correctly translated by our expression 'a right' until 
near the close of the middle ages: the concept lacks any means of expression in Hebrew, Greek, Latin or Arabic, 




not rights. One was a free Athenian, Germanic, etc., but never a mere individual who possessed 
the right to enjoy privileges simply in virtue of existing. Thus, in the ancient world, there was no 
occasion for the slave to unmask his master as a mere individual, and say for instance: “you see 
we are both the same, and therefore deserve equal privileges”. Unmasking and the demand for 
rights (i.e., protest) only become prominent in the modern era, where the natural law theories 
of philosophers like Hobbes, Locke and even Rousseau begin to gain traction. For, by supposing 
the existence a pre-social individual in the state of nature, a man who is not the product of the 
victories and loses of one tribe or another, they create a new standard. It is no coincidence that 
protesters often demand a revolution, in other words, a full cyclical return to this original state 
of humanity. 
To summarize, unmasking becomes possible where: (1) humans are divorced from their 
social roles (e.g., freeman vs. slave, woman vs. man, Greek vs. Barbarian, etc.) and conceived of 
as individuals as such; and (2) virtue no longer signifies excellence, and is thereby divorced from 
successful action. These divorces create distance between humans and the world around them. 
The ontological significance of the individual waxes, while that of his natural abilities and social 
roles wanes, until the latter ultimately appear as no more than masks. Because Christianity and 
Modernity both contribute to the conception of the pre-social individual, they can be regarded 
as necessary conditions for the emergence of unmasking. The Christian tears away the masks of 
race, sex and secular law, revealing the pre-social soul: “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is 
neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus.” 
(Galatians 3:28) The Modern lifts the Courtesan’s mask to reveal the pre-social individual, a 
naturel self who has failed to exercise his rights and freedoms. However, as we shall see there 
Jackanich 241 
 
are other conditions that prevent Christian and Modern authors alike from pursuing the 
unmasking method without reservation, as Rousseau will.  
XII. ii. Unmasking the Christian: Hypocrisy in Molière’s Tartuffe, ou l’imposteur 
MacIntyre regards unmasking as a part of “the distinctively modern moral scheme”, and 
as such, does not consider Christianity as a condition for its development. I believe this to be an 
oversight however. For not only does Christianity seem to provide a template for the pre-social 
individual, as we see above. It also serves as one of the contexts in which the unmasking style is 
first articulated, Molière’s Tartuffe, ou l’imposteur (1664). 352 Hoping to expose the hypocrisy of 
Tartuffe, Elmire tells her husband, “Je vais par des douceurs, puisque j’y suis réduite, faire poser 
le masque à cette âme hypocrite.” [I will by kindnesses, because I’m obliged, place the mask upon 
this hypocritical soul.] (Ibid., p. 97) To unmask means to expose the hypocrite, who merely 
creates the appearance of virtue. “Démêlez la vertu d’avec ses apparences” [Distinguish virtue 
from its appearances] (Ibid., p. 109) is the advice that Cléante gives to his family. Tartuffe hides 
“a soul subjugated to interest” [une âme à l’intérêt soumise] (Ibid., p. 34) behind the mask of 
“saintly fervor” [sainte ferveur] (Ibid.), which in the end proves itself no more than a “venal and 
mercantile devotion” [dévotion métier et marchandise] (Ibid.). On the path to Heaven he pursues 
his fortune.353 Thus, it is Christianity that provides an occasion for Tartuffe’s abuses. But this is 
no coincidence, as Christianity places virtue beyond the pale of action, requiring one to judge 
others on the bases of their intentions, which can more easily be dissimulated and masked. 
 
352 Jean-Baptiste Poquelin Molière, Tartuffe, ou l’imposteur (Paris: E. Flammarion, 1894) 
353 Molière, Tartuffe, ou l’imposteur, p. 34: “Par le chemin du Ciel courir à leur fortune […].” 
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This helps to explain William Barclay’s observation that “In the New Testament, there is 
no sin more strongly condemned than hypocrisy”. 354  For hypocrisy is the sin that threatens the 
moral framework of Christianity the most. The word hypocrisy derives from the classical Greek 
ὑπόκρισις [hupokrisis]. But as Barclay explains, hupokrisis does not signify a vicious or immoral 
act among the ancient Greeks: 
The curious thing is that in classical Greek these words [hupokrisis and hupokrites] have 
no ill favour and no bad meaning whatsoever […]. In classical Greek the basic meaning of 
hupokrites is ‘one who answers’. The verb hupokrinesthai is the standard for ‘to answer’. 
[…] An orator, Demosthenes can be called by one of the critics an exceptional and many-
talents hupokrites. (Barclay, New Testament Words, p. 140 - 141)  
Hupokrisis might also be translated as ‘delivery’, referring to the way in which the statesman or 
poet delivers his lines. Thus, when Demosthenes was asked what the most important aspect of 
oratory is, he famously responded “hupokrisis, hupokrisis, hupokrisis”.355 Neither does Aristotle 
regard hupokrisis negatively in his Rhetoric. Yes, unlike his “writing style”, it is not suited for the 
pursuit of the truth, but this in no way implies that hupokrisis is deceptive or vicious; rather, he 
maintains, it should simply be reserved for prose and poetry, for which his “writing style” is not 
suited.356 At worst, hupokrisis is an oratory style from which more straightforward men abstain, 
 
354 See William Barclay, New Testament Words (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 1974), p. 140.  
355 See Plutarch, Lives of the Ten Orators, in Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 10, trans. Harold N. Fowler (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1960), p. 418, 845b. 
356 See Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civil Discourse, trans. George A. Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), p. 227, III. xii. 2. 1413b: “Written style is most exact; the agonistic style is very much a matter of delivery. Of 
the latter there are two species; for one form is ethical, the other emotional. Thus, actors are on the lookout for 




as in the case of Hyperides.357 Thus, it never approaches the level of vice of the ancient Greeks, 
whose moral framework is significantly different from the Hebrew and Christian ones. 
Indeed, as Barclay indicates, one of the first texts in which hupokrisis takes on a negative 
moral sense is the Septuagint, or the 3rd century (BC) Greek translation of the Old Testament.358 
Hupokrisis does not however acquire its modern meaning from there, where it is more akin to 
something like “law-breaker”.359 In Barclay’s reading, the modern meaning of hypocrisy appears 
to come from the New Testament, and particularly the passages from Matthew that I have cited 
in the previous section: 
The hupokrites is the man who goes in for play-acing goodness, for what has been called 
‘theatrical goodness’. He is the man who wants everyone to see him give alms (Matt. 6.2), 
to see him pray (Matt. 6.5), to know that he is fasting (Matt. 6.16). […] The true motives 
of the people who asked Jesus the question about paying tribute were not to get 
information and guidance but to entangle Jesus in his words. They are hupokritai (Mark 
12.15; Matt. 22.18). […] The hupokrites is the man who hides an evil heart under a cloak 
 
much liked, for example, Chaeremon (for he is as precise as a professional prose writer [logographos]), and Licymnius 
among the dithyrambic poets. On comparison, some written works seem thin in debates, while some speeches of 
[successful] orators seem amateurish when examined in written form. The cause is that [their style] suits debate. 
Thus, things that are intended for delivery, when delivery is absent, seem simple minded, since they are not fulfilling 
their purpose […].” 
357 See Plutarch, Lives of the Ten Orators, p. 445, 850a-b: “It is said that in addressing the public he did not employ 
the actor's art [ἄνευ ὑποκρίσεως], that he merely related the facts of the case and did not bore the jurors even with 
these.” For a further discussion of this topic, see Mike Edwards, “Hypokritēs in Action: Delivery in Greek Rhetoric”, 
in Profession and Performance: Aspects of Oratory in the Greco-Roman World (London: University of London Press, 
2013), p. 17. 
358 See Barclay, New Testament Words, p. 142 
359 “In Job 20.5 Aquila [who made revisions to the Septuagint in the 2nd century BC] has hupokrites and the Septuagint 
has paranomos, which means ‘transgressor’, a ‘law-breaker’. In Isa. 32.6 Aquila has hupokrisis, and the Septuagint 
has anoma, which means ‘lawless things’.” (Ibid.) 
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of piety. The Pharisees were like that (Matt. 23.28). In the end, hupokrites is under 
condemnation of God (Matt. 24.51). (Barclay, New Testament Words, p. 142) 
Tartuffe therefore appears guilty of a quintessentially Christian sin. His cupidity and adulterous 
gaze, vices that are hardly particular to Christianity, pale in comparison to the hypocritical mask 
of righteousness that makes all his other sins possible. By contrast, for classical playwrights like 
Sophocles and Aristophanes, hypocrisy never seems to fundamentally menace the moral order. 
True, Aristophanes’ Assemblywomen mask themselves as men to subvert the government and 
impose communism, but female nature is ultimately the culprit, not the mask.360 The Ancients 
conceived of femininity as being deceptive, with not only Aristophanes expressing this view, 361 
but many others like Xenophon362 and the Roman fabulist Phaedrus.363 In this way, the classical 
 
360 See Aristophanes, The Assemblywomen, in Aristophanes: Frogs, Assemblywomen, Wealth, vol. 4, trans. Jeffrey 
Henderson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 238. As Henderson writes in the “Introduction” to the 
piece, “[…] in Assemblywomen allusions to the political status quo are few, and serve mainly to motivate its abolition 
in favor of a radically new system, a communal utopia under female governance. As in Lysistrata a heroine, Praxagora 
(“Woman Effective in Public”), leads her fellow Athenian women in a plot to save Athens from male misgovernance: 
the women disguise themselves as men, pack the Assembly, vote to transfer power to themselves […].” 
361 In Aristophanes’ play The Women at Thesmophoria, for instance, the women decide to kill Euripides for calling 
them “adultery-addicts”, “wine-swillers”, “betrayers”, etc., rather than correcting their behavior, so that they can 
continue deceiving the state and their husbands. See Aristophanes, The Women at Thesmophoria, trans. Stephen 
Halliwell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 117 – 118; 398 – 431 : “We can no longer do all the things that 
we used to do. / He’s made it impossible—such are the terrible views, / That he’s taught our husbands to hold […] 
/ His downfall has got to be plotted, one way or another, / Whether using poison or some other method instead. / 
We’ve got to destroy him!” 
362 See Xenophon, Oeconomicus, trans. E. C. Marchant (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 447 – 448, 
10.2-11, where Ischomachus explains to his wife the male equivalent of wearing makeup: “Thereupon Ischomachus 
took up his parable. ‘Well, one day, Socrates, I noticed that her face was made up: she had rubbed in white lead in 
order to look even whiter than she is, and alkanet juice to heighten the rosy colour of her cheeks; and she was 
wearing boots with thick soles to increase her height. So I said to her, ‘Tell me, my dear, how should I appear more 
worthy of your love as a partner in our goods, by disclosing to you our belongings just as they are, without boasting 
of imaginary possessions or concealing any part of what we have, or by trying to trick you with an exaggerated 
account, showing you bad money and gilt necklaces and describing clothes that will fade as real purple?’”   
363 See for instance Phaedrus’ fable of “The Young Man and the Courtesan” in The Comedies of Terrence and the 
Fables of Phaedrus, trans. Henry Thomas Riley (London: George Bell & Sons, 1887), IV. xxviii., p. 451: “While a 
perfidious Courtesan was fawning upon a Youth, and he, though wronged by her many a time and oft, still showed 




concept of femininity seems to approximate the modern notion of hypocrisy the most. There is 
however a major differences between the two, since female deceptions are only vicious insofar 
as they conceal la faiblesse feminine (e.g., the female proclivity for communist government over 
more competitive forms of rule, as expressed in the Assemblywomen). By contrast, women who 
mask themselves as men in the pursuit of manly virtues are frequently rewarded in the ancient 
world. In Ovid’s Metamorphoses for example, Ligdus resolves to kill any daughter that his wife 
Telethusa births, as he cannot afford a dowry.364 Giving birth to a girl, Telethusa is visited by the 
goddess Isis, who advises her to raise the girl as a boy. The child is named Iphis, and on the eve 
of her marriage, is rewarded by the goddess and transformed into a man. “Now as she walked 
the girl stepped into manhood.” (Ovid, Metamorphoses, p. 265) 
 By contrast, it is Tartuffe’s hypocrisy as such that offends Cléante the most, and serves as 
the object of the play. Cléante appreciates however that there are limits to unmasking—which 
distinguishes Molière from Jean-Jacques, who pursues unmasking much further as we shall see. 
Tartuffe must be unmasked, but Cléante knows that self-righteous unmasking can itself become 
a mask. His exemplars of virtue are therefore more “humane” in their judgements, less inclined 
to “censor” others, and lead by way of their “actions” rather than by proselytizing:  
Mais les dévots de cœur sont aisés à connoître.  / Notre siècle, mon frère, en expose à 
nos yeux / Qui peuvent nous servir d'exemples glorieux : / Regardez Ariston, regardez 
Périandre, / Oronte, Alcidamas, Polydore, Clitandre ; / Ce titre par aucun ne leur est 
 
gifts, still do I esteem you the most.” The Youth, recollecting how many times he had been deceived, replied: ‘Gladly, 
my love, do I hear these words; not because you are constant, but because you administer to my pleasures.’” 
364 See Ovid, The Metamorphoses, trans. Horace Gregory (New York: Viking Press, 1958), p. 261 – 266. 
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débattu ; / Ce ne sont point du tout fanfarons de vertu ; / On ne voit point en eux ce faste 
insupportable, / Et leur dévotion est humaine, est traitable ; / Ils ne censurent point toutes 
nos actions : / Ils trouvent trop d'orgueil dans ces corrections ; / Et laissant la fierté des 
paroles aux autres, / C'est par leurs actions qu'ils reprennent les nôtres. (Molière, 
Tartuffe, p. 35) 
In short, the exemplar of Christian virtue must be willing to unmask a brazen hypocrite such as 
Tartuffe, but must be willing to accept the imperfections of the common man, lest he be sucked 
into a purity spiral. Interestingly. Cléante prescribes moderation here by recoupling virtue with 
“action”, which deprives the hypocrite of his greatest weapon: language. Moderation, Molière 
understands, is the remedy for Christianity’s greatest sin. In Molière’s comedy, Le Misanthrope, 
Philinte expresses the same sentiment to his friend Alceste, whom he accuses of expecting too 
much from men: “And be charitable to human nature; Do not scrutinize it with great austerity, 
And regard its faults with some tenderness.”365 Rousseau, one must not forget, took the side of 
Alceste in his Lettre à d’Alembert, dismissing Philinte as a “phlegmatic reasoner” whose hollow 
musings on the nature of man are calculated only to serve his own interests, to ease his mind 
and make polite conversation as he dines in luxury.366 
 
365 See Molière, Le Misanthrope, in Les Oeuvres de M. Molière, vol. 2 (The Hague: Pierre Husson, 1725), p. 186: “Et 
faisons un peu grâce à la nature humaine; Ne l'examinons point dans la grande rigueur, Et voyons ses défauts, avec 
quelque douceur.” 
366 See Rousseau, Lettre à d’Alembert, p. 36: “Philinte est le Sage de la Pièce; un de ces honnêtes gens du grand 
monde, dont les maximes ressemblent beaucoup à celles des fripons; de ces gens si doux, si modérés, qui trouvent 
toujours que tout va bien, parce qu'ils ont intérêt que rien n'aille mieux; qui sont toujours contents de tout le monde, 
parce qu'ils ne se soucient de personne; qui, autour d'une bonne table, soutiennent qu'il n'est pas vrai que le peuple 
ait faim; qui, le gousset bien garni, trouvent fort mauvais qu'on déclame en faveur des pauvres; qui, de leur maison 
bien fermée, verraient voler, piller, égorger, massacrer tout le genre-humain sans se plaindre: attendu que Dieu les 
à doués d'une douceur très-méritoire à supporter les malheurs d'autrui. On voit bien que le flegme raisonneur de 
celui-ci est très-propre à redoubler et faire sortir d'une manière comique les emportements de l'autre.” 
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XII. iii. Unmasking the Courtesan: “la masque de l’hypocrisie” in La Bruyère’s Caractères  
 For Molière, unmasking means exposing the hypocrite by “distinguishing virtue from its 
appearances”, a form of moralism that becomes possible in the Christian context, where virtue 
depends more on one’s motives than the success of one’s actions. However, Christianity is not 
the only institution that provides an occasion for unmasking in the 17th century. Equally ripe for 
unmasking are all those faineans, âmes universelles, and honnêtes gens of the French court and 
salon, that grand monde where the Epicurean quest for bons airs means never taking business 
and science seriously, nor saying anything that might choquer le jugement.367 Before Rousseau 
unmasked the philosophes in the Discours, la Bruyère unmasked would-be honnêtes hommes in 
Les Caractères (1687), lifting “le masque de l’hypocrisie [qui] cache la malignité” [the mask of 
hypocrisy that hides malignance.].368 La Bruyère’s mocking caricatures of their superficiality, 
effeminateness, conformity, vanity, politeness and pleasure-seeking bear such a resemblance to 
Rousseau’s own criticisms of the philosophes, that the former’s influence on the latter appears 
undeniable. Like Molière however, la Bruyère recognizes that there are limits to unmasking, and 
does not pursue the procedure to the extent that Rousseau does, as we shall see. 
  La Bruyère’s Caractères ou les Moeurs de ce siècle is a modern version of Theophrastus’ 
own Characters.369 A student of Aristotle, Theophrastus endeavors there to personify the vices 
identified in the Nicomachean Ethics, describing the typical comportment of, say, the flatterer, 
the coward, the backbiter, etc. Interestingly, Theophrastus personifies what might be translated 
 
367 See chapter IV for a study of the French courts and salons of the 17th century.  
368 Jean de la Bruyère, Les Caractères de la Bruyère, suivis des Caractères des Théophraste (Paris: Librairie d’Abel 
Ledoux, 1836), p. 233. 
369 Theophrastus, The Characters of Theophrastus, trans. J. M. Edmonds (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957). 
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as “dissembling”; however, he does not chose the Greek word ὑπόκρισις [hupokrisis] to explain 
this phenomenon, as one might suppose, but rather ειρωνεία [eironeia], which literally means 
“one who acts on the stage” and is the etymology of our word “irony”.370 Theophrastus defines 
dissembling as “an affection of the worse in word and deed” (Theophrastus, Characters, p. 41).  
The dissembler therefore feigns, exaggerates and downplays his emotions, which do not accord 
with his actions and words. Unlike the hypocrite, he is not hiding his true motives, but rather his 
emotions. He’s a dramatic. The difference between the Christian and pagan moral frameworks 
becomes particularly apparent when we examine La Bruyère’s translation of this classical work, 
which the Frenchman published with his own Caractères. La Bruyère does indeed translate the 
Greek eironeia as “dissimulation”, but he places a spurious phrase at the end of his translation of 
Theophrastus’ chapter on dissembling: “Ces manières d’agir ne partent point d’une âme simple 
et droite, mais d’une mauvaise volonté, ou d’un homme qui veut nuire ; le venin des aspics est 
moins à craindre.” (La Bruyère, Caractères, p. 388) The serpent’s “venom […] is to be feared less” 
than the dissembler, La Bruyère writes. Theophrastus makes no such reference to the serpent, 
the primeval deceiver of the Old Testament, nor does he ever speak of the dissembler with such 
enmity. This might be regarded as further proof that Christianity provides the moral framework 
in which the concept of hypocrisy gains traction, and thereby makes unmasking possible.371 La 
 
370 See Harold C. Knutson, “Three Characters in Search of a Vice: The Hypocrite in Theophrastus, Joseph Hall and La 
Bruyère”, in Dalhousie French Studies 27 (Summer 1994): 51 – 63: “With this background in place, we may now 
examine the first of our three Characters (Edmonds 41-43), the one that Theophrastus rather innocuously calls "the 
dissembler" (or "the dissimulator," "the insincere man," depending upon the translation). The Greek word rendered 
as "dissembler" is eiron, not hypokrites, as one might expect; the latter still carried in Classical times the relatively 
neutral meaning of ‘one who acts on the stage’”. (p. 55) 
371 It should be noted that La Bruyère did not produce the first modern version of Theophrastus’ Characters, but 
rather Joseph Hall, Bishop of Exeter. In his Characters of Virtue and Vice (1608), Hall also manifests a tendency to 
render eironeia through the lens of the Christian moral framework, and even translates the word as “hypocrisy”. See 
Joseph Hall, Characters of Virtue and Vice, in The Works of the Right Reverend Joseph Hall, vol. IV (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1863), p. 106. 
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Bruyère’s Caractères is, I believe, an attempt to see the grand monde of the court through the 
lens of this moral framework, and rather than exposing the sinner, hopes to unmask something 
secular: the vanity of self-proclaimed honnêtes hommes. In words that sound like Jean-Jacques’ 
own, La Bruyère affirms in the preface that “l’amour-propre est dans l’homme la cause tous ses 
faibles” [vanity is the cause of all man’s weaknesses] (Ibid., p.382).  
 La Bruyère further develops the concept of unmasking not only (1) by applying it within a 
secular context, but also (2) by creating a catalogue of masks. Molière only exposes one type of 
hypocrite, Tartuffe. Relying on Theophrastus’ Characters however, La Bruyère paints a portrait 
of every vice that hides behind the courtesan’s mask. And although the characters—Théodote, 
Narcisse, Isphis, etc.—that La Bruyère exposes are fictional, they often bore such a resemblance 
to specific courtesans that his readers were inspired to unmask their living models.372 Whether 
this is an indented consequence or not, it means that, in distinction from Molière, La Bruyère is 
also (3) encouraging the practice of unmasking. Let us then analyze some of the characters that 
this modern Theophrastus exposes. 
 In a chapter entitled “De la société et de la conversation”, La Bruyère unmasks the man 
without character and wit,373 who does everything to seem like a “homme universel”, boasting 
about all the places that he has visited, all the books that he has read, all the courtesans in Paris 
 
372 See Knutson, “Three Characters in Search of a Vice: The Hypocrite in Theophrastus, Joseph Hall and La Bruyère”, 
p. 58 - 59: “Thus French criticism invariably refers to La Bruyère's portraits, a practice all the more justified as the 
author often had real people in mind in his satirical images. A whole literature of clés followed in the wake of the 
book's success; while many of the attributions are conjectural, a number seem entirely convincing.” 
373 “Un caractère bien fade est celui de n'en avoir aucun.” (La Bruyère, Les Caractères, p. 77) 
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whom he knows, etc., but has nothing original or intelligent to say about these subjects. Such is 
the character Arrias, or superficiality manifest:   
Arrias a tout lu, a tout vu, il veut le persuader ainsi ; c’est un homme universel, et il se 
donne pour tel […]. Quelqu’un se hasarde de la contredire, et lui prouve nettement qu’il 
dit des choses qui ne sont pas vrais. Arrias ne se trouble point, prend feu au contraire 
contre l’interrupteur : ‘Je n’avance, lui dit-il, je [ne] raconte rien que je ne sache d’original: 
je l’ai appris de Sethon, ambassadeur de France dans cette cour […].” (Ibid., p. 79) 
Note the use of hyperbole here: “Arrias has read everything, has seen everything”. To unmask, 
certain features of the mask must first be highlighted. The character must be caricaturized. The 
danger of unmasking presents itself early on, for Arrias might respond by unmasking La Bruyère 
as an exaggerator; hence, the unmasker always risks being unmasked himself. Nevertheless, la 
Bruyère equally takes aim at the distinctions of class and material wealth of which a man might 
boast in order to appear universal or worldly: 
il ne vous coûtera bientôt pour le connaître que de l'avoir écouté : vous saurez son nom, 
sa demeure, son pays, l'état de son bien, son emploi, celui de son père, la famille dont est 
sa mère, sa parenté, ses alliances, les armes de sa maison ; vous comprendrez qu'il est 
noble, qu'il a un château, de beaux meubles, des valets, et un carrosse. (Ibid., p. 82) 
If any passage in this chapter influenced Rousseau however, then it was La Bruyère’s critique of 
la politesse: “La politesse n'inspire pas toujours la bonté, l'équité, la complaisance, la gratitude; 
elle en donne du moins les apparences, et fait paraître l'homme au dehors comme il devrait être 
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intérieurement.” [Politeness does not always inspire goodness, equity, complicity, gratitude; it 
gives at least the appearance of these, and makes man seem on the outside how he ought to be 
on the inside.] (Ibid., p. 86) Politeness masks what one “ought to be on the inside”, being the 
product of “imitation” and merely reflective of “time”, “place” and “people” (Ibid.). 
 That being said, la Bruyère does not roundly condemn politeness as Rousseau does. 
Rather, despite thinking that it is natural only in a few, he believes that it makes the talents and 
virtues of others agreeable to us: “Il y a des tempéraments qui ne sont susceptibles que de la 
politesse; et il y en a d'autres qui ne servent qu'aux grands talents, ou à une vertu solide. Il est 
vrai que les manières polies donnent cours au mérite, et le rendent agréable […].” [There are 
temperaments that are only susceptible to politeness; and there are others that are suited only 
to great talents, or to a hardy virtue. It’s true that polite manners find their expression in merit, 
and make it agreeable.] (Ibid., p. 86 - 87) Rousseau, to recall, considered politeness the enemy of 
virtue, and accused the so-called talented of using it to ridicule the common man’s virtue and 
conceal their own viciousness. The case is different with la Bruyère, who does not intend to 
altogether abandon the model of the honnête homme, but instead highlight and repair its 
corruption. For as he states in the chapter “Des jugements”: “L'honnêteté, les égards et la 
politesse des personnes avancées en âge de l'un et l'autre sexe me donnent bonne opinion de ce 
qu'on appelle le vieux temps.” [The honesty, the respect and the politeness of persons advanced 
in age of both sexes gives me a good opinion of what we call olden times.] (Ibid., p. 246) Previous 
generations of honnêtes hommes were more honest and polite in La Bruyère’s judgement. And 
if they wore “the veil of modesty”, then it did not prevent them from penetrating another’s 
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“heart”, for one should never expect to be able to judge others “at first glance” and with such 
ease. Returning to La Bruyère’s passage on the mask in “Des jugements”: 
Il ne faut pas juger des hommes comme d'un tableau ou d'une figure, sur une seule et 
première vue : il y a un intérieur et un cœur qu'il faut approfondir. Le voile de la modestie 
couvre le mérite, et le masque de l'hypocrisie cache la malignité. Il n'y a qu'un très petit 
nombre de connaisseurs qui discerne, et qui soit en droit de prononcer ; ce n'est que peu 
à peu, et forcés même par le temps et les occasions, que la vertu parfaite et le vice 
consommé viennent enfin à se déclarer. (Ibid., p. 233) 
While La Bruyère encourages us to unmask the hypocrite, he also encourages us to don the veil 
of modesty, for like Molière, he appreciates that self-righteous unmasking itself easily becomes 
a form of hypocrisy. The soul is not so easily plumbed, which is why “there are but a very small 
number of connoisseurs who should discern, and have the right to pronounce” their judgments. 
And though, like Rousseau, La Bruyère wishes to deflate “l’orgueil dont nous sommes gonflés” 
[the pride with which we are inflated] (Ibid., p. 225) and expose the human “heart”, it is not the 
unmasking style that he adopts, but another. 
 An admirer of the previous generation of honnêtes hommes, I believe that La Bruyère is 
nostalgic for the sprezzatura style, a term that Baldassare Castiglione famously coined in Il Libro 
del Cortegiano (1528).374 Sprezzatura might be translated as “nonchalance” or the “artless art”. 
Difficult to define, but easy to explain by example, sprezzatura is the man in a tailored Italian suit 
 




who has carelessly done his tie. He appears graceful, but without design and art. As Castiglione 
writes, sprezzatura is the first rule of grace: 
But having before now often considered whence this grace springs, laying aside those 
men who have it by nature, I find one universal rule concerning it […] and that is to avoid 
affection to the uttermost […] and, to use possibly a new word, to practice in everything 
a certain nonchalance that shall conceal design and show that what is done and said is 
done without effort and almost without thought. (Castiglione, Cortegiano, p. 35) 
La Bruyère seems to be harkening back to this style, for in his attempt to unmask the hypocrite 
without disturbing the veil of modesty, he refers us to the woman who displays a “grâce naïve” 
[naïve or artless grace] (Ibid., p. 235) and “ne perd rien à être négligée” [loses nothing by being 
negligent or nonchalant] (Ibid.). The sprezzatura style can be found throughout Les Caractères. 
For instance, in “De la mode”, La Bruyère writes that “le philosophe se laisse habiller par son 
tailleur : il y a autant de faiblesse à fuir la mode qu’a l’affecter” [the philosopher allows himself 
to be dressed by his tailor: there is as much weakness in fleeing fashion as there is in following 
it.] (Ibid., p. 267) In other words, the philosopher is fashionable, but does not try to be so. 
XII. iv. Unmasking the Philosophe: Rousseau’s Premier discours and Préface à Narcisse 
As we have already seen, Rousseau’s goal in the Premiers discours is to expose the libido 
sentiendi and dominandi that come packaged with the libido sciendi driving the reestablishment 
of the sciences and arts, or more simply, to expose the philosophes’ much vaunted progress as 
moral corruption and power-seeking. Again, it is not science and art as such that he is criticizing 
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here, but rather the effects of their institutionalization and popularization. Rousseau, however, 
does not content himself with excoriating Enlightenment progress. For he also takes aim at the 
beaux esprits popularizing it, stripping away their masks of culture and politeness, and exposing 
them as effeminate hypocrites who live in a world of appearances.375 La Bruyère simply desires 
to reform the honnête homme; Rousseau, on the other hand, dreams of Cato Sapiens smashing 
the persona underfoot. On the one hand, Rousseau adopts the unmasking method without the 
reservations of La Bruyère and Molière, insisting that even the veil of modesty must be torn to 
shreds along with Alexander the Great’s Persian robe. On the other, he is not merely interested 
in unmasking hypocritical philosophes, but also employs the method to unearth the cité cynique 
and recover the natural virtues “engraved” upon our hearts. In this sense, the Premier discours 
inspires the Deuxième. For in order to completely unmask man, one must return to the state of 
nature, and study man’s natural sentiments in their purest form. 
In the Premier discours, Rousseau characterizes “the Enlightenment” [les lumières] as a 
“uniform and perfidious veil of politeness” [voile uniforme et perfide de politesse] (Rousseau, 
Premier discours, p. 8) that conceals and gives free reign to man’s basest vices. To be sure, the 
philosophes frankly advocated for vices like luxury and idleness, believing them to be not only 
beneficial to society at large, but also to the goal of advancing knowledge. Therefore, when he 
refers to the Enlightenment as a veil, Rousseau is painting these goals as deceptive. In the first 
place, the doctrine of self-interest, which pits men and their “vain talents” (Ibid., p. 15) against 
 
375 “Dites-nous, célèbre Arouet, combien vous avez sacrifié de beautés mâles et fortes à notre fausse délicatesse, et 
combien l'esprit de la galanterie si fertile en petites choses vous en a coûté de grandes.” (Rousseau, Premiers 
discours, p. 21) 
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one another, fails to understand how quickly this meritocratic battle devolves into a battle “to 
distinguish” (Ibid., p. 19) oneself, whereby even the most talented are crushed by sycophants, 
flatters and those who will do anything to acquire the appearance of merit. Indeed, this critique 
closely parallels St. Augustine’s in the City of God, where he contends that the Romans initially 
conceived of their civic virtues to ensure that no tyrannical monarch would ever threaten their 
freedom again, but gradually came to practice them only to acquire social capital. From this it 
follows that the scientific institutions around which the philosophes hope to organize society will 
likewise become corrupted by those who are happy to betray the truth to win distinctions and 
honors. As we have discussed above, the intellectual achieves this by popularizing one scientific 
view or another, which in the eyes of the public is not merely a method of inquiry but rather an 
authority to be “trusted” and “believed”. As a result, any dissent from this view, no matter how 
rigorous, is regarded as “heretical” and “bigoted” in the eyes of the public, which is made to do 
the bidding of these popularizers. Again, Rousseau confirms Pascal’s view that self-interest and 
the truth cannot be reconciled. 
While there are notable differences between Rousseau’s critique and those of Augustine 
and Pascal, one might ask if Rousseau’s adds depth to their arguments, or simply points them at 
different targets. In addition to exposing the hypocrisy of Roman virtue, Augustine even uses the 
rhetoric of the mask in the City of God. In the following passage for instance, he implores us to 
cast off the false “coverings” [tegmen] and deceptive “whitewashes” [dealbationes] of pride and 
glory and to inspect ourselves “sincerely” [sincero]: “Fallacia igitur tegmina et deceptoriae 
dealbationes auferantur a rebus, ut sincero inspiciantur examine. Nemo mihi dicat: Magnus ille 
atque ille, quia cum illo et illo pugnavit et vicit." (Augustine, De Civitate Dei, 3, XIV, p. 114). The 
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difference between Rousseau and Augustine here can be ascribed to the greater demands that 
the Genevan makes on sincerity, which are a consequence of his belief in the natural goodness 
of man. The nature of these demands is only hinted at in the Premier discours, where Rousseau 
praises “rusticity” (Rousseau, Premier discours, p. 7) as the source of virtue, which he considers 
to be “engraved upon the heart” (Ibid., p. 30). This belief only becomes clear in the Deuxième, 
where Rousseau explicitly affirms humanity’s natural innocence. Yes, he affirms that humanity is 
like Glaucus irreparably corrupted. That being said, we still find ourselves one step closer to the 
possibility of human purity than in Augustine, whose doctrine of original sin precludes this 
possibility entirely. Rousseau’s narrative, by contrast, is like that of Plato’s Atlantis, which shall 
forever seduce men into the depths of the ocean. What I mean to say is this: Augustine, despite 
his language, does not subscribe to the doctrine of unmasking, for not only do his views about 
original sin, grace and the soul prevent him from doing so, but he also believes that only Christ 
can lift the veil. By contrast, Rousseau, despite his claim that man’s innocence is lost, will affirm 
the contrary throughout his life. In the Confessions for instance, he claims that when we betray 
others, it is not because we “have ceased to be just and good in the soul,” but owes instead to 
the “situations” and circumstances to which we passively submit.376 It is the pure heart that 
yearns to be unmasked,377 not the one tainted by original sin. 
 
376 See Rousseau, Les Confessions de J.-J. Rousseau, in Œuvres complètes, v. 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1959), p. 56: “J’en ai 
tiré cette grande maxime de morale, la seule peut-être d’usage dans la pratique, d’éviter les situations qui mettent 
nos devoirs en opposition avec nos intérêts, et qui nous montrent notre bien dans le mal d’autrui, sûr que, dans de 
telles situations, quelque sincère amour de la vertu qu’on y porte, on faiblit tôt ou tard sans s’en apercevoir, et l’on 
devient injuste et méchant dans le fait, sans avoir cessé d’être juste et bon dans l’âme.” 
377 As Peter Baehr argues, it is Rousseau’s belief in the purity and simplicity of the hear that inspires his unmasking 
method, and explains other thinkers were unwilling to adopt. Montaigne, for instance, despises the “dissembler” 




On the other hand, in the Confessions of St. Augustine, one encounters a thinker who 
believes that the soul is deeply flawed, and can only be saved by the “Grace” of the Lord.378 
Moreover, as Siedentop points out, Augustine cautions against any notion that God’s grace can 
fully heal or perfect the soul: “For Augustine, it was a fundamental mistake to suppose that the 
church could become a conspicuous society of ‘perfect’ Christians. Grace did not work like that. 
[…] No human institution could attain perfection” (Siedentop, Inventing the Individual, p. 108-
109). As a result, Augustine advises that even the “spiritual” person who possesses “knowledge 
of God” should refrain from passing judgement, and instead teach morality through his or her 
actions. Even “carnal men” are excused by this account, which teaches that even the wisest 
cannot be certain that the sinner has not taken grace into his or heart: 
Here all are equal in thy spiritual grace where, as far as sex is concerned, there is neither 
male nor female, just as there is neither Jew nor Greek, nor bond nor free. […] [E]ven 
though a man is now spiritual and renewed by the knowledge of God according to the 
image of him who created him, he must be a doer of the law rather than its judge. Neither 
does the spiritual man judge concerning that division between spiritual and carnal men 
which is known to thy eyes, O God, and which may not, as yet, be made manifest to us by 
their external works, so that we may know them by their fruits […]. (St. Augustine, 
 
la praesumption”) That being said, Montaigne also admits that all men wear many faces throughout their lifetime, 
not because they wish to deceive, but because the soul is complex: “Non seulement le vent des accidens me remue 
selon son inclination, mais en outre je me remue et trouble moy mesme par l'instabilité de ma posture; et qui y 
regarde primement, ne se trouve guere deux fois en mesme estat. Je donne à mon ame tantost un visage, tantost 
un autre, selon le costé où je la couche. Si je parle diversement de moy, c'est que je me regarde diversement. Toutes 
les contrarietez s'y trouvent selon quelque tour et en quelque façon." (Cf. “De l’inconsistance de nos actions.”) For 
Baehr’s discussion of Montaigne, cf. The Unmasking Style in Social Theory (New York: Routledge, 2019), p. 139 – 140. 
378 St. Augustine of Hippo, Confessions, trans. Albert C. Outler (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955), p. 113: “What 
shall “wretched man” do? “Who shall deliver him from the body of this death,” except thy grace through Jesus Christ 
our Lord […].”  
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Confessions, p. 207-208) 
For Augustine, the heart is veiled, not by man’s actions or institutions, but by God himself, who 
alone can lift it. This is affirmed in the City of God, where he cites St. Paul’s Second Letter to the 
Corinthians: “Nos vero omnes, revelata facie gloriam Domini speculantes, in eamdem imaginem 
transformamur a claritate in claritatem, tamquam a Domini Spiritu.”379 This passage describes 
the fulfillment of the New Covenant with Christ, which, as St. Paul states, removes the “veil that 
lies over their heart” [velamen positum est super cor eorum] since the days of Moses.380 Unlike 
the mask, the veil has a strong religious connation—which is no doubt why authors like Holbach 
and Marx use the terminology of “unveiling” in their critiques of Christianity. For Rousseau, on 
the other hand, there is no such sacred veil covering the heart.  
 In the Premier discours, Rousseau does indeed reproach the philosophes for attempting 
to remove “the dense veil with which [Nature] covered all her designs” [Le voile épais dont elle 
a couvert toutes ses opérations] (Rousseau, Premier discours, p. 15), even though, as we know, 
he will do precisely this in the Deuxième discours. One can interpret this reproach in two ways. 
Either Rousseau is pretending here to be one of those unexceptional common men to whom he 
advises ignorance, which, as Strauss points out, is part of his rhetorical strategy, or he genuinely 
believes this to be true, and thus remains closer to Augustine here than in subsequent works. It 
is difficult to determine which is true. Nevertheless, it is in subsequent works like the Préface à 
 
379 St. Augustine, Confessions, in The Works of Augustine, vol. 2, trans. Marcus Dods (Edinburgh : T & T Clarke, 1871), 
22, XIX, p. 538. See 2 Cor. 3:18. Vulgate Bible. Bible Foundation and On-Line Book Initiative. Accessed Feb. 20, 2021. 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=2+Corinthians+3.18&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0060 




Narcisse, the Deuxième discours and Émile that Rousseau will flesh out the unmasking style that 
he invokes here, and transform it into a method. Two things occur in these works: firstly, nature 
is unmasked, and secondly, those whom Rousseau unmasks are no longer treated as hypocrites 
but instead involuntary hypocrites, i.e., the victims of “situations.” Treating people as victims of 
circumstance also represents a departure from Augustine, because it requires depriving them of 
their autonomy in a way that former was not prepared to do. Both of these points will become 
clear in what follows. 
 Rousseau’s Préface à Narcisse (1752) continues the critique that he leveled against the 
philosophes in the Premier discours, and abandons the veil for the secular concept of the mask. 
Depicting the arts and sciences as a “simulacre public” [public simulacra] (Rousseau, Préface à 
Narcisse, p. 972) there, he accuses the philosophes of wearing the “mask of virtue”: 
Ce simulacre est une certaine douceur de moeurs qui supplée quelquefois à leur pureté, 
une certaine apparence d’ordre qui prévient l’horrible confusion, une certaine admiration 
des belles choses qui empêche les bonnes de tomber tout-à-fait dans l’oubli. C’est le vice 
qui prend le masque de la vertu, non comme l’hypocrisie pour tromper et trahir, mais 
pour s’ôter sous cette aimable et sacrée effigie l’horreur qu’il a de lui-même quand il se 
voit à découvert. (Ibid.) 
Interestingly, Rousseau writes that it’s not the hypocrite whom we hopes to unmask, but rather 
the man who wears “this amiable and sacred effigy” to evade his own reflection, to escape “the 
horror that he has of himself when he sees himself uncovered”. Make no mistake, the man who 
is unable to gaze upon his own reflection is far more insidious than the hypocrite. For while the 
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latter knows that he is a deceiver, the former deceives involuntarily, by second nature. Nothing 
prevents Tartuffe from removing his mask in private and gazing upon his own reflection, just as 
Le Neveu de Rameau cynically and frankly embraces his own hypocrisy—which is admirable in a 
way.381 More wretched than Ovid’s Narcissus, who his enamored with his own face, Rousseau’s 
is in love with his mask. Thus, in Rousseau’s play Narcisse, Valere does not fall in love with his 
own reflection, but rather with a portrait of himself made to resemble a women, covered in 
makeup and observing all the fashionable trends of the day. Spending hours in his toilette, Valere 
is the feminized product of salon culture, a travestied and artificial man enthralled by his 
effeminate mask.382 He does not primarily deceive others, but himself. This updated version of 
Narcissus is the hyper-socialized human. Thoroughly corrupted by the institutionalization of every 
aspect of life, the sciences and arts being only one, he deceives without design. An unwitting 
sprezzatura, he resembles nothing of “the good man […] who contents himself to fight in the 
nude” [l’homme du bien … qui se plaît à combattre nu]” (Rousseau, Premiers discours, p. 8).  
The hyper-socialized man is already contrasted with the “savage” [Sauvage] (Rousseau, 
Préface à Narcisse, p. 970, footnote) in the Préface, where the former is accused of advancing his 
self-interest at the expense of others, and the latter praised for advancing his alongside his 
fellows: “Among the savages […] nothing causes them to deceive one another; public esteem is 
 
381 See Denis Diderot, Le Neveu de Rameau, in Œuvres choisies de Diderot, vol. 2 (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1880), p. 54. 
In the words of Lui: “Quand je lis le Tartuffe, je me dis : Sois hypocrite, si tu veux ; mais ne parle pas comme 
l’hypocrite. Garde des vices qui te sont utiles ; mais n’en aie ni le ton ni les apparences qui te rendraient ridicule. 
Pour se garantir de ce ton, de ces apparences, il faut les connaître. Or, ces auteurs en ont fait des peintures 
excellentes. Je suis moi et je reste ce que je suis ; mais j’agis et je parle comme il convient.” 
382 See Rousseau, Narcisse ou l’amant de lui-même, p. 1010. As Lucinde expresses, “Valere est, par sa délicatesse et 
par l’affectation de sa parure, une espèce de femme cachée sous des habits d’homme, et ce portrait, ainsi travesti, 
semble moins le déguiser que le rendre à son état naturel.”  
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the only good to which each aspires” [Parmi les sauvages … rien ne les porte à se tromper l’un 
l’autre ; l’estime publique est le seul bien auquel chacun aspire]. (Ibid.) As in the first Discours, 
Rousseau has the cité cynique of early Rome in mind here. Though this nation was founded by “a 
troop of bandits” [une troupe des], Rousseau states—no doubt affirming the judgement of those 
like Diderot—within a “few generations the most virtuous people who ever existed” [peu de 
générations le plus vertueux people qui ait jamais existé] (Ibid.) appeared there. To be clear, what 
Rousseau is affirming here is that circumstances make the savage good, since, unlike the hyper-
socialized man, he can only pursue his self-interest by supporting his small community. In fact, 
Rousseau even contends that if the savage does an evil deed, he cannot make it a “habit” (Ibid.), 
because there is nothing to gain from it in the long run in simple societies, where a few betrayals 
suffice to destroy the whole tribe. Here too Rousseau diverges from Augustine, as his solution is 
to recreate the circumstances in which Roman civic virtue was born, so as to align the self-interest 
(i.e., what he shall call l’amour de soi-même in the second Discours) of society’s members. 
Rousseau is mainly interested in how circumstances corrupt the soul, rather than our individual 
choices. And this interest, which leads him to focus upon the unwitting hypocrite, will also lead 
him to reimagine how we see the subject in the Deuxième discours. When for instance Durkheim, 
Weber and other sociologists examine the reasons behind religion, they are studying the 
different social goals that believers unwittingly accomplish. That is, they are unmasking the true 
reasons behind their faith while also denying that the believers themselves autonomously decide 
on them—for if they did, then such studies would be pointless.  
For Rousseau’s predecessors, unmasking serves to expose the incongruence between a 
man’s actions and intentions, and therefore to paint him as a hypocrite. This method of critique 
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supposes a moral framework that separates men from their actions, social status, etc., in order 
to study the being behind them. In the Christian context, that being is the soul, and unmasking 
exposes the hypocritical sinner. For Rousseau however, this being is the pre-social man, who 
might not even know his true intentions—especially if he lacks theoretical knowledge of the state 
of nature. In short, Rousseau calls into question our autonomy or authorship over our intentions. 
Rousseau, of course, was not the first thinker to articulate this pre-social induvial in the state of 
nature, as Hobbes had done so before him. However, he is the first to adopt the unmasking style 
in order to formulate a critique of society that makes the pre-social individual its point of 
reference, and we see how effective this critique is, for Rousseau even mobilizes it in the 
Deuxième discours to unmask Hobbes ‘artificial’ natural man.  
While we cannot pursue the subject to great length here, this should help us understand 
how Rousseau, despite expressing a hatred for hypocrisy throughout his life,383 often excuses his 
own hypocrisy. For instance, in the Rêveries, Rousseau plainly contends that morality would have 
been satisfied if, rather than lying, he merely told a young girl to mind her business when she 
asked him if he had abandoned all of his kids at the orphanage.384 Rousseau is interested in 
hypocrisy, not as an abuse of autonomy, but rather as a product of circumstance. Hence why he 
 
383 Consider, for instance, his response to the King of Poland in the Observations, where he thrashes Rochefoucauld’s 
claim that “l’hypocrisie est un homage que le vice rend à la vertu.” There, he writes that hypocrisy is no more than 
a “cloak” for concealing meanness: “Non, couvrir sa méchanceté du dangereux manteau de l’hypocrisie, ce n’est 
point honorer la vertu; c’est l’outrager en profanant ses enseignes; c’est ajouter la lacheté et la fourberie à tous les 
autres vices; c’est se fermer pour jamais tout retour vers la probité.” (Rousseau, Observations, p. 52) 
384 “Il y a quelque temps que M. Foulquier m’engagea contre mon usage à aller avec ma femme dîner, en manière 
de pique-nique, avec lui et son ami Benoît chez la dame Vacassin, restauratrice, laquelle et ses deux filles dînèrent 
aussi avec nous. Au milieu du dîner, l’aînée, qui est mariée et qui était grosse, s’avisa de me demander brusquement 
et en me fixant si j’avais eu des enfants. Je répondis en rougissant jusqu’aux yeux que je n’avais pas eu ce bonheur. 
Elle sourit malignement en regardant la compagnie : tout cela n’était pas bien obscur, même pour moi.”(Rousseau, 
Rêveries, p. 1034) 
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claims that he only lied “mechanically” [mechanically]385 in this case. Rousseau’s understanding 
of human intentionality clearly presents a danger here. For not only does it allow one to avoid 
responsibility for obviously insensitive acts, such as this one, but it also tends to deprive people 
of their autonomy, even if the author claims that his goal is to restore autonomy. For instance, 
Freud’s conception of the id-ego-superego structure has its merits, and might be justly used to 
“uncover” desires,386 but one can easily see how accusing an advocate of chastity of unwittingly 
desiring to have sex with his mother can be abusive. The same is true of Marx, who exposes or 
unveils God as a fiction and means of exploitation,387 and of Adorno and Marcuse, who unmask 
the White liberal family as crypto-fascists.388 In each of these cases, a second model for society 
is proposed, and anyone who fails to meet its standards is regarded not as hypocritical, but as an 
unwitting phony, mental patient, oppressor or authoritarian. Such critiques ultimately rely on 
Rousseau’s unmasking style, which does not content itself with excoriating a few artificers, as La 
 
385 In Les Rêveries, Rousseau presents the lies and fictions that he invented throughout his life as “l’effet machinal 
de [son] embarras” (p. 1034), as if they were merely the consequence of his artificial or social self, whose concern 
for appearances made lying second nature.  
386 Freud, for instance, speaks of “uncovering” [aufdecken] the “unconscious repressed roots” of moral guilt in Das 
Ich und das Es (Gôttingen: Liwi Verlag, 2020), p. 30, footnote #2: “Der Kampf gegen das Hindernis des unbewußten 
Schuldgefühls wird dem Analytiker nicht leicht gemacht. Man kann direkt nichts dagegen tun, indirekt nichts 
anderes, als daß man langsam seine unbewußt verdrängten Begründungen aufdeckt, wobei es sich allmählich in 
bewußtes Schuldgefühl verwandelt.” 
387 Marx speaks of a religion as an “illusion” [Illusionen] hiding behind a “veil of tears” [Jammertales] in Zur Kritik der 
Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, in Marx-Engels Werke, vol. I (Berlin: Verlag, 1972), p. 378: “Die Aufhebung der 
Religion als des illusorischen Glücks des Volkes ist die Forderung seines wirklichen Glücks. Die Forderung, die 
Illusionen über seinen Zustand aufzugeben, ist die Forderung, einen Zustand aufzugeben, der der Illusionen bedarf. 
Die Kritik der Religion ist also im Keim die Kritik des Jammertales, dessen Heiligenschein die Religion ist.” 
388 See The Authoritarian Personality (London: Verso, 2019), p. 150, where Adorno compares explicit fascism to the 
implicit fascism of “large numbers of ordinary citizens”: “We can now consider the ethnocentric solution to problems 
of group conflict. The ingroup must be kept pure and strong. The only methods of doing this are to liquidate the 
outgroups altogether, to keep them entirely subordinate, or to segregate them in such a way as to minimize contact 
with the ingroups. The first method represents politicalized ethnocentrism— fascism and the dissolution of 
democratic values. This method so obviously violates traditional American values of nonviolence, fairness, and equal 
opportunity that it has found relatively little support in this country. The second and third methods are supported, 
however, by large numbers of ordinary citizens.” 
Jackanich 264 
 
Bruyère does, but instead condemns all of society as artificial, clearing the way for other models 
to take its place. This becomes evident in the second Discours, to which we shall return. For the 
moment, we must determine the role played by autonomy and sincerity in Rousseau’s account 
of unmasking, as his versions of these differ from the ancients’.  
XII. v. Unmasking the Self: Rousseau’s Reconceptualization of Autonomy and Sincerity  
We have determined the aspects of Rousseau’s unmasking style that distinguish it from 
his predecessors’, and qualify it as a unique method of philosophical inquiry. The foundation of 
this method, as we have also seen, is buttressed by numerous sources from antiquity. (1) When 
Rousseau frames scientific progress as a potential source of moral decay and an opportunity for 
power-hungry pseudo-scientists to subvert the nation, Augustine’s argument that libido sciendi 
is often attended by desires for luxury and power—libido sentiendi and libido dominandi—is in 
the background. (2) In contrast to this degenerate city of man, as it were, Rousseau proposes the 
ideal city—the cité cynique—that he discovers in Roman authors like Tacitus, Sallust, and perhaps 
most importantly Seneca. Reflecting on the simplicity of earlier times, Seneca argues that 
philosophical doctrines [docti] multiply in proportion to our desires [libidos]. Drawing on these 
ancient authors, modernity is characterized by all the desires that humanity has amassed since 
its early days, and to cite Epictetus’ maxim, by the multiplication of “that which does not depend 
on us.” In this light, the docti of so-called progress appear as no more than justifications for moral 
degeneracy and human dependency. A walk through nature no longer suffices to put man’s mind 
at ease. He needs spectacles—in Rousseau’s day, the theatre, and in ours, movies, television, pop 
fiction, pornography and so forth. The Spartan spoke his truth in the forum, but the philosophe 
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must wade through the social networks of the salon, the vast bureaucracies of academia, and in 
short, make himself subservient to a list of institutions.  On the other hand, in the cité cynique 
there reigns Xenophon’s ancient ideal of autarky [autarkeia], or self-sufficiency [auta + arkeia]. 
To attain self-sufficiency, one must not only master one’s environment, but first and foremost 
one’s desires; hence the ideal of self-mastery [en + krateia]. Rousseau’s ideal of autonomy, which 
means self-law [auto + nomos] in Greek, ultimately stems from these ancient moral ideals. But 
his account of them is unique, if not more profound. 
Rousseau’s conception of these differs insofar as the Genevan believes that autonomy 
requires something more in the modern era, where the exponential growth of rules, customs, 
academies and institutions in general not only expands our desires, but also—through a process 
of socialization—multiplies the number of masks that we must wear. Again, one must first 
become an “expert,” “respectable,” “enlightened,” etc., to state the truth. Modernity is a great 
mask factory. Thus, the modern autonomous man must not only master his desires, but also 
recover his sense of self, what Jean-Jacques calls “mon âme […] déchirée” [my shredded … soul] 
in a letter to M. de Saint-Germain.389 If modernity furnishes the individual with a unique 
opportunity for discovering his sense of self, then according to Rousseau, it is because modern 
hyper-socialization makes the ‘self’ known by its lack, by the inner void one feels after being ran 
through its institutional shredders. Recovering one’s sense of self not only means mastering the 
desires—for material wealth, social acceptance, etc.—that typically cause one to accept the law 
 
389 See Rousseau, Rousseau à M. de Saint-Germain, February 26, 1770, in Oeuvres complètes de J.-J. Rousseau, vol. 
25 (Bruxelles: Th. Lejeune, 1888), p. 100: “[…] enfin l’on aura soin de répandre une telle horreur de mois sur ma 
route, qu’à chaque pas que je ferai, à chaque objet que je verrai, mon âme soir déchirée: ce qui n’empêchera pas 
que, traité comme Sancho, je ne reçoive partout cent courbettes moqueuses, avec autant de compliments de respect 
et d’admiration : ce sont de ces politesses de tigres qui semblent vous sourire au moment qu’ils vont vous déchirer.” 
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of another contrary to one’s own will, but also removing the masks and determining one’s true 
self, which is captured by concepts like “amour de soi-même” [self-love] in the Deuxième discours 
and “le sentiment d’existence” [the sentiment of existence] in the Rêveries. This sense of self 
contrasts with one’s identity, which is captured by the concept of “amour propre” [vanity]. 
However, and this must be emphasized, Rousseau does not entirely reject amour propre, and 
would no doubt accuse those who wish to overcome all “identity politics” whatsoever as having 
a superficial understanding of humanity. Indeed, as Michael L. McLendon persuasively argues in 
The Psychology of Inequality: Rousseau’s ‘Amour-Propre’, the concept of amour propre has its 
roots in Augustine’s amour sui, and played a central role in the work of Jansenists like Pierre 
Nicole and Blaise Pascal; however, despite the fact that each regarded amour propre as one of 
the main sources of vice and corruption, in the end not one argues that it can or should be 
abolished.390 Likewise, lest one abandons society to become a promeneur solitaire, Rousseau 
believes that the corrupting effects of identity and the desire to distinguish oneself are best 
mitigated by adopting a national identity, which promotes a practical and easily fulfilled sense of 
sympathy for one’s neighbor, as opposed to the nebulous sympathy of the cosmopolitan. To be 
clear, Rousseau prioritizes this identity because he thinks that it reduces the effects of identity 
more than any other—of course, Augustine, who primarily directed his critique of amour sui at 
the pagan Roman Republic, would not agree. Moreover, it should be clear that autonomy for 
 
390 See Michael L. McLendon, The Psychology of Inequality: Rousseau’s Amour-Propre (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2019), p. 84: “Thus, as with Augustine, the neo-Augustinians make no effort to reconcile 
competing views of amour-propre in their works. They appear to accept the darker strands of Augustine’s thought 
that pride in excellence is a dangerous sin. They then minimize these concerns by embracing the most optimistic 
strands of thinking in Augustine and make them the mainsprings of their political thought, even arguing that pride 
in excellence and rationality is a net social positive.” 
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Rousseau precludes many identities, such as those based on consumption or spectacles, e.g., 
being a ‘Marvel fan’. 
Indeed, I would even argue that for Rousseau, the man or women who self-prescribes the 
law never choses his or her identity. Rather, he or she discovers it in the organic bonds of their 
community, in what Rousseau calls the “general will.”391 As Pierre Manent has indicated, from 
the perspective of the people, this will applies generally or indiscriminately, but from the 
perspective of humanity as such, it is anything but general. For it is not reducible to laws that 
apply to humans as such, but rather to the particular character of a people, their history, their 
mores, and ultimately what Rousseau refers to as the “national physiognomy” imprinted upon 
their souls. (See Rousseau, Considérations, p. 960). In other words, and as Strauss also confirms, 
one discovers one’s individuality within one’s national philosophy:  
According to Rousseau, civil society is essentially a particular, or more precisely a closed, 
society. A civil society, [Rousseau] holds, can be healthy only if it has a character of its 
own, and this requires that its individuality be produced or fostered by national and 
exclusive institutions. Those institutions must be animated by a national ‘philosophy’ by 
a way of thinking that is not transferable to other societies: ‘the philosophy of each people 
is little apt for another people.’ (Strauss, “On the Intentions of Rousseau, p. 473)  
 
391 In “Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Origins of Autonomy,” Inquiry 54:5 (2011): 478 – 493, Friedrich Neuhouser 
similarly recognizes the paradoxical nature of Rousseau’s account of autonomy, which requires us to submit to the 
general will to restore our autonomy. However, I disagree with Neuhouser about the nature of this submission. For 
he seems to primarily understand it in terms of (1) “material equality” (p. 488) and (2) “equal moral authority” (p. 
491). I do not disagree that (1) but rather (2), as I believe that for Rousseau, autonomy certainly means submitting 
to a higher authority (the “common good”), which pertains to the character or identity of a people. This aspect of 
Rousseau’s vision of autonomy seems to be lacking in Neuhouser’s account.  
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The idea that the citizen must chose his national identity in order to freely give himself the law 
seems paradoxical. For, as we’ve established above, while this national identity allows a people 
to form very real bonds, and augments perfectly natural sentiments like pity, the identity itself is 
not natural. Further, those philosophers and scientists who are not antagonist to the nation, but 
instead teach the people their duties, are meant to achieve this by consciously advocating for 
something artificial. The question thus arises: is Rousseau’s position here not hypocritical? Is he 
not merely swapping one mask for another? Ruth W. Grant answers this question well, and in a 
way that is consistent with Strauss’ and Manent’s readings. In Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the 
Ethics of Politics (1999), she argues that Rousseau’s moralism is not as uncompromising as his 
rhetoric and commentators often suggest. As she indicates, Rousseau makes clear in the fourth 
promenade of the Rêveries that he is not opposed to lying per se. Rather, he is only opposed to 
lying for his own benefit, but gladly does so for that of others. As Grant writes: “Speaking loosely 
and anachronistically, Rousseau seems to lean in a Kantian direction in acting on his own behalf 
and in a consequentialist direction in acting on behalf of others.”392 This double standard seems 
to be rooted in Rousseau’s belief that people are not rational in the way that philosophers like 
Habermas and Kant presume them to be. This is an interesting take, for Kant claims that it was 
Rousseau who inspired his faith in the common man,393 which likely contributed in some way to 
 
392 Ruth W. Grant, Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 
121.  
393 See Immanuel Kant, Remarks in the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Other Writings, 
trans. Patrick Frierson and Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 20: 44: “I myself am a 
researcher by inclination. I feel the entire thirst for cognition and the eager restlessness to proceed further in it, as 
well as the satisfaction at every acquisition. There was a time when I believed this alone could constitute the honor 
of mankind, and I despised the rabble who knows nothing. Rousseau has set me right. This blinding prejudice 
vanishes, I learn to honor human beings, and I would feel by far less useful than the common laborer if I did not 
believe that this consideration could impart a value to all others in order to establish the rights of humanity.” 
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the categorical imperative, and thus the demand that men always treat one another as rational 
beings. In any case, it follows that citizens cannot be expected to respect the conditions of the 
social compact, i.e., political equality, without some guile. 
 If this is true, then Rousseau seems to avoid the accusation of hypocrisy, which assumes 
that one is lying in one’s own interest. It does not however change the fact that he is advocating 
for a sort of mask, i.e., national physiognomy. Then again, society is essentially corrupt, so one 
cannot hope to entirely liberate him from the mask, lest he be sent back to the state of nature. 
In this way, Grant’s thesis, which seeks to close the distance between Rousseau and Machiavelli 
would also seem to bring the Genevan closer to Burke, who cautions against tearing down what 
he calls “the decent drapery of life.” Likewise, Rousseau would caution against Poles, Germans, 
Frenchmen, etc., from discarding their “national physiognomy” to instead become Europeans. 
Rousseau’s reasons for wanting to conserve this drapery, as it were, are very different however. 
In fact, they are not conservative at all, but rather forward-looking. For reaffirming this identity 
promises greater autonomy and sincerity. Having examined this paradox, we can now examine 
how these two concepts motivate Rousseau’s unmasking critique.  
Baehr argues that Rousseau fired “the opening salvo in the unmasking war”, tracing the 
Genevan’s impetus to his insistence on the uniquely modern “qualities of sincerity, authenticity 
and, probably at their root, autonomy” (Baehr, The Unmasking Style, p. 17). Because he is more 
interested in describing the “ingredients”, “theoretical cogency” and “political effects” (Ibid., p. 
9) of unmasking than writing a genealogy of the style, Baehr does not explain exactly why these 
qualities compelled Rousseau to push unmasking further than either Molière or Montaigne. He 
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is however relying upon Lionel Trilling’s reading of Rousseau in Sincerity and Authenticity which, 
interestingly enough, purports to uncover these qualities in the first Discours.394 
According to Trilling, the primary focus of Rousseau’s critique of the sciences and arts is 
their socializing aspect, or their capacity “to render men more sociable by inspiring in them the 
desire to please themselves and others” [de rendre les hommes plus sociables en leur inspirant 
le désir de se plaire les uns aux autres] (Rousseau, Premiers discours, p. 6). This passage is cited 
by Trilling, who finds its motivation in something like “English sincerity” and a modern sense of 
“personal autonomy”. By contrast with its French version, English sincerity requires that one be 
able to “communicate without deceiving or misleading” (Ibid., p. 58). Emerson paints a portrait 
of such sincere Englishmen in his English Traits (1909) for instance, claiming that: “They require 
you to be of your own opinion, and they hate the coward who cannot in practical affairs answer 
yes or no. They dare to displease, nay, they will let you break all the rules if you do it natively and 
with spirit. You must be somebody; then you may do this or that as you will.”395 Rousseau, who 
thinks that the beaux arts in particular make men weak, idle, cowardly and slavish—as we have 
seen above—would surely have admired such men. 396 Trilling therefore concludes that “English 
sincerity was at the heart of Rousseau’s political thought. The work which won for Rousseau his 
initial fame was the so-called First Discourse, to which the concept of sincerity is central.” (Ibid., 
p. 60) Characteristics like cowardice and laziness not only prevent one from expressing oneself 
sincerely however, but more importantly, from developing a sense of “personal autonomy” 
 
394 See Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 60 – 63 and 94. 
395 Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity, p. 125 – 126. This passage is cited from Ralph Waldo Emerson’s English Traits, 
ed. H. M. Jones (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 66 – 67. 
396 See XI. ii. The Fruits of an Abstract Education: Weak, Idle, Cowardly and Slavish Men. 
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(Ibid.). Drawing on David Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd, Trilling identifies this autonomy-deficient 
individual as the “other-directed” man, who, lacking not only the ancient virtue of “self-
sufficiency” but also the modern one of “self-definition” (Ibid., p. 66), passes through life as “a 
reiterated impersonation”: 
Rousseau is concerned to foster a human type whose defining characteristic is autonomy, 
the will and strength to make strict choice among the elements of our enforced life in 
society. Put it that he is aesthetically revolted by the trashiness of what, some twenty 
years ago, David Riesman called the 'other-directed' personality, […] whose whole being 
is attuned to catch the signals sent out by […] institutional agencies of the culture, to the 
extent that he is scarcely a self at all, but, rather, a reiterated impersonation. (Ibid.) 
Again, Rousseau’s autonomous man is not only free from desire, but also from all those modern 
institutions, those so-called mask factories, where men and women are hollowed out. 
Just as Rousseau’s conception of autonomy differs from the stoical one, so too does his 
understanding of sincerity, which is neither reducible to the virtue that Aristotle describes in his 
Nicomachean ethics, nor to this early modern English version. For after unmasking these beaux 
esprits in his Premier discours, and then all of society in his Deuxième discours, Rousseau must 
prove himself sufficiently autonomous to be dignified of unmasking the world. In other words, 
he must unmask himself and reveal the purity of his heart to the world. Hence the Confessions, 
at the beginning of which Rousseau expresses his ambition to “unveil his interior”: “I presented 
myself such that I was; detestable and vile when I was; good, generous, sublime when I was; I 
unveiled my interior such as you saw yourself.” [Je me suis montré tel que je fus ; méprisable et 
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vil quand je l’ai été, bon, généreux, sublime, quand je l’ai été : j’ai dévoilé mon intérieur tel que 
tu l’as vu toi-même.] (Rousseau, Confessions, p. 5) Reflecting on the significance of Rousseau’s 
Confessions, Trilling writes that: “The person who is depicted in that great work may repel us; but 
the author of the Discourses has the more power over us because he is the subject of the 
Confessions. He is the man; he suffered; he was there.” (Ibid., p. 24) In other words, Rousseau’s 
unmasking style ultimately obliges him to adopt the autobiographical one, and to pursue a type 
of sincerity that Aristotle would have judged self-deprecating and thus extreme. Subsequent 
unmaskers have not dared to unmask themselves with the same sincerity, detracting no doubt 
from their credibility—for instance, we only know of Marx’s betrayal of his wife from his private 
letters and secondary sources.397 In any case, Rousseau’s autobiographical works are based on 
the same social vs. pre-social dichotomy, and seek to sincerely expose the author’s hypocrisies 
and flaws as the effects of socialization by retreating to the pre-social self. Hence, the opening 
lines of the Rêveries read: “Me voici donc seul sur la terre, n’ayant plus de frere, de prochain, 
d’ami, de société que moi-même. Le plus sociable et le plus aimant des humains en a été proscrit 
par un accord unanime.” [Thus alone on earth, having not brother, no fellow, no friend, no society 
but myself. The most sociable and the most loving of humans was proscribed from it by 
unanimous accord.] (Rousseau, Rêveries, p. 995) For Rousseau, autobiography is an exercise in 
 
397 See Mary Gabriel, Love and Capital: Karl and Jenny Marx and the Birth of a Revolution (New York: Back Bay Books, 
2012), p. ii : “those who wanted to keep Marx perched atop a socialist pedestal fought for years to deny that he was 
the father of Helene Demuth’s son, Freddy. Letters existed in the archives in Moscow in which party members 
discussed Freddy’s birth, but Joseph Stalin, when told of them by David Ryazanov, director of the Marx-Engels 
Institute, called it a “petty affair” and instructed Ryazanov to “let it be buried deep in the archives.” The letters were 
not publishes for some fifty years.” 
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self-unmasking, an attempt to discover the pre-social or natural self, or what Rousseau shall 
ultimately call the “le sentiment de l’existence” [the sentiment of existence] (Ibid., p. 1047). 
Finally, Trilling uncovers something like a nascent version of authenticity in the Premier 
discours. However, we must tread carefully here, for authenticity is a concept unfamiliar to the 
Enlightenment, and only became a part of our vocabulary following Martin Heidegger’s use of 
the term in Being and Time (1927). There, authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] means something along 
the lines of “being one’s own” or “being at home” in the world.398 But these are concepts that 
can only be made sense of within the context of Heidegger’s radical ontology, the explication of 
which would require a lengthy digression. Suffice to say, this ontology would regard Rousseau’s 
sentiment of existence as an inauthentic mode of being, given its dependence on romantic and 
humanist ideals that fail to reflect the limits of man’s (or Dasein’s) spatio-temporal being. To be 
more precise, the romantic reduction of nature per se to an idyllic state of nature, as well as the 
humanist reduction of humanity to a universal model (i.e., l’homme sauvage), both presuppose 
an ability to grasp and pin down the essential aspects of existence once and for all, and thereby 
deny or cover up the existential limits of our being from which we derive meaning. For instance, 
my limited nature, and ultimately my mortality, mean that I can only dedicate my affections to 
so many people in a lifetime, but my love for them appears all the more meaningful because of 
this. And just as I cannot truly love humanity as such, neither can I truly love nature as such—as 
 
398 See Somogy Varga, “Authenticity”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, last modified February 20, 2020, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/authenticity/: “The most familiar conception of “authenticity” comes to us 
mainly from Heidegger’s Being and Time of 1927. The word we translate as ‘authenticity’ is actually a neologism 
invented by Heidegger, the word Eigentlichkeit, which comes from an ordinary term, eigentlich, meaning ‘really’ or 
‘truly’, but is built on the stem eigen, meaning ‘own’ or ‘proper’. So the word might be more literally translated as 
‘ownedness’, or ‘being owned’, or even ‘being one’s own’, implying the idea of owning up to and owning what one 
is and does.” 
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some abstract concept. Rather, nature becomes meaningful to me, becomes something worthy 
of preserving, when I recognize all the ways that it determines and guides my being. The forest 
passage that I walked as a youth, the eagles convening on an icy lake soaked in red dawn, these 
experiences make nature a part of me, precluding any possibility of becoming a purely abstract 
subject that might stand above it. When I recognize the influence of such experiences over me, 
over the possibilities of my being, I am “my own” or “at home” in the world. Authenticity might 
then be defined as an appreciation for our limits, which in turn keeps us ‘open’ to new forms of 
meaning, and ultimately Being per se.399 This should not however make us think of all those so-
called ‘open-minded’ types that Lasch identifies as members of the “cult of authenticity”, those 
a-historical hedonists whose hallowed moto is ‘do your own thing’, and who become indignant 
at the slightest contradiction of their universalist creed of individualism and progressivism; 400 no 
doubt, few are willing to swallow the pills that Heidegger is offering. 401  As for Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
 
399 Heidegger explains the concept of “openness” [Offenheit] in his essay “What is Metaphysics?”, which was 
presented to a general audience, and is therefore more accessible. See Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?”, in 
Pathmarks, trans. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 283: “Once ‘existence’ is 
understood correctly, the ‘essence’ of Dasein can be thought, in whose openness Being itself announces and 
conceals itself, grants itself and withdraws; at the same time, this truth of Being does not exhaust itself in Dasein, 
nor can it by any means simply be identified with it after the fashion of the metaphysical proposition that all 
objectivity is as such also subjectivity.” 
400 See Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in the Age of Diminishing Expectations (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1979), p. 4 – 5: “Having no hope of improving their lives in any of the ways that matter, 
people have convinced themselves that what matters is psychic self-improvement: getting in touch with their 
feelings, eating health food, taking lessons in ballet or belly-dancing, immersing themselves in the wisdom of the 
East, jogging, learning how to "relate," overcoming the "fear of pleasure." Harmless in themselves, these pursuits, 
elevated to a program and wrapped in the rhetoric of authenticity and awareness, signify a retreat from politics and 
a repudiation of the recent past.” 
401 Heidegger’s philosophy is much more conservative than his use of words like “openness” would suggest. See for 
instance Gregory B. Smith, Martin Heidegger: Paths Taken, Paths Opened (Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2007), p. 39: “In general, the young Heidegger makes it clear that he saw the need for authority and 
tradition, especially in the face of the subjectivist individualism of the modern world. He opposed what he saw as 
the rootless anomie of modern life.” 
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and Jacques Derrida’s views on authenticity, they are largely derived from Heidegger’s, and are 
no closer to Rousseau’s philosophy.  
Now, to be sure, no such concept of authenticity presents itself in the Premiers discours, 
where Trilling holds that “authenticity” (Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity, p. 94) is reducible to 
something like “not being a Parisian, or, at its most vivid, […] having a weekend cottage, a gun, 
and some friends to drink and shoot with”. (Ibid.) As we have seen, the concept of authenticity 
minimally requires (1) appreciating that our ontological limits are the source of meaning in life, 
and therefore (2) rejecting the sort of universalist and reductionist claims about humanity and 
nature that are typically found in metaphysics. Trilling’s conception of authenticity lacks both of 
these elements; thus, we should not conclude that Rousseau’s unmasking of the philosophes in 
the Premier discours inspires him to adopt an authentic perspective of the world. However, one 
might argue that the seeds of authenticity are planted in the Rêveries—and although Heidegger 
commented on the text, one might even establish a connection between the two if one were so 
inclined, for the former heavily inspired Hölderlin’s poem Der Rhein, with which Heidegger was 
enamored.402 The question therefore becomes the following: given that Rousseau’s unmasking 
style—at least partly—motivates his reconceptualization of autonomy and sincerity, and that he 
goes in search of these virtues in his Rêveries, might we say that his unmasking style ultimately 
leads him to plant the seeds of authenticity? Indeed, Jean-Jacques disavows metaphysics upon 
 
402 See Friedrich Hölderlin, Der Rhein, in Sämtliche Werke, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1953), p. 148-156, 
where he refers to Rousseau on the Lac de Bienne: “Das Himmlische, von selber umfängt / Es unbezwungen, lächelnd 
/ Jezt, da er ruhet, de Kühnen. / Halbgötter denk’ ich jetzt / Und kennen muß ich die Tauern, / Weil oft ihr Leben so 
/ Die sehnende Brust mir beweget. / Wem aber, wie, Rousseau, dir, / Unüberwindlich die Seele / Die 
starkausdauernde ward / […] Dann scheint ihm oft das Beste, / Fast ganz vergessen da, / Wo der Stral nicht brennt, 
/ Im Schatten des Walds / Am Bielersee in frischer Grüne zu seyn, / Und sorglosarm an Tönen, / Anfängern gleich, 
bei Nachtigallen zu lernen.” 
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retreating into the forest, resolving to follow only those precepts that his heart confirms.403 But 
more interestingly, his disavowal is not inspired by empiricism or any other philosophy of the 
day. No, he does this because he wishes “to circumscribe” [circonscrire] (Rosseau, Rêveries, p. 
1040) himself, or cut off all of the artificial and mechanical aspects of his social being. While such 
circumscription is only framed within the social vs. pre-social dichotomy, rather than some 
deeper ontological context, it nonetheless introduces this idea that the truth or the “sentiment 
de l’existence” (Ibid., 1047) is to be uncovered within our limits, where the particular surges forth 
and reveals our being. And this is precisely what occurs in the Rêveries where, circumscribed, 
“the sound of the waves” and “the flux and reflux” (Ibid., p. 1045) of the waves send him into 
that reverie where the sentiment of existence exposes itself to him. This method of discovering 
oneself through the particular, of liberating oneself from the universal and the categories in 
which it places us, pushes the notion of autonomy qua self-definition in the direction of authentic 
being. In such a state, the inability to reduce anyone to one category or another not only makes 
them mask-less, but un-maskable. For there is no universal model—for instance, the state of 
nature—in virtue of which one might be unmasked. At the same time, we see here precisely why 
authenticity is not a virtue for Jean-Jacques, who remains firmly planted within the social vs. pre-
social dichotomy, or the model of the state of nature. 
 
 
403 “Je me suis toûjours dit: tout cela ne sont que des arguties et des subtilités métaphysiques, qui ne sont d’aucun 
poids auprès des principes fondamentaux adoptés par ma raison, confirmés par mon cœur, et qui tous portent le 




XIIII: Conclusion: The Unmasking Machine 
XIII: i. “Fondateur des sciences de l’homme”: Rousseau according to Lévi-Strauss 
 In his essay, “Jean-Jacques Rousseau: fondateur des sciences de l’homme”, Claude Lévi-
Strauss famously argues that the Genevan founded “les sciences humaines” by reconceiving of 
the subject and its relation to society.404 Lévi-Strauss pieces together Rousseau’s science of man 
from several of his works and letters, but neither mentions the Premier discours nor the Préface 
à Narcisse where we first discover the unmasking method. The academic consensus concerning 
the former’s unoriginality, or merely rhetorical significance, is thus affirmed. However, I believe 
that the framework that Lévi-Strauss identifies as the basis of Rousseau’s science of man is the 
very same one that his unmasking method depends on. As I do not intend to deny Lévi-Strauss’ 
conclusion that this framework serves as the latter’s foundation, my goal here is to determine 
the extent to which the unmasking method is tied up with social sciences like sociology. While 
we have identified the different ways in which particular social scientists (e.g., Freud, Marx and 
Adorno) mobilize Rousseau’s unmasking method, we might wonder whether social scientists in 
general depend on this method, which has significant normative implications. For as we’ve seen 
above, the moral framework of the Ancient Greeks and Romans seems to preclude it. 
 Indeed, Lévi-Strauss does not think that Rousseau was the first to study humanity, or to 
do so from a humanist perspective. His argument, rather, is that Rousseau laid the foundations 
 
404 Claude Lévi-Strauss, “Jean-Jacques Rousseau: fondateur des sciences de l’homme”, Maison de Rousseau et de la 
literature, accessed July 20, 2020, http://www.espace-rousseau.ch/f/textes/levi-strauss1962.pdf. Hereafter cited as 
“J.-J. Rousseau; fondateur”. 
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for a uniquely modern science of man, one that made studies like ethnology, anthropology and 
sociology possible. According to Lévi-Strauss, the cornerstone of this foundation is his rejection 
of Descartes’ cogito, which presupposes our ability “to pass directly from the interiority of man 
to the exteriority of the world, without seeing that between these two extremes there exist the 
societies, the civilizations, in other words the universes of man”.405 If Rousseau sheds new light 
on these concepts, then it is because his subject is neither a social animal (i.e., Aristotle) nor an 
individual capable of perfectly abstracting itself from society (i.e., Descartes). Instead, Rousseau 
conceives of a socialized animal. Unlike the former, his social aspect is unnatural, but unlike the 
latter, he cannot so perfectly abstract himself from it. Rousseau’s subject possesses something 
like an enduring unnatural aspect, which is reflected in his comparison of man to Glaucus in the 
Deuxième discours, Glaucus being a poor fisherman who wishes to become a god but is instead 
transformed into a monster. Man, wishing to raise himself above nature, forms civilizations, but 
becomes deformed in them. Hence why Lévi-Strauss maintains that Rousseau studies the “he” 
(i.e., the social self) before attempting to understand the “me” (i.e., the self as such), which has 
the effect of exposing the tensions between individuals on the one hand, and social institutions, 
culture, etc., on the other: 
[…] l'homme doit se connaître comme un ‘il’, avant d'oser prétendre qu'il est un ‘moi’. La 
révolution rousseauiste, préformant et amorçant la révolution ethnologique, consiste à 
refuser des identifications obligées, que ce soit celle d'une culture à cette culture, ou celle 
 
405 “Descartes croit passer directement de l'intériorité d'un homme à l'extériorité du monde, sans voir qu'entre ces 
deux extrêmes se placent des sociétés, des civilisations, c'est-à-dire des mondes d'hommes.” (Lévi-Strauss, “Jean-
Jacques Rousseau: fondateur des sciences de l’homme”, p. 3) 
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d'un individu, membre d'une culture, à un personnage ou à une fonction sociale, que 
cette même culture cherche à lui imposer. (Lévi-Strauss, “J.-J. Rousseau: fondateur”, p. 3) 
This ‘he’ represents the middle term between “the exteriority of the world” and “the interiority 
of man”. ‘His’ social aspect is not entirely natural, but at the same, ‘he’ cannot easily distinguish 
himself from it. For the essence of this aspect is appearance, dissimulation and falsehood. Thus, 
by focusing on the socialized animal, Rousseau understands society in a new light, as that which 
seems. And to be sure, it is precisely in these terms that Christian Smith defines sociology in his 
famous book The Sacred Project of American Sociology: “a great deal of sociology is devoted to 
showing that the ordinary world of everyday life as it seems to most people is not really what is 
going on—in short, to debunking appearances.”406 Does Rousseau’s unmasking method not have 
the same goal as well, debunking the philosophes’ appearances? 
 The corollary of Rousseau’s unnatural socialized animal is the natural asocial animal, or 
l’homme sauvage. Though Rousseau neither conceives of l’homme sauvage nor l’état de nature 
as ideals, refuting on a perennial basis Voltaire’s accusation that he wishes to restore humanity 
to such a state,407 these concepts no doubt serve as points of reference for studying society and 
its corruption. In the words of Lévi-Strauss, Rousseau inverts the poles of research, studying the 
“society of nature” in order to understand “the nature of society”: 
 
406 See Christian Smith, The Sacred Project of American Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. ix. 
407 See Voltaire, Lettre à Jean-Jacques Rousseau, August 30, 1755, in Oeuvre complètes de Voltaire, vol.38 (Paris: 
Garnier Frères, 1880, p. 447: “J'ai reçu, Monsieur, votre nouveau livre contre le genre humain ; je vous en remercie 
; vous plairez aux hommes à qui vous dites leurs vérités, et vous ne les corrigerez pas. Vous peignez avec des couleurs 
bien vraies les horreurs de la société humaine dont l'ignorance et la faiblesse se promettent tant de douceurs. On 




Car, s'il est vrai que la nature a expulsé l’homme, et que la société persiste à l’opprimer, 
l’homme peut au moins inverser à son avantage les pôles du dilemme, et rechercher la 
société de la nature pour y méditer sur la nature de la société. Voilà, me semble-t-il, 
l'indissoluble message du Contrat social, des Lettres sur la Botanique, et des Rêveries. 
(Lévi-Strauss, “J.-J. Rousseau: fondateur”, p. 6) 
Again, Rousseau is not the first philosopher to describe a pre-social state of nature. Long before 
Hobbes, Lucretius conceives of such a state in De rerum natura. There is a significant difference 
however. For in these other accounts, civilization is not considered the accidental consequence 
of the state of nature, and therefore deprived of its validity. But this is precisely what Rousseau 
argues in the Deuxième Discours, where man acquires technology and thus civilization by “some 
accidental fire” [quelque incindie accidentel] (Rousseau, Deuxième discours, p. 172) that he finds 
by the foot of a volcano, and later reproduces in spite of all the “précautions” (Ibid.) that nature 
had taken against its discovery. Like Prometheus, man steals fire from an unwitting Nature, but 
in the end proves the greater victim of the crime: “But that fine son of Iapetos outwitted him  / 
And stole the far-seen gleam of weariless fire / In a hollow fennel stalk, and so bit deeply the 
heart / Of Zeus, the high lord of thunder, who was angry / When he saw the distant gleam of fire 
among men, / And straight off he gave them trouble to pay for the fire”.408 This accident needs 
to be qualified however. For if society were purely accidental, that is, lacking any reason or end, 
then it would be essentially unnatural, and thus unworthy of the kind of study that Rousseau’s 
sciences humaines entail. Rather, it would simply merit destruction. 
 
408 Hesiod, Theogony, in Anthology of Classical Myth, trans. Stephen M. Trzaskoma, R. Scott Smith and Stephen 
Brunet (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2016), p. 147. 
Jackanich 281 
 
Given that Lévi-Strauss does not address this problem, we might turn to Pierre Manent’s 
reading in Naissances de la politique moderne, where he maintains that, for Rousseau, “society 
is not […] bad by itself but, so to speak, by history. History could therefore have been otherwise, 
it seems, and consequently society as well. However, such is not the case.”409 If history resulted 
in the corrupt society in which we now live, then it’s because the accident of technology serves 
our needs, as opposed to our passions and sentiments. Once agricultural tools are invented, and 
humans become attached to parcels of land, the natural talents of a few permit them to obtain 
a greater share at the expense of others, which the former protect by conceiving of notions like 
property rights and money, and by founding so-called “societies” on them—as John Locke does 
for instance. Thus, this accident, which allows man to fulfill his needs in an unprecedented way, 
results in the creation of societies based on unnatural principles that suppress our passions and 
sentiments, notably our sympathy. As Rousseau writes in the second Discours, “property rights 
differ from those resulting from natural law” [le droit de propriété différent de celui qui résulte 
de la loi naturelle] (Rousseau, Deuxième discours, p. 174). The problem, to be more precise, is 
that society is founded here on that which also drives men furthest apart. In Manent’s words: 
Dès lors, la société est corrompue radicalement par suite de cette origine contradictoire. 
En effet, dans a société moderne, les hommes ne se veulent réunis que par le besoin qu’ils 
appellent l’intérêt. Ils mettent donc au principe de leur union ce qui est un principe de 
 
409 “La société n’est donc pas mauvaise par nature mais, pour ainsi dire, par histoire. L’histoire aurait donc pu être 
autre, semble-t-il, et la société aussi, par le fait même. Pourtant il n’en est pas ainsi.” (Manent, Naissances de la 




séparation. Ce qui tend de soi à la satisfaction solitaire, comment sera-ce le ciment d’une 
bonne société ? (Manent, Naissances de la politique moderne, p. 145 – 146) 
Manent turns to Rousseau’s Essai sur l’origine des langues (1781)410 in order to piece together 
the society that history could have produced, had this accident not raised humanity’s needs over 
its passions. While this alternative society is not, strictly speaking, natural, one might call it 
healthy to the extent that it gives expression to our natural sentiments—as one finds in the cité 
cynique or Rousseau’s republic of patriots.411  
The difference between the healthy and unhealthy society can be gleaned from the one 
between the Italian and German societies. As Rousseau explains in the Essai, the hostile 
environment of the North required its inhabitants to adopt a language of necessity, one that 
would permit them to plan for the long winters—hence the logical but unmelodious nature of 
the German tongue. By contrast, “nature does so much for the inhabitants [of the South] that 
they have almost nothing to do” (Rousseau, Essai sur l’origine des langues, p. 408), and can 
therefore develop a language for expressing their passions, serenading lovers, etc. Societies form 
around both languages, but for different reasons, “aidez-moi” [help me] being the foundation of 
the first, and “aimez-moi” [love me] that of the second, where agriculture is undoubtedly far less 
demanding. (Ibid) It goes without saying that Rousseau regards Italian, the so-called language of 
lovers, as having only a paltry share of the impassioned and musical element of some of the first 
languages, and even believes it far closer to German than these. In any case, Manent argues that 
 
410 See Rousseau, Essai sur l’origine des langues, in Oeuvres complètes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, vol. 5, ed., Bernard 
Gagnebin et Marcel Raymond. Paris: Gallimard, 1995. 
411 See chapter XI, sections I and II, where I explain that Rousseau’s cité cynique and patriotic republic are founded 
on a form of negative education designed to permit our natural sentiments their greatest expression. 
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a society’s symbols either reflect our needs or our passions, with money (which is abstract and 
calculable) being the supreme expression of the former, and the latter restricting itself to what 
is local and particular (e.g., national identity).412 The accidental society that serves as the object 
of Rousseau’s science of man is thus unhealthy insofar as it suppresses our sentiments, but can 
be healed by studying the cultural symbols and concepts in which suppressive forces take hold. 
As Lévi-Strauss writes, Rousseau fleshes out the dichotomy between the ‘state of nature’ and the 
‘nature of the state’ by elaborating a “triple passage, from nature to culture, from sentiments to 
the intellect, from animality to humanity”.413 Culture, concepts and even our humanity are each 
presented as that which seems, and more precisely, conceals our nature, passions and animality. 
The invention of the modern social sciences therefore rests on the conception of society as that 
which conceals, or alternatively, as that which masks.  
That which is concealed, however, is not reducible to these terms (i.e., nature, passions 
and animality), but instead fundamentally concerns our autonomy. In a word, society conceals 
man from himself. Or better yet, man conceals himself from himself, hiding his “shredded” and 
self-alienated soul behind all the images and ornaments that our social institutions provide. The 
corollary of the society that conceals is the autonomous subject, whose autonomy is defined as 
 
412 Regarding the abstract nature of money, Manent writes: “Le péché de l’argent, son essence funeste est qu’il n’est 
qu’un signe abstrait. Or, le signe est plus pauvre que la chose qu’il signifie. Plus l’argent se multiplie, au fur et à 
mesure que le désir des richesses se répand et s’accroît, plus ce signe devient abstrait, chargé de représenter 
toujours plus de réalités qualitativement diverses. L’argent absorbe progressivement la profusion multiple du monde 
humain réel.” (Manent, Naissances de la politique moderne, p. 139) As Manent also explains, what Rousseau calls 
the “general will” is not general at all, but rather refers to the particular identity and historical situation of a people. 
It is this particular symbol, which is far less susceptible to abstraction, that binds a people: “la volonté générale est 
volonté de l’identité, et non pas de l’identité morte et impersonnelle, mais volonté de l’être le plus individuel de la 
vie historique : la nation ou la cité.” (p. 176) 
413 “Car, s'il est possible de croire qu'avec l'apparition de la société, se soit produit un triple passage, de la nature à 
la culture, du sentiment à la connaissance, de l'animalité à l'humanité - démonstration qui fait l'objet du Discours.” 
(Lévi-Strauss, “Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Fondateur des sciences de l’homme”, p. 4) 
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freedom from institutional influences. The basic question posed by this subject, as Lévi-Strauss 
argues, is neither ‘what do I know?’ nor ‘do I exist?’ but instead ‘what am I?’: “Au ‘que sais-je?’ 
de Montaigne […], Descartes croyait pouvoir répondre que je sais que je suis, puisque je pense; 
à quoi Rousseau rétorque un ‘que suis-je?’.” [To Montagne’s ‘what do I know?’…, Descartes 
believed himself capable of responding that I know that I exist, because I think; to which 
Rousseau retorqued ‘what am I?’] (Lévi-Strauss, “J.-J. Rousseau: fondateur”, p. 3) The essential 
structure of Rousseau’ science of man therefore appears to be the same as that of his unmasking 
method, not simply because the former accuses society of concealing its intentions, but because 
it treats such concealment as involuntary—as I have shown above, one can only be unmasked if 
he is unaware of the mask that he wears. Just as Rousseau imputes motives to the philosophes 
in the Premier Discours, he imputes them to society in general in the Deuxième, the principle 
accusation being that ‘although society purports to satisfy people’s needs, in reality it suppresses 
their deepest passions and sentiments’. 
XIII. ii. The Social Sciences, and Institutionalized Unmasking 
Having shown (1) that Rousseau’s science of man is unmasking on a macroscale, and (2) 
that the unmasking method is not limited to certain social scientists, but instead parallels those 
of entire fields, such as sociology, we might now ask whether unmasking is an essential feature 
of the social sciences in some way. In The Unmasking Method in Social Theory, Baehr maintains 
that unmasking can be avoided in social theory by rejecting any conception of the self as static, 
transparent or everywhere the same. If the self cannot be pinned down, then intentions cannot 
be forced upon it. Montaigne, Baehr reminds us, speaks of the self in “flux”: “I give my soul now 
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one face, now another, according to which direction I turn it. If I speak of myself in different ways, 
that is because I look at myself in different ways. All contradictions may be found in me by some 
twist and in some fashion”.414 Chateaubriand, he adds, contents himself with the opaqueness of 
man’s soul in the Mémoires: “You who are hidden and obscure, you whose lives are pleasing to 
God and work miracles, all hail to your secret virtues!”415 Finally, Baehr believes that unmasking 
can be avoided by adopting the attitude of “conflictual pluralism” (Baehr, The Unmasking Style, 
p. 142), and admitting that our existential differences prevent us from adequately grasping the 
motives or passions of others. Presumably, social theories that adopt this conception of the self 
would deny the ontological validity of concepts that impute motives—or at least those that do 
so without any empirical evidence, the fruits of which are slogans like “silence is violence”. One 
is psychologically sick, one is (insert)phobic, etc., precisely because one does nothing. Whether 
unmasking is an intrinsic feature of contemporary social theory, I cannot say. There is however 
an important difference between Rousseau’s unmasking style and unmasking as a social science 
that might be institutionalized within a government and its bureaucratic entities, the university 
in particular. Rousseau did not set out to become the founder of the humanities, and I maintain 
that the institutionalization of unmasking within the social sciences is a contradiction. 
 To begin with, unmasking presents us with a seeming paradox, as the unmasker pursues 
his own autonomy by depriving society and its members of theirs. Rousseau seeks to repair his 
shredded soul by exposing the salon-world as artificial, and the philosophes that populate it as 
 
414 See Baehr, The Unmasking Style in Social Theory, p. 140. Cited from Montaigne’s Essay, “On the Inconsistency of 
Our Actions”. 
415 Ibid., p. 139. 
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the unwitting products of custom, not scientists but popularizers thereof, not lovers of wisdom 
but sophists who would mock Socrates, not virtuous men but mere debaters of virtue, etc. The 
unmasker, of course, will claim that his goal is not to deprive his fellows of their autonomy, but 
instead to reveal the conditions of its possibility. The danger of this method is evident however, 
for the unmasked must accept the unmasker’s point of reference—whether this be Rousseau’s 
state of nature or Marx’s science of history—to achieve his autonomy. When the unmasker is a 
dissident like Rousseau, one cannot be coerced or even forced to accept this point of reference. 
Hence, whatever autonomy the unmasked is deprived of is purely theoretical, since he reserves 
the right to scrutinize the unmasker’s point of reference. Two things occur, however, when the 
unmasking method is institutionalized. In the first place, institutions easily become coercive and 
frequently forceful, and can therefore oblige the unmasked to adopt their point of reference for 
unmasking him. Here, one is undoubtedly deprived of his autonomy. The unmasked affirms his 
Christian belief in free will, the Marxist government unmasks him as an exploiter; the unmasked 
professes his classical liberalism, the media-academic cathedral unmasks him as an oppressor, a 
bigot and so forth. Institutionalized unmasking presents a second and far greater contradiction 
however. For if the goal of unmasking is to restore the individual’s autonomy, where autonomy 
is defined as freedom from society’s institutions, then understanding our autonomy by virtue of 
the point of reference that society itself manufactures, surely cannot make us autonomous. The 
difference here is between discovering the state of nature on one’s own, perhaps on the Lac de 
Bienne or the shores of Rhine, and adopting society’s version of nature. For society is, according 
to Rousseau, nature’s corruption manifest.  
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 Although Rousseau may have founded modern social science by applying his unmasking 
method to society, he couldn’t have intended for this science to become institutionalized either 
within the salon or academia. After showing his play Le Devin du village in 1752, Rousseau was 
honored with a pension on the behalf of Louis XV, but refused it, preferring instead to support 
his career by taking odd jobs, as a secretary, tutor, music copyist, etc. His reasoning was that no 
man could be truthful, free and courageous if he were paid to do so: 
Je perdais, il est vrai, la pension qui m’était offerte en quelque sorte ; mais je m’exemptais 
aussi du joug qu’elle m’eût imposé. Adieu la vérité, la liberté, le courage. Comment oser 
désormais parler d’indépendance, de désintéressement. Il ne fallait plus que flatter ou 
me taire, en recevant cette pension : encore qui m’assurait qu’elle serait payée ? Que de 
pas à faire, que de gens à solliciter? (Rousseau, Confessions, p. 380) 
Herein lies the difference between Jean-Jacques and the philosophes who would subsequently 
dare, like him, to push unmasking beyond the limits that Molière and La Bruyère had respected. 
One such philosophe was the Baron d’Holbach, who inherited the unmasking method from his 
friend Nicholas-Antoine Boulanger (1722 – 1759) rather than Rousseau. A friend of Diderot and 
member of the famous coterie holbachique, Boulanger composed his magnum opus, L’Antiquité 
dévoilée par ses usages (published posthumously in 1766), before dying at the age of 37.416 The 
goal of the work, Boulanger explains, is to lift “the veil of time” (Boulanger, L’Antiquité dévoilée, 
p. 19) behind which “the most uniform and the most useless history” (Ibid.) hides, and thereby 
expose that forgotten “motives” (Ibid., p. 6) that inspired our various traditions. For instance, he 
 
416 Nicholas-Antoine Boulanger, L’Antiquité dévoilée par ses usages (Amsterdam: Marc Michel Rey, 1766). 
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shows that the celebration of Christmas is not new, but instead a copy of other “cyclical 
celebrations” (Ibid., p. 124) that have a “purely astrological” (Ibid., p. 124) origin. While 
L’Antiquité dévoilée is not an explicitly atheistic work, Boulanger intends to debunk, as it were, 
the notion of Christian Revelation, which conceals the original and practical reasons for our 
traditions, causing them to become misinterpreted and perverted.417 Boulanger’s book was 
undoubtedly the inspiration for Holbach’s notorious Le Christianisme dévoilé ou Examen des 
principes et des effets de la religion chrétienne (1761), which the latter published under the name 
of his deceased friend, for fear of being unmasked as the author of an explicitly atheistic work. 
Unlike Rousseau, Holbach wears a mask when he unmasks society. 
 Holbach lacked both the erudition and subtlety of Boulanger. When Boulanger unveiled 
Christian beliefs and customs, he discovered those of the Ancient Greeks and Syrians, which he 
attempted to make sense of by relating them to a real-world event, the deluge. Holbach, on the 
other hand, raises his sword and utters a battle cry: “the Christian religion has no right to boast 
of the advantages that she procures in morality, or in politics. Tear away […] the veil with which 
she covers herself […].”418 Behind the veil of Christianity, he finds—or let us say imputes—every 
 
417 See Paul Sardin and Vincent Giroud, “Nicholas-Antoine Boulanger (1722 – 1759),” in The Yale University Gazette, 
71, no. 1 (October 1996): 3 – 42, p. 32 – 32, for an explanation of Boulanger’s goals in L’Antiquité dévoilé: “One of 
Boulanger's purposes, which was to destroy the unique standing of Judeo-Christianity as a revealed religion, could 
have prompted [the reader] to neglect this book. But we have already noted that the Scriptures are for him a 
fundamental document of the history of mankind; furthermore, it suited him to draw from the same sources as his 
adversaries. It was fitting to show, using the very texts which founded Judeo-Christianity, that this religion, 
considered by its zealots to be of an essentially different order, offered the same narratives, the same rituals, and 
the same festivals as the others; and that while it revealed, like them, the erring ways of man troubled by the fear 
of the Flood, no supernatural mark distinguished it from all others.” 
418 Paul-Henri Thiry Holbach, Le Christianisme dévoilé ou Examen des principes et des effets de la religion chrétienne, 
in Premières oeuvres (Paris: Les Classiques du people, 1972). See p. 112: “Concluons donc que la religion chrétienne 
n'a point de titre pour se vanter des avantages qu'elle procure à la morale, ou à la politique. Ar-rachons-lui donc le 
voile dont elle se couvre […].” 
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baseness imaginable. What are the “motives” (Holbach, Le Christianisme dévoilé, p. 106) behind 
Christianity? “Fears”, “habit”, “prejudice” (Ibid.), “wrath”, “hatred” (Ibid., p. 106), “fanaticism”, 
“imagination” (Ibid., p. 111), “pride” and “vanity” (Ibid., p. 124) are the motives that the Baron 
ascribes to the most “unsociable, turbulent, intolerant and rebellious citizens” (Ibid., p. 135), or 
as he refers to them elsewhere, the “pious savages” (Ibid., p. 110). Holbach is so assured of his 
own enlightenment, or to use a contemporary phrase, of his being ‘on the right side’ of reason, 
that nothing seems more prejudiced than his war against prejudice. Boulanger studied and then 
judged Christianity; Holbach merely prejudged it. What is more interesting, however, is that the 
Baron imagines an enlightened “sovereign” who “will disabuse” the people of their “chimeras”; 
by “authorizing tolerance” and obliging the Christian sects to debate one another, he adds, they 
will be forced to “unmask” themselves and render one another “mutually ridiculous”:  
[…] c'est le souverain seul qui peut ramener les peuples à la raison; […] il les détrompera 
peu à peu de leurs chimères, s'il en est lui-même détrompé; il empêchera la superstition 
de nuire en la méprisant, en ne se mêlant jamais de ses futiles querelles, en les divisant, 
en autorisant la tolérance des différentes sectes qui se battront réciproquement, qui se 
démasqueront, qui se rendront mutuellement ridicules : enfin la superstition tombera 
d'elle-même […]. (Ibid., p. 142 – 143) 
For Rousseau, it sufficed to protect Émile from the education system and make nature his guide 
to assure his autonomy and ability to penetrate the many masks of men. For Holbach however, 
the sovereign is charged with unveiling the chimeric illusions of men; and to be sure, tolerance 
does not mean here mutual respect between Catholics and Protestants, but instead spells their 
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mutual destruction. Tolerance means that everyone must become an atheist, because religious 
peoples are fundamentally intolerant—one is reminded here of what Herbert Marcuse refers to 
as “repressive tolerance”, the idea that true tolerance requires “intolerance against movements 
from the Right”.419 Repressive tolerance goes hand in hand with institutionalized unmasking, as 
motives (e.g., hatred, violence, extremism, etc.) must first be imputed to a group to then justify  
their censorship by the state, or as the institutional unmaskers would say, to bestow upon them 
the gift of autonomy. 
 If Rousseau founded the human sciences as Lévi-Strauss argues, then he never intended 
for them to be institutionalized, or in other words, pursued by pensioned philosophers like Lévi-
Strauss himself. Rousseau pioneered the modern conception of autonomy as self-definition, or 
as freedom from the self-alienating forces of society. One could only imagine how horrified he 
would be to learn of all the institutions that society had invented to inculcate man with its own 
superficial version of autonomy—that which cannot be destroyed is instead subverted. At first, 
the philosophes merely regarded the common man as ‘prejudiced’, and sought to educate him. 
But once the intellectual class adopted unmasking, and could impute motives, his re-education 
became their imperative. The common man therefore went from simply being erroneous in his 
reasoning, to being filled with hate, violence, and all things that those who love their nation and 
faith are routinely accused of. And because it is not one dissident, but instead society imputing 
the motives, one can hardly escape them. In the end, institutionalized unmasking treats people 
 
419 Herbert Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance”, in A Critique of Pure Tolerance, ed. R.P. Wolff and B. Moore (Boston, 
MA: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 109: Liberating tolerance, then, would mean intolerance against movements from the 
Right and toleration of movements from the Left. As to the scope of this tolerance and intolerance: ... it would extend 
to the stage of action as well as of discussion and propaganda, of deed as well as of word.” 
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as no better than “inmates of an insane asylum”, as Lasch once said in reference to the Frankfurt 
School.420 In the Ancient world, people are judged by their actions. In the Christian one, they are 
judged by their intentions. And in the Modern world, they are judged by the intentions that the 
academic-media complex ascribes to them.  
XIII. iii. The Social Sciences, and the Unmasking Technocracy  
 The Marquis de Condorcet was one of the last philosophes, and unlike Voltaire, Holbach 
and Turgot, lived to see the lumieres come to fruition, that is, to witness the French Revolution. 
In 1794 he was imprisoned not by Royalists, but revolutionary Jacobins who found his criticisms 
intolerable. Condemned to the infamous prisons of the so-called Bourg-l’Égalité, he perished—
whether by suicide or murder—only a few days later.421 “À l’exemple de Saturne, la révolution 
dévore ses enfants.” [By Saturn’s example, the revolution devours its own children.]422 Although 
Condorcet meditated more than the Jacobins on the tensions between social progress and 
libertarian freedom, he too believed that the advancement of the former would require the use 
 
420 See Christopher Lasch, The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critiques (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
1991), p. 447: “The purpose and design of Studies in Prejudice dictated the conclusion that prejudice, a psychological 
disorder rooted in the "authoritarian" personality structure, could be eradicated only by subjecting the American 
people to what amounted to collective psychotherapy—by treating them as inmates of an insane asylum, as 
Thurman Arnold would have put it.” 
421 See Antoine Guillois, La Marquise de Condorcet, sa Famille, son Salon, ses Amis, 1764 – 1822 (Paris: Paul 
Ollendorff, 1897), p. 145: “La question de savoir si Condorcet avait avancé sa fin ou s’il était mort naturellement a 
été fort discutée. Le billet de Jean Debry, du 30 juin 1793, serait à lui seul une preuve concluante. De plus, Cabanis 
a toujours déclaré que Condorcet s’était empoisonné. Il y a, dans les archives de l’Institut, une lettre que ‘. Fayolle 
écrivait à Arago, le 28 février 1842, qui n’est pas moins concluante : ‘C’est de Garat, dit-il, que j’ai appris que Cabanis 
avait remis à plusieurs personnes de ses amis, en 1793, ce poison (l’opium combiné avec la stramonium), qu’il 
appelait le pain des frères.”  
422 Jacques Mallet de Pan, Considérations sur la nature de la revolution de France (London: Emm. Flon, 1793), p. 80.  
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of both “force” and “power”.423 For instance, upon being elected to the Académie française, 
Condorcet expressed his fear that the “march of the moral sciences will be […] slower than that 
of the physical sciences” given that their fruits are not immediately apparent, and there will be 
“need to force, so to speak, minds to receive them”:  
La marche des sciences morales sera donc plus lente que celle des sciences physiques, et 
nous ne devons pas être étonnés si les principes sur lesquels elles sont établies ont besoin 
de forcer, pour ainsi dire, les esprits à les recevoir, tandis qu’en physique ils courent au-
devant des vérités, et souvent même des erreurs nouvelles.424 
Condorcet intimated a similar sentiment to his friend and mentor Turgot, writing that “in order 
to do good one must have at least as much power as good will”.425 Force and power might very 
well be necessary to do good. Indeed, Rousseau thought as much, asserting in Du contrat social 
that those who ignore the general will “shall be forced to be free”, lest they expose themselves 
and everyone else to tyrannical power.426 But there is a difference between what Rousseau and 
Condorcet wish to force on the common man. The former wishes to force him to undertake the 
 
423 See Keith Michael Baker, “Scientism, Elitism and Liberalism”, in French Prose and Criticism through 1789, ed. by 
Herald Bloom (New York: Chelsea House, 1990), p. 416: “[Condorcet] revealed the latent tension involved in that 
idea between an authoritarian conception of society administered by a scientific elite upon the basis of an 
unequivocal scientific plan, and that of a libertarian society guided by the public interplay of subjective political 
action and often uninformed interests.” 
424 Marquis de Condorcet, “Discours de réception de M. de Condorcet”, Académie française, accessed August 10, 
2020, http://www.academie-francaise.fr/discours-de-reception-du-marquis-de-condorcet.  
425 Marquis de Condorcet, Lettre à Turgot, 29 juin 1770, in Correspondance inédite de Condorcet et Turgot, 1770 – 
1779 (Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1893), p. 16: “Il me semble que pour faire le bien il faut du moins autant de pouvoir que 
de bonne volonté et que pour empêcher le mal c’est tout le contraire.” 
426 “Afin donc que ce pacte social ne soit pas un vain formulaire, il renferme tacitement cet engagement, qui seul 
peut donner de la force aux autres, que quiconque refusera d'obéir à la volonté générale, y sera contraint par tout 
le corps ; ce qui ne signifie autre chose sinon qu'on le forcera à être libre, cartelle est la condition qui, donnant 
chaque citoyen à la patrie, le garantit de toute dépendance personnelle, condition qui fait l'artifice et le Jeu de la 
machine politique, et qui seule rend légitimes les engagements civils, lesquels, sans cela, seraient absurdes, 
tyranniques, et sujets aux plus énormes abus.” (Rousseau, Du contrat social, p. 364) 
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democratic duties on which his rights depend, while the latter wishes to force the common man 
to accept a view of social progress handed down to him by an elite cadre of intellectuals. Thus, 
the former is frequently accused of being the father of democratic tyranny, while the latter that 
of technocratic tyranny. As Gorman Beauchamp writes: “Technocracy […] necessitates a ruling 
class of experts, which, possessed of the requisite scientific knowledge, must exercise exclusive 
rights to social decision making: a class of technocrat kings. The evolution of Condorcet from a 
revolutionary republican to a proponent of scientific oligarchy provides an instructive, concrete 
example of the logic of technocracy.”427 It should be useful to examine the difference between 
these two uses of ‘force’ to grasp what exactly technocracy entails.  
 If Rousseau argues that, in a democracy, certain citizens must be forced to be free, then 
it’s because he thinks that no form of government is more demanding. “If the people were gods, 
they would govern themselves democratically. A government so perfect does not suit men.”428 
Democracy is demanding because rights are abstract, and therefore easily taken for granted, or 
uncritically multiplied. Thus, their maintenance depends on the fulfillment of attending duties, 
which, by contrast, are concrete. One theoretically has the right to his property, but if in reality 
everyone salted their fields, then no crops would grow and the nation would starve to death. In 
some cases, it is therefore necessary to impose particular duties (e.g., to use one’s land well) on 
people in order to prevent them from abusing their rights, weakening the nation, and exposing 
it to oligarchical and tyrannical powers. When a family does not make good use of its property, 
 
427 Gorman Beauchamp, “The Dangers of Oligarchy: Condorcet and the Logic of Technocracy”, in Humanitas 22, no. 
1 and 2 (2009): 23 – 32, p. 26. 
428 “S’il y avoit un peuple de Dieux, il se gouverneroit démocratiquement. Un Gouvernement si parfait ne convient 
pas à des hommes.” (Rousseau, Du contrat social, p. 406) 
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and must sell it either to foreign parties or oligarchs, their children are deprived of their means 
of subsistence, and made dependent upon the powerful. Rousseau—and Thomas Jefferson for 
that matter—both conceive of the dutiful, middle-class landowner as the basis of democracy.429 
On the other hand, commentators like Isaiah Berlin maintain that when a people imposes such 
duties upon itself, their rights become dependent upon a particular version of the good; what it 
means to use one’s land or resources well is contestatory, and if the minority is forced to adopt 
what the majority regards as good to exercise its rights, then according to Berlin, the former are 
subject to democratic tyranny.430 Of course, this poses no problem for Rousseau, who believes 
that the abstract and alienating nature of society ought to be mitigated by forming democratic 
nations around our passions, which always have a local flavor. Hence why, as I’ve shown above, 
the “common good” at the heart of the “general will” refers to the national identity of a people, 
or as Rousseau calls is, their “national physiognomy”.431 For Jean-Jacques, the diverse passions 
of the various peoples of the world cannot be satisfied within those vast, homogenizing liberal 
states constructed around ‘the economy’. My intention here is not defend this view, but only to 
highlight the fact that Rousseau thinks that force is necessary to keep humanity rooted in what 
 
429 On Jefferson’s middle-calls agrarian ideal, see Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Rev. James Madison, October 28, 1785, 
in Writings (New York: The Library of America, 1984), p. 196: “The small landholders are the most precious part of a 
state.” For Rousseau’s own version of this ideal, see his “système rustique” in his Projet de Constitution pour la Corse, 
in Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Oeuvres complètes, vol. 3, ed. Bernard Gagnebin et Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 
1964), p. 907. 
430 See Isaiah Berlin, Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 208: 
“Rousseau does not mean by liberty the ‘negative’ freedom of the individual not to be interfered with within a 
defined area, but the possession by all, and not merely by some, of the fully qualified members of a society of a 
share in the public power which is entitled to interfere with every aspect of every citizen's life.” 
431 “Donnez une autre pente aux passions des Polonais, vous donnerez à leurs âmes une physionomie nationale qui 
les distinguera des autres peuples, qui les empêchera de se fondre, de se plaire, de s'allier avec eux, une vigueur qui 
remplacera le jeu abusif des vains préceptes, qui leur fera faire par goût et par passion ce qu'on ne fait jamais assez 
bien quand on ne le fait que par devoir ou par intérêt.” (Rousseau, Considérations, p. 960 – 961) 
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is concrete, while Condorcet wishes to forcibly render humanity more abstract, to universalize, 
systematize and calculate the human race. 
 As opposed to the cité cynique, everything is calculable in the cité technocratique, most 
notably our passions, which Condorcet subjects to his “social mathematics”. Whereas Rousseau 
thinks that society corrupts man, Condorcet believes that society perfects him, and conceives of 
his social mathematics in the Tableau général des sciences (1793) as a catalyst to this process:  
Comme toutes ces applications sont immédiatement relatives aux intérêts sociaux, ou à 
l’analyse des opérations de l’esprit humain, et que, dans ce dernier cas, elles n’ont encore 
pour objet  que l’homme perfectionné par la société, j’ai cru que le nom de mathématique 
sociale était celui qui convenait le mieux à cette science.432 
Condorcet’s social mathematics mobilizes probability theory and statistics to address a host of 
economic, legal and social problems, such as the fair distribution of tax burdens, the probability 
that a jury comes to a just conclusion, that one candidate will be elected over others, etc. These 
represent uncontroversial applications of Condorcet’s method. But he also proposes measuring 
and estimating “the veritable force of motives of belief”, which will allow us to understand why, 
“for example, […] a fact improbable in itself is nonetheless defended by imposing testimonies”, 
and “to bring the day of reason to those objects long ago abandoned to the seductive influences 
of the imagination, interest or the passions”.433 In theory, this “mathematical” method might be 
 
432 Marquis de Condorcet, Tableau général de la science, qui a pour objet l’application du calcul aux science politiques 
et morales, in Œuvres de Condorcet, vol. 1 (Paris : Firmin Didot Frères, 1847 – 1849), p. 540.  
433 “Le calcul des probabilités nous apprend à connaître, à mesurer la véritable force des motifs de crédibilité […]. Le 




applied to simply understand what makes people tick, as it were, what passions are satisfied by 
doing x and y. But Condorcet clearly has a political goal in mind, expressing his desire “to strike 
the final blows to superstition”, and to prove “why a sort of defiance so constantly accompanies 
the great lumières, while intrepid conviction is the share of ignorance.”434 Before studying them, 
he already knows what unreasonable madness that “the priests and their stupid or hypocritical 
instruments”435 are hiding behind the mask of faith. Thus, here again we encounter the notion 
that science—and particularly the purest science, mathematics—will disabuse man of his 
religious prejudices, and place him on the upward-bound, linear path to moral progress. 
 Condorcet, however, distinguishes himself from predecessors like Fontenelle, believing 
that social mathematicians will one day perfect this method, replacing the need for virtues such 
as courage and sacrifice,436 and even that of government itself.437 As Frank Manuel writes in the 
 
peuvent se combiner ou se combattre relativement à une même proposition : comme, par exemple, lorsqu’un fait 
improbable en lui-même est cependant appuyé sur des témoignages imposants. L’application du calcul à ces 
dernières questions aura l’avantage de porter le jour de la raison sur des objets longtemps abandonnées aux 
influences séductrices de l’imagination, de l’intérêt ou des passions.” (Condorcet, , Tableau général de la science, p. 
555) 
434 “C’est par ce seul moyen que l’on peut à la fois porter les derniers coups à la superstition comme au pyrrhonisme, 
à l’exagération de la crédulité comme à celle du doute. C’est alors qu’on verra comment et pourquoi la force du 
sentiment qui nous porte à croire, s’affaiblit à mesure que les motifs de crédibilité sont appréciés avec plus 
d’exactitude ; et, par conséquent, pourquoi une sorte de défiance accompagné si constamment les grandes lumières, 
tandis qu’une conviction intrépide est le partage de l’ignorance.” (Condorcet, , Tableau général de la science, p. 556) 
435 See the Marquis de Condorcet, Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain, in Œuvres de 
Condorcet, vol. VI, (Paris: Firmin Didot Frères, 1847), p. 244: “Il arrivera donc, ce moment où le soleil n'éclairera plus 
sur la terre que des hommes libres, ne reconnaissant d'autre maître que leur raison ; où les tyrans et les esclaves, 
les prêtres et leurs stupides ou hypocrites instruments n'existeront plus que dans l'histoire et sur les théâtres.” 
436 “Le projet de rendre tous les hommes vertueux est chimérique : mais pourquoi ne verroit-on pas un jour les 
lumières, jointes au génie, créer, pour des générations plus heureuses, une méthode d’éducation, un système de 
lois qui rendroient presque inutile le courage de la vertu ? Dirigé par ces institutions salutaires, l’homme n’auroit 
besoin que d’écouter la voix de son cœur, et celle de sa raison.” (Condorcet, “Discours de réceptions”) 
437 In a note to his Reception Speech at the French Academy, Condorcet expresses that: “If, on the other hand, the 
theory of the constitution of the states and the sciences of legislation and administrations have fixed principles—if, 
human nature being given and ideas of right and justice well established, all these sciences consist in deducing the 
consequences of these principles in such a way that all particular questions relating to these subjects are decided 




Prophets of Paris, “With the accumulation of sufficient data and the application of the calculus 
of probabilities the state could be run by social mathematics—without debates. With one leap 
the first sociologist of scientific creativity traversed the age of middle-class parliamentarism and 
arrived at the ideal of the all-knowing scientific technician as the ruler of society.”438 Condorcet 
not only grounds morality in the sciences, but also imagines scientists as the leaders of society, 
reminding us of Bacon’s New Atlantis. In his Fragment sur l’Atlantide, the Marquis asserts that: 
“Regarding legislation, [the learned] have as a barrier […] the obligation to respect the rights of 
men. […] But regarding institutions of public instruction, and the encouragements that it will be 
their duty to give to those who cultivate the sciences, there can be only one guide, the opinion 
of men illuminated by these objects, necessarily foreign to the masses.”439 But there’s a crucial 
difference between Bacon’s version and Condorcet’s, where society is the object of science just 
as must as science is the object of society. There, “the learned” [savants] do not merely labor in 
the caves, but also in the minds of men. 
 To recall, when Rousseau unmasks the philosophes, he does not merely seek to expose 
them as hypocrites, but rather to show that they’re the unwitting servants of a corrupt system, 
and have therefore suppressed the passions and sense of autonomy that once flourished in the 
 
will scarcely be worth the effort, and the qualities of a great statesman will be education and exactness of mind 
rather than shrewdness and cunning.” See the Marquis de Condorcet, Condorcet: Selected Writings, ed. by Keith M. 
Baker (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merril Company, 1976), p. 18. Baker claims to have discovered this note among the 
author’s unpublished writings. 
438 Frank E. Manuel, The Prophets of Paris: Turgot, Condorcet, Saint-Simon Fourier, and Comte (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1962), p. 96. 
439 Marquis de Condorcet, Fragment sur l’Atlantide, ou efforts combines de l’espèce humaine pour le progrès des 
sciences, in Œuvres de Condorcet, vol. 11 (Paris: Firmin Didot Frères, 1847), p. 601 : “En fait de législation, ils ont 
pour barrière, et la nécessité de respecter les droits de hommes […]. Mais quant aux institutions d’instruction 
publique, et aux encouragements qu’il serait de leur devoir de donner à ceux qui cultivent les sciences, ils ne peuvent 




state of nature. Similarly, when Condorcet applies his social mathematics to unmask the priests, 
his intention is not merely to expose them as hypocrites, but instead to paint them as slaves to 
those “seductive influences”. There is a difference however, for Condorcet does not hold up the 
state of nature as a model, but instead the future, a time when reason, science and technology 
reign supreme. In the future state, human beings are practically immortal,440 no longer fight for 
resources, and therefore have no need for virtue; there is perfect equality between the citizens 
(including women) of a nation, as well as between nations: “Nos espérances sur l'état à venir de 
l'espèce humaine peuvent se réduire à ces trois points importants : la destruction de l'inégalité 
entre les nations; les progrès de l'égalité dans un même peuple; enfin, le perfectionnement réel 
de l'homme.” [Our hopes for the future state of the human race can be summarized by three 
important points: the destruction of inequality between nations, the progress of equality among 
a single people; finally, the real perfection of man.] (Condorcet, Esquisse d’un tableau historique 
des progrès, p. 237) Condorcet truly believes that man will be redeemed by reason alone, and 
ignoring all of Rousseau’s warnings in the first Discours, professes that “the glory of talents must 
soon become the first” [la gloire des talents doit bientôt devenir la première]. (Condorcet, 
Fragment sur l’Atlantide, p. 603) In many ways, Condorcet resembles something like Rousseau’s 
parody of the philosophe.  
 Despite Condorcet’s emphasis on the future and reason, and Rousseau’s on the past and 
sentimentality, the thinkers share a common thread, for both unmask their adversaries in order 
 
440 “Sans doute l'homme ne deviendra pas immortel ; mais la distance entre le moment où il commence à vivre et 
l'époque commune où naturellement, sans maladie, sans accident, il éprouve la difficulté d'être, ne peut-elle 
s'accroître sans cesse?” (Condorcet, Esquisse d’un tableau des progrès, p. 273) 
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to liberate humanity from the corrupted passions that “bad institutions” (Condorcet, Fragment 
sur l’Atlantide, p. 611) breed. Unlike Rousseau however, Condorcet thinks that society perfects 
rather corrupts us, and is confident in the inherent goodness of science; thus, the Marquis does 
not hesitate to conceive of those institutions—particularly academia and media—that might be 
empowered to unmask humanity’s exploiters. In addition to imagining a future state where the 
government is obsolete, and society led by academics who unmask the superstitious, Condorcet 
praises the press for unmasking the priests and tyrants: 
Ceux qui n'ont pas réfléchi sur la marche de l'esprit humain dans la découverte […] doivent 
s'étonner qu'un si-long espace de temps ait séparé la connaissance de l'art d'imprimer les 
dessins, et la découverte de celui d'imprimer des caractères. Sans doute, quelques 
graveurs de planches avaient eu l'idée de cette application de leur art; […] et il est même 
heureux qu'on n'ait pu en soupçonner toute l'étendue; car les prêtres et les rois se 
seraient unis pour étouffer, dès sa naissance, l'ennemi qui devait les démasquer et les 
détrôner. (Condorcet, Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès, p. 138) 
In Condorcet’s technocratic state, the academic mines motives, while the media imputes them 
to humanity’s masked exploiters—the priests and tyrants who corrupt their reason by seducing 
their passions and imagination. While he insists that the academic class must not be careful not 
“to fatigue the citizens with too rapid of changes”, and must allow “the brake of public opinion” 
(Condorcet, Fragment sur l’Atlantide, p. 601) to be occasionally applied, Condorcet is confident 
that his unmasking machine won’t be abused, that the hopes and expectations of the lumières 
won’t be swallowed up, and libido sciendi converted into libido dominandi.  
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  If Condorcet does not perceive this danger, then it’s because he believes that reason will 
overcome “the obstacle that the will and passions can pose to the establishment of a perpetual 
society for the progress of the sciences” (Ibid., p. 611). He believes, in other words, that reason 
alone makes man good. Rousseau rejected this notion in the Premier discours, where he defends 
ignorance and cautions against praising talents before virtue. But Louis de Bonald formulates a 
direct response to Condorcet in his Théorie du pouvoir politique et religieux (1796): 
Les hommes ne deviennent pas meilleurs, ni plus maîtres de leurs passions, en devenant 
plus savants, par la même raison qu’ils ne deviennent pas meilleurs, ni plus maîtres de 
leurs passions, en devenant plus forts. Au contraire, la passion de dominer s’accroît avec 
les moyens de la satisfaire ; et cette passion dans le savant et l’homme fort est la même 
dans son objet, et ne diffère que par les moyens […].441 
Reason, like physical strength, grants power, but we have no assurance that, unchecked, it will 
produce good. Louis de Bonald’s critique parallels Rousseau’s: the philosophes fail to appreciate 
how intimately related the will to know and the will to power are. This, of course, makes sense, 
for as Strauss indicates, the Moderns conceive of reason in opposition to authority, contrary to 
the Ancients, who opposed it to appearance. Confident that they were fighting the war against 
prejudice and authority, the savants could hardly recognize their own prejudices and potential 
to abuse authority. Hence why Rousseau unmasked them, and why they, in turn, institutionalized 
unmasking without a second thought, giving birth to the social sciences. 
 
441 Louis de Bonald, Théorie du pouvoir politique et religieux dans la société civile, démontré par le raisonnement et 
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